## CAPTION

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
**FOR THE [__________] DISTRICT OF [__________]**

**MICHAEL SCHWARTZ**,
*Pro Se Plaintiff*,

**v.**

**DONALD J. TRUMP**,
President of the United States,
The White House,
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW,
Washington, D.C. 20500

*Defendant.*

**Case No.:** _______________

---

### **COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (PRO SE)**

---

## I. INTRODUCTION

I did not write this alone. This document exists because of many hands, many minds. Librarians who pointed me to books I wouldn’t have found on my own. Aunts and uncles who read my drafts and told me where my words faltered. Teachers who taught me to argue with more than just anger. TikTok, YouTube, the scattered knowledge of the internet, and plain old-fashioned research. Every sentence here was shaped by people who still believe words matter, that the law still matters, that justice—however fragile—still holds.

I am homeless. The son of an illegal immigrant. A heroin addict, though I have that managed for now. I know what that makes me in the eyes of many. Lesser. Disposable. Someone whose words should not carry weight. That is fine. But it does not erase my rights. Not yet. Not until Trump finds a way to take them.

And so, with the help of those who saw value in me when the world did not, I have written this. Not with a lawyer, but with truth. I, Michael Schwartz, bring this Complaint pro se because I am suffering ongoing and direct harm from Donald J. Trump’s unconstitutional occupancy of the Office of the President.

The Constitution speaks plainly. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualifies anyone who has engaged in insurrection from holding office. Yet Trump, who incited the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol, has been allowed to reclaim power. Because no one has stopped him.

This Court must declare:

> That Donald J. Trump engaged in insurrection as defined under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

If this Court fails to act, then Trump will continue to wield unconstitutional power, and people like me—people this country already tries to erase—will pay the price.

---

## II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this case arises under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
2. Declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act).
3. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because substantial harm occurred in this District due to Defendant’s unconstitutional actions.

---

## III. PARTIES

- Plaintiff: Michael Schwartz, a homeless individual, filing pro se.
- Defendant: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, unconstitutionally holding office at The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20500.

---

## IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3, establishes a clear disqualification clause for individuals who have taken an oath to support the Constitution and subsequently engaged in insurrection. To evaluate whether Donald J. Trump meets these criteria, a structured legal analysis is necessary.

The analysis follows a logical sequence:

1. **Step 1** establishes that Trump took an oath to support the Constitution, a necessary condition for disqualification.
2. **Step 2** explains that Section 3 requires a legal determination that a person engaged in insurrection before disqualification can be enforced.
3. **Step 3** examines the findings of the Colorado Supreme Court in *Anderson v. Griswold*, which concluded that Trump engaged in insurrection.
4. **Step 4** discusses the role of federal courts in interpreting and applying Section 3.
5. **Step 5** clarifies that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in *Trump v. Anderson* addressed state enforcement but did not preclude federal judicial review.
6. **Step 6** considers declaratory judgment as the appropriate legal mechanism for determining eligibility under Section 3.
7. **Step 7** reviews the concept of self-execution in constitutional provisions and how it applies to Section 3.

This section presents the relevant constitutional provisions, legal interpretations, and judicial findings necessary to evaluate Trump’s status under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

### Step 1: Trump Meets the First Condition of Section 3 – Taking an Oath

- Premise 1: Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualifies any person from holding office if they have engaged in insurrection after taking an oath to support the Constitution.
- Premise 2: Donald Trump took the presidential oath on January 20, 2017, swearing to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."
- Conclusion (1): Therefore, Trump satisfies the one of two conditions of Section 3 because he took an oath to support the Constitution.

#### Why This Matters
The key issue is not whether Trump took an oath—this is undisputed. The only remaining question is whether he engaged in insurrection.

---

### Step 2: Section 3 Disqualification Requires a Legal Determination of Insurrection

- Premise 1: Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualifies any person from holding office if they have engaged in insurrection after taking an oath to support the Constitution.
- Premise 2: A determination of whether someone has engaged in insurrection is a legal question that requires a judicial or authoritative finding under constitutional standards.
- Conclusion (2): Therefore, a person is disqualified under Section 3 only after a court or legal authority determines that they engaged in insurrection.

#### Why This Matters
This explains why Trump’s disqualification is not automatic, even though Section 3 is self-executing. A legal determination is necessary to apply it.

Federal courts routinely rely on state court decisions involving federal constitutional issues, particularly when those decisions are well-reasoned and based on a thorough evidentiary record. For example, in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993), the Supreme Court held that federal courts may consider state court rulings as persuasive authority when they involve federal constitutional questions. Similarly, in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court emphasized the importance of uniformity in federal constitutional interpretation, which is furthered by giving weight to state court decisions that apply federal law. The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Griswold meets this standard, as it applied federal constitutional principles and conducted a rigorous evidentiary review. This Court should therefore consider Anderson’s findings and conclusions as persuasive authority in determining whether Defendant engaged in insurrection under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

---

### Step 3: Trump Meets the Second Condition of Section 3 – Engaging in Insurrection

- Premise 1 (from Conclusion 2): A person is disqualified under Section 3 only after a court or legal authority determines they engaged in insurrection.
- Premise 2: The Colorado Supreme Court, a court of competent jurisdiction, in *Anderson v. Griswold*, ruled that Trump engaged in insurrection under federal law, based on a full legal process and evidentiary findings.
- Conclusion 3: Trump meets the second condition of Section 3, as a court has already ruled that he engaged in insurrection, and this factual finding remains legally undisturbed.

