# Chapter I: Introduction
## Foreword
The present volume appears to demand some introductory notes clarifying its scope, content, and method of presentation.
There is a large number of texts, monographs, symposia, etc., devoted to "systems" and "systems theory". "Systems Science," or one of its many synonyms, is rapidly becoming part of the established university curriculum. This is predominantly a development in engineering science in the broad sense, necessitated by the complexity of "systems" in modern technology, man machine relations, programming and similar considerations which were not felt in yesteryear's technology but which have become imperative in the complex technological and social structures of the modern world. Systems theory, in this sense, is preeminently a mathematical field, offering partly novel and highly sophisticated techniques, closely linked with computer science, and essentially determined by the requirement to cope with a new sort of problem that has been appearing.
What may be obscured in these developments-important as they are-is the fact that systems theory is a broad view which far transcends technological problems and demands, a reorientation that has become necessary in science in general and in the gamut of disciplines from physics and biology to the behavioral and social sciences and to philosophy. It is operative, with varying degrees of success and exactitude, in various realms, and heralds a new world view of considerable impact. The student
in "systems science" receives a technical training which makes systems theory-originally intended to overcome current over-specialization-into another of the hundreds of academic specialties. Moreover, systems science, centered in computer technology, cybernetics, automation and systems engineering, appears to make the systems idea another-and indeed the ultimate technique to shape man and society ever more into the "megamachine" which Mumford (1967) has so impressively described in its advance through history.
The present volume appears to demand some introductory notes clarifying its scope, content, and method of presentation. There is a large number of texts, monographs, symposia, etc., devoted to "systems" and "systems theory". "Systems Science," or one of its many synonyms, is rapidly becoming part of the established university curriculum. This is predominantly a development in engineering science in the broad sense, necessitated by the complexity of "systems" in modern technology, man machine relations, programming and similar considerations which were not felt in yesteryear's technology but which have become imperative in the complex technological and social structures of the modern world. Systems theory, in this sense, is preeminently a mathematical field, offering partly novel and highly sophisticated techniques, closely linked with computer science, and essentially determined by the requirement to cope with a new sort of problem that has been appearing. What may be obscured in these developments-important as they are-is the fact that systems theory is a broad view which far transcends technological problems and demands, a reorientation that has become necessary in science in general and in the gamut of disciplines from physics and biology to the behavioral and social sciences and to philosophy. It is operative, with varying degrees of success and exactitude, in various realms, and heralds a new world view of considerable impact. The student in "systems science" receives a technical training which makes systems theory-originally intended to overcome current over-specialization-into another of the hundreds of academic specialties. Moreover, systems science, centered in computer technology, cybernetics, automation and systems engineering, appears to make the systems idea another-and indeed the ultimate technique to shape man and society ever more into the "megamachine" which Mumford (1967) has so impressively described in its advance through history. The present book hopes to make a contribution in both respects implied in the above: offering to the student of syst ok hopes to make a contribution in both respects
implied in the above: offering to the student of systems science a broadened perspective, and to the general reader a panoramic view of a development which is indubitably characteristic of and important in the present world. While fully realizing his limitations and shortcomings, the author feels entitled to do so because he was among the first to introduce general system theory, which is now becoming an important field of research and application.
As Simon (1965) correctly remarked, an introduction into a rapidly developing field largely consists in its conceptual history. It may not be inappropriate, therefore, that the present work consists of studies written over a period of some thirty years. The book thus presents systems theory not as a rigid doctrine (which at present it is not) but rather in its becoming and in the development of its ideas which, hopefully, can serve as a basis for further study and investigation.
In order to serve the purpose, these studies were arranged in logical rather than chronological order and were carefully edited. Editing was limited, however, to elimination of repetitions, minor stylistic improvements and some suitable rearrangements. Intentionally, no changes in content were made from hindsight gained at a later time. Repetitions could not be completely avoided because similar ideas sometimes appeared in different contexts; but it is hoped they were kept at a tolerable level. They may even be not undesirable to the student seeking the general idea or its application in a specific field.
The original sources are indicated in the list of Acknowledgments. For evaluation of the material presented and reasons of priority which will become apparent, some major data may be summarized as follows. Chapter 5 (1940) introduced the
"theory of the organism as open system." Together with Burton's (1939) work, this was the original statement of the concept which gained increasing importance and application. This publication remained almost unknown among British and American scientists and is therefore reproduced in its entirety, although much can be added, as is partly reviewed in Chapters 7 (1964) and 6 (1967). Similarly, the first announcement of general system theory (1945) is reproduced as Chapter 3, abridged and somewhat rearranged, but otherwise true to the original The Appendix (review of an address presented in 1947) is reproduced as an early statement long before systems theory and cognate terms and fields appeared academically or in technology. A review in nontechnical language (1956) serves as Chapter 2; Chapters 1 and 4 try to
bring the story up to date.
The author wishes to extend his thanks to many persons and agencies that facilitated the work here presented. Thanks are due to Dr. George Brantl, editor at George Braziller, Inc., for having
suggested the publication and for his valuable editorial assistance in presenting the book to its advantage. The permissions of editors and publishers where the essays were first published, as indicated in the source list, are gratefully acknowledged. So is the assistance of various agencies, the National Research Council and National Cancer Institute of Canada, the Canada Council, the University of Alberta General Research Committee and others, which sponsored part of the work here reported by research grants and other support. The author's secretary, Mrs. Elizabeth Grundau, took care of the manuscript in its various phases, assisted in bibliographic and library work, and provided translations of the chapters originally published in German, thus far exceeding secretarial routine. Last but not least, my wife, Maria von Bertalanffy, has to be thanked for her untiring help and criticism when these essays were written. Without the encouragement of colleagues, too numerous to mention, the writer, in the face of obstructions and obstacles, would hardly have persevered in the task of introducing and developing general system theory.
## Introduction
### Systems everywhere
If someone were to analyze current notions and fashionable catchwords, he would find "systems" high on the list. The concept has pervaded all fields of science and penetrated into popular thinking, jargon and mass media. Systems thinking plays a dominant role in a wide range of fields from industrial enterprise and armaments to esoterie topics of pure science. Innumerable publications, conferences, symposia and courses are devoted to it. Professions and jobs have appeared in recent years which, unknown a short while ago, go under narnes such as systems design, systems analysis, systems engineering and others. They are the very nucleus of a new technology and technocracy; their practitioners are the "new utopians" of our time (Boguslaw, 1965) who in contrast to the classic breed whose ideas remained between the covers of books-are at work creating a New World, brave or otherwise.
The roots of this development are complex. One aspect is the development from power engineering-that is, release of large amounts of energy as in steam or electric machines-to control engineering, which directs processes by low-power devices and has led to computers and automation. Self-controlling machines have appeared, from the humbie dornestic thermostat to the selfsteering missiles of World War II to the immensely improved missiles of today. Technology has been led to think not in terms of single machines but in those of "systems." A steam engine, automobile, or radio receiver was within the competence of the engineer trained in the respective specialty. But when it comes to ballistic missiles or space vehicles, they have to be assembled from components originating in heterogeneons technologies, mechanical, electronic, chemica!, etc.; relations of man and machine come into play; and innumerable financial, economie, social and political problems are thrown into the bargain. Again, air or even automobile traffic are not just a matter of the number of vehicles in operation, but are systems to be planned or arranged. So innumerable problems are arising in production, commerce, and armaments.
Thus, a "systems approach" became necessary. A certain objective is given; to find ways and means for its realization requires the systems specialist (or team of specialists) to consider alternative solutions and to choose those promising optimization at maximum efficiency and minimal cost in a tremendously complex network of interactions. This requires elaborate techniques and computers for solving problems far transeending the capacity of an individual mathematician. Both the "hardware" of computers, automation and cybernation, and the "software" of systems science represent a new technology. It has been called the Second Industrial Revolution and has developed only in the past few decades. These developments have not been limited to the industrialmilitary complex. Politicians frequently ask for application of the "systems approach" to pressing problems such as air and water pollution, traffic congestion, urban blight, juvenile delinquency and organized crime, city planning (Wolfe, 1967), etc., designating this a "revolutionary new concept" (Carter, 1966; Boffey, 1967). A Canadian Premier (Manning, 1967) writes the systems approach into his politica! platform saying that
>an interrelationship exists between all elements and constituents of society. The essential factors in public problems, issues, policies, and programs must always be considered and evaluated as interdependent components of a total system.
