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###186 Thus, every day life is construed as an eternal and unsurpassable feature of the social world. Although there might be minor role confusions or value-conflicts, it remains a non-contradictory and essentially unproblematical component of social existence.
因此，日常生活被解释为社会生活的永恒的无人可及的特征，尽管存在少许角色的困惑或价值观斗争，它仍保持着社会存在的非矛盾化和非问题化因素。
#189 By contrast, for the theorists discussed in this book, everyday life does have a history, one that is intimately bound up with the dynamics of modernity (and, some would argue, postmodernity). Hence, it is riven with numerous contradictions and marked by a considerable degree of internal complexity (Crook 1998). It must be acknowledged that everyday life incorporates a form of ‘depth’ reflexivity,
相形之下，对本书讨论的那些理论家来说，日常生活确实有历史，她与现代性的激情（有些会说是后现代）密切相关。因此，它被诸多矛盾分裂，受制于相当程度的内在复杂性。我们必须承认日常生活有深度的反身性。
#193 which is necessary if we are to account for the remarkable ability that human beings display in adapting to new situations and coping with ongoing existential challenges, as well as to explain the enormous crosscultural and historical variability that daily life manifests. This reflexivity displays both discursive and pre-discursive, embodied qualities, as well as unconscious elements, as Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens and others have pointed out.
这是必要的，如果我们要为这显著的能力负责，即人类在适应新环境回应存在的挑战的同时也在积极解释庞大的跨文化和历史变量，正如每日生活显示的那样。
这个反身性显示不着边际和前不着边际（pre-discursive），体现品质，同样体现无意识因素，正如（Pierre Bourdieu）布迪厄和吉登斯（Anthony Giddens）和其他社会学家所指出的。
#196 Although everyday life can display routinized, static and unreflexive characteristics, it is also capable of a surprising dynamism and moments of penetrating insight and boundless creativity. The everyday is, as Maffesoli puts it, ‘polydimensional’: fluid, ambivalent and labile. Perhaps we could say that one of the primary goals of the theorists discussed here is to problematize everyday life, to expose its contradictions and tease out its hidden potentialities, and to raise our understanding of the prosaic to the level of critical knowledge.
尽管日常生活可以显示常规的稳定的非条件反射式的一面，它同样有能力显示惊人的激情，尖锐的眼光与无可阻挡的创造性。日常，如maffesoli所指出的，是”多维“的：流动的，矛盾的，不稳定的。也许我们能说，理论家首要目的是将日常生活问题化，暴露诸多矛盾，开掘潜在的危险，将我们平凡的见解上升到批判意识。
#199 Whereas for mainstream interpretive approaches the everyday is the realm of the ordinary, the alternative pursued here is to treat it as a domain that is potentially extraordinary.5The ordinary can become extraordinary not by eclipsing the everyday, or imagining we can arbitrarily leap beyond it to some ‘higher’ level of cognition or action, but by fully appropriating and activating the possibilities that lie hidden, and typically repressed, within it. That everyday life is not as impoverished or habit-bound as conventional social science (of both a macro- and microsociological persuasion) usually assumes is a point that is made forcefully in the following passage from John O’Neill’s The Poverty of Postmodernism: It cannot be sufficiently stressed that the common-sense world is not a reified and unreflexive praxis. It is full of art and humour, it is explored in literature, art, song, film and comic strips. Common-sense knowledge is far from being a poor version of science. It is selfINTRODUCTION 7 critical and, above all, capable of dealing with the contradictions and paradoxes of social life that otherwise drive sociologists off into utopias, anachronisms, and nostalgias that make ordinary people suspicious of the intellectual’s grasp of reality. We ought to reject the social science stereotype of the rigidity of custom, habit and instinct in human affairs. (1995: 172)