---

#### Why This Matters

This establishes that there is already a judicial determination that Trump engaged in insurrection. A federal court does not need to re-litigate the facts—only determine whether Section 3 applies.

While the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in *Anderson v. Griswold* is not binding on federal courts, its factual findings and legal conclusions are the result of a rigorous judicial process applying federal constitutional principles. The court conducted an extensive evidentiary review, applying a clear and convincing evidence standard, and concluded that Defendant engaged in insurrection under federal law. These findings are persuasive and should be given substantial weight by this Court.

Federal courts routinely consider state court decisions as persuasive authority, particularly when they involve federal constitutional issues and are based on rigorous evidentiary review (*Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); *Lockhart v. Fretwell*, 506 U.S. 364 (1993)). While this Court is not bound by *Anderson v. Griswold*, the decision’s application of a clear and convincing evidence standard and its reliance on federal constitutional principles provide substantial support for its consideration in determining Trump’s ineligibility under Section 3.

The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in *Cawthorn v. Amalfi*, 35 F.4th 245 (4th Cir. 2022), confirms that modern federal officeholders are subject to Section 3, undermining any argument that its application is obsolete. This decision, which affirmed that courts can adjudicate disqualification claims, directly supports this Court’s jurisdiction in ruling on Defendant’s ineligibility under Section 3.

Even if this Court deems an independent factual review necessary, the findings in *Anderson v. Griswold* provide a fully developed evidentiary framework, allowing this Court to avoid unnecessary duplication of fact-finding. The Colorado Supreme Court applied a detailed legal framework consistent with Supreme Court precedent, including *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), to evaluate incitement and insurrection under constitutional standards. Given the overlap in legal questions, this Court should afford substantial weight to *Anderson*’s conclusions, even if it undertakes its own review of the facts.

Defendant may argue that *Anderson v. Griswold* is politically motivated or lacks neutrality. However, the court’s decision was based on strict legal standards and a comprehensive factual record, not political considerations. The court’s ruling was grounded in historical precedent, constitutional interpretation, and evidentiary review consistent with Supreme Court precedent (*Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)). Furthermore, the ruling applied a clear and convincing evidence standard, which is higher than the preponderance of the evidence threshold used in civil cases, ensuring a robust factual determination.

---

#### Additional Authorities Supporting Judicial Enforcement of Section 3

In addition to *Anderson v. Griswold*, legal scholars such as Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Cass R. Sunstein have affirmed that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is self-executing and compels judicial enforcement nationwide (see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Cass R. Sunstein, *The Rule of Law and the Constitution: A Methodological Perspective*, Harvard Law Review (2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, *Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies*, 5th ed. (2015)). This understanding is reinforced by judicial precedent.

In Cawthorn v. Amalfi, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that modern officeholders are subject to Section 3, affirming that courts retain authority to adjudicate disqualification claims.

Historical cases such as *Griffin’s Case*, 11 F. Cas. 7 (C.C.D. Va. 1869), *United States v. Powell*, 27 F. Cas. 605 (C.C.D.N.C. 1871), and *Worthy v. Barrett*, 63 N.C. 199 (1869) illustrate that the judiciary has long interpreted Section 3 as a self-executing provision that operates automatically upon the occurrence of insurrection, without requiring additional congressional action. The Colorado Supreme Court applied judicially manageable standards by employing the clear and convincing evidence standard to determine that the events of January 6, 2021, met the constitutional definition of insurrection.

The Court’s rigorous analysis—comparing legal and historical definitions and determining that Defendant’s active role in inciting, encouraging, and failing to prevent the attack on the Capitol satisfied the necessary legal tests, while rejecting First Amendment defenses by applying the *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) incitement standard—further supports this conclusion.

Additionally, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that Trump’s disqualification is a non-justiciable political question, consistent with the principle articulated in *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and with *In re Tate*, 63 N.C. 308 (1869). These authorities collectively reinforce that Section 3’s plain language and self-executing effect necessitate its uniform enforcement across all jurisdictions.

---

#### In Summary

The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Griswold provides a well-reasoned, factually robust, and legally sound basis for determining that Trump engaged in insurrection under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

While not binding on this Court, the decision’s rigorous application of federal constitutional principles and its clear and convincing evidence standard make it highly persuasive authority.

When combined with historical precedent, modern judicial rulings, and scholarly consensus, the findings in Anderson v. Griswold provide a compelling foundation for this Court to conclude that Trump is disqualified from holding office under Section 3.

By giving substantial weight to these findings, this Court can efficiently and effectively resolve the constitutional question before it, ensuring the uniform enforcement of Section 3 across all jurisdictions.

---

### Step 4: Federal Courts Retain Authority to Rule on Section 3 Disqualification

- Premise 1: The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in _Trump v. Anderson_ that "responsibility for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates rests with Congress and not the States."
- Premise 2: Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over all cases arising under the Constitution, including enforcement of Section 3.
- Conclusion 4: While _Trump v. Anderson_ ruled states cannot enforce Section 3, it did not rule on whether federal courts can enforce it. Federal courts retain this authority.

---

### Step 5: The Supreme Court’s Ruling in _Trump v. Anderson_ Does Not Prevent Federal Enforcement

- Premise 1: The Supreme Court’s ruling only barred state enforcement of Section 3.
- Premise 2: The ruling did not state that Congress has exclusive authority—only that states do not have enforcement power.
- Conclusion 5: The ruling does not bar federal courts from enforcing Trump’s disqualification under Section 3.

