DOROTHY E. SMITH:
A SOCIOLOGY FOR PEOPLE

读书笔记

世界上并不存在我们必须抵抗的地狱，抑或支持的天堂：并没有唯一的神。我们面临的是一个充满我们生活经验的万神庙。在这座庙里，有一切悲剧与不确定的社会存在。在这里，我们确实能找到所必须面对的宿命。——米歇尔·马费索利

（米歇尔·马费索利的研究涉及想象物、后现代性、青年文化、流行文化、对日常生活的分析和对当前欧洲社会中的个人主义的衰落进行的考察等等。他提出了一种基于想象物理论之上的日常生活的社会学。）百度百科

史米斯的方法，在本质上，一个三方性质：第一，对权力的知识和制度化形式之间的关系的一个重要的审讯，尤其是体现在主流社会学；其次，试图打造的轮廓（一个属于女性的社会学，这反过来又需要批判带有性别偏见的社会学；第三，探讨日常生活的实践，从而取代她所谓的日常世界和课堂社会学和书之间的联系缺乏（1994：54）。对这三个主题的审议将构成本章的主要重点。

第一点：对主流社会学的拷问
Sociologists, generally speaking, only ‘know’ the lifeworld in a vicarious sense. This gulf is actively perpetuated by the institutional character of sociology itself, which is engaged in a process of abstraction and hypostatization by virtue of its very history, organizational status, and commitment to what Bauman (1987) terms ‘legislative reason’. 社会学家，一般来说，只知道在一个替代别人感受意义上的生活世界。这个海湾是积极延续了社会学本身的制度特征，是一个由于历史原因从事抽象和实体化过程，组织状况，并承诺鲍曼（1987）条款的立法理由。

She contends that mainstream, institutionalized forms of sociology present us with versions of the social world that are systematically exclusionary and distorting. Formalized accounts of these practices operate to suppress and de-legitimate unofficial or non-expert narratives, simply because they do not coincide with official interests, purposes and requirements.
她认为主流的、制度化的社会学形式给我们提供了有系统的排斥和扭曲的社会世界的版本。这些做法的形式化的帐户运作，以抑制和取消合法的非官方或非专家的叙述，仅仅因为它们不符合官方的利益、目的和要求。

Social actors are therefore transformed into objects of a formalized knowledge, and are drained of any real agency. This procedure conforms to what Smith labels ‘textualization’, which she describes as a ‘detached and objectified mode’ (1990a: 3) that locates actors outside the everyday lifeworld.
因此，社会行动者转变成形式化知识的对象，并被任何真正的机构所耗尽。这个过程符合史米斯标签的文本”，她形容为“超然和客观化模式”（1990a：3）位于演员以外的日常生活世界。

Smith argues that all formal institutions, whether private or state-sponsored, have developed various techniques and procedures for the accumulation and interpretation of data regarding the ‘correct’ versus ‘aberrant’ behaviour of individuals. Institutions like mental hospitals, although they have an ostensive therapeutic function in society, are no exception to this. Doctors, nurses and administrators learn and reproduce a particular set of bureaucratic and professional practices and terminologies that become part of their essential frame of reference, particularly when they treat patients and make crucial diagnostic and administrative decisions.
史米斯认为，所有正式的机构，不管是私人的还是国家资助的，都制定了各种各样的技术和程序来积累和解释关于“正确”与“反常”个人行为的数据。精神病院等机构虽然在社会中有明确的治疗作用，但也不例外。医生、护士和管理人员的学习和复制一组特定的官僚和专业实践和术语，成为参考的基本框架的一部分，特别是当他们的治疗和诊断和行政决策的关键。

When authoritative accounts do make use of a social agent’s knowledge, they generally do so in a selective and distorting fashion, by ‘framing’ such understandings within pre-existing formalized categories and explanatory modes. Official discourses now constitute the essential referential matrix of interpretation, rather than the subject’s own experiential sphere of action
当权威性的帐户确实利用了社会代理人的知识时，他们通常以选择性和扭曲的方式，通过在已有的正式形式和解释模式中“建立”这种理解。官方话语现在构成了解释的基本参照矩阵，而不是主体自己的经验活动范围。

Smith’s own writings tend to reinforce this perspective, insofar as she is highly sympathetic to Marx’s materialist method and such twentieth-century Marxists as Merleau-Ponty, who also sought to combat the abstractions of scientific positivism and return us to the terrain of embodied, lived experience (Smith 1974, 1981).
史米斯自己的著作倾向于加强这种观点，因为她是马克思的唯物主义方法和Merleau Ponty等20世纪马克思主义者非常同情，他还试图打击科学实证主义的抽象，回归我们的饱含生活经验的土壤（Smith 1974, 1981）。

So ideology is not simply a neutral belief system; it is inscribed within the matrix of social activities that structure our relationship to the world and helps to generate a particular knowledge of it. 因此，意识形态不仅仅是一个中立的信仰体系，它被铭刻在社会活动的矩阵中，它构成了我们与世界的关系，并有助于产生特定的知识。

Ideological practices are structured in such a way as to reinforce existing patterns of power and authority, and therefore provide an essential bulwark for the maintenance of systems of domination in Western societies. 意识形态的构建加强了现存权力和权威的形式，因此提供了维护西方统治制度的重要支柱。