然而，主流的阐释将日常视为常规的领域，可供选择的是把它视为额外常规的领域。寻常变为不寻常不是通过把日常盖住，或想象我们可以随意超越它去往更高的认识层面，而是充分使得潜在的可能性活跃起来。日常生活不是习惯性像传统社会科学那样的贫乏（同样对于宏观或微观社会学来说），后者设想着一个来自于John O Neill的《后现代主义的贫乏the poverty of postmodernism》具有说服力的观点：我们难以证据充足地指出——常识世界并不是一个具体化和非条件反射式的实践世界。常识世界（common-sense world）充满了艺术与幽默，它被拓展为文学，艺术，歌曲，电影，连环画的世界。生活知识（common-sense knowledge）并不是科学的通俗版本，它自我批判，具有处理社会生活当中矛盾与悖论的能力；不然就把社会学家都送进乌托邦，不合时宜与怀旧中去了，这样只会使得公众怀疑知识分子能否认清现实。总之，我们要回绝社会科学中对人的生活所持的刻板印象，习惯。
#211 This brings me to my final point regarding mainstream interpretive sociology: that in developing a critical knowledge of everyday life, we must go beyond merely describing the pragmatic activities of social agents within particular social settings. Everyday life cannot be understood in a sui generis sense, because we are compelled to relate it analytically to wider sociohistorical developments. We cannot be satisfied with a surface account of ordinary social practices and modes of consciousness, because to do so would remain at the level of what Karel Kosík (1976) calls the ‘pseudoconcrete’. That is, we must also be concerned to analyse the asymmetrical power relations that exist between a given bureaucratic or institutional system and its users (Warf 1986). The key argument here is that, as Jürgen Habermas (1983, 1987) has frequently pointed out, in the context of modernity systems are dominated by a technocratic or productivist logic. The overriding criterion of success within such systems is their efficient, utilitarian operation, rather than the satisfaction of non-instrumentalized needs as expressed by particular individuals and communities.（1995：172）
这使我想到我关于主流解释的社会学的最后观点：在发展对日常生活的批判性知识时，我们必须超越仅仅在特定的社交环境中描述社会主体的实用性活动。日常生活不能以特殊的方式来理解 因为我们在分析时不得不将之与更广泛的社会历史发展关联起来。我们不能满足于一般的社会实践和意识模式的表面，因为这样做 将保持在KarelKosík（1976）所称的“伪具体”（pseudo-concrete）的层面。 也就是说，我们也必须关注分析在既定的官僚体制或制度体系和它们的使用者之间存在的不对称权力关系 （Warf 1986）。这里的关键论点是，就像哈贝马斯JürgenHabermas （1983,1987）经常指出：现代性体系是由技术专家型或生产型逻辑主宰。 在这样的系统内衡量成功的标准是它们的高效率，功利性 ，而不是满足由特定的个人和社群表达的非工具化需求。
It is to this technocratic rationality that the ‘non-logical logics’ of everyday life are generally contrasted and opposed by the theorists examined in this book. Such a focus on ingrained power imbalances also raises the possibility that ideological factors can play a significant role in structuring our ‘common-sense’ view of the world, and that lay members’ accounts of their situation are often partial and circumscribed, if not ‘false’ in some narrowly epistemological sense, as implied by certain Marxian theories of ideology.6Social agents are not ‘cultural dopes’, but nor are their thoughts and actions fully transparent to them. As Bourdieu cogently notes, whilst people’s everyday interpretation of their social world has considerable validity that must be recognized and accorded legitimacy, at the same time we should not succumb to ‘the illusion of immediate knowledge’ (Bourdieu et al. 1991: 250; also Watier 1989).
技术理性—— 日常生活中“非逻辑性的逻辑”的合理性 是被本书所讨论的理论家比照和反对的。这样一个对 根深蒂固的权力不平衡的聚焦也提高了意识形态因素在塑造生活共识上扮演重要角色的可能性，而且下属成员对他们的情况的描述往往是局部的 如果不是狭义的认识论意义上的“虚假”，那么它就是受限制的，就如某些马克主义思理论所暗示的。社会主体不是 “文化笨蛋”，但他们的思想和行动对他们来说也不是完全自我明了的 。正如布迪厄令人信服地指出，当人们对日常的解释在他们的社会世界具有相当的有效性，我们必须承认其合法性，同时我们也不应该屈从于“当下认识的幻象”。（Bourdieu等人1991：250; Watier 1989）。
Critical reason and structural analysis therefore have a crucial role to play in CRITIQUES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 8 exposing such patterns of ideological determination and enhancing what Melvin Pollner (1991) has called a ‘radical reflexivity’, whereby people can develop a heightened understanding of their circumstances and use this comprehension as the basis of conscious action designed to alter repressive social conditions.
