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AGNES HELLER: RATIONALITY, ETHICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE ——AGNES HELLER：理性，伦理与日常生活

Whatever you are doing, as a scientist or anything else, you always start out from problems of everyday life. ——Georg Lukács
无论你在做什么，作为一个科学家抑或其他，你总是从日常生活的问题开始。

INTRODUCTION（P127-128）

• 关于Agnes Heller
  Agnes Heller1929年出生于匈牙利，是马克思主义理论家Georg Lukacs的明星学生和研究助理（Georg Lukacs是一位杰出的知识分子，她对二十世纪的社会思想，尤其是美学、社会学和政治理论产生了重大影响）。1956年匈牙利起义失败后，Agnes Heller被匈牙利共产党和布达佩斯大学开除，原因是她的“修正主义”观点。直到1963年之前，她一直在一所中学教书，当时正值共产主义政权的部分自由化。在此期间，她对文艺复兴文化进行了历史研究，此研究在1965年的著作《Renaissance Man》中达到顶峰。从这次历史调查中，她对日常生活中的问题和社会构成产生了浓厚的兴趣，最终导致了日常生活的出版。在20世纪60年代和70年代初，Heller是所谓的“布达佩斯学派”(Budapest School)的重要成员，这是一群年轻的批评家和知识分子，他们围绕着Lukacs，包括Ferenc Fehér(她已故的丈夫和合伙人)、Gyorgy Markus、Istvan Meszaros和Mihaly Vajda(Frankel和Martin 1973;Gabel 1975)。布达佩斯学校在“布拉格之春”时期对捷克斯洛伐克的民主化和自由化的声援，在1968年的苏联和东欧集团的入侵中戛然而止，导致了卡达政权的长期边缘化，以及他们被降级为“异议”的地位。这所学校的大多数成员很快就离开了匈牙利。Heller和Feher于1977年移民到澳大利亚，她在La Trobe大学获得了社会学和哲学方面的职位。在离开匈牙利之后，Heller的工作变得越来越复杂和广泛，涉及到诸如需求理论、史学、政治哲学、人类科学的方法论问题、伦理学、后现代主义以及国家社会主义社会学等领域。
  在这一章中，我将重点关注Heller对日常生活的分析，以及她对伦理、理性和乌托邦的思考。

THE SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 日常生活中的社会本体论（P128-142）

她的研究很大程度上是黑格尔和海德格尔观念的结合，同时也受到古典西方哲学的遗产的影响，尤其是亚里士多德和康德的思想。她在日常尝试中运用历史唯物主义方法论工具的写作，受到了Lukacs后来研究“社会本体论”的影响，与现象学传统形成的某些见解相结合，以揭示日常存在和人类主体间性的本质。

• 基本观点
  In taking this position, Heller argues that everyday life cannot be understood as a ‘thing’ or ‘system’, or even an ‘attitude’ à la Schütz. This would be to confuse the reified appearance of daily existence under commodity capitalism with its essential qualities, which are themselves subject to change and transformation. By contrast, she conceptualizes everyday life as an ensemble of historically constituted practices and forms of subjectivity that are complexly related to and mediated by other structures, institutions and practices. ‘Everyday life’, Heller writes, ‘is not “something” but rather the shared modern life- experience on which our intersubjective constitution of the world rests’ (1987: 297). As such, she sets out to analyse these practices and ensembles by relating them to the fundamental ontological categories of the sociocultural world. Heller’s main supposition is that we can never fully comprehend any part of society without considering the context of social existence in its entirety.
  Heller认为日常生活不能被理解为“事物”或“系统”，甚至是“态度”。这将使商品资本主义的日常生存状态与它的本质特征相混淆，即使它们本身也会发生变化和转移。相比之下，她将日常生活概念化为一套历史实践与主观性集合，这些形式与其他结构、制度和实践相关联。Heller写道，“日常生活”不是某种特定类型，而是一种分享现代生活的经历，这是我们对世界的主观构成的体验。因此，她着手分析这些实践和组合，将它们与社会文化世界的基本本体论范畴联系起来。Heller的主要假设是，如果不考虑社会存在的整体背景，我们就永远无法完全理解社会的任何部分。
  Heller’s essential position is that everyday life cannot be considered in isolation, and abstracted from wider social relations and institutions. As with Lefebvre et al., she insists that it is necessary to view everyday life in contemporary society from a broader sociohistorical perspective. In premodern societies, daily life is fully integrated into a wider range of productive, ritualistic and sacred practices. Everyday life becomes detached from other activities when ‘higher’ or more specialized pursuits, such as science, religion and art, become the prerogative of elites.
  Heller的基本立场是，日常生活不能被孤立地考虑，要从更广泛的社会关系和机构中抽象出来。与Lefebvre等人一样，她坚持认为，从更广泛的社会历史角度看待当代社会的日常生活是必要的。在前现代社会里，日常生活完全融入到广泛的生产力、仪式性和神圣的实践中。当“更高”或更专业化的追求(如科学、宗教和艺术)成为精英的特权时，日常生活就从其他活动中脱离而出了。