>
These developments would be merely another of the many facets of change in our contemporary technological society were it not for a significant factor apt to be overlooked in the highly sophisticated and necessarily specialized techniques of computer science, systems engineering and related fields. This is not 'onlya tendency in technology to make things bigger and better (or alternatively, more profitable, destructive, or both). It is a change
in basic categories of thought of which the complexities of modern technology are only one-and possibly not the most important manifestation. In one way or another, we are forced to deal with complexities, with "wholes" or "systems," in all fields of knowledge. This implies a basic re-orientation in scientific thinking.
An attempt to summarize the impact of "systems" would not be feasible and would pre-empt the considerations of this book. A few examples, more or less arbitrarily chosen, must suffice to outline the nature of the problem and consequent re-orientation. The reader should excuse an egocentric touch in the quotations, in view of the fact that the purpose of this book is to present the author's viewpoint rather than a neutral review of the field.
In physics, it is well-known that in the enormous strides it made in the past few decades, it also generated new problemsor possibly a new kind of problem-perhaps most evident to the laymen in the indefinite number of some hundreds of elementary particles for which at present physics can offer little rhyme or reason. In the wordsof a noted representative (de-Shalit, 1966), the further development of nuclear physics "requires much experimental work, as well as the development of additional powerful methods for the handling of systems with many, but not infinitely many, particles." The same quest was expressed by A. Szent-Györgyi (1964), the great physiologist, in a whimsical way:
>When I joined the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton I did this in the hope that by rubbing elbows with those great atomie physicists and mathematicians I would learn something about living matters. But as soon as I revealed that in any living system there are more than two electrons, the physicists would not speak to me. With all their computers they could not say what the third electron might do. The remarkable thing is that it knows exactly what to do. So that little electron knows something that all the wise men of Princeton don't, and this can only be something very simple.
>
And Bernal (1957), some years ago, formulated the still-unsolved
problems thus:
>No one who knows what the difficulties are now believes that the crisis of physics is likely to be resolved by any simple trick or modification of existing theories. Something radical is needed, and it will have to go far wider than physics. A new world outlook is being forged, but much experience and argument will be needed before it cna take a definitive form. It must be coherent, it must include and illuminate the new knowledge of fundamental particles and their complex fields, it must make the world inside the atom and the wide spaces of the universe equally intelligible. It must have a different dimensions from all previous world views, and include in itself an explanation of development and the origin of new things. In this it will fall naturally in line with the converging tendencies of the biological and social sciences in which a regular pattern blends with their evolutionary history.
>
The triumph in recent years of molecular biology, the "breaking" of the genetic code, the consequent achivements in genetics, evolution, medicine, cell physiology and many other fields, has become knowlegde. But in spite of-or just because of-the deepened insight attained by "molecular" biology, the necessity of "organismic" biology has become apparent, as this weiter had advocated for some 40 years. The concern of biology is not only at the physuci-chemical or molecular level but at the higher leveles of living organization as well. As we shall discuss later (p.12), the demand has been posed with renewed strength in consideration of recent facts and knowledge; buy hardly an argument not previously discussed (von Bertalanffy, 1928a, 1932, 1949a, 1960) has been added. Again, the basic conception in psychology used to be the "robot model". Behavior was to be explained by the mechanistic stimulus-response (S-R)scheme; conditioning, according to the pattern of animal experiment , appeared as the foundation of human behavior; "meaning" was to be replaced by conditioned response; specificity of human behavior to be denied, etc. Gestalt psychology first made an inroad into the mechanistic scheme some 50 years ago. More recently, manu attempts toward a more satisfactory "image of man" have been made and the system concept is gaining in importance (Chapter 8); Piaget, for example, "expressely related his conceptions to the general system theory of Bertalanffy" (Hahn, 1967).
Perhaps even more than psychology, psychiatry has taken up the systems viewpoint (e.g. Menninger, 1963; von Bertalanffy, 1966; Grinker, 1967; Gray et al., in press). To quote from Grinker:
>Of the so-called global theories the one initially stated and defined by Bertalanffy in 1947 under the title of "general systems theory" has taken hold .... Since then he has refined, modified and applied his concepts, established a society for general systems theory and publislied a General Systems Yearbook. Many social scientists but only a handful of psychiatrists studied, understood or applied systems theory. Suddenly, under the leadership of Dr. William Gray of Boston, a threshold was reached so that at the l22nd annual meeting of the American Psychiatrie Association in 1966 two sessions were held at which
this theory was discussed and regular meetings for psychiatrists were ensured for future participation in a development of this
"Unified Theory of Human Behavior." If there be a third
revolution (i.e. after the psychoanalytic and behavioristic), it is
in the development of a general theory (p. ix).
>
A report of a recent meeting (American Psychiatrie Association, 1967) draws a vivid picture:
> When a room holding 1,500 people is so jammed that hundreds stand through an entire morning session, the subject must be one in which the audience is keenly interested. This was the situation at the symposium on the use of a general systems theory in psychiatry which took place at the Detroit meeting of the American Psychiatrie Association (Damude, 1967).
>
The same in the social sciences. From the broad spectrum, widespread confusion and contradictions of contemporary sociological theories (Sorokin, 1928, 1966), one secure condusion emerges: that social phenomena must be considered as "systems"-difficult and at present unsettled as the definition of sociocultural entities may be. There is
>a revolutionary scientific perspective (stemming) from the General Systems Research movement and (with a) wealth of principles, ideas and insights that have already brought a higher degree of scientific order and understanding to many areas of biology, psychology and some physical sciences .... Modern systems research can provide the basis of a framework more capable of doing justice to the complexities and dynamic properties of the socio-cultural system (Buckley, 1967).
>
The course of events in our times suggests a similar conception in history, including the consideration that, after all, history is sociology in the making or in "longitudinal" study. It is the same socio-cultural entities which sociology investigates in their present state and history in their becoming.
Earlier periods of history may have consoled themselves by blaming atrocities and stupidities on bad kings, wicked dictators, ignorance, superstition, material want and related factors. Consequently, history was of the "who-did-what" kind-"idiographic," as it was technically known. Thus the Thirty-Years War was a consequence of religious superstition and the rivalries of German princes; Napoleon overturned Europe because of his unbridled ambition; the Second World War could be blamed on the wickedness of Hitier and the warlike proclivity of the Germans.
We have lost this intellectual comfort. In a state of democracy, universal education and general affiuence, these previous excuses for human atrocity fail miserably. Contemplating contemporary history in the making, it is difficult to ascribe its irrationality and bestiality solely to individuals (unless we grant them a superhurnan-or subhuman-capacity for malice and stupidity). Rather, we seem to be victims of "historica! forces"-whatever this may mean. Events seem to involve more than just individual decisions and actions and to be determined more by socio-cultural "systems," be these prejudices, ideologies, pressure groups, social trends, growth and decay of civilizations, or what not. We know precisely and scientifically what the effects of pollution, waste of natural resources, the population explosion, the armaments race, etc., are going to be. We are told so every day by countless critics citing irrefutable arguments. But neither national leaders nor society as a whole seems to be able to do anything about it. If we do not want a theistic explanation-Quem Deus perdere vult dementat-we seem to follow some tragic historical necessity.
While realizing the vagueness of such concepts as civilization and the shortcomings of "grand theories" like those of Spengler and Toynbee, the question of regularities or laws of socio-cultural systems makes sense though this does not necessarily mean historical inevitability according to Sir Isaiah Berlin. An historical panorama like McNeills's The Rise of the West (1963), which indicates his anti-Spenglerian position even in the title, nevertheless is a story of historical systems. Such a conception penetrates into seemingly outlying fields so that the view of the "provess-school of archaeology" is said to be "borrower from Ludwig von Bertalanffy's framework for the developing embryo, where systems trigger behavior at critical junctures and, once they have done so, cannot return to their original pattern" (Flannery 1967).
