You are absolutely right! My apologies for the misunderstanding. I was still stuck in the one-threat-per-asset mindset.

Let's redo Step 2.2 correctly. Each asset will have **three** threats, one each corresponding to **Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A)**. Each threat will also have a threat value (1-3) based on its frequency, as defined on page 7 of the assignment document.

Here is the revised Step 2.2 table with three threats per asset mapped to C, I, and A:

**Threat Identification and Mapping Table:**

| Asset No. | Asset | Vulnerability | V. Value | V. Reason | C. Threat | C. Threat Value | C. Threat Reason | I. Threat | I. Threat Value | I. Threat Reason | A. Threat | A. Threat Value | A. Threat Reason |
| :-------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1 | Official GDP Figures and Growth Rate Statistics | **Inadequate Access Control and Data Handling Practices** | 2 | While the *impact* of compromised economic data is severe, exploitation requires a threat with the means to bypass access controls and data handling. This is less likely to occur once a generic threat shows up. So, once the threat *frequently* targets such systems, this becomes vulnerable. | **Data Breach by External Attackers** | 2 | While significant, these attackers may not *constantly* target GDP data. | **Data Manipulation by Malicious Insider** | 2 | Requires a trusted insider with access, making it less frequent than a constant threat. | **DoS Attack Targeting Economic Data Repositories** | 1 | Unlikely to be a frequent target; availability of this specific data is not as critical as other assets. |
| 2 | Trade Agreements and Related Documentation | **Insufficient Protection Against Unauthorized Access and Disclosure** | 2 | While highly sensitive, exploiting the lack of strong access controls and encryption *frequently* during an intrusion attempt is more probable than immediately with a single generic threat. | **Espionage by Foreign Governments** | 2 | A realistic threat, as foreign entities may have an interest in sensitive trade information, but likely targeted, not constant. | **Data Falsification by Disgruntled Employees** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; requires specific motivation and access. | **System Outage Due to Hardware Failure** | 1 | Availability of trade agreement data is less critical than operational data; hardware failures are less frequent. |
| 3 | Financial Forecasts and Projections | **Inadequate Data Integrity Controls and Insider Threat** | 2 | While the impact is high, exploiting a lack of data integrity controls requires an insider threat or a frequent threat who targets such systems. A general threat will not immediately access such system with ease, so, a value of 2. | **Leak of Sensitive Information by Insider** | 2 | Possible but requires an insider with access and intent, making it less frequent than a constant threat. | **Data Corruption by Software Glitch** | 2 | Software glitches that affect data integrity can happen, but are not a constant threat. | **DDoS Attack Targeting Financial Data Systems** | 1 | While possible, unlikely to be a frequent occurrence; less critical than availability of operational systems. |
| 4 | Tax Revenue Data | **Compromised Data Security Due to Weak Access Controls and Encryption** | 2 | While sensitive, exploiting weak controls and encryption requires more than just a generic threat and *frequent* attempts. An occasional threat would not expose this. | **Unauthorized Access by Cybercriminals** | 2 | Cybercriminals may target this data for financial gain, but it might not be a constant threat. | **Data Modification by Malicious Insider** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent. | **System Downtime Due to Power Outage** | 1 | While power outages can occur, they are infrequent and less likely to specifically target tax data systems. |
| 5 | Geological Survey Reports and Maps (Mineral Reserves) | **Vulnerabilities in GIS and Data Management Systems** | 2 | While GIS vulnerabilities are significant, they require *frequent* targeting of the specific GIS and data management systems. | **Theft of Data by Competitors** | 2 | Industrial espionage is a possibility, but likely to be targeted, not a constant threat. | **Data Tampering by Disgruntled Employee** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access, making it less frequent. | **System Failure Due to Natural Disaster** | 1 | While possible, natural disasters affecting these specific systems are infrequent. |
| 6 | Resource Estimation Reports (Mineral Reserves) | **Insufficient Data Integrity and Validation Controls** | 2 | While the *impact* is severe, exploitation of the lack of data integrity is not possible once the threat occurs, instead it is possible when the threat *frequently* appears. | **Leak of Confidential Information by Employees** | 1 | Possible but less likely and less frequent than a targeted attack. | **Data Corruption by Faulty Software Update** | 2 | While possible, faulty software updates are not a constant threat. | **Denial of Service Attack on Data Repositories** | 1 | Availability of these reports is less critical than operational systems, making DoS attacks less likely. |