#### Why This Matters
This ensures that _Trump v. Anderson_ is not misinterpreted as blocking federal enforcement.

---

### Step 6: Declaratory Judgment is the Proper Legal Mechanism to Determine Trump’s Ineligibility

- Premise 1: 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act) authorizes federal courts to issue declaratory relief for actual legal controversies.
- Premise 2: Trump’s constitutional eligibility is an ongoing controversy under Section 3.
- Conclusion 6: Declaratory judgment is the proper legal mechanism to determine Trump’s ineligibility.

---

### Step 7: The Judiciary Has the Duty to Enforce Self-Executing Constitutional Provisions

- Premise 1: The Supreme Court has ruled that self-executing constitutional provisions require no additional legislation to take effect (_United States v. Windsor_, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)).
- Premise 2: Section 3 states that an individual who has engaged in insurrection "shall not" hold office, meaning disqualification is automatic once the conditions are met.
- Conclusion 7: Since Section 3 is self-executing, a federal court does not need Congressional approval to enforce it through a declaratory judgment proceeding.

#### Why This Matters
This confirms that Trump is already disqualified under the Constitution, and federal courts must recognize and enforce that legal reality.

## V. STANDING

1. I am currently homeless, and I lack stable housing or adequate shelter.
2. I have been directly harmed by Trump’s unconstitutional policies, including his administration’s cuts to shelter funding and the removal of anti-discrimination rules that previously protected individuals like me from being turned away from shelters without cause.
3. Because of these cuts, I have been turned away from shelters that were full and lost protections that once prevented arbitrary denials of shelter access.
4. Trump’s immigration policies also directly harmed me and my family. My father, an undocumented immigrant with no criminal history, went into hiding after Trump broadened deportation priorities, removing earlier guidelines that focused on criminals. I lost all contact with him and spent my limited resources seeking information on his whereabouts, which financially devastated me.
5. Trump’s attacks on birthright citizenship create uncertainty about my own legal status because I was born to a non-citizen father. Heightened documentation requirements and threats to birthright citizenship mean I risk losing access to IDs, employment, and government benefits if my citizenship is questioned.
6. Due to Trump’s unconstitutional occupation of office, I have also lost clear access to Medicaid and SNAP. With tightened eligibility and threatened immigration enforcement, I fear being denied or losing benefits crucial to my survival.

These facts demonstrate I have suffered a concrete, particularized harm that is fairly traceable to Trump’s retention of unconstitutional power and redressable through a declaratory judgment invalidating his authority.

## VI. POLITICAL QUESTIONS DOCTRINE ANALYSIS

### A. Introductory Paragraph
The seven tests presented below are drawn from established judicial precedent—most notably from cases such as Baker v. Carr and Marbury v. Madison—which have long guided courts in determining whether an issue is nonjusticiable as a political question. These tests assess, respectively:
1. Textual Commitment
2. Judicial Discoverability of Standards
3. Definitiveness (Short‑Answer Test)
4. Political Branch Discretion
5. Coordination of Branches
6. Interbranch Conflict
7. Practical Implications

The arguments that follow demonstrate that the application of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the present dispute does not invoke any of these political question concerns and, therefore, falls squarely within the judiciary's authority to decide.

---

### B. Core Tests for the Political Question Doctrine

#### 1. Test 1: Textual Commitment
This test asks whether the Constitution explicitly commits the issue to a coordinate political branch.

**Argument 1.1**
- **Premise 1:** All provisions of the U.S. Constitution fall under the jurisdiction of federal courts (U.S. Const. art. III, § 2).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a provision of the U.S. Constitution.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, federal courts have jurisdiction to interpret Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

**Explanation:** Article III, § 2 grants federal courts authority over "all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution." Although Trump v. Anderson limits enforcement to Congress, it does not strip the courts of their interpretive role.

**Argument 1.2**
- **Premise 1:** No Supreme Court decision states that only Congress can interpret Section 3.
- **Premise 2:** In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling or constitutional text granting exclusive interpretive authority to Congress, the federal judiciary retains interpretive authority (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the Constitution does not reserve Section 3 interpretation exclusively to Congress.

**Explanation:** Marbury confirms that it is "the province and duty" of the judiciary to say what the law is; nothing in Section 3 directs that role exclusively to Congress.

**Argument 1.3**
- **Premise 1:** Trump v. Anderson holds that only Congress may enforce Section 3 against federal officeholders.
- **Premise 2:** Trump v. Anderson does not address, restrict, or preclude federal judicial interpretation of Section 3.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, while enforcement is reserved to Congress, interpretation remains within the judiciary’s purview.

**Explanation:** This distinction shows that the Court’s role is to clarify the law, not to execute its enforcement, which remains a political function.

---

#### 2. Test 2: Judicial Discoverability of Standards
This test examines whether there are clear, judicially manageable standards for resolving the issue.

**Argument 2.1**
- **Premise 1:** No purely political question is resolved by judicially discoverable standards (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
- **Premise 2:** Determining "insurrection" under Section 3 requires applying a legal definition to factual evidence, which constitutes a judicially discoverable standard.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, deciding insurrection under Section 3 is not a purely political question and may be resolved by the courts.

**Explanation:** Baker v. Carr demonstrates that if clear legal standards exist, courts have the competence to resolve the issue.

**Argument 2.2**
- **Premise 1:** A constitutional provision is "self‑executing" if it "creates an immediate legal consequence without requiring additional legislative action" (Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949)).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 states "No person shall hold any office" if they engaged in insurrection after taking an oath.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Section 3 is self‑executing and provides a clear legal standard.

**Explanation:** The immediate legal consequence in the text ("shall not hold office") satisfies the self‑executing requirement.