• 社会本体论
  Indeed,shedefines everyday life as ‘the aggregate ofthose individual reproduction factors which, pari passu, make social reproductions possible’ (1984a: 3). The reproduction of society, including the institutional sphere, is therefore contingent upon the reproduction ofthe individual, inasmuch as society can only survive ifhuman beings discharge particular functions. Accordingly, Heller argues, everyday life is a human universal: it exists in all societies, although of course the actual form and content of the everyday life world is historically variable.Inorderto grasp this dualistic process of reproduction and the relationship between them, Heller develops a social ontology that comprises three basic categories: (1) ‘objectivation-in-itself’; (2) ‘objectivation-for-itself’; and (3) ‘objectivation-for-and-in-itself’.
  她将日常生活定义为“个体复制因子的总和，即pari passu，使社会复制成为可能”。由于社会的再生产，包括制度领域取决于个体的繁衍，因此社会只有在人类履行特殊职能时才能生存。因此Heller认为，日常生活是人类普遍存在的:它存在于所有社会中，当然，日常生活的真实形式和内容都是历史变量。为了把握复制的二元过程和两者之间的关系，Heller开发了一种包含三个基本范畴的社会本体论:
  (1)“objectivation-in-itself”;
  (2)“objectivation-for-itself”;
  (3)“objectivation-for-and-in-itself”。
  （objectivation客观化）

• objectivation-in-itself
  Objectivation-in-itself’ is properly understood as a framework or guide to action that is mastered and internalized by the individual actor. By way of mastering these skills and competencies, the individual appropriates the external world and engages in an ‘objectivation’ oftheself,where by a sense of unique personhood is formulated.Objectivation-in-itself remains a human universal, and the primary sphere responsible for the socialization of the individual and the formulation of fundamental human needs, values and identities.
  “objectivation-in-itself”应理解为一种框架或指南，由作为演员的个人掌握并内化。通过掌握这些技能和能力，个人将外部世界占有，并参与“objectivation”，在此基础上形成一种独特的人格。objectivation-in-itself本身是一个人类的普遍现象，而主要的领域是个体的社会化和人类的基本需求、价值和身份的形成。