| 7 | Contracts and Agreements with Mining Companies | **Inadequate Physical and Digital Document Security** | 2 | While the potential impact is significant, unauthorized disclosure requires *frequent* attempts to bypass physical security or digital controls. | **Theft of Physical Documents by Unauthorized Personnel** | 2 | Possible but requires physical access, making it less frequent than a constant threat. | **Unauthorized Modification of Contracts by Insider** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent. | **Loss of Documents Due to Fire or Flood** | 1 | While possible, these events are infrequent. |
| 8 | Agricultural Crop Yield Statistics | **Data Integrity Issues Due to Inadequate Input Validation and Monitoring** | 2 | Exploiting data validation issues to misrepresent crop yields requires *frequent* opportunities to manipulate data over time. | **Leak of Data by Employees** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; not highly sensitive data. | **Data Manipulation by External Actors (e.g., for market manipulation)** | 2 | Possible, but requires motive and capability, making it less frequent than a constant threat. | **System Downtime Due to Server Maintenance** | 1 | Planned maintenance is infrequent and usually announced in advance. |
| 9 | Agricultural Export Volumes | **Data Manipulation and Reporting Errors** | 2 | Exploiting data manipulation and reporting errors requires a threat who is *frequently* attempting to change data over time. | **Unauthorized Disclosure of Data** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; not highly sensitive data. | **Data Falsification by Employees** | 2 | Possible, but requires motive and opportunity, making it less frequent than a constant threat. | **Disruption of Data Reporting Systems** | 1 | Less likely and less critical than disruption of operational systems. |
| 10 | Geological Survey Reports (Offshore Oil and Gas) | **Compromised Data Security and Unauthorized Access** | 2 | While data is highly sensitive, a threat would need *frequent* attempts to compromise access controls and encryption. | **Espionage by Foreign Governments or Competitors** | 2 | A realistic threat due to the strategic importance of oil and gas, but likely to be targeted, not constant. | **Data Tampering by Malicious Insider** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent. | **System Failure Due to Software Glitch** | 1 | While possible, software glitches causing system failures are less frequent. |
| 11 | Seismic Data (Offshore Oil and Gas) | **High Sensitivity Data with Inadequate Protection** | 2 | While very sensitive, exploiting this requires the threat to be *frequently* targeting these systems. | **Theft of Data by Foreign Intelligence Agencies** | 2 | A realistic threat due to the strategic importance of oil and gas, but likely to be targeted, not constant. | **Data Corruption Due to Hardware Malfunction** | 1 | Less frequent than a targeted attack. | **Denial of Access Due to Natural Disaster** | 1 | While possible, natural disasters affecting these specific systems are infrequent. |
| 12 | Drilling Reports (Offshore Oil and Gas) | **Vulnerabilities in Data Collection and Reporting Systems** | 2 | While it impacts business decisions, exploiting the vulnerabilities requires the threat to be *frequently* targeting data collection and reporting system. | **Leak of Confidential Information by Employees or Contractors** | 2 | Possible, but likely to be targeted, not a constant threat. | **Data Falsification by Employees to Inflate Production Figures** | 2 | Requires motive and opportunity; less frequent, but possible. | **Disruption of Data Reporting Due to Network Issues** | 1 | Less frequent and less critical than disruption of operational systems. |
| 13 | Environmental Impact Assessments (Oil & Gas) | **Insufficient Document Security and Access Controls** | 2 | This is sensitive but does not represent a high exploitable attack vector to require a 3. This will require *frequent* attempts. | **Unauthorized Disclosure by Hacktivists** | 2 | Possible, driven by environmental concerns, but might not be a constant threat. | **Data Modification by Disgruntled Employees** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent. | **Loss of Data Due to Accidental Deletion** | 1 | While possible, less frequent than a targeted attack. |
| 14 | Production Forecasts (Oil & Gas) | **Data Integrity and Unauthorized Access Risks** | 2 | While the impact can be severe, a threat must *frequently* attempt to modify data. So, the vulnerability is only exploitable when the threat frequently attempts access to it. | **Espionage by Competitors** | 2 | Industrial espionage is a possibility, but likely to be targeted, not constant. | **Data Manipulation by Malicious Insider to Impact Market Prices** | 2 | Requires motive, access, and opportunity; less frequent but possible. | **System Downtime Due to Server Failure** | 1 | While possible, server failures are less frequent and less critical than disruption of operational systems. |