While sociology (and presumably history) deals with informal organizations, another recent development is the theory of formal organizations, that is, structures planfully instituted, such as those of an army, bureaucracy, business enterprise, etc. This theory is "framed in a philosophy which accepts the premise that only meaningful wat to study organization is to study it as a system," systems analysis treating "organization as a system of mutually dependent variables"; therefore "modern organization theory leads almost inevitably into a discussion of general system theory" (Scott, 1963). In the words of a practitioner of operational research,
>In the last two decades we have witnessed the emergence of the "system" as a key concept in scientifuc research. Systems, of course, have been studied for centuries, but something new has been added... The tendency to study systems as an entity rather than as a conglomeration of parts is consistent with the tendency in contemporary science no longer to isolate phenomena in narrowly confined contexts, but rather to open interactions for examination and to examine larger and larger slices of nature. under the banner of systems research (and its many synonyms) we have also witnessed a convergence of many more specialized contemporary scientifuc developments... These research pursuits and many others are being interwoven into a cooperative research effort involving an everwidening spectrum of scientific and engineering disciplines. We are participating in what is probably the most comprehensive effort to attain a sythesis of scientific knowledge yet made (Ackoff, 1959).
>
In this way, the circle closes and we come back to those developments in contemporary technological society with which we started. What emerges from these considerations-however and superficial-is that in the gamut of modern sciences and life new conceptualizations, new ideas and categories are required, and that these, in one way or another, are centered about the
concept of "system." To quote, fora change, from a Soviet author:
>The elaboration of specific methods for the investigation of systems is a general trend of present scientific knowledge, just as for 19th century science the primary concentratwn of attention to the elaboration of elementary forms and processes in nature was characteristic (Lewada, in Hahn, 1967, p. 185).
>
The dangers of this new development, alas, are obvious and have often been stated. The new cybernetic world, according to the psychotherapist Ruesch (1967) is not concerned with people but with "systems"; man becomes replaceable and expendable. To the new utopians of systems engineering, to use a phrase of Boguslaw (1965), it is the "human element" which is precisely the unreliable component of their creations. It either has to he eliminated altogether and replaced by the hardware of computers, self-regulating machinery and the like, or it has to be made as reliable as possible, that is, mechanized, conformist, controlled and standardized. In somewhat harsher terms, man in the Big System is to be-and to a large extent has become-a moron, button-pusher or learned idiot, that is, highly trained in some narrow specialization but otherwise a mere part of the machine. This conforms to a well-known systems principle, that of progressive mechanization-the individual becoming ever more a cogwheel dominated by a few privileged leaders, mediocrities and mystifiers who pursue their private interests under a smokescreen of ideologies (Sorokin, 1966, pp. 558ff). Whether we envisage the positive expansion of knowledge and beneticent control of environment and society, or see in the systems movement the arrival of Brave New World and 1984-it deserves intensive study, and we have to come to terms with it.
### On the History of Systems Theory
As we have seen, there is a consensus in all major fields-from subatomic physics to history-that a re-orientation of science is due. Developments in modern technology parallel this trend. So far as can be ascertained, the idea of a "general system theory" was first introduced by the present author prior to cybernetics, systems engineering and the emergence of related fields. The story of how he was led to this notion is briefly told elsewhere in this book (pp. 89ff.), but some amplification appears to be in order in view of recent discussions.
As with every new idea in science and elsewhere, the systems concept has a long history. Although the term "system" itself was not emphasized, the history of this concept includes many illustrious names. As "natura! philosophy," we may trace it back to Leibniz; to Nicholas of Cusa with his coincidence of opposites; to the mystic medicine of Paracelsus; to Vico's and ibn-Kaldun's vision of history as a sequence of cultural entities or "systems"; to the dialeetic of Marx and Regel, to mention but a few narnes from a rich panoply of thinkers. The literary gourmet may remember N1cholas of Cusa's De ludo globi (1463; cf. von Bertalanffy, 1928b) and Hermann Hesse's Glasperlenspiel, both of them seeing the working of the world reflected in a cleverly designed, abstract game.
There had been a few preliminary works in the field of general system theory. Köhler's "physical gestalten" (1924) pointed in this direction but did not deal with the problem in full generality, restricting its treatment to gestalten in physics (and biological and psychological phenomena presumably interpretable on this basis). In a later publication (1927), Köhler raised the postulate of a system theory, intended to elaborate the most general properties of inorganic compared to organic systems; to a degree, this demand was met by the theory of open systems. Lotka's classic (1925) came dosest to the objective, and we are indebted to him for basic formulations. Lotka indeed dealt with a general concept of systems (not, like Köhler's, restricted to systems of physics). Being a statistician, however, with his interest lying in population problems rather than in biological problems of the individual organism, Lotka, somewhat strangely, conceived communities as systems, while regarding the individual organism as a sum of cells.
Nevertheless, the necessity and feasibility of a systems approach became apparent only recently. lts necessity resulted from the fact that the mechanistic scheme of isolable causal trains and meristic treatment had proved insufficient to deal with theoretical problems, especially in the biosocial sciences, and with the practical probierus posed by modern technology. lts feasibility resulted from various new developments-theoretical, epistemological, mathematical, etc.-which, although still in their beginnings, made it progressively realizable.
The present author, in the early 20's, became puzzled about obvious lacunae in the research and theory of biology. The then prevalent mechanistic approach just mentioned appeared to neglect or actively deny just what is essential in the phenomena of life. He advocated an organismic conception in biology which emphasizes consideration of the organism as a whole or system, and sees the main objective of biologica! sciences in the discovery of the principlesof organization at its various levels. The author's first statements go back to 1925-26, while Whitehead's philosophy of "organic mechanism" was publisbed in 1925. Cannon's work on borneostasis appeared in 1929 and 1932. The organismic conception had its great precursor in Claude Bernard, but his work was hardly known outside France; even now it awaits its full evaluation (cf. Bernal, 1957, p. 960). The simultaneous appearance of similar ideas independently and on different continents was symptomatic of a new trend which, however, needed time to become accepted.
These remarks are prompted by the fact that in recent years "organismic biology" has been re-emphasized by leading American biologists (Dubos, 1964, 1967; Dobzhansky, 1966; Commoner, 1961) without, however, mentioning the writer's much earlier work, although this is duly recognized in the literature of Europe and of the socialist countries (e.g., Ungerer, 1966; Blandino, 1960; Tribifio, 1946; Kanaev, 1966; Kamaryt, 1961, 1963; Bendmann, 1963, 1967; Afanasjew, 1962). It can be definitely stated that recent discussions (e.g., Nagel, 1961; Hempel, 1965; Beckner, 1959; Smith, 1966; Schaffner, 1967), although naturally referring to advances of biology in the past 40 years, have not added any new viewpoints in comparison to the author's work.
In philosophy, the writer's education was in the tradition of neopositivism of the group of Moritz Schlick which later became known as the Vienna Circle. Obviously, however, his interest in German mysticism, the historical relativism of Spengler and the history of art, and similar unorthodox attitudes precluded his becoming a good positivist. Stronger were his honds with the Berlin group of the "Society for Empirical Philosophy" of the 1920's, in which the philosopher-physicist Hans Reichenbach, the psychologist A. Herzberg, the engineer Parseval (inventor of dirigible aircraft) were prominent.
In connection with experimental work on metabolism and growth on the one hand, and an effort to concretize the organismic program on the other, the theory of open systems was advanced, based on the rather trivial fact that the organism happens to be an open system, but no theory existed at the time. The first presentation, which foliowed some tentative trials, is included in this volume (Chapter 5). Biophysics thus appeared to demand an expansion of conventional physical theory in the way of generalization of kinetic principles and thermodynamic theory, the latter becoming known, later on, as irreversible thermodynamics.
But then, a further generalization became apparent. In many phenomena in biology and also in the behavioral and social sciences, mathematical expressions and models are applicable. These, obviously, do not pertain to the entities of physics and chemistry, and in this sense transeend physics as the paragon of "exact science." (Incidentally, a series Abhandlungen zur exakten Biologie, in succession of Schaxel's previous Abhandlungen zur theoretischen Biologt:e, was inaugurated by the writer but stopped during the war.) The structural similarity of such models and their isomorphism in different fields became apparent; and just those problems of order, organization, wholeness, teleology, etc., appeared central which were programmatically excluded in mechanistic science. This, then, was the idea of "general system theory."
