# CryptoPAC
**Acronym**: Crypto Political Action Committee.

**Goal**: The goal of the Crypto PAC is to allow community members to pool their influence and manage their attention while retaining sovereignty over their stakeholdership.

**Abstract**: It has been observed that crypto tokens have a wide range of properties related to *money* but that their actual *moneyness* varies widely. The discussion of *moneyness* provides necessary nuance to the emerging economic design space. We futher acknowledge that the political design space is being experimented with. Crypto-networks have a wide range of proerties related to *democracy* but their actual **democracyness** varies widely. In fact many *DAO*s are actually are plutocratic, despite democratic ideals. Tokenized systems provide a lot of capacity for democratic arrangements but this is not nessessarily acheieved through maximizing liquidity as too much freedom in the flow of power accelerates the accumulation of power amongst the powerful. The CryptoPAC aims to recognize the inherent political aspects of human organizations and to make equipment to empower self-organzation and self-actualization at the community level. To do so we parameterize tradeoffs related to infuence, attention, and capital, to improve coordination in the allocation of these resources by self-selected communities.

This endeavor maybe viewed as the political counterpart to such projects like MolochDAO and MetaCartel that aim to allocate capital. CryptoPACs are a primitive for allocating attention and decision making power, which are tied to tokenized voting rights. Unlike capital allocation voting rights retain their value when used; also unlike the capital allocation DAOs, the PAC does not require continuing injections of capital to continue its operation. Nonethesis the size and power of the PAC may ebb and flow as the stakeholdership allocates more or less capital and attention to it.

TLDR: *Second order mechanism for influence pooling*

### Existing experimentations

The moloch bribery contract (https://selloutdao.com/) is an early attempt at enabling outsiders to exert influence in a permissioned digital polity against capital by having a member sells its influence for a fee.
While pointing at serious attack vectors for on-chain governnce there is no mechanism enabling both honest and adversarial agents to pool influence.

### Design parameters:
ideally this would be highly cloneable for many unique PACs rather than insentivizing one super-PAC.

the purpose of having explicit design parameters is so that cloned DAOs can take on a form unique to their creators with minimal changes to core code.

- the reserve currency: the voting currency of a DAO, for example ANT
- bonding curve shape parameters, generally define this in term of a an invariant function F such that $F(reserve, supply)=const$,
- proportial example . $R/S = constant$, this is trivially $S=R$, one for one deposit for PAC token.
- for example $R^2/S = const.$, this example creates a diminishing return for overloading a single PAC with reserve, and instead incentivizes PACs to split into smaller interest groups as they get larger.
- By enabling staking on political opinion expression vehicles we incentivize curation of political issues.
- By setting the constant and/or the curvature of the invariant function we can tune this. We discussed using a desired fraction of the ANT supply as a critical point in the phase space.
- exit fee, $\phi$
- when redeeming: $r_{out} = (1-\phi)\cdot Redeem(s_{burned})$

### Mechanisms:
Rough outline of the methods the contract would need to have

- deposit reserve currency to mint PAC tokens
- burn PAC tokens to redeem reserve currency
- if exit fee then fee is charged on redemption and the reserve tokens stay in the PAC assigned to the PAC address
- PAC token holders delegate their PAC tokens to other PAC token holders
- this is a signalling mechanism which is used as part of a process that determines who has the the authority to sign a transaction on behalf of the PAC, essentially some form of liquid democracy for governers
- it is expected that the governers can change but we want that process to be somewhat illiquid so there is an important tradeoff between faster and slower processes for changing decision makers
- to incentivize delegating tokens more widely than mapping them all to one address, a quadratic cost of delagated votes could be included (this would also make the project more likely to get positive attention from RxC)
- We want to be able to lock the mint and burn mechanisms leading up to and during important voting events
- locking is MVP
- later on conviction voting style mechanisms can provide time smoothing that limits the need for locking mechanics
- Vote; the governers would participate in a multi-transaction process in order to caste a vote with the full weight of the PAC on proposal called where the reserve currency is a unit of voting power
- retain transparency about which governors voted and how they votes so that the governors remain accountable to the community that empoweres them to vote on their behalf
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### Multi-agent Flow:

1. Stake ANT
* A liquidity pool can be employed to accept multiple tokens including governance and prediction tokens
* Multiple curves with different CWs in order to accumulate the collateral to ANT
2. Mint NFT as claim
* NFT as receipt containing stake amount, timestamp
* Alternatives?
3. CryptoPAC DAO* signals with collateral:
* DAO members can propose a safe execute action via the Agent app that handles the reserve pool funds
* if the proposal is accepted the dao signs a transaction with the collateral amount to signal in other contracts
* Withdrawal freezing around network votes to prevent attacks (can use 1hive's delay app)
* Alternatively, use of conviction voting
4. Participants redeem collateral by burning NFTs

**CryptoPAC DAOs are council formations which hold representative rights based on their undersignatories/participants. The governance mechanisms of these formations will be entertained non-deterministically in order to allow for emergent design patterns and alternative templates.*

5. Nested PAC's : one of the issues with big tent parties in majoritarian democracies is the requirement for convergence with the political center (the so called median voter) and flattening of intra-party opinions. Nested PACs allow political agents to pool influence and vote separetely as a subgroup on some issues where they can diverge while pooling their votes on consensual issues. This could work via a complex and specific routing of permission enabling a meta-dao use the pool of subdaos to signal votes only if the subdaos unanimously agree on an issue. If not they are free to individually vote.

### (Format placement) Design Objectives:
- Incentivize cloning and fragmentation
-