| 15 | Pipeline Infrastructure Schematics (Oil & Gas) | **Security Vulnerabilities in Systems Storing and Displaying Schematics** | 2 | Requires an attacker to specifically target pipeline schematic systems, a task that is not likely with one attempt. This is possible when a threat is *frequently* accessing the system. | **Theft of Data by Terrorist Organizations** | 2 | A serious threat, but likely to be targeted, not constant. | **Data Tampering by Malicious Insider to Cause Disruption** | 2 | Requires high-level access and specific motive; less frequent but possible. | **Denial of Access Due to System Sabotage** | 2 | Possible but requires physical access or sophisticated cyberattack; less frequent than other threats. |
| 16 | Employment Statistics by Sector | **Data Integrity and Collection Errors** | 1 | Errors in data collection are only possible when the collection process is *very frequently* being used. These are human errors or errors introduced with data collection software used at this time. | **Unauthorized Disclosure of Data by Employees** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; not highly sensitive data. | **Data Manipulation by Employees** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; limited impact. | **System Downtime Due to Software Update** | 1 | Planned updates are infrequent and announced in advance. |
| 17 | Skill Gap Analyses | **Data Security and Potential for Misuse** | 2 | While there are risks, it is unlikely this can be exploited immediately when the threat appears once. It needs *frequent* attempts. | **Leak of Information by Disgruntled Employees** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; limited impact. | **Data Falsification by Employees** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; limited impact. | **System Downtime Due to Server Maintenance** | 1 | Planned maintenance is infrequent and usually announced. |
| 18 | Educational Attainment Levels of Workforce | **Data Accuracy and Reporting Vulnerabilities** | 1 | Errors are most likely introduced with *very frequent* reporting and manipulation of the data entry and reporting itself. Otherwise, a single attack will not make this data exploitable immediately. | **Unauthorized Access to Data by External Parties** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; limited impact. | **Data Manipulation by Employees** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; limited impact. | **System Downtime Due to Hardware Failure** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; limited impact. |
| 19 | Specific Infrastructure Project Proposals and Blueprints (Roads, Rail, etc.) | **Vulnerabilities in Document Management and Access Control Systems** | 2 | While access controls might be weak, a single generic threat will not be able to expose this system with one attempt. Requires *frequent* attempts. | **Theft of Intellectual Property by Competitors** | 2 | Industrial espionage is a possibility, but likely to be targeted, not constant. | **Data Modification by Disgruntled Employees** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent. | **Loss of Data Due to Accidental Deletion** | 1 | While possible, less frequent than a targeted attack. |
| 20 | Financial Agreements with Infrastructure Investors | **Insufficient Document Security and Contract Management Practices** | 2 | Though sensitive, exploiting the inadequate document security requires frequent attempts to get access to these systems and documents. A general threat would not do this with a single attempt. | **Leak of Confidential Information by Employees or Contractors** | 2 | Possible, but likely to be targeted, not a constant threat. | **Unauthorized Alteration of Agreements by Malicious Insider** | 1 | Requires high-level access and specific motive; less frequent. | **System Downtime Due to Power Outage** | 1 | Less frequent and less critical than disruption of operational systems. |
| 21 | Progress Reports on Infrastructure Development | **Data Integrity and Reporting Accuracy Vulnerabilities** | 2 | Errors in data collection and reporting requires *frequent* manipulation or access to systems where these reports are generated and stored. A single attack will not have an immediate impact. | **Unauthorized Disclosure of Information by Employees** | 2 | Possible, but may not be a constant threat. | **Data Falsification by Contractors to Hide Delays or Overruns** | 2 | Requires motive and opportunity; less frequent but possible. | **Disruption of Reporting Systems Due to Network Issues** | 1 | Less frequent and less critical than disruption of operational systems. |