**Argument 2.3**
- **Premise 1:** If a provision "explicitly states a prohibition" and does not instruct Congress to enact further rules, it is self‑executing (Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 declares that disqualified persons "shall not hold office" and nowhere directs Congress to craft enforcement laws.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Section 3 is self‑executing because its text imposes a complete prohibition without additional legislation.

**Argument 2.4**
- **Premise 1:** The Supreme Court has recognized self‑executing provisions whenever they "impose direct legal consequences without requiring legislation" (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 directly disqualifies insurrectionists from office, a legal consequence not contingent on further statutes.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Section 3 meets the Supreme Court’s criteria for self‑execution.

**Argument 2.5**
- **Premise 1:** "If Congress has exclusive authority to enforce a provision, then courts cannot act without congressional authorization" (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)).
- **Premise 2:** Trump v. Anderson (2024) only ruled that states cannot enforce Section 3, not that only Congress can.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, federal courts retain power to enforce Section 3.

**Explanation:** This shows that federal courts are not precluded from interpreting Section 3 even though enforcement may be reserved to Congress.

**Argument 2.6**
- **Premise 1:** Section 5 grants Congress "power to enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment, but does not automatically exclude the judiciary’s constitutional role (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
- **Premise 2:** No Supreme Court decision states Section 3 enforcement is committed solely to Congress.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Congress’s Section 5 power does not negate federal courts’ authority to interpret or apply Section 3.

**Explanation:** Marbury establishes that interpretation is the judiciary’s duty regardless of Congress’s enforcement role.

**Argument 2.7**
- **Premise 1:** "Courts must determine whether a person’s actions meet constitutional definitions before applying disqualifications" (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 disqualification depends on whether someone "engaged in insurrection," a factual and legal question.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, a legal determination of insurrection is required before Section 3 applies.

**Explanation:** The factual inquiry is manageable under clear legal standards, confirming that self‑execution does not equate to automatic disqualification.

**Argument 2.8**
- **Premise 1:** Other constitutional provisions (for example, the Emoluments Clause) require enabling legislation for enforcement.
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 explicitly provides its prohibition without any requirement for additional legislation.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Section 3’s self‑executing nature distinguishes it from provisions that require legislative action and confirms that it yields judicially discoverable standards.

**Additional Scholarly Commentary:**

"In addition to Anderson v. Griswold, legal scholars such as Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Cass R. Sunstein have affirmed that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is self‑executing and compels judicial enforcement nationwide (see, e.g., Fallon & Sunstein, 'The Rule of Law and the Constitution: A Methodological Perspective,' Harvard Law Review (2003); Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 5th ed. (2015)). In Cawthorn v. Amalfi, 35 F.4th 245 (4th Cir. 2022), the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the courts retain authority to adjudicate disqualification claims under Section 3. Moreover, historical cases such as Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7 (C.C.D. Va. 1869), and United States v. Powell, 27 F. Cas. 605 (C.C.D.N.C. 1871), further illustrate that Section 3 was intended to operate automatically upon the occurrence of insurrection. The Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. ___ (2024), which held that state enforcement of Section 3 is impermissible, does not preclude federal judicial review; rather, it confirms that the proper venue for resolving disqualification claims is in federal courts. As recognized by legal scholars such as William Baude and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Section 3 was designed to serve as an immediate, self‑executing bar to officeholding by insurrectionists without requiring separate congressional action. These authorities collectively reinforce that Section 3’s plain language and self‑executing effect necessitate its uniform enforcement across all jurisdictions."

---

#### 3. Test 3: Definitiveness (Short‑Answer Test)
This test considers whether the issue can be decided with a short, definitive judicial answer.

**Argument 3.1**
- **Premise 1:** Under Section 3, a person who (a) took an oath to support the Constitution, and (b) later engaged in insurrection, is disqualified from holding office.
- **Premise 2:** Once a legal authority confirms both "oath" and "insurrection," the disqualification is immediate because Section 3 is self‑executing.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, proof of oath plus insurrection triggers automatic disqualification under Section 3.

**Argument 3.2**
- **Premise 1:** Donald Trump took the presidential oath on January 20, 2017, "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."
- **Premise 2:** The Colorado Supreme Court in Anderson v. Griswold found that Trump engaged in insurrection under federal law.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Trump fulfills both prongs, so he is disqualified under Section 3.

**Argument 3.3**
- **Premise 1:** "Federal courts have authority to decide all cases arising under the Constitution" (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178).
- **Premise 2:** Determining whether Trump is disqualified under Section 3 is a constitutional matter within Article III jurisdiction.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, federal courts can rule on Trump’s Section 3 disqualification, providing a short, definitive answer once the facts are established.

**Argument 3.4**
- **Premise 1:** Conflicting state rulings undermine uniform constitutional interpretation.
- **Premise 2:** A definitive federal ruling on Section 3 would resolve such conflicts.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, a federal ruling under Section 3 is necessary to ensure uniformity.

**Explanation:** By providing a uniform decision, federal judicial review prevents a patchwork of state interpretations.

---

#### 4. Test 4: Political Branch Discretion
This test asks whether resolving the issue would force the court to decide a matter more appropriately left to the political branches.

**Argument 4.1**
- **Premise 1:** Matters concerning constitutional eligibility for office can be subject to judicial review unless the Constitution vests exclusive authority elsewhere (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486).
- **Premise 2:** Enforcing Section 3 concerns constitutional eligibility—whether a person is disqualified due to insurrection.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, enforcing Section 3 is within judicial review and does not require the exercise of political discretion.

