Executive Summary
This report presents a rigorous, quantitative analysis of the trade execution efficiency of the SPEEDEX protocol, a novel decentralized exchange (DEX) design proposed by researchers at Stanford University. The central objective is to determine whether SPEEDEX offers a more efficient trading mechanism compared to the incumbent DEXs currently operating on the Ethereum network. To answer this question, this analysis moves beyond theoretical claims by conducting a counterfactual simulation. Using a comprehensive dataset of all trades on the ETH/USDC and ETH/WBTC pairs executed over the past three months on major Ethereum DEXs, we simulate how these same trades would have been executed under the SPEEDEX model.
The methodology is grounded in established financial analysis principles, defining trade execution quality through the metric of Price Improvement (PI). This metric measures the difference between a trade's executed value and a benchmark "fair market" price, which is established using the minute-by-minute mid-price from Binance, a high-liquidity centralized exchange. By comparing the actual PI achieved by traders on platforms like Uniswap and Curve against the counterfactual PI they would have achieved with SPEEDEX, we derive a Net Efficiency Gain (NEG) for every trade.
The primary finding of this report is that the SPEEDEX protocol, through its batch auction mechanism based on an Arrow-Debreu market structure, offers significant and quantifiable price improvement over the sequential execution models of existing DEXs. The simulation demonstrates that, for the analyzed period, the SPEEDEX model would have generated a substantial aggregate Net Efficiency Gain for traders across all major DEXs. This gain stems directly from SPEEDEX's architectural ability to eliminate internal arbitrage and mitigate a prevalent class of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), specifically front-running and sandwich attacks, by settling all trades within a block at a single, uniform clearing price.
However, this economic efficiency comes with a fundamental trade-off: execution latency. While incumbent DEXs offer near-instantaneous settlement within a single transaction, SPEEDEX trades are necessarily delayed until the end of a block period to be batched and cleared. Therefore, the conclusion is nuanced: SPEEDEX is demonstrably more efficient in terms of pure price execution and economic fairness, preserving significant value for users. Its overall superiority is contingent upon a user's or application's tolerance for this inherent settlement latency. The findings suggest that SPEEDEX provides a powerful blueprint for future Layer-1 blockchains or specialized rollups aiming to build more equitable and capital-efficient financial markets from the ground up.
Section 1: The Landscape of Decentralized Exchange Mechanisms and the Efficiency Problem