| 22 | Diplomatic Communications and Strategy Documents (G20) | **High-Value Target with Inadequate Protection Against Unauthorized Disclosure** | 2 | Though sensitive, unauthorized disclosure requires a threat who is *frequently* making attempts to get access to communication channels and documents. | **Espionage by Foreign Intelligence Agencies** | 2 | A serious threat due to the political sensitivity, but likely to be targeted, not constant. | **Data Tampering by Malicious Insider to Sabotage Negotiations** | 1 | Requires high-level access and specific motive; less frequent. | **Loss of Data Due to System Failure** | 1 | Less frequent and less critical than a targeted attack. |
| 23 | Economic Reform Plans Related to G20 Criteria | **Sensitive Information with Inadequate Access Control and Data Security** | 2 | Though sensitive, unauthorized disclosure requires a threat who is *frequently* making attempts to get access to planning documents and systems. | **Leak of Information by Government Officials** | 2 | Possible, but likely to be targeted, not a constant threat. | **Data Modification by Employees to Undermine Reforms** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent. | **System Downtime Due to Cyberattack** | 1 | Less frequent and less critical than disruption of core operational systems. |
| 24 | National Cybersecurity Strategy Documents | **Compromised Document Security and Unauthorized Access** | 2 | Although a primary target, access requires a threat who is *frequently* targeting document systems and access controls. | **Theft of Data by Foreign Governments** | 2 | A serious threat due to the strategic importance, but likely to be targeted, not constant. | **Data Alteration by Malicious Insider to Weaken Security Posture** | 1 | Requires high-level access and specific motive; less frequent. | **Loss of Documents Due to Natural Disaster** | 1 | While possible, these events are infrequent. |
| 25 | NCA Cybersecurity Incident Response Plans | **Inadequate Protection Against Unauthorized Access and Disclosure** | 2 | Though a key system, getting access requires a threat who is *frequently* targeting document systems and access controls. | **Espionage by Foreign Intelligence Agencies** | 2 | A serious threat, but likely to be targeted, not constant. | **Data Modification by Malicious Insider to Disrupt Response Efforts** | 1 | Requires high-level access and specific motive; less frequent. | **System Downtime Due to Hardware Failure** | 1 | While possible, hardware failures affecting these specific systems are infrequent. |
| 26 | NCA Vulnerability Management Procedures | **Vulnerabilities in Systems and Processes for Vulnerability Management** | 2 | Exploiting vulnerabilities in management process requires *frequent* targeting of that specific system. | **Theft of Data by Competitors or Hacktivists** | 2 | Possible, but likely to be targeted, not a constant threat. | **Data Corruption by Software Glitch** | 1 | Less frequent than a targeted attack. | **Denial of Access Due to System Overload** | 1 | Less frequent and less critical than disruption of core operational systems. |
| 27 | NCA Cyber Threat Intelligence Reports | **Compromised Security of Threat Intelligence Data** | 2 | While very sensitive, this requires *frequent* targeting of threat systems and their security controls. | **Espionage by Foreign Governments** | 2 | A serious threat due to the strategic importance, but likely to be targeted, not constant. | **Data Falsification by Malicious Insider to Mislead Analysis** | 1 | Requires high-level access and specific motive; less frequent. | **System Downtime Due to Power Outage** | 1 | While possible, power outages affecting these specific systems are infrequent. |
| 28 | Contact Information and Communication Protocols between NCA and Critical Infrastructure | **Vulnerabilities in Communication Channels and Contact Databases** | 2 | Exploiting vulnerabilities to disrupt communications needs a threat to *frequently* probe and attempt access to communication channels. | **Phishing Attacks Targeting NCA Personnel** | 2 | Possible, but might not be a constant threat. | **Data Manipulation by Disgruntled Employees** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent. | **DDoS Attack on NCA Communication Systems** | 2 | Possible and could be disruptive, but may not be a constant threat. |
| 29 | Records of Cybersecurity Incidents Reported to the NCA | **Inadequate Protection of Incident Records and Reporting Systems** | 2 | Exploiting inadequate protection of records requires a threat who is *frequently* trying to access records and systems. | **Unauthorized Access by Hacktivists or Cybercriminals** | 2 | Possible, but might not be a constant threat. | **Data Tampering by Malicious Insider to Conceal Incidents** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent. | **System Downtime Due to Software Glitch** | 1 | While possible, software glitches causing system failures are less frequent. |