• objectivation-for-itself
  ‘Objectivation-for-itself’ performs this task by establishing a unity between the heterogeneous activities of everyday life, and by absorbing the cultural and cognitive surpluses generated by individuals and groups in the course of their daily lives which can not be exhausted in mundane forms of action and thought.Aswith ‘objectivation-in-itself’, the sphere of ‘objectivation-for-itself’ is an empirical universal. Moreover, it often surpasses the here and now: a particularly rich set of higher objectivations(forexample,Greco- Roman philosophy or Elizabethan drama) can persist for extended periods of time and be continuously reinterpreted in very different cultural and historical contexts. The appropriation of the complex cultural meanings generated within the sphere of ‘objectivation-for-itself’ involves a ‘suspension’ of narrowly utilitarian everyday activities and the rigorous concentration on one task. In so doing, the human-as-a-whole is transformed into ‘human wholeness’. Innovative and creative thoughts and actions are more predominant here than in the sphere of ‘objectivation-in- itself’, because in undertaking such higher objectivations, one ‘concentrates all of one’s abilities, endowments, emotional dispositions, and judgmental powers’ (1987: 306).
  “Objectivation-for-itself”通过在日常生活的异质性活动中建立一个统一，通过吸收个人和群体在日常生活中产生的文化和认知盈余来完成任务，在日常生活中不能用平凡的行动和思想来耗尽。与“Objectivation-in-itself”一样，“Objectivation-for-itself”是一种经验的普遍性。此外,它往往超越此时此地:一个特别丰富的更高的客体化(例如,希腊-罗马哲学或伊丽莎白时代戏剧)可以持续长时间的在非常不同的文化和历史背景被不断重新解释。在“Objectivation-for-itself”的范围内所产生的复杂文化含义的盗用，涉及一种狭隘的功利主义的日常活动，以及对一项任务的严格专注。在这样做的过程中，人的整体被转化为“整体的人”。创新和创造性的思想和行动在这里比在“Objectivation-in-itself”的领域中更重要，因为在进行如此高的客观化的过程中，一个人要把所有的能力、禀赋、情绪倾向、和判断能力都集中在一起。

• objectivation-for-and-in-itself
  This leaves a third primary ontological sphere: what Heller designates as ‘objectivation-for-and-in-itself’. This consists of various institutions and formal organizations that together conform to ‘the identity of a particular social structure’ (1985a: 104). According to Heller, the sphere of ‘objectivation-for- and-in-itself’ is a specialized and institutionalized sphere that, unlike ‘objectivation-for-itself’, does not concern the human-being-as-a-whole. At the same time, Heller argues against the pervasive thesis of ‘one-dimensionality’ – that is, the idea that the critical impulses contained within art and philosophy have been entirely co-opted and institutionalized, absorbed into the prevailing system of power. Her basic argument is that everyday life has always been ‘colonized’ à la Habermas; it has always been subject to the hegemony of ‘a particular institutionalized, meaningful world-view’ (1985a: 129). Science,whichremainsthe dominant worldview of modernity, is simply incapable of binding together the heterogeneous ‘norms-and-rules’ of everyday life into a meaningful whole. Because of this, science ‘can only technically, not morally legitimate domination’, which means that its capacity to successfully induce ‘one- dimensionality’ is limited (1985a: 137).
  这留下了第三个主要的本体论领域:Heller所指的“objectivation-for-and-in-itself。这包括各种机构和正式组织，它们共同遵守“特定社会结构的身份”。根据Heller的说法，“objectivation-for- and-in-itself”的领域是一个专门的、制度化的领域，不像“objectivation-for-itself”，它不关心人的整体。与此同时，Heller反对“单一维度”的普遍观点——即认为，艺术和哲学中所包含的批判性冲动是完全被共同选择和制度化纳入主流的权力体系中。她的基本观点是，日常生活总是被“殖民化” a la Habermas;它始终受制于“一种特殊的制度化、有意义的世界观”。科学一直是现代社会的主流世界观，但它根本无法将日常生活中不同的规范和规则结合在一起，形成一个有意义的整体。因此，科学“只能从技术上，而非伦理上的进行合法支配”，这意味着它成功诱导“一个维度”的能力是有限的。