The time was not favorable for such development. Biology was understood to he identical with laboratory work, and the writer had already gone out on a limb when publishing Theoretische Biologie (1932), another field which has only recently become academically respectable. Nowadays, when there are numerous journals and publications in this discipline and model building has become a fashionable and generously supported indoor sport, the resistance to such ideas is hard to imagine. Affirmation of the concept of general system theory, especially by the late Professor Otto Pötzl, well-known Vienna psychiatrist, helped the writer to overcome his inhibitions and to issue a statement (reproduced in Chapter 3 of this book). Again, fate intervened. The paper (in Deutsche Zeitschrift f~r Philosophie) had reached the proof stage, but the issue to carry it was destroyed in the catastrophe of the last war. After the war, general system theory was presented in lectures (cf. Appendix), amply discussed with physicists (von Bertalanffy, 1948a) and discussed in lectures, and symposia (e.g., von Bertalanffy et al., 1951).
The proposal of system theory was received incredulously as fantastic or presumptuous. Either-it was argued-It was trivial because the so-called isomorphisms were merely examples of the truism that mathematics can be applied to all sorts of things, and it therefore carried no more weight than the "discovery" that 2 + 2 = 4 holds true for apples, dollars and galaxies alike; or it was false and misleading because superficial analogies-as in the famous simile of society as an "organism" -camouflage actual differences and so lead to wrong and even morally objectionable conclusions. Or, again, it was philosophically and methodologically unsound because the alleged "irreducibility" of higher levels to lower ones tended to impede analytical research whose success was obvious in various fields such as in the reduction of chemistry to physical principles, or of life phenomena to molecular biology.
Gradually it was realized that such objections missed the point of what systems theory stands for, namely, attempting scientific interpretation and theory where previously there was none, and higher generality than that in the special sciences. General system theory responded to a secret trend in vanous disciplines. A letter from K. Boulding, economist, dated 1953, well summarized the situation:
>I seem to have come to much the same condusion as you have reached, though approaching it from the direction of economics and the social sciences rather than from biology that there is a body of what I have been calling "general empirical theory," or "general system theory" in your excellent terminology, which is of wide applicability in many different disciplines. I am sure there are many people all over the world who have come to essentially the same position that we have, but we are widely scattered and do not know each other, so difficult is it to cross the boundaries of the disciplines.
>
In the first year of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Palo Alto), Boulding, the biomathematician A. Rapoport, the physio1ogist Ralph Gerard and the present writer found themselves together. The project of a Society for General System Theory was realized at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1954. The name was later changed into the less pretentious "Society for General Systems Research," which is now an affiliate of the AAAS and whose meetings have become a well-attended fixture of the AAAS conventions. Local groups of the Society were established at various centers in the United States and subsequently in Europe. The original program of the Society needed no revision:
>The Society for General Systems Research was organized in 1954 to further the development of theoretical systems which are applicable to more than one of the traditional departments of knowledge. Major functions are to: (l) investigate the isomorphy of concepts, laws, and models in various fields, and to help in useful transfers from one field to another; (2) encourage the development of adequate theoretical models in the fields which lack them; (3) minimize the duplication of theoretical effort in different fields; (4) promote the unity of science through improving communication among specialists.
>
The Society's Yearbooks, General Systems, under the efficient editorship of A. Rapoport, have since served as its organ. Intentionally General Systems does not follow a rigid policy but rather provides a place for working papers of different intention as seems to be appropriate in a field which needs ideas and exploration. A large number of investigations and publications substantiated the trend in various fields; a journal, Mathematical Systems Theory, made its appearance.
Meanwhile another development had taken place. Norhert Wiener's Cybernetics appeared in 1948, resulting from the then recent developments of computer technology, information theory, and self-regulating machines. It was again one of the coincidences occurring when ideas are in the air that three fundamental contributions appeared at about the same time: Wiener's Cybernetics (1948), Shannon and Weaver's information theory (1949) and von Neumann and Morgenstern's game theory (1947). Wiener carried the cybernetic, feedback and information concepts far beyond the fields of technology and generalized it in the biological and social rea1ms. It is true that cybernetics was not without precursors. Cannon's concept of homeostasis became a cornerstone in these considerations. Less well-known, detailed feedback roodels of physiological phenomena had heen elaborated by the German physiologist Richard Wagner (1954) in the 1920's, the Swiss Nobel prize winner W. R. Hess (1941, 1942) and in Erich von Holst's Reafferenzprinzip. The enormous popularity of cybernetic.s in science, techno1ogy and general publicity is, of course, due to Wiener and his proclamation of the Second Industrial Revo1ution.
The close correspondence of the two movements is well shown in a programmatic statement of L. Frank introducing a cybernetics conference:
>The concepts of purposive behavior and te1eology have long been associated with a mysterious, self-perfecting or goal-seeking capacity or final cause, usually of superhuman or super-natural origin. To move forward to the study of events, scientific thinking had to reject these beliefs in purpose and these concepts of teleological operations for a strictly mechanistic and deterministic view of nature. This mechanistic conception became firmly established with the demonstration that the universe was based on the operation of anonymous particles moving at random, in a disorderly fashion, giving rise, by their multip1icity, to order and regularity of a statistkal nature, as in classical physics and gas laws. The unchallenged success of these concepts and methods in physics and astronomy, and later in chemistry, gave biology and physiology their major orientation. This approach to problems of organisms was reinforced by the analytical preoccupation of the Western European culture and languages. The basic assumptions of our traditions and the persistent implications of the language we use almost compel us to approach everything we study as composed of separate, discrete parts or factors which we must try to isolate and identify as potent causes. Hence, we derive our preoccupation with the study of the relation of two variables. We are witnessing today a search for new approaches, for new and more comprehensive concepts and for methods capable of dealing with the large wholes of organisms and personalities. The concept of teleological mechanisms, however it may be expressed in different terms, may be viewed as an attempt to escape from these older mechanistic formulations that now appear inadequate, and to provide new and more fruitful conceptions and more effective methodologies for studying selfregulating processes, self-orientating systems and organisms, and self-directing personalities. Thus, the terms feedback, servomechanisms, circular systems, and circular processes may be viewed as different but equivalent expressions of much the same basic conception. (Frank et al., 1948, condensed).
>
A review of the development of cybernetics in technology and science would exceed the scope of this book, and is unnecessary in view of the extensive literature of the field. However, the present historical survey is appropriate because certain misunderstandings and misinterpretations have appeared. Thus Buckley (1967, p. 36) states that "modern Systems Theory, though seemingly springing de novo out of the last war effort, can be seen as a culmination of a broad shift in scientific perspective striving for dominance over the last few centuries." Although the second part of the sentence is true, the first is not; systems theory did not "spring out of the last war effort," but goes back much further and had roots quite different from military hardware and related technological developments. Neither is there an "emergence of system theory from recent developments in the analysis of engineering systems" (Shaw, 1965) except in a special sense of the word.
Systems theory also is frequently identified with cybernetics and control theory. This again is incorrect. Cybernetics, as the theory of control mechanisms in technology and nature and founded on the concepts of information and feedback, is but a part of a general theory of systems; cybernetic systems are a special case, however important, of systems showing self-regulation.
### Trends in Systems Theory
At a time when any novelty, however trivial, is hailed as being revolutionary, one is weary of using this label for scientific developments. Miniskirts and long hair being called teenage revolution, and any new styling of automobiles or drug introduced by the pharmaceutical industry being so announced, the word is an advertising slogan hardly fit for serious consideration. It can, however, be used in a strictly technical sense, i.e., "scientific revolutions" can be identified by certain diagnostic criteria.
Following Kuhn (1962), a scientific revolution is defined by the appearance of new conceptual schemes or "paradigms." These bring to the fore aspects which previously were not seen or perceived, or even suppressed in "normal" science, i.e., science generally accepted and practiced at the time. Hence there is a shift in the problems noticed and investigated and a change of the rules of scientific practice, comparable to the switch in perceptual gestalten in psychological experiments, when, e.g., the same figure may be seen as two faces vs. cup, or as duck vs. rabbit. Understandably, in such critical phases emphasis is laid on philosophical analysis which is not felt necessary in periods of growth of "normal" science. The early versions of a new paradigm are mostly crude, solve few problems, and solutions given for individual problems are far from perfect. There is a profusion and competition of theories, each limited with respect to the number of problems covered, and elegant solution of those taken into account. Nevertheless, the new paradigm does cover new problems, especially those previously rejected as "metaphysical". These criteria were derived by Kuhn from a study of the "classical" revolutions in physics and chemistry, but they are an excellent description of the changes brought about by organismic and systems concepts, and elucidate both their merits and limitations. Especially and not surprisingly, systems theory comprises a number of approaches different in style and aims.
