This specification is to define a standard to the voting process that satisfies the virtues of decentralised governance in the absence of direct sovereignty.
Policies put important safeguards in place for organisations, to refute poor and constitute fair practices of governance. Outlining a clear definition of consensus. In the case of decentralised voting, it is not a common occurrence that this is assumed to be a numerical static value, denoted as a quorum.
Quorum: a minimum threshold that the total tally of any ballot is required to meet to be deemed as consensus
While this can be seen as a benefit in defence of the organisation, it can also be seen as a deterrent to progressing the initiative if there is insufficient participation present. The issue roots from predominantly generalising that such value alone - is effectively a minimised policy.
Policies are de-facto principles to the voting process, which defines the parameters for facilitation. Concerning the case of on-chain governance, the policy is encoded into the smart contracts that facilitate governance, conditioned by the following parameters.
However, in the case of off-chain signalling mechanisms like Snapshot that commonly operate in collaboration with a subsidiary. Aspects of the reflective policy become absent, for example, stakes are no longer time restrained but assorted by relative presence, recorded at a specific block height. The demographic can be extended to stakeholders who otherwise would not be compliant to vote, such as liquidity provisioners via custom voting strategies. Furthermore, on default creation of a Snapshot space, a quorum is not a prominent setting in configuration. Failure to specify such parameter is a direct compromise to the governance process.
The connotations of cost-effective governance are masked by the extended exposure to more stakeholders, at the cost of reducing the commitment to governance and disenfranchising individual sovereignty. Leaving it susceptible to manipulation from internal, external or subsidiary actors if no substitute policy is in place to form an equitable democratic process.
To be feasibly considered, presentations must adhere to be concise and should specify the reasoning behind any request. Additionally, the relative benefits and risks to the organisation should be declared. The details and nature of the request should be described in depth.
All proposals have a relative association to their fulfilment and so a target demographic (see Acting Groups) can be labelled to which the proposal concerns.
Proposals once drafted or authored should be shared to the public forums for feedback, which are then subject to a minimum recommended waiting period of 7 days to allow discussion to form before being balloted.
This policy is subject to change at the discretion of governance and should be re-evaluated quarterly to gauge its feasibility and potential weaknesses. As the native asset of authority is subject to market appreciation or depreciation, significant changes in either circumstance should incur a reassessment of the iterative policy. Then if the sentiment for change is shared, a new policy is balloted to deem whether such is necessary., internal or subsidiary actors if no substitute policy is in place to form an equitable democratic process.
To be feasibly considered, presentations must adhere to be concise and should specify the reasoning behind any request. Additionally, the relative benefits and risks to the organisation should be declared. The details and nature of the request should be described in depth.
All proposals have a relative association to their fulfilment and so a target demographic (see Acting Groups) can be labelled to which the proposal concerns.
Proposals once drafted or authored should be shared to the public forums for feedback, which are then subject to a minimum recommended waiting period of 7 days to allow discussion to form before being balloted.
This policy is subject to change at the discretion of governance and should be re-evaluated quarterly to gauge its feasibility and potential weaknesses. As the native asset of authority is subject to market appreciation or depreciation, significant changes in either circumstance should incur a reassessment of the iterative policy. Then if the sentiment for change is shared, a new policy is balloted to deem whether such is necessary.