RATIONALITY AND ETHICS理性与伦理（P142-152）

• “理性”，“合理的理性”与“理智的理性”
  In a highly compressed and programmatic essay entitled ‘Everyday Life, Rationality of Reason, Rationality of Intellect’, Heller sets out to clarify the relationship between rationality and everyday life. Indeed,Heller defines ‘reason’ as ‘the faculty of discriminating between good and bad’, and ‘rationality’ as ‘action according to reason’ (1985a: 74). Rationality concerns our ability to comprehend and internalize the value- system of a particular society and culture, and to act consistently on behalf of positive values. The human capacity for rationality is to be contrasted with mere ‘thinking’, which for Heller is valuationally neutral.
  在一篇名为《日常生活，合理理性，理智理性》的高度浓缩和结构的文章中，Heller开始阐明理性与日常生活之间的关系。Heller将“理性”定义为“区分好与坏的能力”，“理性”是“根据理性行动”。理性关系到我们理解和内化某一特定社会和文化的价值体系的能力，并代表积极的价值观一致行动。人类理性的能力与单纯的“思考”形成了鲜明的对比，后者对Heller来说是一种价值中立的思维方式。
  However, this can be understood in two distinct ways. First, reason can represent an uncritical and unquestioning adherence to extant norms and values; that is, values can be internalized and followed in a largely unconscious and automatic fashion. Heller refers to this as ‘rationality of reason’, which is typical of many patterns of thought and action within the sphere of ‘objectivation-in-itself’. The habitualization of action is to a certain extent necessary and desirable; Yet the full automatization of our actions would spell disaster, for it would imply the death of the subject as an autonomous and rational entity. So there are repetitive and quasi-instinctive elements within everyday life that will never disappear, but there are also imaginative, problem-solving and intuitive aspects. If we are capable of utilizing and cultivating these creative propensities in a conscious manner, we can make the transition from ‘rationality of reason’ to what Heller calls ‘rationality of intellect’. The latter concerns the reflexive capacity to utilize a particular value-system in order to critically evaluate the habit-bound norms within the sphere of‘objectivation- in-itself’, and to act in a reasoned and autonomous manner. It is a ‘pleasurable release’, because it allows us to live to our fullest potential, to indulge all of our abilities and propensities, whether bodily, intellectual or affective.
  首先，理性可以表现为对现存规范和价值的不批判和不质疑的坚持;也就是说，价值观可以被内化，并在很大程度上是无意识和自动的。Heller认为这是“合理的理性”，这是“objectivation-in-itself”的许多思维和行动模式的典型特征。行动的习惯化在一定程度上是必要和可取的;然而，我们的行为的完全自动化将意味着灾难，因为它将意味着主体的死亡是一个独立而理性的实体。因此，在日常生活中，有重复和准本能的元素永远不会消失，但也有想象力、解决问题和直觉的方面。
  如果我们能够有意识地利用和培养这些创造性的倾向，我们就可以从理性的理性过渡到Heller所说的“理智的理性”。后者涉及到利用某一特定价值体系的条件反射性能力，以批判地评价“objectivation-in-itself”范围内的习惯约束规范，并以理性和自主的方式行动。这是一种“令人愉快的解脱”，因为它让我们得以充分发挥自己的潜能，尽情享受我们所有的能力和倾向，无论是身体上的、智力上的还是情感上的。
  The achievement of ‘rationality of intellect’ is never easy; rather, it is a continuous, life-long process. For one thing, it involves maintaining some degree of distance from the time/space of everyday life. We must forsake an exclusive preoccupation with immediate needs and desires in favour of a more imaginative and reflective approach to life and to our status as moral beings.
  “理智的理性”的实现从来都不是一件容易的事;相反，这是一个持续的、终身的过程。首先，它需要与日常生活的时间/空间保持一定距离。我们必须放弃一种排他性的当务之急，即以一种更有想象力的、反思的方式来对待生活，以及我们作为道德的人的地位。
• “理性”在现代性中的出路