Ideologies are practical – they motivate people, reinforce patterns of action, and legitimate existing institutions and ways of doing things. 意识形态是实际的——它能激励群众，加强行为模式，并合法化现存的机构和做事的方式。
As intimated earlier, sociology as an academic discipline is not entirely innocent of this ‘ideological effect’. For much of its history, sociology has sought to identify with the so-called ‘hard’ sciences, and has enthusiastically adopted positivistic and objectivistic methodologies, forms of explanation, and approaches to theory construction. In practice, what this has entailed is a tacit acceptance of a Cartesian epistemology, in which a solitary mind reflects on an independently existing object-world, through which it derives ‘correct’ ideas that are felt to be isomorphic with this reality. There is a dual strategy occurring here: first, the active knower is banished from the production of sociological knowledge, because objectivity demands the suppression of individual and social influences, biases and values. What is expressly denied is that the knower is necessarily an embodied entity, situated in a particular time and place, and irrevocably part of the world that is under investigation. This account suggests that knowledge is value-free, and phenomena like reflexivity, corporeality and subjectivity are irrelevances. Secondly, Cartesianism (in the guise of mainstream social science) disavows the notion that the objects of knowledge – in this case, the social actors who are being studied – have an entirely legitimate and wholly independent perspective into their own practices, beliefs and activities.
社会学作为一门学科，有意识形态的部分。历史的大部分时期，社会学试图找出所谓的“硬”科学，并积极采用实证主义和客观主义的方法，形式的解释，对理论的构建方法。在实践中，这带来的是一个心照不宣的笛卡尔认识论，一个孤立的思想反映了一个独立存在的客观世界，通过它衍生出的“正确”的想法被认为与这个现实是同构的。

这是的双重战略是：第一，主动者被生产社会学知识驱逐出去，因为客观性要求抑制个人和社会影响、偏见和价值观。意料之中的是，主动者必然是体现的实体，坐落在一个特定的时间和地点，是所研究的世界中不可改变的一部分。此观点认为知识是价值中立的，而反身性、物质性和主观性是无关紧要的事。第二，笛卡尔主义（在主流社会科学的幌子下）否认这种认识，即否认对自己的实践、信仰和活动有完全合法和独立的观点。在这种情况下，社会行动者是被研究的。

Sociological explanations typically circumvent this experiential realm and assert that social behaviour is rigidly determined by the underlying structural properties of a given sociocultural system, the most notorious example being the functionalist paradigm (which can take on a liberal or Marxian hue), in which the actions of subjects, or ‘cultural dopes’, blindly follow existing norms and merely reproduce existing social structures. In short, sociological models often simply bypass the everyday lifeworld, and, in so doing, play an important role in legitimating elite knowledges and upholding the relations of ruling. ‘Sociological methods of thinking and research write over and interpret the site of experience’, asserts Smith. Its ‘methods of analyzing experience and of writing society produce an objectified version that subsumes people’s actual speech and what they have to tell about themselves; its statements eliminate the presence of subjects as agents in sociological texts; it converts people from subjects to objects of investigation’.
社会学的解释典型地规避这种体验境界，认为社会行为是严格地由底层结构性质的社会文化系统决定的。最有名的例子是功能主义范式（可采取自由主义或马克思信仰），其中主体的行为，或“文化的兴奋剂”，盲目遵循现有的规范和只是复制现有的社会结构。总之，社会学的模型往往只是绕过了日常生活世界，并在这样做时，在合法化精英知识和拥护统治关系发挥了重要作用。“社会学的思维和研究方法改写和解释了经验的领域”，Smith断言。其分析经验的方法和描述社会产生一个客观化的版本，包含了人们的真实的话语与他们谈论自己；其陈述消除了社会学文本中的主体；它把人从学科研究主体转化成客体。

第二点：属于女性的社会学
Given Smith’s strongly pro-feminist leanings, it is important to understand more precisely how the relations of ruling are bound up with the phenomenon of gender. In tandem with many other feminist writers, she argues that the abstracting and reifying tendencies of official textual accounts of the world, especially as reflected in the discipline of sociology, are part and parcel of a pronounced asymmetry of power between men and women in contemporary society. Simply put, it is men who, as a distinct social category, are primarily in charge of the construction and regulation of the relations of ruling, at both the organizational and discursive levels. It is therefore no accident that official discourses operate in such a way to abstract from everyday and ‘everynight’ social practices.
在Smith强烈的女权主义倾向下，很重要的一点是更精确地了解统治关系是如何与性别现象息息相关的。与许多其他女性作家的一致的是，她认为正式文字中描述的世界中抽象和具体化的倾向，特别是反映在社会学中的，是一个明显的不对称的男性和女性之间的权力。简单地说，作为一个独特的社会范畴的男性，主要负责在组织和话语层面上的建设和管理统治关系。因此，不出意外，官方话语以这样一种方式，日日夜夜在社会实践操作中抽象出来。

Historically speaking, what cannot be disputed is that sociology has been mainly conducted by men, and it has tended to investigate those manifestations of the social world that are connected to extant power structures – such as the state apparatus, economic systems, or movements rooted in social class (Oakley 1981). 从历史上看，不可争议的是，社会学已经主要由男性进行的，它倾向于研究那些表现的社会世界，连接到现存的权力结构–如国家机器、经济系统，或植根于社会阶级运动。

