TLDR Proposal editing: allowing proposers to update their proposal’s transactions and text description, during the Updatable period only, which is the state upon proposal creation. Editing also works with signatures, assuming the proposer is able to accumulate signatures from the same signers. Propose by signature: allowing Nouners and delegates to pool their voting power towards submitting a proposal, by submitting their signature, instead of the current approach where sponsors must delegate their votes to help a proposer achieve threshold. Objection-only Period: a conditional voting period that gets activated upon a last-minute proposal swing from defeated to successful, affording against voters more reaction time. Votes Snapshot After Voting Delay: moving votes snapshot up, to provide Nouners with reaction time per proposal, to get their votes ready (e.g. some might want to move their delegations around). Proposal editing Proposals get voter feedback almost entirely only once they are on-chain. At the same time, proposers are reluctant to cancel and resubmit their proposals for multiple reasons, e.g. prefering to avoid restarting the proposal lifecycle and thus delay funding. Spec

Pesudo code Before a certain proposal reached the Defeated / Executed states, any Noun owner can call: dao.signalSplit(proposalId, tokenIds[]) - reverts if msg.sender doesn't own all tokenIds - reverts if proposal state isn't valid for signalSplit - a new escrow clone is created for this Noun owner and this proposalId (or an existing one is reused if it's the same owner and proposalId) - all tokenIDs are transferred to the escrow - voting power is delegated back to the Noun owner, so they can continue to vote until the split is executed or cancelled - stores the account and its tokenIds in the list of splitting accounts for later (to be used to give people their tokens)

Conditions Split can be signaled on proposals. To successfully split, the following conditions must be met: You voted opposite the proposal's outcome, e.g.:You voted against and the proposal passed. You voted for, quorum was reached, and the proposal was defeated. You signaled to split during voting period or during timelock delay. Enough Nouns signaled to split on this proposal to pass the split threshold; Nouns may submit a split signal up until the end of a proposal's queuing period (before execution if successful) or up until a proposal is defeated.

Vote options (not part of the description; these are the vote options on Snapshot) A choice rank vote with the following: Urgent & important: build right away; pause all WIP projects other than private voting. Not urgent but important: do it once WIP projects are nearly done. Don't build it at all. Intro On December 20th we (verbs) hosted a ragequit discussion on TNS's twitter account. The main sentiment we gathered from that discussion was: (1) the risks are concerning, let's not rush into it; and (2) it doesn't feel urgent, we could be doing other things in the short term.

Intro We’re excited to design a better way for the DAO to give Nouns to builders/partners, thanks to jacob’s idea. This is a tough feature to design, as it rubs against the original Nouns auction and inflation meme (one a day). So we're bringing the decision to all Nouners to help us get at "what the DAO wants". This is a choice-rank vote Please be sure to click on all options, in order of your preference. We're using choice rank in order to maximize preference information this vote captures. While some might want multiple designs implemented, at this point we'd like to discover the most desired design, and build that one. Additional designs can be added later.

A mandated round where ZK/cryptography researchers are encouraged to pitch themselves to undertake a private voting research project. Private Voting Requirements Musts Privacy is preserved forever; e.g. designs where voter identity is exposed when counting votes, or at any point post vote casting are not acceptable. At no point should the number of votes a voter has be connected to an on-chain vote; e.g. if one's balance (voting power) is exposed on any on-chain tx, it becomes very easy to identify whale accounts.Should be impossible to tally a proposal's votes before the voting period ends; the reason is that if tallying is possible, whale votes become easily identifiable. Should support delegates as well as token owners. Double voting must not be possible.

What success looks like Teams that decided to apply should have great UX All relevant people should be aware this is happening Applicant UX Discord onboarding requires further thinking and optimizationa read-only welcome channel? assign helper roles to certain people like david and 40? We should reach out to anyone we're aware of and suggest an intro call

We're excited to design a better way for the DAO to give Nouns to builders/partners, thanks to Jacob's idea. This is a tough feature to design, as it rubs against the original Nouns auction and inflation meme (one a day). Our goal with this post is: Present the DAO with the leading designs on the table Solicit additional design suggestions Get a discussion going among voters

Calling all ZK/cryptography researchers to research solutions to private voting for Nouns DAO and beyond! 3 teams, 3 months, 70K USDC grant per team. Each team will submit their designs, with their analysis of limitations / benefits, and a working proof-of-concept of their favorite design. Everything will be open source. To win, your proposal needs to be in the top three, and receive at least 300 votes. Top proposals with under 300 votes will not receive funding. Step by step:

Builder accountability: how might we improve? example props that didn't succeed fully: Nouns marketplace Salvino Nouncil: what's really going on there? what should we learn and bring back to Nouns? Delegation incentive problem: do we have past examples of misaligned incentives? how might we avoid in future? Nouns "discount tokens / coupons" for builders, to get them closer to having a Noun

Introduction Nouns Public is a Nouns DAO fork focused on funding Ethereum public goods that don't align with VC funding due to not having a business model. Nouns Public NFTs would be auctioned off over time, with the proceeds going to the DAO's treasury; the NFT is meant to capture value through provenance and the impact certificats model. Differentiation from Nouns DAO A narrower meme of Ethereum public goods, ideally capturing new capital currently not deployed to Nouns Minimal governance with a default to spend, e.g. by using a TCR (token-curated registry) of proposals to fund, with automatic spending at a set cadence (e.g. 1/12 of treasury each month) Stretch: quadratic voting with sybil resistance with some strong-enough human identity verification (e.g. social attestations)