  Under the conditions of modernity, rationality is not attributed to the ‘human-being-as-a-whole’, but rather the ‘specialized human who acts within rationalized institutions’ (1985a: 206). ‘Goodness’ is now equated with purely instrumental or utilitarian success, and practical reason has been gradually transformed into ‘calculative reason’. Everyday life cannot be shaped by a free, purposive activity, because it is dominated by an ethos of ‘calculation and rationalization’. The wholesale adoption and internalization of bureaucratized roles means a retreat into particularism, an uncritical worship of the ‘facts’, and an abrogation of human responsibility. In a particularly illuminating passage, Heller writes:
  ‘Scientific-technological’ manipulation, as it is today, has taken over all the negative functions of religion, without its compensating positive aspects. It ‘fattens up’ particularity and particularistic motivations, but promotes, or indeed, permits, only those particularistic qualities to flower which go to serve the interests of a given ‘organization’. It prevents the person from taking a moral decision in ideological or political questions; it forms attitudes and ideologies which serve the status quo, without making it in any way questionable.
  在现代性的条件下，理性并不是由“人的整体”而归，而是由“在合理的制度内行为的专业化的人”。“Goodness”现在等同于纯粹的工具性或功利性的成功，而实践理性已逐渐转化为“计算理性”。日常生活不能被自由、有目的的活动所塑造，因为它被一种“计算和合理化”的风气所主导。对官僚角色的广泛采用和内化意味着一种倒退特殊主义，一种对“事实”的不批判的崇拜，以及对人类责任的废除。在一个特别有启发性的段落中，Heller写道:
  “科学技术”的操纵在今天已经取代了宗教的所有消极功能，却没有它的积极作用。它使人产生了“特殊的动机”，促进或确实允许，只有那些特定的特质才能为某一“组织”的利益服务。它阻止人们在意识形态或政治问题上做出道德决定;它形成了服务于现状的态度和意识形态，不容置疑。
  The task of a critical social philosophy, as Heller sees it, is to combat this technocratic domination and to defend and foster individuality, ‘felt’ human needs, and species-essential values. In particular, she refers to art, philosophy, and the non-instrumentalized qualities of daily life as exemplars of liberated human thought and action. These represent human activities that resist commodification and alienation, and they hold out the possibility of the fulfilment of ‘rationality of intellect’ and generic human values. ‘Beauty of any kind partakes in art’, writes Heller, ‘in so far as it transcends the category of direct utility, even when the object or institution in which it is manifested is “employable”’ (1984a: 110; Heller and Fehér 1986b).
  Similarly, Heller conceives of philosophy as a species-essential endeavour that effectively unites the properties of science and art, a synthesis of non- dogmatic, critical inquiry with a desire for creative expression and the pursuit of sensuous beauty. Its chief function is to de-fetishize the taken-for-granted and challenge received truths, and to provide us with a worldview and a set of ethical standards that must be adhered to in our daily life if we are to fulfil the injunction to act as moral creatures. Moreover, Heller suggests that the utilization of a creative, unrepressed imagination is central to the philosophical project. This ability to articulate utopian alternatives to the status quo, or what philosophers call ‘counterfactuals’, makes philosophy a crucial resource in subverting both the commonsensical norms and rules of daily life and the unquestioned authority of the apparatus of bureaucratic power.
  正如Heller所看到的，关键的社会哲学的任务是对抗这种技术统治的统治，捍卫和培育个性，“感受”人类的需要，以及物种的本质价值。她特别指的是艺术、哲学和日常生活中那些没有被工具化的品质，它们是解放人类思想和行动的典范。“任何形式的美都是艺术”，Heller写道，“它超越了直接效用的范畴，即使它所表现的对象或机构是“可雇佣的”。
  同样，Heller认为哲学是一种特殊的努力，它有效地将科学和艺术的特性联系在一起，这是一种非教条的批判性的探究，渴望创造性的表达和追求感官的美。它的主要功能是消除被接受和挑战的事实，并为我们提供一种世界观和一套伦理标准，如果我们要履行作为道德生物的禁令，我们的日常生活必须遵守这些道德标准。此外，Heller认为创造性的、压抑的想象力的利用是哲学项目的核心。这种能够将乌托邦式的替代方式表达出来的能力，或者哲学家称之为“反事实”的能力，使哲学成为颠覆日常生活的常识，日常生活规则和官僚权力机构的权威的关键资源。