**Explanation:** Powell confirms that the courts may review qualifications.

**Argument 4.2**
- **Premise 1:** "No discretionary policy decision is settled by applying a constitutional fact‑based standard in court" (Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238).
- **Premise 2:** All Trump‑related Section 3 disputes involve a legal test (oath plus insurrection) rather than a policy choice.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, no Trump‑related Section 3 dispute is a discretionary policy decision.

**Argument 4.3**
- **Premise 1:** Nixon v. United States held that non‑justiciable impeachment proceedings are reserved for the political branches.
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 disqualification is a matter of constitutional eligibility, not impeachment.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Section 3 is within the judiciary’s competence and does not raise the same justiciability concerns as impeachment.

---

#### 5. Test 5: Coordination of Branches
This test considers whether the Constitution assigns ultimate responsibility for the issue to a particular branch.

**Argument 5.1**

- **Premise 1:** Trump v. Anderson held that states cannot enforce Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates, including the presidency.
- **Premise 2:** The Court did not strip federal courts of their authority to interpret Section 3 or determine whether a disqualification applies.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Trump v. Anderson does not bar federal courts from interpreting Section 3.

**Explanation:** The ruling limits state enforcement but leaves the interpretive role with the judiciary.

**Argument 5.2**

- **Premise 1:** No Supreme Court decision states that only Congress can interpret Section 3.
- **Premise 2:** In the absence of a textual commitment to Congress, the federal judiciary retains interpretive authority (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the Constitution does not assign exclusive interpretive responsibility for Section 3 to Congress.

**Argument 5.3**

- **Premise 1:** Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the "power to enforce" the Amendment.
- **Premise 2:** However, Section 5 does not preclude the judiciary from interpreting Section 3.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Congress’s enforcement role under Section 5 does not detract from the judiciary’s authority to interpret Section 3.

---

#### 6. Test 6: Interbranch Conflict
This test examines whether a judicial decision would risk intruding on the functions or prerogatives of another branch.

**Argument 6.1**
- **Premise 1:** "An issue is deemed a political question only if there is a 'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment' to another branch or if conflicting rulings exist among branches" (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217).
- **Premise 2:** No branch of the federal government has issued any ruling regarding Trump’s eligibility under Section 3.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the issue of Trump’s eligibility under Section 3 is not a political question because no conflicting rulings exist.

**Explanation:** Without conflicting rulings, judicial review does not intrude on another branch’s domain.

**Argument 6.2**
- **Premise 1:** A conflict between branches occurs only when one branch asserts a power that contradicts the ruling of another.
- **Premise 2:** Congress has taken no action regarding Trump’s eligibility under Section 3.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Congress has not created an interbranch conflict.

**Argument 6.3**
- **Premise 1:** The federal judiciary has the authority to interpret and enforce constitutional provisions when Congress does not act (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137).
- **Premise 2:** Congress has not acted on Trump’s disqualification under Section 3.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the judiciary is empowered to review and enforce Section 3 regarding Trump’s eligibility.

**Argument 6.4**
- **Premise 1:** Trump v. Anderson holds that only Congress may enforce Section 3; however, judicial interpretation is distinct from enforcement.
- **Premise 2:** Judicial intervention, when limited to interpretation, does not contradict any ruling by another branch.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, judicial review of Section 3 does not conflict with Congress’s enforcement role.

**Explanation:** Separating interpretation from enforcement avoids interbranch conflict.

**Argument 6.5**
- **Premise 1:** The federal courts have the power to declare the rights of parties when an actual constitutional controversy exists (Marbury v. Madison; United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)).
- **Premise 2:** Trump’s continued occupation of the presidency in light of his alleged insurrection presents an actual controversy.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the judiciary has the authority to issue a declaratory judgment on Trump’s eligibility under Section 3.

**Explanation:** A declaratory judgment does not intrude on another branch’s functions.

---

#### 7. Test 7: Practical Implications
This test asks whether resolving the issue judicially would unduly interfere with the political process.

**Argument 7.1**
- **Premise 1:** "All constitutional provisions requiring interpretation fall within the courts’ duty to 'say what the law is'" (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
- **Premise 2:** "All questions of whether someone violated Section 3 by engaging in insurrection are constitutional questions requiring interpretation."
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, questions about Trump’s eligibility under Section 3 fall within the courts’ interpretive authority.

**Argument 7.2**
- **Premise 1:** "All disputes over office qualifications are resolved by courts without intruding on legislative powers" (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486).
- **Premise 2:** "All questions of Trump’s Section 3 disqualification are disputes over office qualifications."
- **Conclusion:** Hence, courts may decide Trump’s eligibility without disrespecting Congress.

**Argument 7.3**
- **Premise 1:** "No court ruling that a person is constitutionally disqualified physically removes that person from office" (Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201).
  - (Such rulings merely declare legal status; they do not direct marshals to evict or replicate impeachment.)
- **Premise 2:** "All Section 3 decisions declaring Trump ineligible merely state his legal status."
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, a declaratory judgment does not forcibly remove Trump from office.

**Explanation:** A declaratory judgment clarifies that someone "shall not hold office" without enacting physical removal; the impeachment process remains with Congress.

**Argument 7.4**
- **Premise 1:** "All cases clarifying presidential powers demonstrate that courts can set constitutional limits without overstepping" (e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube; U.S. v. Nixon).
- **Premise 2:** "All Section 3 eligibility rulings similarly set a constitutional limit (no insurrectionists can hold office)."
- **Conclusion:** Hence, a Section 3 ruling on Trump’s ineligibility enforces a constitutional limit without disrespect.

