# Compound Market Listing Framework Consideration points: - Token Etherscan link - Contract code verified and open-source? - Team - Who? - Experience in their respective field - Whitepaper - Audits - Governance structure - Multi-sig, snapshot, or fully on-chain governance? - Number of contract transactions - Age of the token - Social channels - Pausability - Mintability - Upgradeability - Who is authorized to make an upgrade? - Can an upgrade happen instantaneously or is there a time-lock delay? - Which components can be upgraded? - Under what circumstances can an unauthorized upgrade occur? - Restrictions on transfers - Token supply - Fixed or variable? - Total supply - Circulating supply - Market cap - Fully diluted market cap - Token distribution - Number of unique holders - Addresses holding >= 10% of supply - Gini coefficient - Market liquidity: - CEX liquidity - DEX liquidity - Price volatility - Supporting oracles - Underlying assets - How quickly can the amount or value of any underlying assets change? - Collateral factors, if any? - Insurance [for each insuring entity] - What’s covered: - Amount staked ($): - Capacity ($): - Max individual coverage length: - Cost: Proposal factors: - Collateral factor (0 to start) - Borrow cap - Interest rate model - Reserve factor (typically 25%) Related resources: - [Compound: Format process for new collateral assets](https://www.comp.xyz/t/formal-process-for-new-collateral-assets/2124) - [Compound: Add Market: LINK](https://www.comp.xyz/t/add-market-link/1516/50) - [Compound: Add Markets: MKR, AAVE, SUSHI, YFI](https://www.comp.xyz/t/add-markets-mkr-aave-sushi-yfi/1977) - [Aave: ARC: Add support for stETH (Lido)](https://governance.aave.com/t/arc-add-support-for-steth-lido/5793)
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COMP Reward Adjustments v2

After many discussions with Getty, I'm pivoting my prior COMP Rewards Adjustments proposal. The objective of the COMP rewards program was initially to distribute the token to our users. The sad truth is that an overwhelming amount of the COMP rewards are being farmed and instantly sold off, making the rewards program ineffective in achieving the initial goal. I believe there’s a clear need to re-evaluate how best to distribute the token to our community. When a market first launches, we don’t see much activity until the market receives COMP rewards. There’s little incentive to deposit into it when there’s no borrowing demand (or rewards), and there’s no borrowing demand because there aren’t enough tokens to borrow to make the cost of the borrow transaction worth it. A market needs to have great enough incentives for depositors to provide enough liquidity to make the cost of borrowing worth it. The above statements I made in my prior proposal still hold. At the time of writing, I advocated for our users - who are also token holders - to continue receiving a share of the protocol. Decentralization of ownership matters. However, my perspective on the overall issue was slightly incorrect.

4/15/2022
Payroll Protocol: Decentralized Protocol Payroll

Why: To pay contributors efficiently. Idea: A DAO sets a budget for [X role] payroll. Token delegates get a share of say equal to the proportion of tokens they hold. Each delegate provides [white-listed] addresses and corresponding weights. Results are aggregated and pay is distributed accordingly. User stories Protocol development payroll The gov board or multisig whitelists timmy.eth and tom.eth for the development role. The gov board sets a budget of $10M annually for development. a16z with 50% of the vote says 10% to timmy and 80% to tom, with 10% going to nobody. a16z's pay share distribution is $10M * 50% * 10% = $500K annualized for timmy and $10M * 50% * 80% = $4M annualized for tom.

3/30/2022
COMP Rewards Adjustments

Building off Getty's discussion of COMP distribution speeds, I think we should be more intentional about how COMP is distributed. The objective of the COMP rewards program was initially to distribute the token to our users. The sad truth is that an overwhelming amount of the COMP rewards are being farmed and instantly sold off, making the rewards program ineffective in achieving the initial goal. I believe there's a clear need to re-evaluate how best to distribute the token to our community. This is something that will evolve over time, so it doesn't mean we have to completely figure this out before changing the existing program. Rather than distributing massive amounts of tokens arbitrarily to markets, I propose changing the existing rewards program (as just one of our rewards programs) to utilize COMP rewards to: Strategically incentivize growth while maximizing profits (minimizing losses), and Maintain minimum market sizes When a market first launches, we don't see much activity until the market receives COMP rewards. There's little incentive to deposit into it when there's no borrowing demand (or rewards), and there's no borrowing demand because there aren't enough tokens to borrow to make the cost of the borrow transaction worth it.

3/6/2022
Multi-Chain Evaluation Framework

Criteria Decentralization Consensum mechanism Number of active validators (past 14 days) Validator share distribution (past 14 days, gini coefficient) Token supply distribution (top 100 holders on Ethereum or on the chain itself, gini coefficient) Network statistics

3/4/2022
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