Since sociological descriptions have been unduly influenced by the male point of view, reflecting an overly formalized standpoint, the result has been that women’s experiences are ‘organized extra-locally, abstracted, grounded in universal forms, and objectified’ (Smith 1990a: 6).
从社会学的描述已经被男性视角的过度影响，反映了一种过于形式化的角度来看，其结果是，妇女的经验是“有特别本地化，抽象的，基于通用的形式，和客观化” (Smith 1990a: 6)

Under these conditions, the viewpoint of women tends to remain concrete, localized and particularistic in nature. As such, the essential challenge, as Smith sees it, is to develop a woman-centred sociology that respects the integrity of everyday life, and hence the ‘lived’ character of female experience, but without translating this experiential realm into abstracted textual forms that dovetail with the requirements of bureaucratic power and control. 在这些条件下，女性的观点趋于具体、局部和特殊性。因此，必要的挑战，在史米斯看来，是开发一个女人为中心的社会学方面的日常生活的完整性，因此“鲜活”特征的女性的经验，但没有使经验领域进入抽象的文本形式符合官僚权力和控制的要求。

It has been suggested that Smith’s stance here is vulnerable to arguments often marshalled against ‘essentialism’ or ‘feminist standpoint theory’, in which women’s penchant for the concrete and the particular is felt to be both an inherent component of their subjectivity or even biology, as well as in some sense epistemologically superior. 它已经表明，史米斯的立场是脆弱的论据往往引领反对本质主义”或“女性主义立场论”，即妇女的具体和特定的倾向是一种内在的构成其主体性甚至生物性，以及在某种意义的认识论上。

What this means is that we cannot talk about gender as a general, all-embracing category, but only in relation to ‘particular local historical sites of women’s experience[,] as multiple and sometimes contradictory relations’ 这意味着，我们不能把性别问题当作一个普遍的、包罗万象的范畴来讨论，而只涉及“妇女经验的特定地方历史点”，即“多元的，有时是相互矛盾的关系”。(Smith 1990a: 159).

For Smith, it must be understood that capitalism as an economic system has encouraged a general process of abstraction and idealization, especially through the growing importance of the commodity-form and what Habermas refers to as the ‘colonization’ of the lifeworld by the imperatives of bureaucratic systems. As discussed earlier, such critical theorists as Adorno and Marcuse felt the extension of the commodity into virtually every aspect of life under late capitalism is correlated with a process of intensive quantification, in which the lived, subjective aspects of human existence are reduced to universal, abstract units of value that facilitate the exchange of commodities through the medium of money. And because men are largely in control of the mechanisms of capitalist production, distribution and exchange, their worldview tends to take on a hyperrational and reified character. 对于Smith的理论，你必须明白资本主义作为一种经济制度鼓励一般的抽象和理想化的过程，特别是通过商品的形式日益增长的重要性和哈贝马斯所指的官僚系统需要的生活世界的殖民化”。如前面所讨论的，正如阿多诺和马尔库塞认为商品延伸到生活的各个方面在晚期资本主义的批判理论家与密集的量化过程相关，在其中生活，人的主观方面存在降低到普遍的、抽象的单位的价值，促进商品交换以货币介质。因为男人在很大程度上是在资本主义生产的机制控制，分配和交换，他们的世界观，往往采取一种超理性和具体化。

‘Capitalism creates a wholly new terrain of social relations external to the local terrain and the particularities of personally mediated economic and social relations’, writes Smith. ‘These extralocal, impersonal, universalized forms of action became the exclusive terrain of men, while women became correspondingly confined to a reduced local sphere of action organized by particularistic relationships’ (1987: 5). In malestream sociological discourse, the body – especially the female body – is marginalized and commodified, separated from the functioning of wider institutions and the abstract knowledges used to operate them. “资本主义创造了一个全新的社会关系领域，这与当地地形和个人调解的经济和社会关系的特殊性有关。”。“这些超本地化、客观、普遍的活动形式，成了男人的专属的地形，而女性成为相对局限于特殊关系组织的小的局部活动”（1987：5）。在“男权主义”社会学话语，身体–尤其是女性的身体–被边缘化和商品化，从更广泛的机构和抽象的知识的分离。

Any consideration of embodiment is generally restricted to women’s role in biological reproduction and the maintenance of the domestic sphere.
任何对实施方式的考虑，一般都局限于妇女在生物繁殖和维持家务方面的作用。

In taking this position, Smith follows Simone de Beauvoir’s suggestion in The Second Sex (1984) that immanence is characteristic of women’s lives, whereas transcendence is more typical of the world of men. Hence, the relations of ruling have a strongly gendered character. The central conclusion that emerges from this discussion is that there is nothing ‘essential’ about men that encourages the reified character of the masculinist worldview; it is a byproduct of their location in a specific set of social and cultural practices that reinforces a certain ideological perspective on the world. 在这个位置上，史米斯遵循西蒙娜·德·波伏娃的建议，在第二性（1984），内蕴性是妇女生活的特点，而超越性是比较典型的是男人的世界。因此，统治关系具有强烈的性别特征。从这个讨论中出现的主要结论是：没有什么是“重要的”男人，鼓励物化特征的男权世界观；它是一组特定的社会和文化习俗，是增强了世界的某些思想观点承认他们的位置的副产品。