**Explanation:** Courts routinely rule on constitutional limits without overstepping into political functions.

**Argument 7.5**
- **Premise 1:** "All ongoing constitutional violations fall under the courts’ duty to remedy, so long as they are within judicial reach" (Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)).
- **Premise 2:** "Scenarios where a disqualified official remains in office constitute an ongoing constitutional violation within judicial reach."
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, courts must resolve Trump’s ineligibility to prevent an ongoing constitutional violation.

**Explanation:** The Court’s duty to enforce the Constitution requires addressing any violation, even if that means clarifying a candidate’s legal status.

**Argument 7.6**
- **Premise 1:** "All provisions of the Constitution rank above any political decision or process" (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
- **Premise 2:** "Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment bars anyone who engaged in insurrection from holding office."
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, even if a political process seats an insurrectionist, it conflicts with the supreme Constitution.

**Argument 7.7**
- **Premise 1:** "No judicial declaration of ineligibility physically removes a person from office; it merely declares that person 'shall not hold' office" (Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201).
- **Premise 2:** "Any ruling that Trump is disqualified under Section 3 functions solely as a declaratory judgment."
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, a declaratory judgment clarifies legal status without forcible removal.

**Argument 7.8**
- **Premise 1:** "Courts can review and declare political decisions unconstitutional if they conflict with higher law" (United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
- **Premise 2:** "Seating someone disqualified under Section 3 is a political decision that conflicts with the supreme law."
- **Conclusion:** Hence, judicial review would render such political decisions ineffective.

**Argument 7.9**
- **Premise 1:** "All self‑executing constitutional clauses apply immediately, without extra legislation" (United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)).
- **Premise 2:** "Section 3 is self‑executing, stating insurrectionists 'shall not hold office,' giving courts direct authority to interpret and apply it."
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, courts must declare Section 3 disqualifications, regardless of which political branch authorized the officeholder.

**Argument 7.10**
- **Premise 1:** Conflicting state rulings on Section 3 would undermine uniform constitutional interpretation.
- **Premise 2:** A definitive federal ruling would ensure uniformity and stability in the application of Section 3.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, federal judicial review is necessary to prevent a patchwork of state rulings.

---

### C. Additional Issues Beyond the Core Seven Tests

#### 1. Addressing the Lack of Modern Precedent for Section 3

**Syllogism 1:**
- **Premise 1:** Constitutional provisions are interpreted based on their text and original meaning, not solely on historical application (District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 explicitly disqualifies individuals who engaged in insurrection, and its text remains unchanged.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Section 3 remains applicable in the modern era.

**Syllogism 2:**
- **Premise 1:** Modern courts and scholars, including the Colorado Supreme Court in Anderson v. Griswold, have affirmed that Section 3 is self‑executing and applies to contemporary officeholders.
- **Premise 2:** The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Griswold applied judicially manageable standards to a modern officeholder.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Section 3 is enforceable in the modern era, and courts can adjudicate disqualification claims without relying solely on Reconstruction-era cases.

**Syllogism 3:**
- **Premise 1:** Historical cases, such as Griffin’s Case and United States v. Powell, demonstrate that Section 3 was intended to operate as a self‑executing disqualification clause.
- **Premise 2:** Modern legal scholarship, including works by William Baude and Michael Stokes Paulsen, confirms that Section 3 applies to contemporary officeholders without additional legislation.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Section 3’s applicability is not limited to the Reconstruction era, and courts can enforce it in modern contexts.

**Syllogism 4:**
- **Premise 1:** The judiciary routinely applies constitutional provisions to modern contexts, even when those provisions were enacted in a different historical era (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 remains a relevant constitutional provision.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the judiciary can apply Section 3 to modern officeholders, including the presidency.

---

#### 2. Addressing the Court’s Concern That Disqualifying a Sitting President Is Too Political

**Syllogism 1:**
- **Premise 1:** Courts have ruled on constitutional qualifications for elected officials (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 disqualifies individuals based on insurrection.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, determining Trump’s eligibility under Section 3 is a constitutional question, not a political one.

**Syllogism 2:**
- **Premise 1:** Constitutional qualifications for office are legal standards that courts are competent to interpret.
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 requires a factual and legal determination of insurrection.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Trump’s disqualification under Section 3 is within the judiciary’s purview.

**Syllogism 3:**
- **Premise 1:** The judiciary has a duty to enforce constitutional provisions even when doing so involves politically sensitive issues (United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 is a constitutional provision disqualifying insurrectionists.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the judiciary must enforce Section 3.

**Syllogism 4:**
- **Premise 1:** The political question doctrine does not apply when clear legal standards exist (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 provides clear legal standards for disqualification based on insurrection.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the issue of Trump’s eligibility is justiciable.

---

#### 3. Addressing Concerns That the Colorado Supreme Court’s Finding Is Not Binding

**Syllogism 1:**
- **Premise 1:** Federal courts may take judicial notice of state court rulings when they provide persuasive evidence in constitutional matters (Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
- **Premise 2:** The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Griswold applied a clear and convincing evidence standard to determine that Trump engaged in insurrection.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, federal courts can consider Anderson v. Griswold as persuasive authority in ruling on Trump’s disqualification under Section 3.

**Syllogism 2:**
- **Premise 1:** The Colorado Supreme Court’s factual findings in Anderson v. Griswold were based on a rigorous application of legal standards, including the Brandenburg test for incitement.
- **Premise 2:** Federal courts are competent to independently evaluate factual findings and legal conclusions from state courts.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the federal court can rely on Anderson v. Griswold as persuasive evidence while independently reviewing the legal and factual issues.

