After many discussions with Getty, I'm pivoting my prior COMP Rewards Adjustments proposal. The objective of the COMP rewards program was initially to distribute the token to our users. The sad truth is that an overwhelming amount of the COMP rewards are being farmed and instantly sold off, making the rewards program ineffective in achieving the initial goal. I believe there’s a clear need to re-evaluate how best to distribute the token to our community. When a market first launches, we don’t see much activity until the market receives COMP rewards. There’s little incentive to deposit into it when there’s no borrowing demand (or rewards), and there’s no borrowing demand because there aren’t enough tokens to borrow to make the cost of the borrow transaction worth it. A market needs to have great enough incentives for depositors to provide enough liquidity to make the cost of borrowing worth it. The above statements I made in my prior proposal still hold. At the time of writing, I advocated for our users - who are also token holders - to continue receiving a share of the protocol. Decentralization of ownership matters. However, my perspective on the overall issue was slightly incorrect.

Why: To pay contributors efficiently. Idea: A DAO sets a budget for [X role] payroll. Token delegates get a share of say equal to the proportion of tokens they hold. Each delegate provides [white-listed] addresses and corresponding weights. Results are aggregated and pay is distributed accordingly. User stories Protocol development payroll The gov board or multisig whitelists timmy.eth and tom.eth for the development role. The gov board sets a budget of $10M annually for development. a16z with 50% of the vote says 10% to timmy and 80% to tom, with 10% going to nobody. a16z's pay share distribution is $10M * 50% * 10% = $500K annualized for timmy and $10M * 50% * 80% = $4M annualized for tom.

Consideration points: Token Etherscan link Contract code verified and open-source? Team Who? Experience in their respective field

Building off Getty's discussion of COMP distribution speeds, I think we should be more intentional about how COMP is distributed. The objective of the COMP rewards program was initially to distribute the token to our users. The sad truth is that an overwhelming amount of the COMP rewards are being farmed and instantly sold off, making the rewards program ineffective in achieving the initial goal. I believe there's a clear need to re-evaluate how best to distribute the token to our community. This is something that will evolve over time, so it doesn't mean we have to completely figure this out before changing the existing program. Rather than distributing massive amounts of tokens arbitrarily to markets, I propose changing the existing rewards program (as just one of our rewards programs) to utilize COMP rewards to: Strategically incentivize growth while maximizing profits (minimizing losses), and Maintain minimum market sizes When a market first launches, we don't see much activity until the market receives COMP rewards. There's little incentive to deposit into it when there's no borrowing demand (or rewards), and there's no borrowing demand because there aren't enough tokens to borrow to make the cost of the borrow transaction worth it.

Criteria Decentralization Consensum mechanism Number of active validators (past 14 days) Validator share distribution (past 14 days, gini coefficient) Token supply distribution (top 100 holders on Ethereum or on the chain itself, gini coefficient) Network statistics

Fei USD (FEI) is a highly scalable and decentralized algorithmic stablecoin that utilizes protocol controlled value (PCV) for peg stabilization, while maintaining highly liquid secondary markets. Users can mint FEI from ETH and other bonding curves, while FEI is redeemable at $1 USD (with a 1% fee) for ETH at the peg price. FEI is governed by TRIBE holders who manage the PCV, backing FEI with a community-owned reserve. This proposal serves to add a market for Fei USD (FEI) with the following parameters: Interest rate model: same as cDAI, cUSDT, and cTUSD (stablecoin standard) Collateral factor: 0% (standard to start) Reserve factor: 25% (standard) Borrow limit: none

Pax Dollar (USDP) is one of the most regulated stablecoin around being regulated by the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”). This has the following benefits (taken from here): The value of each stablecoin token is tied directly to the value of the US dollar, and the amount of “reserve” dollars equal or exceed the number of stablecoins outstanding. Regulators are overseeing the establishment and maintenance of reserves backing the stablecoins. Reserves may only be held in the safest forms, such as FDIC-insured bank accounts and in short-term maturity US Treasury instruments. Reserves are fully segregated from corporate assets, specifically for the benefit of token holders, and are held bankruptcy remote pursuant to the New York Banking Law. This proposal serves to add a market for Pax Dollar (USDP) with the following parameters: Interest rate model: same as cDAI, cUSDT, and cTUSD (stablecoin standard)

This question has been debated and specifics have been worked on for about the past year by the community. This proposal serves as a temperature check, ensuring that this initiative has sufficient support before making further proposals as to address how to distribute the token to early users. The actions of this proposal are nil - the protocol does not change at all regardless of whether this proposal passes or fails. Rather, this proposal gauges consensus regarding the issue in the following way: FOR: You believe COMP tokens should be distributed to early users in at least some amount and/or way. AGAINST: You believe no amount of COMP tokens should be distributed to early users. If this proposal...

Objective Correct the amounts of over-accrued COMP due to the bug in Proposal 62 and fully restore the functionality of COMP rewards. Justification Proposal 62 introduced a bug in the COMP distribution logic that allowed users borrowing certain assets to claim more than their intended share of COMP. Proposal 64 patched the bug introduced in Proposal 62 and disabled COMP claiming for users active in the affected markets (cSUSHI, cMKR, cYFI, cAAVE, cTUSD, and cSAI). Details Now that proposal 64 has been executed, we're able to compile a definite list of users who have over-accrued COMP along with the exact amounts they over-accrued.