The system problem is essentially the problem of the limitations of analytical procedures in science. This used to be expressed by half-metaphysical statements, such as emergent evolution or "the whole is more than a sum of its parts," but has a clear operational meaning. "Analytical procedure" means that an entity investigated be resolved into, and hence can be constituted or reconstituted from, the parts put together, these procedures being understood both in their material and conceptual sense. This is the basic principle of "classical" science, which can be circumscribed in different ways: resolution into isolable causal trains, seeking for "atomic" units in the various fields of science, etc. The progress of science has shown that these principles of classical science-first enunciated by Galileo and Descartes-are highly successful in a wide realm of phenomena.
Application of the analytical procedure depends on two conditions. The first is that interactions between "parts" be nonexistent or weak enough to be neglected for certain research purposes. Only under this condition, can the parts be "worked out," actually, logically, and mathematically, and then be "put together." The second condition is that the relations describing the behavior of parts be linear; only then is the condition of summativity given, i.e., an equation describing the behavior of the total is of the same form as the equations describing the behavior of the parts; partial processes can be superimposed to obtain the total process, etc.
These conditions are not fulfilled in the entities called systems, i.e., consisting of parts "in interaction." The prototype of their description is a set of simultaneous differential equations (pp. 55ff.), which are nonlinear in the general case. A system or "organized complexity" (p. 34) may be circumscribed by the existence of "strong interactions" (Rapoport, 1966) or interactions which are "nontrivial" (Simon, 1965), i.e., nonlinear. The methodological problem of systems theory, therefore, is to provide for problems which, compared with the analytical-summative ones of classical science, are of a more general nature.
As has been said, there are various approaches to deal with such problems. We intentionally use the somewhat loose expression "approaches" because they are logically inhomogeneous, represent different conceptual models, mathematical techniques, general points of view, etc.; they are, however, in accord in being "systems theories." Leaving aside approaches in applied systems research, such as systems engineering, operational research, linear and nonlinear programming, etc., the more important approaches are as follows. (For a good survey, d. Drischel, 1968).
"Classical" system theory applies classical mathematics, i.e., calculus. Its aim is to state principles which apply to systems in general or defined subclasses (e.g., closed and open systems), to provide techniques for their investigation and description, and to apply these to concrete cases. Owing to the generality of such description, it may be stated that certain formal properties will apply to any entity qua system (or open system, or hierarchical system, etc.), even when its particular nature, parts, relations, populations of molecules or biological entities, i.e., to chemical and ecological systems; diffusion, such as diffusion equations in physical chemistry and in the spread of rumors; application of steady state and statistical mechanics models to traffic flow (Gazis, 1967); allometric analysis of biological and social systems.
Computerization and simulation. Sets of simultaneous differential equations as a way to "model" or define a system are, if linear, tiresome to solve even in the case of a few variables; if nonlinear, they are unsolvable except in special cases (Table 1.1). For this reason, computers have opened a new approach in systems research; not only by way of facilitation of calculations which otherwise would exceed available time and energy and by replacement of mathematical ingenuity by routine procedures, but also by opening up fields where no mathematical theory or ways of solution exist. Thus systems far exceeding conventional mathematics can be computerized; on the other hand, actual laboratory experiment can be replaced by computer simulation, the model so developed then to be checked by experimental data. In such way, for example, B. Hess has calculated the fourteenstep reaction chain of glycolysis in the cell in a model of more than 100 nonlinear differential equations. Similar analyses are routine in economics, market research, etc.
>Table 1.1: Classification of Mathematical Problems'" and Their Ease of Solution by Analytical Methods. After Franks, 1967.
-Algeabric equation, one linear equation: Trivial
-Ordinary differential, one linear equation: Easy
-Partial differential, one linear equation: Difficult
-Algeabric equation, several linear equations: Easy
-Ordinary differential, several linear equations: Difficult
-Partial differential, several linear equations: Essentially impossible
-Algeabric equation, many linear equations: Essentially impossible
-Ordinary differential, many linear equations: Essentially impossible
-Partial differential, many linear equations: Impossible
-Algeabric equation, one non linear equation: Very difficult
-Ordinary differential, one non linear equation: Veru difficult
-Partial differential, one non linear equation: Impossible
-Algeabric equation, several non linear equations: Very difficult
-Ordinary differential, several non linear equations: Impossible
-Partial differential, several non linear equations: Impossible
-Algeabric equation, many non linear equations: Impossible
-Ordinary differential, many non linear equations: Impossible
-Partial differential, many non linear equations: Impossible
>
Compartment theory. An aspect of systems which may be listed separately because of the high sophistication reached in the field is compartment theory (Rescigno and Segre, 1966), i.e., the system consists of subunits with certain boundary conditions between which transport processes take place. Such compartment systems may have, e.g., "catenary" or "mammillary" structure (chain of compartments or a central compartment communicating with a number of peripheral ones). Understandably, mathematical difficulties become prohibitive in the case of three- or multi compartment systems. Laplace transforms and introduction of net and graph theory make analysis possible.
Set theory. The general formal properties of systems, dosed and open systems, etc., can be axiomatized in terms of set theory (Mesarovic, 1964; Maccia, 1966). In mathematical elegance this approach compares favorably with the cruder and more special formulations of "classical" system theory. The connections of axiomatized systems theory (or its present beginnings) with actual systems problems are somewhat tenuous.
Graph theory. Many systems problems concern structural or topologic properties of systems, rather than quantitative relations. Some approaches are available in this respect. Graph theory, especially the theory of directed graphs (digraphs), elaborates relational structures by representing them in a topological space. It has been applied to relational aspects of biology (Rashevsky, 1956, 1960; Rosen, 1960). Mathematically, it is connected with matrix algebra; modelwise, with compartment theory of systems containing partly "permeable" subsystems, and from here with the theory of open systems.
Net theory, in its turn, is connected with set, graph, compartment, etc., theories and is applied to such systems as nervous networks (e.g., Rapoport, 1949--50).
Cybernetics is a theory of control systems based on communication (transfer of information) between system and environment and within the system, and control (feedback) of the system's function in regard to environment. As mentioned and to be discussed further, the model is of wide application but should not be identified with "systems theory" in general. In biology and other basic sciences, the cybernetic model is apt to describe the formal structure of regulatory mechanisms, e.g., by block and flow diagrams. Thus the regulatory structure can be recognized, even when actual mechanisms remain unknown and undescribed, and the system is a "black box" defined only by input and output. For similar reasons, the same cybernetic scheme may apply to hydraulic, electric, physiological, etc., systems. The highly elaborate and sophisticated theory of servomechanism in technology has been applied to natural systems only in a limited extent (d. Bayliss, 1966; Kalmus, 1966; Mil sum, 1966).
Information theory, in the sense of Shannon and ,Veaver (1949), is based on the concept of information, defined by an expression isomorphic to negative entropy of thermodynamics. Hence the expectation that information may be used as measure of organization (d. p. 42; Quastler, 1955). While information theory gained importance in communication engineering, its applications to science have remained rather unconvincing (E.N. Gilbert, 1966). The relationship between information and organization, information theory and thermodynamics, remains a major problem (d. pp. 151ff.).
Theory of automata (see Minsky, 1967) is the theory of abstract automata, with input, output, possibly trial-and-error and learning. A general model is the Turing machine (1936). Expressed in the simplest way a Turing automaton is an abstract machine capable of imprinting (or deleting) "I" and "0" marks on a tape of infinite length. It can be shown that any process of whatever complexity can be simulated by a machine, if this process can be expressed in a finite number of logical operations. Whatever is possible logically (i.e., in an algorithmic symbolism) also can be construed-in principle, though of course by no means always in practice-by an automaton, i.e., an algorithmic machine.
Game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) is a different approach but may be ranged among systems sciences because it is concerned with the behavior of supposedly "rational" players to obtain maximal gains and minimal losses by appropriate strategies against the other player (or nature). Hence it concerns essentially a "system" of antagonistic "forces" with specifications.
