# Privacy footprint If engaging in self-stalking was not a mandatory assignment, I would never have thought to discover what was being revealed about my identity, activity, and preferences on various platforms. I am relatively cautious with what I post on the Internet, and I assumed this would be reflected in my self-stalking. [Kernighan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brian_Kernighan) (2017) describes the sources of personal data as being two-fold: people directly give away personal information for entertainment and convenience, but they also may not realize the other ways their information is being gathered. Forget the third-party cookies that people rarely consider, I did not even realize what information I had “voluntarily” given [Facebook](facebook.com) and [Google.](google.com) [Haridy](https://newatlas.com/author/rich-haridy/) (2019) recognizes this common oversight by individuals, arguing that Facebook does not need to scheme and perform sneaky acts in order to collect your information because you have already freely provided them with it. **The idiom, “like taking candy from a baby” certainly describes my naivety well.** For example, I had also unknowingly enabled Google to recognize my age range, gender, primary language, and interests in financial software, athletic apparel, and HelloFresh. The age range and gender assumption stick out to me the most, as Google likely concluded this based on trends in big data (Kernighan, 2017). Perhaps Google tracked my search history, finding that I was searching for traditionally feminine products, to conclude this. ![image alt](https://i.imgur.com/nuo6alu.png) ![google ad personalization](https://i.imgur.com/lTgHvfm.png) Luckily, there is an abundance of much more talented Justine Chens out there, including a [world-famous composer and violinist](https://www.justinefchen.com/about). The information of said musician has flooded my results for sites, images, and videos associated with my name. But, my identity remains easily accessible. I had allowed Facebook to distribute my birthday and friends list to the public. My LinkedIn profile picture is among one of the first results that pop up on Google, as is an article that I wrote for my high school newspaper. ![image alt](https://i.imgur.com/BOrHmJ4.png) ![image alt](https://i.imgur.com/mq8EEna.png) ![image alt](https://i.imgur.com/Cyfr5Tb.png) Spokeo revealed that I am from [San Jose](https://www.google.com/maps/place/San+Jose,+CA/@37.2968617,-121.8174129,10z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x808fcae48af93ff5:0xb99d8c0aca9f717b!8m2!3d37.3382082!4d-121.8863286) and [my phone carrier.](att.com) The combination of the information just listed would enable a stranger to easily connect the dots and learn who I am as a person. ![fb profile info](https://i.imgur.com/OS5sN2G.png) ![spokeo phone number](https://i.imgur.com/GG609RC.png) Since our previous courses about third-party cookies and ad-blocking, I have disabled third-party cookies and installed [UBlockOrigin](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin/cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm?hl=en) on my primary browser. I’m curious about the degree to which this has lowered the amount of personal information I am providing. Although Kernighan (2017) claims that tracking is primarily used for commercial interests and advertising purposes, I am more concerned about the issues of identity theft, financial fraud, and physical harm. It would be easy for a vengeful ex-best friend or boyfriend to use this information for evil. ![image alt](https://i.imgur.com/iCvBweO.png)