In a naive implementation where the local EL client sorts transactions by priority fee, an adversarial actor (e.g., the proposer for slot n+1
) could flood the mempool with their own transactions, occupying most of the available space in inclusion lists (ILs). When proposing a block, this actor could intentionally invalidate these transactions, incurring minimal cost. As a result, the IL space is wasted, reducing efficiency and affecting overall IL performance.
n
. This allows the proposer of slot n+1
to bypass the inclusion list at a reasonable cost.
The current approach of the IL committee packing transactions from the local mempool using only priority gas fees is insufficient and can easily be manipulated. To improve this, we propose defining a more robust scoring function for transactions in the mempool. The variables for this scoring function are defined below, but the approach is not limited to these variables. Each client should be able to choose its own variants, which will enhance client diversity. With this variability, the IL transactions become more challenging to exploit, as the IL committee will be composed of different client implementations.
Bonuses:
Then, for example, a possible scoring function could be:
Where is a positive constant that controls the exponential scaling based on reorgs. A higher value means the score will increase more sharply with each additional reorg.