因此，关键的道理和结构分析可以在揭露这样的意识形态的判断和增强梅尔文·波尔纳（Melvin Pollner，1991）称之为“激进的反身性”时起到至关重要的作用 ，据此人们可以加深对他们自身状况的理解并使其成为旨在改变压抑的社会条件的有意识行动。
Thus far, I have been concerned to contrast the critical approach to the study of everyday life with mainstream microsociological theories. The differences are, I think, fairly straightforward. However, the situation becomes somewhat more complex if we consider two more recent approaches that, in certain respects, also set out to challenge the received epistemological assumptions and rigid disciplinary boundaries enforced by modernist social science: namely, cultural studies and postmodernism. With respect to the former, it is clear that some notion of ‘everyday life’ has been a central, even foundational concept in its development, from its origins in the work of Richard Hoggart, E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams in the 1950s, to the more formal establishment of British cultural studies (the socalled ‘Birmingham School’) in the 1970s and its more recent extension to Australia, North America, and beyond (Johnson 1986/7). Indeed, many of the figures discussed in this are often cited as key theoretical influences within cultural studies. However, Laurie Langbauer (1992: 47) makes the valuable point that although crucial to the vocabulary and general sensibility of the cultural studies paradigm, everyday life is ‘so taken for granted by it, that it is almost never defined’, much less examined systematically. Cultural studies has, moreover, become increasingly amorphous and diffuse in recent years, and has lost much of the critical and politically engaged character that it displayed in its original incarnation. The result is a distressing tendency that Meagan Morris (1988) has described as the ‘banalization’ of cultural studies, whereby the critique of consumer capitalism and socioeconomic inequities has been supplanted by a vague, depoliticized populism. Increasingly, the ‘everyday’ is evoked in a gestural sense as a bulwark of creativity and resistance, regardless of the question of asymmetries of power, class relations, or increasingly globalized market forces (McChesney 1996; McRobbie 1991).
到目前为止，我一直在关注和主流的研究日常生活的微观社会学产生对比的批判方法。我认为差异是相当直接的。但是，如果我们考虑两个更多的方法，情况就会变得更加复杂 在某些方面也采取了一些办法来挑战来自现代主义社会科学强制执行的公认的认识论假设和僵化的学科界限：即文化研究和后现代主义。出于对前者的尊重，显然有一些“日常生活”的概念在现代主义社会科学中一直是中心和基础的概念，从20世纪50年代Richard Hoggart，E. P. Thompson和Raymond Williams的作品，到20世纪70年代英国文化研究（所谓的 “伯明翰学派”）更正式的出版物，及其最近扩展到澳大利亚，北美和其他国家（Johnson 1986/7）。的确，很多 这里讨论的数字往往被认为是在文化研究中关键的理论影响。然而，laurie Langbauer（1992：47）做出的有价值一点是，日常生活虽然对词汇和对文化研究范式总体的鉴别力至关重要 ，但是“它是如此理所当然地被提及， 却几乎从来没有被定义“，更不用说系统性的检查了。此外，文化研究近来变得越来越无定形和广泛传播，而且已经失去了许多政治参与性的重要品质 ，正如它以前做的那样。结果是一种令人痛心的倾向——梅根·莫里斯（1988）曾形容为文化研究的“平庸化” ，从批判消费资本主义和社会经济不平等到被一个模糊的，政治化的民粹主义所取代。 “日常”越来越以创造力和 抵抗的堡垒为姿态被唤起，却不管权力不对称的问题，阶级 关系或日益全球化的市场力量（McChesney 1996; McRobbie 1991）。