Decision theory is a mathematical theory concerned with choices among alternatives.
Queuing theory concerns optimization of arrangements under conditions of crowding.
Inhomogeneous and incomplete as it is, confounding models (e.g., open system, feedback circuit) with mathematical techniques (e.g., set, graph, game theory), such an enumeration is apt to show that there is an array of approaches to investigate systems, including powerful mathematical methods. The point to be reiterated is that problems previously not envisaged, not manageable, or considered as being beyond science or purely philosophical are progressively explored. Naturally, an incongruence between model and reality often exists. There are highly elaborate and sophisticated mathematical models, but it remains dubious how they can be applied to the concrete case; there are fundamental problems for which no mathematical techniques are available. Disappointment of overextended expectations has occurred. Cybernetics, e.g., proved its impact not only in technology but in basic sciences, yielding models for concrete phenomena and bringing teleological phenomena-previously tabooed-into the range of scientifically legitimate problems; but it did not yield an all-embracing explanation or grand "world view," being an extension rather than a replacement of the mechanistic view and machine theory (d. Bronowski, 1964). Information theory, highly developed mathematically, proved disappointing in psychology and sociology. Game theory was hopefully applied to war and politics; but one hardly feels that it has led to an improvement of political decisions and the state of the world; a failure not unexpected when considering how little the powers that be resemble the "rational" players of game theory. Concepts and models of equilibrium, homeostasis, adjustment, etc., are suitable for the maintenance of systems, but inadequate for phenomena of change, differentiation, evolution, negentropy, production of improbable states, creativity, buildingup of tensions, self-realization, emergence, etc.; as indeed Cannon realized when he acknowledged, beside homeostasis, a "heterostasis" including phenomena of the latter nature. The theory of open systems applies to a wide range of phenomena in biology (and technology), but a warning is necessary against its incautious expansion to fields for which its concepts are not made. Such limitations and lacunae are only what is to be expected in a field hardly older than twenty or thirty years. In the last resort, disappointment results from making what is a useful model in certain respects into some metaphysical reality and "nothing-but" philosophy, as has happened many times in intellectual history.
The advantages of mathematical models-unambiguity, possibility of strict deduction, verifiability by observed data-are well known. This does not mean that models formulated in ordinary language are to be despised or refused.
A verbal model is better than no model at all, or a model which, because it can be formulated mathematically, is forcibly imposed upon and falsifies reality. Theories of enormous influence such as psychoanalysis were unmathematical or, like the theory of selection, their impact far exceeded mathematical constructions which came only later and cover only partial aspects and a small fraction of empirical data.
Mathematics essentially means the existence of an algorithm which is much more precise than that of ordinary language. History of science attests that expression in ordinary language often preceded mathematical formulation, i.e., invention of an algorithm. Examples come easily to mind: the evolution from counting in words to Roman numerals (a semiverbal, clumsy, halfalgorithm) to Arabic notation with position value; equations, from verbal formulation to rudimentary symbolism handled with virtuosity (but difficult for us to follow) by Diophantus and other founders of algebra, to modern notation; theories like those of Darwin or of economics which only later found a (partial) mathematical formulation. It may be preferable first to have some nonmathematical model with its shortcomings but expressing some previously unnoticed aspect, hoping for future development of a suitable algorithm, than to start with premature mathematical models following known algorithms and, therefore, possibly restricting the field of vision. Many developments in molecular biology, theory of selection, cybernetics and other fields showed the blinding effects of what Kuhn calls "normal" science, i.e., monolithically accepted conceptual schemes.
Models in ordinary language therefore have their place in systems theory. The system idea retains its value even where it cannot be formulated mathematically, or remains a "guiding idea" rather than being a mathematical construct. For example, we may not have satisfactory system concepts in sociology; the mere insight that social entities are systems rather than sums III' social atoms, or that history consists of systems (however ill IIrlined) called civilizations obeying principles general to systems, IlIlplies a reorientation in the fields concerned.
As can be seen from the above survey, there are, within the "systems approach," mechanistic and organismic trends and models, trying to master systems either by "analysis," "linear (Including circular) causality," "automata," or else by "wholeness," "interaction," "dynamics" (or what other words may be used to circumscribe the difference). While these models are not mulually exclusive and the same phenomena may even be approached by different models (e.g., "cybernetic" or "kinetic" concepts d. Locker, 1964), it can be asked which point of view is the more general and fundamental one. In general terms, this is a question to be put to the Turing machine as a general automaton.
One consideration to the point (not, so far as we have seen, treated in automata theory) is the problem of "immense" numbers. The fundamental statement of automata theory is that happenings that can be defined in a finite number of "words" can be realized by automaton (e.g., a formal neural network after McCulloh and Pitts, or a Turing machine)(Von Neumann, 1951). The question lies in the term "finite". The automaton can, by definition, realize a finite series of events (however large), but not an infinite one. However, what if the number of steps required is "immense," i.e., not infinite, but for example trascending the number of particles in the universe (estimated to be of the order 10 elevated to the 80) or of events possible in the time span of the universe or some of its subunits (According to Elsaasser's, 1966, proposal, a number whose logarithm is a large number)? Such inmense numbers apper in many system problems with exponentials, factorials and other explosively increasing functions. They are encountered in systems even of a moderate number of components with strong (nonnegligible) interactions (c.f. Ashby, 1964). To "map" them in a Turing machine, a tape of "inmense" length would be required, i.e., one exceeding not only practical but physical limitations.
Consider, for a simple example, a directed graph of N points (Rapoport, 1959b). Between each pair an arrow may exist or may not exist (two possibilities). There are therefore 2N elevated to the product of N and N minus 1 different ways to connect N points. If N is only 5, there are over a million ways to connect the points. With N=20, the number of ways exceeds the estimated number of atoms in the universe. Similar problems arise, e.g., with possible connections between neurons (estimated of the order of 10 billion in the human brain) and with the genetic code (Repge, 1962). In the code, there is a minimum of 20 "words" (nucleotide triplets) spelling the twenty amino acids (actually 64); the code may contain some millions of units. This gives 20 elevated to 1 ,000,000 possibilities. Supposing the Laplacean spirit is to find out the functional value of every combination; he would have to make such number of probes, but there are only 10 elevated to 80 atoms and organisms in the universe. Let us presume (Repge, 1962) that 10 elevated to 30 cells are present on the earth at a certain point of time. Further assuming a new cell generation every minute would give, for an age of the earth of 15 billion years (10 elevated to 16 minutes), 10 elevated to 46 cells in total. To be sure to obtain a maximum number, 10 elevated to 20 life-bearing planets may be assumed. Then, in the whole universe, there certainly would be no more than 10 elevated to 66 living beings-which is a great number but far from being "immense." The estimate can be made with different assumptions (e.g., number of possible proteins or enzymes) but with essentially the same result.
Again, according to Hart (1959), human invention can be conceived as new combinations of previously existing elements. If so, the opportunity for new inventions will increase roughly as a function of the number of possible permutations and combinations of available elements, which means that its increase will be a factorial of the number of elements. Then the rate of acceleration of social change is itself accelerating so that in many cases not a logarithmic but a log-log acceleration will be found in cultural change. Hart presents interesting curves showing that increases in human speed, in killing areas of weapons, in life expectation, etc., actually followed such expression, i.e., the rate of cultural growth is not exponential or compound interest, but is super-acceleration in the way of a log-log curve. In a general way, limits of automata will appear if regulation in a system is directed not against one or a limited number of disturbances, but against "arbitrary" disturbances, i.e., an indefinite number of situations that could not possibly have been "foreseen"; this is widely the case in embryonic (e.g., experiments of Driesch) and neural (e.g., experiments of Lashley) regulations. Regulation here results from interaction of many components (d. discussion in Jeffries, 1951, pp. 32ff.). This, as von Neumann himself conceded, seems connected with the "self-restoring" tendencies of organismic as contrasted to technological systems; expressed in more modern terms, with their open-system nature which is not provided even in the abstract model of automaton such as a Turing machine.