| 30 | Office Building PC User Data and Settings | **User-Level Security Vulnerabilities due to Lack of Awareness and Unpatched Systems** | 3 | User susceptibility to phishing and social engineering *immediately* makes this exploitable, as there is no way to mitigate with one attempt. Any threat immediately compromises users due to lack of awareness and outdates systems. | **Phishing Attacks** | 3 | A very common and frequent threat. | **Malware Infection via Removable Media** | 2 | Less frequent than phishing, but still a significant threat. | **System Downtime Due to User Error** | 1 | While possible, user errors causing system downtime are less frequent than other threats. |
| 31 | Installed Software and Applications on Office Building PCs | **Presence of Unauthorized, Unvetted, or Outdated Software** | 3 | This is immediately exploitable upon any threat appearing as there are always new pieces of unvetted software, outdated software, or unauthorized software running on the PCs. | **Exploit of Software Vulnerabilities** | 3 | A very common and frequent threat, especially with outdated software. | **Software Misconfiguration Leading to Errors** | 2 | Less frequent than exploits, but can still occur. | **Software Crash Due to Bugs** | 1 | While possible, less frequent than other threats. |
| 32 | Files Stored on Office LAN File Servers | **Insufficient Access Controls and Lack of File Integrity Monitoring** | 2 | Weak access controls and lack of integrity monitoring requires the threat to be *frequently* probing the file systems to be effective. | **Unauthorized Access by Employees** | 2 | Possible, but may not be a constant threat; depends on internal controls. | **Data Corruption Due to Hardware Failure** | 1 | Less frequent than unauthorized access. | **Denial of Access Due to Server Overload** | 1 | Less frequent and less critical than disruption of core operational systems. |
| 33 | Access Logs for Office LAN File Servers | **Inadequate Log Management and Analysis Practices** | 2 | Access logs that are not regularly monitored and analyzed require *frequent* manipulation of log systems. So this vulnerability is not exploitable with a single threat attempt. | **Unauthorized Access to Logs by Employees** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; not a primary target. | **Log Tampering by Malicious Insider** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent. | **Log File Corruption Due to Software Glitch** | 1 | While possible, less frequent than other threats. |
| 34 | Print Queues and Scan History on Multifunction Printers | **Network Segmentation and Device Security Weaknesses** | 2 | Exploiting the lack of segmentation requires a threat to be probing *frequently*. Also, weak device security is not immediately exposed without repeated probes by an attacker. | **Sniffing of Network Traffic to Capture Print Jobs** | 2 | Possible, but requires specific technical skills and may not be a constant threat. | **Unauthorized Modification of Printer Settings** | 1 | Less likely and less frequent; limited impact. | **Printer Denial of Service Due to Network Issues** | 1 | Less frequent and less critical than disruption of core operational systems. |
| 35 | Call Logs and Configurations of Telephones (Office LAN) | **Vulnerabilities in VoIP Systems and Weak Authentication** | 2 | The weaknesses in VoIP systems require *frequent* attempts to target those vulnerabilities to get access or eavesdrop. One attempt will not do it. | **Eavesdropping on VoIP Calls** | 2 | Possible, but may not be a constant threat; depends on the implementation of security controls. | **Call Data Manipulation by Malicious Insider** | 1 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent. | **Disruption of VoIP Service Due to Network Congestion** | 1 | Less frequent and less critical than disruption of core operational systems. |
| 36 | Configuration Files for Office LAN Networking Equipment (Routers, Switches) | **Unsecured Management Interfaces and Weak Configuration Management** | 3 | If management interfaces for network devices are not properly secured, they can be easily exploited by any threat that appear to target the device. It does not require frequent activity. | **Unauthorized Access to Management Interface** | 3 | A significant and frequent threat if devices are not properly secured. | **Configuration Errors Leading to Network Instability** | 2 | Less frequent than unauthorized access, but can still occur. | **Denial of Service Attack Targeting Network Devices** | 2 | Possible and can be disruptive, but may not be a constant threat. |
| 37 | Operating Systems of Computer Center Servers | **Outdated and Unpatched Operating Systems** | 3 | This is very easy to exploit once a generic threat occurs. A server with outdated OS is immediately vulnerable to any threat. | **Exploit of OS Vulnerabilities** | 3 | A very common and frequent threat, especially with outdated operating systems. | **OS Configuration Errors Leading to Security Weaknesses** | 2 | Less frequent than exploits, but can still occur. | **System Crash Due to Hardware Failure** | 1 | While possible, less frequent than other threats. |
