This is not (yet) a governance proposal for IPFS; at this stage it is a set of notes and questions about how IPFS governance could work. The idea is to discuss and iterate, and to let some of these ideas marinate in the community for some time.
A plausible and pragmatic governance structure could look roughly like this:
ipfs
or
ipfs-shipyard
orgs but we should ensure that we count things like organizing a conference
or local event, writing documentation, cat herding, outreach. CoC violations can lead to
exclusion from the NomCom.Questions:
One difficulty in setting up community governance is to avoid giving excessive power to a single group. Implementers have a lot of inherent power simply based on their control of infrastructure, and NomCom structured as above will easily consolidate that power. This can easily lead to toxic cultures in which implementers become gatekeepers for the entire community and believe themselves fair while in fact only listening to input that matches their biases. (This is the "call center" model of governance, in which the KPI is that implementers will consider themselves successful if they've listened to some people.)
Avoiding entrenched bias can only be achieved when decisionmakers are confronted with actual reality checks. (We can think of this as the scientific method for governance.) We should therefore look for ways to guarantee that a variety of stakeholders is represented, and can both collaborate and keep one another in check.
There are several ways to achieve that, depending on which stakeholders we wish to see represented. One is to divide the NomCom into constituencies and guarantee representation in each group for all constituencies. Each constituency could then have different rules for NomCom eligibility (eg. the implementers constituency might have commits, operators might have some measure of participation in BANANA, community leaders might have events organized). Another option is to reserve some seats for reps of other orgs. Say, hypothetically, a representative from the Content Addressable Alliance gets a seat and a vote. (How they pick that rep is up to them.) These options can be mixed.
A simpler mechanism will work better than a more complex one that tries to be scrupulously fair in excessive detail. The key questions are:
We have a decent idea of how to build governance for a project the size and maturity of IPFS, even if it involves a number of open questions for fine-tuning.
What we don't know is how to avoid becoming insular, how to not develop a culture that is too weird and too detached from outside reality. Most governance groups of this nature develop exceedingly strong in-group mentalities. That makes for a powerful (and stimulating) driver of work while a project is still young and in need of adoption, but it cuts off participation from others and severely reduces diversity.
People regularly need to spin up groups to coordinate doing things (not necessarily producing specs). We need a lightweight process to set these up (and spin them down), and some basic infrastructure to make them pleasant to work with.
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tk The Fund is a pretty important part of this; how do we enshrine and administer it? How do we encourage it to grow and get funders to contribute?
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