A NOTE ON UTOPIA 关于乌托邦（P152-P155）

The utopian imagination will not die; however, we must accept that utopianism has definite limits that are primarily of an ethical nature.Consequently, instead of striving to develop a utopia with a specific content, and which aims at some kind of spurious normative consensus, Heller favours the ‘open’ utopia. Such a utopia would strive to uphold a multiplicity of value-systems, by enshrining a few core or universalistic values necessary to protect this pluralistic pursuit of value- orientations. These would include (i) an ideal of domination-free communication, as articulated by Habermas in his notion ofthe ‘ideal speech situation’;5(ii) the unconditional recognition and acceptance of all human needs, which excludes the use of people as a means to an end; and (iii) the full development of all the individual’s physical, psychical and intellectual abilities in a free and unconstrained manner (1984b: 157–74). In an interview conducted in 1985, Heller clarified her conception of the open utopia:
The utopian is not the impossible; it is the ‘counterfactual’, conceived as a realisable alternative to present realities. My suggestion about the acceptance of universal political principles is utopian but I am convinced that it is not a pipedream. Utopia is one of the constituents of an alternative ‘imaginary institution’ which should be contrasted to the dominant ‘imaginary institution’ of the present. But utopias are in the present, not in the future. The more a utopia captures the imagination of people in the present, the more it is transformed into a new utopian mentality which can transcend the dominant social imagination. In a future-oriented and future- directed society such as ours, utopias are always at work. . . . In the simplest possible terms, the universal utopia that I propose is that of a society in which the norms and rules of justice are set by all members of society through rational discourse, whereas all other norms, among them the purely moral ones, remain diverse and pluralistic.
乌托邦式的想象不会消亡;然而，我们必须承认，乌托邦主义有明确的限制，主要是伦理性的。因此，Heller非但没有努力建立一个具有特定内容的乌托邦，而是以某种虚假的规范性共识为目标，更倾向于“开放”的乌托邦。这样一个乌托邦将努力维护价值体系的多重性，通过将一些必要的核心或普遍性的价值观加以保护，以保护这种多元化追求价值取向。这些将包括:
(1)一种无主-自由交流的理想，Habermas在他的“理想语言情况”的概念中阐述;
(2)无条件承认和接受所有人的需要，不包括使用人作为一种手段的目的;
(3)以自由和不受约束的方式全面发展个人的身体、心理和智力能力。
在1985年的一次采访中，Heller澄清了她对开放乌托邦的看法:
乌托邦不是不可能的;它是“反事实”，被认为是现实的可实现的替代。我关于接受普遍政治原则的建议是乌托邦式的，但我相信这不是一个白日梦。“乌托邦”是另一种“假想机构”的组成部分，它应该与目前的“假想机构”形成对比。但乌托邦在当下，而不是未来。一个乌托邦越是抓住当前人们的想象，它就越是转化为一种新的乌托邦心态，这种心态可以超越主导的社会想象。在一个以面向未来、未来导向的社会，像我们这样的社会，乌托邦总是在工作……在最简单的条件下，我提议的普遍的乌托邦是一个社会，社会的所有成员通过理性的话语来确定正义的规范和规则，而所有其他的规范，其中包括纯粹的道德准则，仍然是多样的和多元的。

CONCLUSION（P155-P156）

Meaningful social change does not simply concern large-scale institutions and structures; it must equally involve a transformation of the everyday lifeworld and an injection of the ‘ethics of care’ into the most basic forms of human intersubjectivity. At the same time, Heller affirms the necessity for critical thought to go beyond the reified appearances of everyday life under capitalism, in order to grasp fundamental human values and proclivities that only exist today in potentia – that is, in a suppressed or distorted form, which requires the exercise of a utopian imagination.
有意义的社会变革并不仅仅关注大规模的机构和结构;它必须同样涉及到日常生活的转变，以及向人类主体间性的最基本形式注入“关怀的伦理”。Heller肯定了批判性思维的必要性，超越了资本主义下日常生活的具体化表现，以掌握人类的基本价值和癖好，这些价值和癖性只存在于今天的潜能之中——即被压抑或扭曲的形式，这就需要实现一种乌托邦式的想象。

Tue, Nov 14, 2017 10:45 PM