This brings me to the relationship between critical theories of everyday life and postmodernism, which is a complex issue. Admittedly, there are many similarities: both camps excoriate abstract reason, and acknowledge that human life exhibits many non-rational tendencies, embodied desires and poetical qualities that cannot be captured in the reductive explanatory INTRODUCTION 9 models favoured by positivist social science; they equally privilege marginalized, ‘unofficial’ and de-centred spaces and practices over centralized, bureaucratic systems, and seek to give a voice to the silenced; both are critical of the myriad dualisms (mind/matter, nature/culture, masculine/feminine), aporias and blindspots of modernity; and, finally, they both evince an overriding preoccupation with such phenomena as culture, intersubjectivity and language. But there remain crucial differences. The theorists discussed in this study are thoroughly critical of modernity, but in an eminently dialectical fashion, acknowledging both its negative and positive qualities. All the thinkers discussed here reject the sort of Cartesian, abstract reason and mind/body dualism , that has been the hallmark of instrumental rationality, but without wholly abandoning critical inquiry and sociopolitical analysis. Each asserts the need to engage in ideologiekritik, in order to forgo a lapse into a postmodernist relativism.7In this, they consistently reject what Alex Callinicos (1985) calls ‘textualism’, by which he means a reduction of complex social practices to the workings of language or discourse, and they repudiate a politics of the sign, or transgression for its own sake, so long as these are detached from a wider vision of social transformation and the full realization of human possibilities. Lefebvre, in particular, was alert to the dangers and limitations of this sort of purely symbolic politics, as expressed through modes of ironization and satirical distanciation endorsed by many contemporary postmodernists:
这使我想到了日常生活批判理论和后现代主义之间的关系，这是一个复杂的问题。无可否认，有 许多相似之处：两个阵营都痛恨抽象的理由，并承认人类的生活表现出许多非理性的倾向，体现欲望和 在受实证主义社会科学青睐的还原性解释模型中无法捕捉到的诗性;他们同样权利被边缘化，“非官方”和去中心的空间和过于注重实践，反对官僚体系，并试图为沉默的大多数发出声音; 都批判无数的二元对立概念（精神/物质，自然/文化， 男性/女性），批判现代性的悖论和盲点;最后，他们 都表现出对文化，主体间性，语言等现象的压倒一切的关注。但仍然存在重大分歧。 在这个研究中讨论的理论家对现代性是彻底的批判，但是在一种正式的辩证法方式下，他们承认它的消极和积极因素。这里讨论的所有思想家都拒绝那种笛卡儿式的抽象 理性和思维/身体二元论，这一直是工具理性的标志，但没有完全放弃批判性的探究和社会政治 分析。每个人都声称需要参与意识形态批评，以避免 陷入了后现代主义的相对主义之中.7在这一点上，他们一直拒绝Alex Callinicos（1985）所谓的“textualism”文本主义，后者的意思是减少 复杂的社会实践对语言或话语的干预。这些人否认政治被当作符号来解读，或者犯罪有其自身缘故，只要这里存在一种对社会转型和人类可能性的全面实现的宏大视野的分隔。 Lefebvre，尤其地，警惕像这样纯粹的象征性政治的危险和局限性 ，就像当代后现代主义者所赞同的讽刺的间离化方式所表述的那样：
Symptomatically, any transgression which ceases to be an act and becomes a state is in fact no more than a flight (needless to say, a flight backwards). Transgression turns into retrogression. It is a prayer in the void, and in spite of substituting an immanence – life, immediate enjoyment – for a dead transcendence, it never gets beyond nihilism; it is a relapse into adolescence, manufactured by and accepting oppression – even a relapse into the infantile condition, with its discursive babelism. (1976: 40–1)
从症状上来说，任何违逆行为都不再是一种行为，而是成为一种状态，其实只不过是一次飞行（不用说，一次倒退的飞行）。 违逆成为倒退。尽管取代了内在的生活与即刻的享受，它仍是一个虚空中的祈祷者，为了一次死亡的超越，它永远无法超越虚无主义; 这是一次青春期的复发，被压迫所制造从而接受压迫 - 甚至带着它的话语的混乱重新进入婴儿时期。
Adherents of the critical approach to the study of everyday life therefore take an explicit ethico-political stance, and place considerable stress on the potential for individual and collective agency to transform existing social conditions, a strategy that is anathema to practitioners of mainstream social CRITIQUES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 10 science no less than the more coopted and compromised versions of postmodernism.