Or what Pierre Bourdieu (1977) has termed doxa: schemas of thought and knowledge that are unquestioned and viewed as natural. It also means that men, by virtue of their membership in a distinct social category and set of sociohistorical relations (rather than as individuals), are invested with a certain degree of authority in both the public and private spheres, and enjoy the lion’s share of institutionalized power over women. Pierre Bourdieu（1977）所说的信念：思想和知识架构，是不容置疑的，视为自然。这也意味着，男性，由他们在一个独特的社会范畴和一套社会历史关系（而不是个人），根植于公共和私人领域有一定的权威，对妇女享有制度化的权力的最大的份额。

Women, she asserts, are ‘active, skilled, make choices, consider, are not fooled or foolish. With discourse there is play and interplay’ (1990a: 203). In other words, systems, discursive or otherwise, are not immune to change, and a critical reason still has a central role to play in exposing the nature of such systems and highlighting points of vulnerability. Even women who conform on the surface to proffered gender stereotypes and appear to defer to male authority can do so in an ironic, double-edged fashion, in a manner that does not necessarily signal passive compliance, but rather what Michel de Certeau identifies as ‘tactics’, as discussed in Chapter 7.
她断言，女性是“积极的、熟练的、做出选择的、考虑的、不会被愚弄或愚蠢的”。话语有发挥和相互作用（1990a：203）。换言之，系统，无论是散漫的还是其他的，都不能避免变化，关键的原因仍然是在揭示这种系统的性质和突出脆弱性方面发挥中心作用。即使女人表面上提供符合性别刻板印象，似乎服从男性权威可以在一种讽刺，双刃的方式这样做，在一个方式，不一定信号被动顺应，而是Michel de Certeau所确定的策略，如在7章讨论。

The preceding discussion helps to explain why Smith does not want to abandon the notion of socioeconomic and political analysis and critique. Her position is that feminist theory needs to pursue a critical interrogation into the interrelationship between the structural organization of late capitalism and the specific forms that patriarchy has taken in contemporary society. The knowledge generated by such an investigation can facilitate the construction of a specifically women’s point of view on social reality, ‘an experience of being, of society, of social and personal process that must be given form and expression in the culture, whether as knowledge, as art, or as literature or political action’ (Smith 1987: 36).
前面的讨论有助于解释为什么史米斯不想放弃社会经济和政治分析和批评的概念。她的立场是，女性主义理论需要对晚期资本主义的结构组织与父权制在当代社会中的具体形式之间的相互关系进行批判性的追问。通过这样的调查产生的知识能够方便的查看具体女性点的建设对社会现实的一个经验是，社会，社会和个人的过程，必须以文化的形式和表达，无论是知识，艺术，或文学或政治行动”（史密斯1987：36）。

To give voice to the silenced requires that women become knowers rather than known, active subjects rather than passive objects of scientific discourse. In this, Smith would appear to adhere to a Habermasian ‘strong programme’ of reason, albeit an expanded, ‘corporeal’ rationality that reminds one strongly of Lefebvre’s dialectical reason’. But to adopt such a point of view is to abandon the pretense of the ‘God’s eye’ point of view encouraged by malestream social science, a universalizing and implicitly normative perspective masquerading s a value-neutral stance, one that is blithely unaware of the conditions of its own existence and of its embeddedness within specific sets of social practices and historical circumstances. By contrast, the central focus of a sociology for women must be represented by the standpoint of the situated, embodied and reflexive subject.
给声音沉默的女人需要成为知者而不是已知的、活跃的学科而不是科学话语的被动对象。在这，史米斯似乎坚持哈贝马斯的“强纲领”的原因，虽然扩大了，肉体的理性，让人想起勒菲弗的辩证理性的强烈。但采用这一观点是放弃看由社会科学malestream鼓励“上帝的眼睛”的幌子，普及和隐含的价值规范的角度伪装中立的立场，一个是无视自身存在的条件及其嵌入在特定组的社会实践与历史环境。相比之下，女性社会学的中心焦点必须以处境、体现和反身主体的观点来表示。

A sociology for women preserves the presence of subjects as knowers and as actors. It does not transform subjects into the objects of study or make use of conceptual devices for eliminating the active presence of subjects. Its methods of thinking and its analytic procedures must preserve the presence of the active and experiencing subject. A sociology is a systematically developed knowledge of society and social relations. [We] go further than Marx in insisting that both subject matter and the ‘head’ that theorizes it as well as its theorizing are enfolded in the existence of our subject matter. A sociology for women must be conscious of its necessary indexicality and hence that its meaning remains to be completed by a reader who is situated just as she is – a particular woman reading somewhere at a particular time amid the particularities of her everyday world – and that it is the capacity of our sociological texts as she enlivens them, to reflect upon, to expand, and to enlarge her grasp of the world she reads in, and that is the world that completes the meaning of the text as she reads.
一个社会学学科为女性保留他们的存在和作为演员。它不会把受试者转变为研究对象或利用概念装置消除主体的主动存在。它的思维方法及其分析程序必须保持主动和经验主体的存在。社会学是一门系统地发展社会和社会关系的学问。[我们]超越马克思在坚持主题和“头”的理论以及其理论是构成我们的标的物的存在。一个社会对女性必须意识到其必要的索引，因此，它的意义还有待于读者就位于她–特定女性阅读的地方在一个特定的时间在她生活的世界–的特殊性，这是我们社会学文本的能力，她使他们完成，以反思，扩大，并扩大她的把握世界她读，这是世界上，完成对文本意义的为她读。