**Syllogism 3:**
- **Premise 1:** State court rulings on federal constitutional issues are not binding on federal courts but may be considered as persuasive authority (Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993)).
- **Premise 2:** The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Griswold is a well-reasoned ruling on a federal constitutional issue.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the federal court may consider Anderson v. Griswold as persuasive authority in ruling on Trump’s disqualification under Section 3.

---

#### 4. Addressing Separation of Powers Concerns

**Syllogism 1:**
- **Premise 1:** The judiciary’s role includes determining whether individuals meet constitutional qualifications for office (Marbury v. Madison; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a constitutional qualification for office by disqualifying individuals who engaged in insurrection.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, determining whether Trump is disqualified under Section 3 is a judicial function, not an executive one.

**Syllogism 2:**
- **Premise 1:** Enforcing constitutional qualifications for office does not interfere with the executive branch’s powers but instead upholds the Constitution.
- **Premise 2:** A declaratory judgment on Trump’s ineligibility under Section 3 would clarify his legal status without compelling enforcement by the executive branch.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, such a judgment does not violate separation of powers.

**Syllogism 3:**
- **Premise 1:** The judiciary has the authority to interpret and enforce constitutional provisions, even when doing so affects the executive branch (United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
- **Premise 2:** Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a constitutional provision that disqualifies individuals who engaged in insurrection from holding office.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the judiciary can enforce Section 3 without violating separation of powers.

---

#### 5. Addressing the Political Question Doctrine’s “Embarrassment” Factor

**Syllogism 1:**
- **Premise 1:** Courts have a duty to clarify constitutional law even when multiple branches are involved (United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
- **Premise 2:** A federal ruling on Section 3 would provide a uniform legal standard, thereby preventing state-by-state inconsistencies in enforcement.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, judicial review of Trump’s eligibility would reduce legal uncertainty and prevent conflicts rather than create them.

**Syllogism 2:**
- **Premise 1:** Conflicting state rulings on Section 3 undermine uniform constitutional interpretation.
- **Premise 2:** A definitive federal ruling would ensure uniformity and stability in the application of Section 3.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, federal judicial review is necessary to prevent a patchwork of state rulings.

**Syllogism 3:**
- **Premise 1:** The judiciary’s role is to resolve constitutional disputes even when they involve high-stakes political issues (United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
- **Premise 2:** A timely ruling on Trump’s eligibility would provide clarity and prevent uncertainty during the election cycle.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, judicial review of Trump’s eligibility would enhance the democratic process.

---

#### 6. Final Summary and Conclusion

Our analysis demonstrates that:

1. Test 1 (Textual Commitment): Section 3 is a constitutional provision not textually committed exclusively to another branch; federal courts have authority to interpret it.
2. Test 2 (Judicial Discoverability of Standards): Section 3 is self‑executing and yields clear, judicially manageable standards for determining disqualification.
3. Test 3 (Definitiveness): Once the factual test (oath plus insurrection) is met, Section 3 provides a short, definitive answer.
4. Test 4 (Political Branch Discretion): Determining disqualification under Section 3 is a legal inquiry—not a discretionary policy decision—and is distinct from impeachment.
5. Test 5 (Coordination of Branches): The Constitution does not assign exclusive interpretive responsibility for Section 3 to Congress; federal courts retain that role despite Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5.
6. Test 6 (Interbranch Conflict): No branch has asserted exclusive authority over Section 3, and congressional inaction permits judicial review without interbranch conflict.
7. Test 7 (Practical Implications): A judicial declaration of ineligibility clarifies a candidate’s legal status without forcibly removing them from office or disrupting the political process; moreover, a definitive federal ruling prevents a patchwork of state rulings.

Based on the seven tests for the political question doctrine this case can be decided in court. Federal courts have both the power and responsibility to interpret Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment and decide if a candidate—specifically Donald Trump—is disqualified from holding office because of insurrection.

The political question doctrine does not bar this Court from adjudicating Plaintiff’s claim. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a self-executing constitutional provision that imposes a clear prohibition on holding office for those who have engaged in insurrection. The issue before this Court involves the application of judicially manageable standards to determine whether Defendant engaged in insurrection, a task well within the competence of the judiciary.

The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Griswold provides a well-reasoned and factually robust basis for this Court to conclude that Defendant is disqualified under Section 3. By issuing a declaratory judgment, this Court can clarify Defendant’s legal status without encroaching on the authority of the political branches.

A ruling in Plaintiff’s favor would uphold the Constitution, ensure uniform enforcement of Section 3, and provide redress for the harms caused by Defendant’s unconstitutional actions. For these reasons, this Court should reject the political question doctrine and proceed to the merits of Plaintiff’s claim

## VII. CAUSE OF ACTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (28 U.S.C. § 2201)

Plaintiff incorporates all facts and arguments above. An actual, ongoing legal controversy exists regarding whether Donald J. Trump, having engaged in insurrection, is disqualified from holding the Office of the President under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

By virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2201, this Court is empowered to declare the respective rights and obligations of the parties. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Donald J. Trump is constitutionally ineligible to hold the Office of the President, and that all executive actions taken under that unconstitutional occupancy are subject to immediate legal challenge.

