--- GIP: 0007 Title: Separate slashing percentages for query and indexing disputes Authors: Ariel Barmat <ariel@edgeandnode.com> Created: 2021-05-21 Updated: 2021-06-03 Stage: Candidate Discussions-To: https://forum.thegraph.com/t/different-slashing-percentages-for-query-and-indexing-disputes/2020 Implementations: https://github.com/graphprotocol/contracts/pull/458 Audits: https://blog.openzeppelin.com/thegraph-slashing-upgrade-audit/ --- # GIP-0007: Separate slashing percentages for query and indexing disputes # Abstract This proposal introduces two different slashing percentages, one for indexing disputes and another for query disputes. This change allows slashing percentages to be set in such a way that accounts for the different risks of producing slashable faults while indexing and querying. # Motivation One of the security mechanisms in The Graph relies on filing disputes whenever an Indexer presents a wrong Proof of Indexing (PoI) or if it returns a query with inaccurate data. After any participant files a dispute, the Arbitrators will decide if the dispute is valid according to norms established via protocol governance. If the Arbitrator accepts the dispute, the offending Indexer's stake is slashed according to a governance parameter called `slashingPercentage`. The issue with having a single `slashingPercentage` parameter for both indexing and query disputes is that an Indexer, in the regular day-to-day operation, will return a disproportionately higher amount of queries than PoIs. As a result, servicing queries is a higher-risk activity than indexing. This proposal allows two different slashing percentages to balance the risk, one for indexing disputes and another for query disputes. # Detailed Specification All the changes required to implement this proposal are related to the **DisputeManager** contract. ## Current Behavior By default, every time disputes are accepted, indexers get slashed on the their total stake using the single `slashingPercentage` protocol parameter, both for indexing dispute and query disputes. ## Proposed Changes #### 1) Introduce separate protocol parameters for query and indexing slashing Change set slashing percentage signature to accept two different parameters. ``` function setSlashingPercentage(uint32 _qryPercentage, uint32 _idxPercentage) ``` Add two state variables in the contract storage: ``` uint32 public qrySlashingPercentage; uint32 public idxSlashingPercentage; ``` #### 2) Add dispute type when created Whenever a new dispute is created we store the dispute type. This way the contract can resolve using the appropiate slashing percentage. ``` enum DisputeType { Null, IndexingDispute, QueryDispute } // Disputes contain info necessary for the Arbitrator to verify and resolve struct Dispute { address indexer; address fisherman; uint256 deposit; bytes32 relatedDisputeID; DisputeType disputeType; } ``` #### 3) Dispute resolution Update the `acceptDispute` function to slash based on the dispute type. # Backwards Compatibility The current solution changes the getter of the previous `slashingPercentage` variable. Anyone doing an integration with the contracts need to take special care to call the proper `idxSlashingPercentage` or `qrySlashingPercentage` according to their needs. Additionally, the function `setSlashingPercentage(uint32 _percentage)` changed to `setSlashingPercentage(uint32 _qryPercentage, uint32 _idxPercentage)`. # Validation ## Audits An [audit](https://blog.openzeppelin.com/thegraph-slashing-upgrade-audit/) of the changes described in this document has been performed by OpenZeppelin. ## Testnet The implementation is yet to be deployed to testnet and the source code verified in Etherscan. # Copyright Waiver Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
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GIP XXXX - Reduce Curation Tax

Abstract This GIP proposes reducing the Curation Tax parameter in the protocol from 2.5% to 1%. The proposal evaluates this change in the context of a previously undisclosed attack we refer to as a Subgraph Withholding Attack. Motivation As production subgraphs migrate to The Graph's decentralized network, we have collected more data and feedback on the total costs of using the network as a subgraph developer. As many subgraph developers initially signaled ~100K GRT initially when using the network, the cost of upgrading a subgraph currently sits around 2.5K GRT. This cost is in addition to the opportunity cost of locking up the signal as well as the cost of actually paying for query fees. Note This ignores the curation tax costs associated with signal delegation, which will be addressed in a separate GIP. See Future Work.