| 38 | Application Software Running on Computer Center Servers | **Vulnerable and Unpatched Application Software** | 3 | Similar to the OS, unpatched software is easily exploitable upon the appearance of any threat. It does not require the threat to act frequently. | **Exploit of Application Vulnerabilities** | 3 | A very common and frequent threat, especially with unpatched applications. | **Application Misconfiguration Leading to Security Issues** | 2 | Less frequent than exploits, but can still occur. | **Application Crash Due to Bugs** | 1 | While possible, less frequent than other threats. |
| 39 | Databases Hosted on Computer Center Servers | **Critical Data with Inadequate Database Security** | 3 | Weak database security makes it immediately exploitable once a general threat is targeting such systems. It does not require multiple attempts. | **SQL Injection Attacks** | 3 | A very common and frequent threat to databases. | **Database Corruption Due to Software Errors** | 1 | Less frequent than SQL injection attacks. | **Denial of Service Attack Targeting Databases** | 2 | Possible and can be disruptive, but may not be a constant threat. |
| 40 | Real-time Operational Data from Infrastructure Systems (ICS) | **Vulnerabilities in ICS Protocols and Data Transmission** | 3 | Because ICS protocols are by design vulnerable, *any* threat that attempts to exploit them will likely be successful once. | **Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on ICS Communications** | 3 | A significant threat to the integrity of ICS data. | **Data Manipulation by Malicious Actors** | 3 | A very serious threat that can directly impact physical processes. | **Disruption of ICS Operations Due to Network Attacks** | 3 | A significant threat that can cause immediate disruption. |
| 41 | Configuration Settings for Industrial Equipment (ICS) | **Insecure Configuration and Management of ICS Devices** | 3 | Because ICS configuration is typically done with weak passwords and weak interfaces, they are immediately vulnerable with any appearance of a threat attempting to get into those systems. | **Unauthorized Access and Modification by Malicious Actors** | 3 | A very serious threat that can directly impact physical processes. | **Configuration Errors Leading to Equipment Malfunction** | 2 | Less frequent than unauthorized access, but can still occur. | **Denial of Service Attack on ICS Devices** | 3 | A significant threat that can cause immediate disruption. |
| 42 | Historical Data Logs from Industrial Equipment (ICS) | **Lack of Log Integrity and Secure Storage** | 2 | Requires *frequent* attempts to manipulate or delete logs from these systems. One attempt will not expose the vulnerability. | **Unauthorized Access to Logs by Malicious Actors** | 2 | Possible, but may not be a constant threat. | **Log Tampering to Conceal Malicious Activity** | 2 | Requires specific motive and access; less frequent but possible. | **Loss of Logs Due to System Failure** | 1 | While possible, less frequent than other threats. |
| 43 | Configuration Files for Computer Center Networking Equipment | **Critical Network Devices with Inadequate Security Hardening and Configuration Management** | 3 | If the network devices are not properly configured and hardened, *any* threat can exploit the configuration problems immediately. It does not require multiple attempts or any specific targeting. | **Unauthorized Access and Modification of Device Configurations** | 3 | A very serious threat that can compromise the entire network. | **Configuration Errors Leading to Network Outages** | 2 | Less frequent than unauthorized access, but can still occur. | **Denial of Service Attack Targeting Network Devices** | 3 | A significant threat that can disrupt the entire infrastructure. |
| 44 | Data Stored on Blade Servers (Computer Center) | **Compromised Physical and Digital Security of Blade Servers** | 3 | The deactivated retina scan coupled with inadequate data protection immediately makes this system vulnerable to a physical intrusion or digital compromise. | **Theft of Data by Unauthorized Personnel (Physical or Remote)** | 3 | A significant threat due to the combination of physical and digital security weaknesses. | **Data Corruption Due to Hardware Failure** | 1 | Less frequent than unauthorized access. | **Denial of Access Due to Power Loss** | 1 | While possible, less frequent than other threats. |
| 45 | Content of the Telecom Grid Public Website | **Web Application Vulnerabilities (e.g., XSS, SQL Injection)** | 2 | Web application vulnerabilities are only exploitable if the threat is *frequently* scanning the system for vulnerabilities. A single general threat appearing once will not have any impact. | **Website Defacement by Hacktivists** | 2 | A common threat, but may not be constant. | **Data Corruption Due to Software Bugs** | 1 | Less frequent than website defacement. | **Denial of Service Attack on the Website** | 2 | Possible and can be disruptive, but may not be a constant threat. |

Tabel Vulnerability-threat part 2/2 ada di sini: https://hackmd.io/@naufalfaza/tabel-vulnerability-uas-2/edit