第三点：日常生活的实践
According to Smith, the everyday world must be the main focus of a sociology for women, rather than a textually mediated discourse that reflects the material interests of privileged groups and bolsters the relations of ruling. The everyday lifeworld is produced through mundane but highly skilled practices and accomplishments on the part of specific social actors. However, we remain largely ignorant of daily life and how it operates, particularly with ‘how people are knitted into the extended social relations of a contemporary capitalist economy and society and not discoverable with them’ (Smith 1987: 110). To elucidate this nexus must be one of the paramount concerns of a critical feminist sociology. This is because the standpoint of women is generally ‘situated outside textually mediated discourse, and hence exists within the actuality of our everyday lives. We must direct our attention to an embodied subject located in a particular actual historical setting’ (Smith 1987: 108). Even textually mediated images and relations are ultimately played out in the locale of the everyday world, and it is precisely this domain that has been more or less ignored by orthodox sociology. Whereas traditional social science has typically suppressed the presence of the (female) subject, a feminist sociology must reverse this, and bring the active subject back into the picture.
史米斯认为，日常的世界必须是一个社会对女性的主要焦点，而不是文本话语，反映了弱势群体的物质利益和巩固统治的关系。日常生活世界是由平凡但高度熟练的实践和取得的成就，对特定的社会主体的一部分。然而，我们仍然在很大程度上忽略了日常生活和它是如何运作的，特别是“人们如何编织成扩展社会关系的一个当代资本主义经济和社会，他们没有发现”（Smith 1987：110）。要阐明这种联系，必须是批判的女性主义社会学的首要问题之一。这是因为女性的立场是一般位于外介导的话语文本，因此存在于我们日常生活的现实。我们必须把注意力集中在特定的实际历史背景中的体现主体（史密斯1987：108）。即使文字介导的图像和关系最终发挥了日常世界的现场，正是这个领域，已经或多或少被正统社会学。传统的社会科学通常压制女性（女性）的存在，而女性主义社会学必须扭转这一现状，使活跃的主体重新回到画面中。

In this approach, Smith demonstrates her appreciation for such micro-oriented sociologies as ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism, because these help us to articulate an ‘insider’s knowledge’ of language and other sociocultural practices. Her writings are peppered with references to such social thinkers as Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman, George Herbert Mead, Alfred Schütz, and more recently Mikhail Bakhtin (Smith 1998). At the same time, however, her fidelity to the political cause of the feminist movement has sensitized her to the limitations of such approaches. Although the writings of Schütz and others do operate quite effectively to draw our attention towards the subject’s own practices and the relevant biographical and pragmatic setting of his or her activities, and to demonstrate the inherent limitations of structuralist-type explanations, there is no real motivation in such approaches to go beyond a surface description of these practices, so as to grasp the underlying mechanisms of domination, and to provide a moral critique of existing social arrangements with an eye to transforming them. What is lacking in established forms of microsociology is a utopian vision of a transfigured social landscape, a belief in the possibility of a society with a more equitable distribution of power and resources and more closely attuned to the possibilities of human self-realization, community and solidarity. Any sociology worth pursuing must combine an intimate understanding of real individuals and the material conditions of their existence, including how our activities are jointly co-ordered in time and space, with an insight into how these conditions operate to suppress the legitimate aspirations of marginalized groups towards greater autonomy and self-organization. The problem with theories like ethnomethodology is that, although they acknowledge that sociological accounts are creative interpretations in which there is an active relation between knower and known, and that all such descriptions are in an important sense context-dependent, they tend to assume that the Schützian ‘natural attitude’ is the only possible one, that there is no real potential for transforming consciousness into a more intensively reflexive form, what Paul Ricoeur (1981) refers to as a ‘depth hermeneutics’. The latter requires an understanding of how everyday practices are connected to wider social institutions and processes that are themselves historically situated, and a heightened awareness of our own locatedness in these activities and organizations, as subjects with particular gender, class and racial affiliations and experiences. ‘Located in the actualities of our everyday life, we cannot grasp how it is put together’, writes Smith (1992: 131). Hence, there is no appeal in her work to ‘raw’, unmediated experience as some sort of privileged site of authenticity or superior knowledge.
在这种方法中，史米斯展示了她欣赏这样的微型社会学作为方法学和符号互动论，因为这些帮助我们表达的语言和其他社会文化实践“内幕的知识。她的作品充满了像Harold Garfinkel、尔文·戈夫曼、乔治·赫伯特·米德这样的社会思想家的引用，Alfred SchüTZ，和最近的Mikhail Bakhtin（Smith 1998）。但与此同时，她对女权运动政治事业的忠诚使她认识到这种做法的局限性。虽然学校üTZ人的著作做操作相当有效地吸引了我们的注意力转向主体自身的实践和相关的传记和务实的他或她的活动设置，并论证结构主义式的解释的固有的局限性，这种方法去超越这些做法表面描述没有真正的动机，从而掌握控制机制，并提供一个道德存在的社会安排着眼于改造他们的批判。什么是缺乏形式的微观社会学是一个变形的社会景观的一个乌托邦式的设想，一种信仰，一个社会的可能性和更平等的权力和资源，更紧密地与人的自我实现的可能性分布，社区和团结。任何社会学的价值追求必须结合现实的个人和他们的物质生活条件的深刻理解，包括我们的活动在时间和空间的共同点，以了解这些操作的条件下，抑制边缘群体走向更大的自主性和自组织的合法诉求。用理论方法学的问题是，尽管他们承认社会账户的创造性诠释，其中有知者和已知的活性之间的关系，和所有这样的描述是一个依赖性的重要意义的背景下，他们倾向于认为学校ützian“自然态度”是唯一可能的一个，有是转变意识到更深入的反思形式，没有真正的潜力，是保罗·利科（1981）所指的“深度解释学。后者要求日常生活如何连接到更广泛的社会制度和过程本身是历史情境的理解，并越来越意识到自己的locatedness在这些活动和组织，与特定性别的主体，阶级和种族背景和经验。史米斯写道：“在我们日常生活的现实中，我们无法理解它是如何组合在一起的”（1992：131）。因此，在她工作的'原始'是没有上诉的，无中介的经验为某种特定部位的真实性或卓越的知识。