It appears therefore that, as vitalists like Driesch have emphasized long ago, the mechanistic conception, even taken in the modern and generalized form of a Turing automaton, founders with regulations after "arbitrary" disturbances, and similarly in happenings where the number of steps required is "immense" in the sense indicated. Problems of realizability appear even apart from the paradoxes connected with infinite sets.
The above considerations pertain particularly to a concept or complex of concepts which indubitably is fundamental in the general theory of systems: that of hierarchic order. We presently "see" the universe as a tremendous hierarchy, from elementary particles to atomic nuclei, to atoms, molecules, high-molecular compounds, to the wealth of structures (electron and lightmicroscopic) between molecules and cells (Weiss, 1962b), to cells, organisms and beyond to supra-individual organizations. One attractive scheme of hierarchic order (there are others) is that of Boulding (Table 1.2). A similar hierarchy is found both in "structures" and in "functions." In the last resort, structure (i.e., order of parts) and function (order of processes) may be the very same thing: in the physical world matter dissolves into a play of energies, and in the biological world structures are the expression of a flow of processes. At present, the system of physical laws relates mainly to the realm between atoms and molecules (and their summation in macrophysics), which obviously is a slice of a much broader spectrum. Laws of organization and organizational forces are insufficiently known in the subatomic and the supermolecular realms. There are inroads into both the subatomic world (high energy physics) and the supermolecular (Physics of high molecular compounds); but these are apparently at the beginnings. This is shown, on the one hand, by the present confusion of elementary particles, on the other, by the present lack of physical understanding of structures seen under the electronmicroscope and the lack of a "grammar" of the genetic code (d. p. 153).
A general theory of hierarchic order obviously will be a mainstay of general systems theory. Principles of hierarchic order can be stated in verbal language (Koestler, 1967; in press); there are semimathematical ideas (Simon, 1965) connected with matrix theory, and formulations in terms of mathematical logic (Woodger, 1930-31). In graph theory hierarchic order is expressed by the "tree," and relational aspects of hierarchies can be represented in this way. But the problem is much broader and deeper: The question of hierarchic order is intimately connected with those of differentiation, evolution, and the measure of organization which does not seem to be expressed adequately in terms either of energetics (negative entropy) or of information theory (bits) (d. pp. 150ff.). In the last resort, as mentioned, hierarchic order and dynamics may be the very same, as Koestler has nicely expressed in his simile of "The Tree and the Candle."
Thus there is an array of system models, more or less progressed and elaborate. Certain concepts, models and principles of general systems theory, such as hierarchic order, progressive differentiation, feedback, systems characteristics defined by set and graph theory, etc., are applicable broadly to material, psychological and sociocultural systems; others, such as open system defined by the exchange of matter, are limited to certain subclasses. As practice in applied systems analysis shows, diverse system models will have to be applied according to the nature of the case and operational criteria.
>Table 1.2: An Informal Survey of Main Levels in the Hierarchy of Systems. Partly in pursuance in Boulding, 1956b
-Static structures:
-Description and examples: Atoms, molecules, crystals, biological structures from the electron-microscopic to the macroscopic level
-Theory and models: E.g. structural formulas of chemistry; crystallography; anatomical descriptions
-Clock works:
-Description and examples: Clocks, conventional machines in general, solar systems
-Theory and models: Conventional physics such as laws of mechanics (Newtonian and Einsteinian) and others
-Control mechanisms:
-Description and examples: Thermostat, servomechanisms, homeostatic mechanism in organisms
-Theory and models: Cybernetics; feedback and information theory
-Open systems:
-Description and examples: Flame, cells and organisms in general
-Theory and models: (a) Expansion of physical theory to systems maintaining themselves in flow of matter (metabolism). (b) Information storage in genetic code (DNA) . Connection of (a) and (b) presently unclear
-Lower organisms:
-Description and examples: "Plant-like" organisms: Increasing differentiation of system (so-called "division of labor" in the organism); distinction of reproduction and functional individual ("germ track and soma")
-Theory and models: Theory and models almost lacking
-Animals:
-Description and examples: Increasing importance of traffic in information (evolution of receptors, nervous systems) ; learning; beginnings of consciousness
-Theory and models: Beginnings in automata theory (S-R relations), feedback (regulatory phenomena) , autonomous behavior (relaxation oscillations). etc.
-Man:
-Description and examples: Symbolism: past and future, self and world, self-awareness, etc., as consequences; communication by language, etc.
-Theory and models: Incipient theory of symbolism
-Socio-cultural systems:
-Description and examples: Populations of organisms (humans included) ; symbol-determined communities (cultures) in man only
-Theory and models: Statistical and possibly dynamic laws in population dynamics. sociology. economics, possibly history. Beginnings of a theory of cultural systems.
-Symbolic systems:
-Description and examples: Language, logic, mathematics, sciences, arts, morals, etc.
-Theory and models: Algorithms of symbols (e.g. mathematics, grammar) ; "rules of the game" such as in visual arts, music, etc.
NB.-This survey is impressionistic and intuitive with no claim for logical rigor. Higher levels as a rule presuppose lower ones (e.g. life phenomena those at the physico-chemical level, socio-cultural phenomena the level of human activity, etc.); but the relation of levels requires clarification in each case (d. problems such as open system and genetic code as apparent prerequisites of "life"; relation of "conceptual" to "real" systems, etc.). In this sense, the survey suggests both the limits of reductionism and the gaps in actual knowledge.
>
## The Meaning of General System Theory
[capitulo 2](https://hackmd.io/@bix9kyHhRQKNGGA6Q-iYXw/HkEIqUWw3/edit)
### The Quest for a General System Theory
### Aims of General System Theory
### Closed and Open Systems: Limitations of Conventional Physics
### Information and Entropy
### Causality and Teleology
### What Is Organization?
### General System Theory and the U nity of Science
### General System Theory in Education: The Production of Scientific Generalists
### Science and Society
### The Ultimate Precept: Man as the Individual
## Some System Concepts in Elementary Mathematical Consideration
### The System Concept
### Growth
### Competition
### Wholeness, Sum, Mechanization, Centralization
### Finality
### Types of Finality
### Isomorphism in Science
### The Unity of Science
## Advances in General System Theory
[Capítulo 4](https://hackmd.io/@migueles13/BkzNCu0In/edit)
### Approaches and Aims in Systems Science
### Methods in General Systems Research
### Advances of General System Theory
## The Organism Considered as Physical System
[capitulo 5](https://hackmd.io/@bix9kyHhRQKNGGA6Q-iYXw/HyR0FnAI3/edit)
### The Organism as Open System
### General Characteristics of Open
### Chemica! Systems
### Equifinality
### Biological Applications
## The Model of Open System
[capitulo 6](https://hackmd.io/@QgqGQrQuRyCFRWSep7yqlA/Byue9Lkwh)
- The Living Machine and lts Limitations
- Some Characteristics of Open Systems
- Open Systems in Biology
- Open Systems and Cybernetics
- Unsolved Problems
- Condusion
aqui termina
## Some Aspects of System Theory in Biology
[Capítulo 7](https://hackmd.io/@migueles13/BJ6QbTyPh/edit)
### Open Systems and Steady States
### Feedback and Romeostasis160
### Allometry and the Surface Rule
### Theory of Animal Growth
### Summary
## The System Concept in the Sciences of Man
[capitul 8](https://hackmd.io/@bix9kyHhRQKNGGA6Q-iYXw/rJvvonA82/edit)
### The Organismic Revolution
### The Image of Man in Contemporary Thought
### System-Theoretica! Re-orientation
### Systems in the Social Sciences
### A System-Theoretical Concept of Ristory
### The Future in System-Theoretica! Aspect
## General System Theory in Psychology and Psychiatry
El contenido del capitulo 9 esta dentro en otro hackMD
[capitulo 9 listo](https://hackmd.io/jcJoh6u0TcKpHTRggjCHzg)
- The Quandary of Modern Psychology
- System Concepts in Psychopathology
- Conclusion
Aqui termina el contenido "capitulo 9"
## The Relativity of Categories
[Capítulo 10](https://hackmd.io/@migueles13/HymbBYbDn/edit)
### The Whorfian Hypothesis
### The Biological Relativity of Categories
### The Cultural Re1ativity of Categories
### The Perspectivistic View
### Notes
1. This and other examples in Whorf's argument are criticized by Whatmough (1955). "As Brugmann showed (*Syntax des einfachen Satzes, 1925, pp. 17-24), fulget, pluit, tonat* are simple old ti-stems (nouns 'lightning there, rain there, thunder there') and Whorf was quite wrong when he said that *tonat* (he used that very word) is structurally and logically unparalleled in Hopi." Similarly, "the Hopi for 'prepare, ' we are told, is 'to try-for, to practise-upon,' But this is exactly prae-paro." "It will not do to say that Hopi physics could not have had concepts such as space, velocity, and mass, or that they would have been very different from ours. Hopi has no physics because the Hopi are hindered by taboo or magic from experimental investigation." Although one has to surrender to the linguist's authority, it seems amply demonstrated that the style of thinking is different in the several civilizations even though Whorf's supposition that this is more or less solely due to linguistic factors, is open to criticism.