1/18/2023
GIP-0009: Arbitration Charter

Abstract The Graph has a protocol role called an Arbitrator who is assigned through decentralized governance. The Arbitrator is an Ethereum Account that has the ability to decide the outcome of disputes in the protocol. The purpose of the Arbitration Charter are to establish norms that constrain the Arbitrator's actions beyond what is expressible or currently expressed in smart contract code. We propose that any Arbitrator that does not comply with the norms laid out in this charter be replaced via decentralized governance. This section contains the body of the arbitration charter. Later sections elaborate on the context and motivation for the design. Arbitration Charter 1. Role of the Arbitrator. The role of the Arbitrator is to decide the outcome of indexing and query disputes. Their goal is to maximize the utility and reliability of The Graph Network. They fulfill this purpose by looking at the Proofs of Indexing (PoIs) or query Attestations associated with a dispute and checking if they correspond to the results that the Arbitrator produced when reproducing the work themselves. They decide the outcome of the dispute according to the norms laid out in this charter and based on whether the PoI or Attestation was produced correctly.

6/4/2021
GIP-0008: Subgraph API Versioning and Feature Support

Abstract This proposal defines a process for defining the canonical behavior of the subgraph API in the protocol as well as establishing the matrix of subgraph API features and their corresponding supported protocol features. Motivation A core value proposition of The Graph, as a decentralized protocol for indexing and querying public data is that a Consumer can trust the integrity of the work performed by the network, with minimal or zero trust in any individual Indexer. There are a number of techniques for achieving this with varying degrees of trust minimization. These include off-chain reputation systems as well as mechanisms that may be combined with slashing such as arbitration, refereed games and cryptographic fraud or validity proofs. In general, the more trustless the mechanism, the greater the research and engineering effort required to implement it. This proposal therefore describes a support matrix comprising which subgraph API features can be used in conjunction with which features of the protocol, as determined by the strength of the techniques available for guaranteeing the integrity of said features. Having this granular support matrix allows new subgraph API features to be continuously and immediately added to the protocol with additional protocol features supported for those features in later stages--all while driving query volume for these features to the decentralized network, as opposed to any centralized services that might be used to expose these features. Additionally, all the mentioned techniques with the notable exception of reputation systems, require that the work that Indexer perform be defined deterministically. Therefore, this proposal also describes how a canonical version of the subgraph API may be established via decentralized governance. This is a hard requirement for supporting protocol features such as disputing and slashing Indexers for invalid indexing or query work.

6/4/2021
GIP-0005: Gas costing for handlers

Abstract This GIP proposes that the computational cost of a handler be measured in units of gas and limited to a maximum cost. If a handler attempts to consume more gas than the maximum, the subgraph will fail with a deterministic error. This is necessary so that it is possible to prove that a subgraph cannot be indexed past the block which triggers such a handler. Motivation Subgraph handlers that run for too long are an issue for operators, since they excessively consume resources, and also a issue for protocol security since they make the subgraph impossible to sync in a reasonable time, if it can be synced at all. Graph Node currently implements a timeout for handlers, which is useful to prevent excessive resource consumption, however timeouts are not deterministic. For protocol security, it is necessary to deterministically measure the cost of a handler. This GIP proposes gas costing for handlers, similar to the gas costing for transactions that exists in blockchain protocols. Detailed Specification Gas is defined as the unit of execution cost. As a reference, one unit of gas should correspond to 0.1ns of execution time, making for 10 billion gas in a second. Close correlation with execution time is not a primary goal of gas costing, at least not in this first iteration. Still gas needs to have some correlation to execution time in order to be useful. The maximum gas cost for a handler should be sufficient for any reasonable subgraph, and be limited by the cost a Fisherman or Arbitrator would be willing to incur in order to check an attestation. The proposed limit is 1000 seconds of execution time, which corresponds to 10 trillion gas.

6/4/2021
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