‘Universities suck knowledge out of people outside the university, put it through a special filtering procedure provided by social science, and confine it to specialists’, asserts Smith. ‘It serves the organization of ruling people, rather than serving people’ (1992:130). Even in interpretive microsociologies, it would seem, it is only the (generally male) sociologist who is privileged to speak. Relations of ruling always intervene between formalist textual accounts and a social agent’s actual practices, and ethnomethodology is blind to this process of mediation.
没有反思批判和不注意如何执政功能关系方面的社会学描述方法如符号互动理论或方法学意味着文本表面的假定权力组织为协调人们的活动和组织实施生产版本的世界，是非常片面的过程，使用，只有在执政方式，以及定义其权力的对象（Smith 1987：84）。史米斯断言，大学通过大学以外的人吸收知识，通过社会科学提供的特殊过滤程序，并将其局限于专家。“这是执政的人的组织，而不是为人民服务”（1992:130）。甚至在解释微观社会学，看来，这是唯一的（通常是男性）社会学家说是特权。形式主义的文本解释与社会主体的实际做法之间的干涉关系执政的始终，与常人方法论忽视这一过程的调解。

The absence of reflexive critique and an inattentiveness to how the relations of ruling function with respect to sociological descriptions in approaches like symbolic interactionism or ethnomethodology means that ‘textual surfaces presuppose an organization of power as the concerting of people’s activities and the uses of organization to enforce processes producing a version of the world that is peculiarly one-sided, that is known only from within the modes of ruling, and that defines the objects of its power’ (Smith 1987: 84).
没有反思批判和不注意如何执政功能关系方面的社会学描述方法如符号互动理论或方法学意味着文本表面的假定权力组织为协调人们的活动和组织实施生产版本的世界，是非常片面的过程，使用，只有在执政方式，以及定义其权力的对象（Smith 1987：84）。

So whereas primary narratives empower readers to use their own experiences in order to draw conclusions regarding the veracity of particular sociological descriptions or interpretations, free from the weight of what Mikhail Bakhtin calls ‘second-hand’ definitions, ideological accounts never proceed beyond the level of formalized knowledges, and are hence self-validating and immune to criticism. Smith advocates what she terms an ‘insider’s feminist materialism’, one that ‘takes concepts, ideas, ideology, and schemata as dimensions and organizers of the ongoing social process that we can grasp only as insiders, only by considering our own practices’ (1990b: 202). In so doing, sociological inquiry must be construed as a form of reflexive critique, in which the everyday world is ‘known’ only insofar are we ourselves participate in it. By exploring these relations, and reflecting on the nature of ‘primordial’ existence as well as second-order sociological descriptions of the lifeworld, we can ‘bring into view not just our actual practices of thinking, reasoning, reading, making sense of accounts, and so forth, but the social relations we participate in by doing so’ (Smith 1990b: 204). Hence, what Smith envisages by a feminist social theory is in most respects antithetical to the current gamut of postmodernist feminisms. The problem with postmodernist approaches is that they fail to consider the role of subjects other than as ‘positions’ within particular discourses. A materialist insider’s feminism, by contrast, insists that ideological criticism remains of relevance and that there are relatively more and less accurate accounts of the social world; that marginalized groups, especially women, have shared material interests (though largely for socioeconomic rather than metaphysical reasons); and that there always remains the possibility of transformative agency, particularly in a collective sense. Postmodernism must be subjected to critical scrutiny because it tends to deny the possibility of speaking of a world beyond discourse; theory itself legitimates the speaker’s claim for theory’s authority. [In] a phenomenal universe of discourse without people and activity, nothing even happens; nobody does anything, there is no history; here is no work; there is no economy; there are no wars, no misery, no violence, no rape, no watching your children starve. If there is a lived world, we may not speak of it. [But] of course we’ve learned in practice that women speaking as such (in our sexed bodies) have things to tell us of their lives, of how things happen to them, of their work and struggles that we don’t already know, that discourse hasn’t already previsaged. Speaking from experience has the power to disrupt discourse, not simply because the feminine speaks and when it speaks it disrupts, but because women speaking their experience as women, speak from where they are in their sexed bodies as they live.
所以，而主要的叙述让读者以自己的经验，关于特定社会的描述或解释的准确性，得出结论，从Mikhail Bakhtin所说的“二手”定义的重量，思想不会超过账户的形式化的知识水平，并因此自我验证和受批评。史米斯倡导她所谓的“内幕的女权主义的唯物主义”，这是概念、观念、思想、和图式尺寸和持续的社会过程的组织者，我们能把握的只有业内人士，只有结合我们自己的实践（1990b：202）。这样做，社会学探究必须被理解为一种反思性批评，在日常生活世界中，“只有我们自己参与”才是“已知的”。通过探索这些关系，以及对自然的原始的存在以及二阶社会学描述的生活世界，我们可以把视图不只是我们的实际做法，思考，推理，阅读，理解客户，等等，但社会关系我们参加这样的（史米斯1990b：204）。因此，史米斯所设想的女权主义的社会理论是在大多数方面的后现代女权主义目前色域对立。后现代主义方法的问题是，他们没有考虑在特定的话语中的“位置”以外的主题的作用。唯物主义的内幕的女权主义，相反，强调意识形态批评保持相关性和相对较多的和不准确的社会世界的帐户；边缘群体，尤其是女性，有共同的物质利益（尽管很大程度上是社会而不是形而上学的原因）；而总会有变形机构的可能性，特别是在集体意识。后现代主义必须经过严格审查，因为它往往否认说世界超越话语的可能性；理论本身合法化理论的权威者的观点。在一个没有人和活动的现象宇宙中，没有任何事情发生；没有人做任何事情，没有历史；这里没有工作；没有经济；没有战争，没有苦难，没有暴力，没有强奸，没有看着你的孩子挨饿。如果有一个活生生的世界，我们就不能说它了。[但是]当然，我们在实践中，女人说这样学到的（在我们的性体）有事情要告诉我们他们的生活，事情发生在他们身上，他们的工作和斗争，我们不知道，话语已经不previsaged。从经验上讲具有破坏力量的话语，不只是因为女性说话，当它说话时它会破坏，但因为女人讲他们的经历的女人，说他们在哪里他们的性体作为他们生活。