2. It is interesting to note that exactly the same viewpoint was stated by Lorenz (1943) in terms of the biological determination of categories: "The terms which language has formed for the highest functions of our rational thinking stilI bear so dearly the stamp of their origin that they might be taken from the 'professional language' of a chimpanzee. We 'win insight' into intricate connections, just as the ape into a maze of branches, we found no better expression for our most abstract ways to achieve goals than 'method,' meaning detour. Our tactile space still has, as it were from time to non-jumping lemurs, a particular preponderance over the visual. Hence we have 'grasped' (*erfasst*) a 'connection' (*Zusammenhang*) only if we can 'comprehend' (*begreifen,* i.e., seize) it. Also the notion of object (*Gegenstand,* that which stands against us) originated in the haptic perception of space .... Even time is represented, for good or wrong, in terms of the visualizable model of space (p. 344) .... Time is absolutely unvisualizable and is, in our categorical thinking, made visualizable always [?; perhaps a Western prejudice, L. v. B.] only by way of spatio-temporal processes .... The 'course of time' is symbolized, linguistically and certainly also conceptually, by motion in space (the stream of time). Even our prepositions 'before' and 'after; our nouns 'past, present and future' originally have connotations representing spatio-temporal configurations of motion. It is hardly possible to eliminate from them the element of motion in space" (pp. 351 ff.).
3. As far as can be seen, this simple demonstration of the non Euclidean structure of the visual space was first indicated by von Bertalanffy (1937, p. 155), while "curious enough, no reference whatever is found in the literature on the physiology of perception" (Lorenz, 1943. p. 335).
4. An excellent analysis on the culture-dependence of perception, cognition, affect, evaluation, unconscious processes, normal and abnormal behavior, etc., is given in Kluckhohn (1954). The reader is referred to this paper for ample anthropological evidence.
5. I find that Toynbee (1954, pp. 699 ff.) , in his otherwise not overly friendly comment on Spengler's theory of types of mathematical thinking, arrives at an identical formulation. He speaks of a different "penchant" of civilizations for certain types of mathematical reasoning, which is the same as the above-used notion of "predilection." The present writer's interpretation of Spengler was, in the essentials, given in 1924, and he has seen no reason to change it.
6. This perhaps can lead to a fairer interpretation of Goethe's "Theory of Colors." Goethe's revolt against Newtonian optics which is a scandal and completely devious within the history of occidental physics, can be understood in this way: Goethe, an eminently eidetic and intuitive mind, had the feeling (which is quite correct) that Newtonian optics purposely neglects, and abstracts from, exactly those qualities which are most prominent in sensory experience. His *Farbenlehre*, then, is an attempt to deal with those aspects of reality which are not covered by conventional physics; a theoretical enterprise which remained abortive.
7. Notice the theological motive in Leibniz's invention of the binary system. It represented Creation since any number can be produced by a combination of "something" (1) and "nothing" (0). But has this antithesis metaphysical reality, or is it but an expression of linguistic habits and of the mode of action of our nervous system?
## Appendix I: Notes on advances in the mathematical theory of systems (1971)
[apendice 1](https://hackmd.io/@bix9kyHhRQKNGGA6Q-iYXw/SkFDB9bvn/edit)
## Appendix: The Meaning and Unity of Science
At a time of universal crises such as we are experiencing today, the question of the meaning and purpose of natmal sciences arises. That science is to be blamed for the miseries of our time is a reproach frequently heard; it is believed that men have been enslaved by machines, by technology at large, and eventually have been driven into the carnage of the world wars. We do not have the power to substantially influence the course of history; our only choice is to recognize it or to be overrun by it.

A renowned scholar, Professor Dr. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, addressed a crowded audience in the Department of Forensic Medicine within the framework of a scientific lecture series spousored by FöST (Freie österreichische Studentenschaft). He spoke on vital present-day questions in connection with the problem of the special position of man in nature.

In contrast to the animal which has an "ambient" (Umwelt) determined by its organization, man himself creates his world, which we call human culture. Among the presuppositions for its evolution are two factors, language and formation of concepts, which are closely related to each other. "Language" as appeal or command can already be observed in the animal world; examples for this are the singing- of birds, the warning whistle of mountain chamois, etc. Language as representation and communication of facts, however, is man's monopoly. Language, in the wider sense of the word, comprises not only oral speech but also script and the symbolic system of mathematics. These are systems not of inherited but of freely created and traditional symbols. First of all, this explains the specificity of human history in contrast to biological evolution: Tradition in contrast to hereditary mutations which occur only over a long period of time. Secondly, physical trial-and-error, largely characteristic of animal behavior, is replaced by mental experimentation-i.e., one with conceptual symbols. For this reason, true goal-directedness becomes possible. Goal-directedness and teleology in a metaphorical sense-i.e., regulation of happenings in the sense of maintenance, production and reproduction of organic wholeness, is a general criterion of life. True purposiveness, however, implies that actions are carried out with knowledge of their goal, of their future final results; the conception of the future goal does already exist and influences present actions. This applies to primitive actions of everyday life as well as to the highest achievements of the human intellect in science and technology. Furthermore, the symbolic world created by men gains a life of its own, as it were; it becomes more intelligent than its creator. The symbol system of mathematics, for example, is embodied in an enormous thinking machine which, fed with a statement, produces in return a solution on the basis of a fixed process of concatenation of symbols, which could hardly be anticipated. On the other hand, however, this symbolic world becomes a power which can lead to grave disturbances. If it comes to a conflict between the symbolic world-which in human society has emerged in moral values and social conventions-and biological drives, which are out of place in cultural surroundings, the individual is confronted with a situation prone to psychoneurosis. As a social power the symbolic world, which makes man human, at the same time produces the sanguinary course of history. In contrast to the naive struggle for existence of organisms, human history is largely dominated by the struggle of ideologies-i.e., of symbolisms, which are the more dangerous, the more they disguise primitive instincts. We cannot revoke the course of events, which has produced what we call "man"; it is up to him, however, whether he applies his power of foresight for his enhancement or for his own annihilation. In this sense the question of what course the scientific world-conception will take is at the same time a question of the destiny of mankind.

A survey of scientific developments reveals a strange phenomenon. Independently of each other, similar general principles start to take shape in the various fields of science. As such, the lecturer emphasized especially the aspects of organization, wholeness, and dynamics, and sketched their influence in the various sciences. In physics, these conceptions are characteristic of modern in contrast to classical physics. In biology, they are emphasized by the "organismic conception" represented by the lecturer. Similar conceptions are found in medicine, psychology (gestalt psychology, theory of stratification) and in modern philosophy.

This results in a tremendous perspective, the prospect of a unity of the world-view hitherto unknown. How does this unity of general principles come about? Dr. von Bertalanffy answers this question by demanding a new field in science which he calls "General System Theory" and which he attempted to found. This is a logico-mathematical field, whose task is the formulation· and derivation of those general principles that are applicable to "systems" in general. In this way, exact formulations of terms such as wholeness and sum, differentiation, progressive mechanization, centralization, hierarchical order, finality and equifinality, etc., become possible, terms which occur in all sciences dealing with "systems" and imply their logical homology.

Last century's mechanistic world picture was closely related to the domination of the machine, the theoretical view of living beings as machines and the mechanization of man himself. Concepts, however, which are coined by modern scientific developments, have their most obvious exemplification in life itself. Thus, there is a hope that the new world concept of science is an expression of the development toward a new stage in human culture.
## References
## Suggestions for Further Reading
## Index