Here’s how we can structure **Section VIII: How a Declaratory Judgment Provides Meaningful Relief While Respecting the Rule of Law** using the **hybrid approach**, combining both **specific harm to you** and **broader constitutional implications**:

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## VIII. HOW A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PROVIDES MEANINGFUL RELIEF WHILE RESPECTING THE RULE OF LAW

A declaratory judgment that Donald J. Trump is an insurrectionist under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment would not only address the personal harm suffered by Plaintiff but would also restore constitutional integrity and uphold the rule of law for all similarly situated individuals. This ruling would have both direct, individual impact and broader constitutional significance, ensuring that Section 3 is enforced effectively.

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### A. Plaintiff’s Direct and Concrete Injury
As a homeless individual, Plaintiff has suffered direct, ongoing harm due to policies implemented under Trump’s unconstitutional presidency. A declaratory judgment would provide meaningful relief by creating a basis to invalidate unlawful executive actions that continue to harm Plaintiff.

1. Loss of Shelter Protections
- Under Trump’s administration, federal rules ensuring access to homeless shelters were weakened, allowing providers to deny services based on arbitrary factors.
- Plaintiff has personally been denied shelter access as a result of these rollbacks, exacerbating his homelessness and physical suffering.

2. Increased Immigration Enforcement & Family Separation
- Plaintiff’s father, an undocumented immigrant with no criminal record, went into hiding due to Trump’s expanded deportation priorities.
- Plaintiff was financially and emotionally devastated attempting to locate and support his father, suffering direct economic harm.

3. Threats to Birthright Citizenship
- Trump’s Executive Order 14160 (issued in 2025) challenges birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.
- As someone born to a non-citizen parent, Plaintiff faces uncertainty regarding his legal status, directly impacting his access to government benefits, identification, and employment.

4. Denial of Medicaid & SNAP Benefits
- Trump’s executive actions have tightened eligibility requirements for essential benefits, leading to Plaintiff’s inability to access food and healthcare.
- This has placed Plaintiff in immediate danger, further exacerbating the harms caused by Trump’s unconstitutional retention of office.

A declaratory judgment that Trump engaged in insurrection and is ineligible to hold office would provide Plaintiff with a critical legal basis to challenge these harms.

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### B. How a Declaratory Judgment Restores Constitutional Integrity
Beyond Plaintiff’s direct harm, this ruling would also serve a vital constitutional function: ensuring that insurrectionists cannot continue to wield presidential power. The Fourteenth Amendment's Section 3 was designed to prevent those who attack democracy from holding office, and the Court’s ruling would reaffirm that principle.

1. Reaffirms the Constitution’s Prohibition on Insurrectionists Holding Office
- The Court would provide legal clarity that Trump is disqualified under Section 3.
- This ensures that no individual who engages in insurrection can bypass the Constitution’s safeguards.

2. Prevents Executive Overreach
- While this ruling would not remove Trump from office (as that is beyond the Court’s power), it would create a legal basis for challenging all executive orders and policies issued under his unlawful tenure.

3. Ensures Uniform Enforcement of Section 3
- Without a federal ruling, state-level decisions on Trump’s eligibility are inconsistent.
- A declaratory judgment from this Court would establish a nationwide precedent, ensuring that Section 3 is enforced uniformly.

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### C. Provides a Legal Tool for Courts and Agencies to Reject Trump's Orders
A ruling that Trump is constitutionally ineligible to serve would empower courts, federal agencies, and individuals to challenge and disregard Trump’s executive actions. This ruling would:

1. Allow Federal Agencies to Refuse to Implement Trump’s Directives
- Agencies could decline to enforce executive orders issued by an ineligible president.
- This would immediately mitigate the harm caused by Trump’s policies.

2. Enable Courts to Invalidate Trump’s Actions
- Any litigation challenging Trump’s policies would be bolstered by a court declaration of his ineligibility.
- Courts could strike down harmful executive actions, providing relief to impacted individuals.

3. Give Affected Individuals a Defense Against Trump’s Orders
- Plaintiff and others harmed by Trump’s policies could argue that his actions are legally void, strengthening their legal standing in seeking relief.

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### D. Strengthens Legal Defenses for Those Harmed by Trump’s Unlawful Tenure
A declaratory judgment would fortify the legal standing of individuals and organizations resisting Trump’s actions.

1. Homeless Individuals Denied Shelter
- Would have a stronger legal argument that Trump’s policies are invalid and unenforceable.

2. Immigrants Facing Deportation
- Could challenge Trump’s anti-immigrant directives as unconstitutional due to his disqualification.

3. Plaintiff and Other Vulnerable Populations
- Could seek injunctive relief against harmful policies.

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### E. Prevents Future Constitutional Crises
By issuing a declaratory judgment, the Court would send a clear message that insurrectionists cannot hold office, preventing future challenges to democratic stability.

- Ensures that future insurrectionists do not attempt to return to power through unconstitutional means.
- Reaffirms that the judiciary has the authority to enforce constitutional disqualifications.

===

## IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Declare that Donald J. Trump engaged in insurrection under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment

2. Declare that Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals have standing to challenge the enforcement of executive actions issued by Defendant after January 20, 2025, as ultra vires (beyond his constitutional authority).

3. Declare that Defendant’s actions as President are subject to challenge on constitutional grounds in all courts of competent jurisdiction** and that agencies and individuals **may** seek declaratory or injunctive relief as appropriate.

4. In the alternative, if this Court declines to adopt the factual findings in _Anderson v. Griswold_, Plaintiff requests that this Court appoint a Special Master (or other neutral fact-finder) to conduct an evidentiary hearing** on whether Defendant engaged in insurrection within the meaning of Section 3.

5. **Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.**

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Dated: ________________

Respectfully submitted,

[*Sign Your Name*]
Michael Schwartz, Pro Se
[Contact Information (if available)]