In reading Dorothy Smith, we are privy to the work of a theorist engaged passionately in an ambitious project, one that involves nothing less that the rethinking and re-invigoration of the sociological enterprise. She seeks to jettison the positivist tendencies and objectivistic pretenses of orthodox sociology, moving the discipline towards a position of moral engagement and institutional critique, but at the same time resisting the siren call of fashionable postmodernisms. All of her writings bespeak of the need to challenge existing hierarchies of power and authority, by exposing their intrinsic connection to expert knowledges which are implicated in perpetuating a form of ‘symbolic violence’ upon the everyday lifeworld, and by extension the marginalized groups that tend to occupy this sphere. In taking this position, she refuses to write off Marxism as an intellectual anachronism, for which she has been criticized vigorously (Doran 1993). At the same time, however, Smith opens up Marxism to a variety of invigorating influences, especially feminism, dialogism, existential phenomenology and micro-oriented sociologies. Out of these diverse influences there emerges an unconventional social theory that is far more than the sum of its parts, and that occupies an important position in the critical analysis of everyday life. As Steven Seidman puts it in Contested Knowledge, Smith’s goal ‘has been to craft a sociology by and for women that looks to women’s experiences, interests and values as the basis of social knowledge and politics. [She] offers a powerful, imaginative moral vision of a sociology and a society in which knowledge is both the dominating power and our social hope’ (1994: 304, 305).
(Smith 1993: 189)
阅读Dorothy Smith，我们都知道一个理论家的工作热情在一个雄心勃勃的项目，其中包括没有少，反思和重新振兴的社会企业。她试图抛弃实证主义倾向和目标伪装正统社会学、运动学科走向道德的参与和制度的批判立场，但同时抵制时尚的后现代主义的诱惑。她所有的作品显示的需要挑战权力和权威存在的层次结构，通过暴露其内在联系专家知识与延续的一种“符号暴力”在日常生活世界，甚至被边缘化的群体，往往占据这一领域。在采取这一立场，她拒绝把马克思主义作为一种知识的时代，而她被批评大力（兰1993）。同时，然而，史米斯开辟了马克思主义各种振兴的影响，尤其是女性主义、对话、存在主义现象学和微观社会学取向。在这些不同的影响下，出现了一种非传统的社会理论，它远远超过了其组成部分的总和，在日常生活的批判性分析中占据着重要的地位。正如Steven Seidman在有争议的知识，史米斯的目标一直是工艺学和妇女，看起来女性的经验、利益和价值观作为社会知识和政治基础。[她]提供了一个强大的，富有想象力的道德视野的社会学和一个社会，其中知识是主导力量和我们的社会希望'（1994：304, 305）。Henri Lefebvre

结束语
In this book I have sketched out the main elements of a critical ‘everyday life’ paradigm, focusing on certain thinkers and traditions I felt to be most representative of such an approach. Less a unified ‘theory’ than a general sensibility or ethos connected by a series of overlapping themes, it represents a mode of cultural, social and historiographic investigation that is, in the best and most productive sense of the word, interdisciplinary. Drawing inspiration from anthropology, sociology, geography, literary and cultural theory, political studies, and philosophy, it is fraught with possibilities that extend well beyond these disciplines. Although the tone of my commentary has been occasionally critical, even the casual reader will recognize an overarching sense of empathy and enthusiasm for this project – mainly because the perspective outlined here sets out to supersede many of the debilitating dualisms, philosophical blindspots and ethico-political compromises of mainstream social science. It argues that everyday life deserves to be taken seriously and is worthy of intensive study in its own right.
在这本书中，我勾画了一个批判的“日常生活”范式的主要元素，重点是我认为最有代表性的思想家和传统。不统一的“理论”不是一般的情感或精神由一系列重叠的主题相连，它代表的是一种模式的文化、社会和历史的研究，是在世界上最好的和最有生产力的意义上，跨学科。从人类学、社会学、地理学、文学和文化理论、政治学和哲学中汲取灵感，充满了超越这些学科的可能性。虽然我的评论的语气已经偶尔批评，即使不经意的读者会认识一个包罗万象的同理心和热情为这个项目–主要因为这里列出的角度出发来取代许多衰弱的二元论，哲学的盲点与主流社会科学的伦理政治妥协。它认为日常生活应该受到重视，值得自己深入研究。

Yet it is not satisfied with the mere documentation or neutral description of mundane social practices, as practised by ethnomethodology or symbolic interactionism. It is also concerned with the transformation of daily life into something quite different, because the latter is held to contain ‘redemptive’ moments that point towards a transfigured and liberated social existence, and that must be realized fully. Established forms of social theorizing have occluded rather than facilitated a proper understanding of this sphere because they have transcribed the embodied, affective and experiential qualities of profane social life into rarefied abstractions that dovetail with the requirements of technocratic power. This denigration of the everyday is both symptom and bulwark of the alienated, reified character of society under the regime of modernity, and its tendency to hypostatize the phenomenally ‘given’ at the expense of deeper, underlying processes and potentialities. By concentrating on such apparent trivialities as the ‘culinary act, festive moments, daily walks, leisure activities and the like’, the everyday life standpoint effectively side-steps such static sociological abstractions as ‘roles’ or ‘structures’. We are therefore able to bear more accurate witness to the pluralistic, collective energies that constitute the minutiae of lived social relations, generate new forms of personal identity and express our corporeal needs and desires, and that might even denote a ‘new form of sedition’, as Michel Maffesoli characterizes it (1990: 90, 92). The everyday life paradigm seeks to relate the particular to the general, locate the concrete in the universal, and to grasp the wider sociohistorical context within which everyday practices are necessarily inscribed. It evinces certain affinities with the postmodernist predilection for the peripheral and the de-centred, and its imperative to give a voice to the silenced, but it declines to make a fetish of marginality for its own sake. It does not shirk from the difficult task of social and ideological critique, and articulates an ethics of alterity or ‘otherness’. In so doing, it adheres to a more synoptic and dialectical (or ‘dialogical’) perspective than ‘establishment’ postmodernism would ever contemplate.
然而，它不是仅仅满足于文档或世俗社会实践中性描述，实行由常人方法论、符号互动论。它也关注日常生活进入完全不同的转变，因为后者被认为包含“救赎”的时候，指向了解放的社会存在，必须充分认识到。建立社会理论形式有遮挡而不是促进正确理解这球因为他们转录的体现、情感和体验品质的世俗社会生活进入稀薄的抽象，配合技术能力要求。这种诋毁的每天都是征兆和异化的壁垒，物化的社会特征的现代性体制下，其倾向于实体非常'给'在更深的费用、基本过程和潜力。通过对这种琐事的烹饪法，喜庆的时刻，每天散步、休闲等活动，日常生活的角度有效侧步骤静态社会学的抽象的“角色”或“结构”。我们也因此能够承受更准确的证人到多元化、集体能量构成的细节生活的社会关系，产生新的个人身份的形式表达我们的需要和欲望，这可能表示一个新形式的叛乱”，米歇尔·马费索利把它（1990：90, 92）。日常生活范式旨在与特殊到一般，在通用定位混凝土，并掌握更广阔的社会历史语境的日常实践必然是刻。它表现出一定的亲和力与外周和去中心的后现代主义倾向，其必须给沉默的声音，但它拒绝为自己而盲目崇拜的边缘性。它不逃避社会和意识形态批判的艰巨任务，并阐明了一个道德的异性或“他者”。在这样做时，它坚持了更提纲挈领的和辩证（或“对话”）的角度比'建立'后会考虑。

The critical approach to the study of everyday life therefore conforms to what Rob Shields (1999: 188) has usefully termed a ‘utopian humanism’: it is an outlook that celebrates the intrinsic but oft-hidden promises and possibilities of ordinary human beings and the inherent value of commonsensical forms of thought, but that recognizes limitations in the prosaic world as it is currently constituted, and that is attuned to the transgressive, sensual and incandescent qualities of everyday existence, whereby the entire fabric of daily life can take on a festive hue and be considered akin to a ‘work of art’.
为了研究日常生活批判方法因此符合Rob Shields（1999：188）已成功地被称为“人文主义”乌托邦：这是一种庆祝的内在但经常隐藏的承诺和普通人的可能性和常识的思维方式所固有的价值观，但承认局限在平凡的世界按照目前的构成，这是适应了有犯罪倾向的，世俗的和充满激情的的日常生存的特质，即日常生活的整个织物可以有节日的色调，而被认为是类似于“艺术作品”。