In web3.storage we describe concept of an account as convenience for aggregating and managing capabilities across various user spaces under same identity, simplifying recovery and authorization flows.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119.
In web3.storage users MAY create number of user spaces simply by generating asymmetric key pairs. User MAY also receive capability delegations from other user spaces. Managing these delegations and keypairs across multiple spaces, agents and devices can get complicated.
To address this we propose a concept of an account, which is a principal that can be delegated all relevant capabilities across various user spaces.
We also propose account authorization flow that would allowing allow authorized agent to act on behalf of the account principal.
User account is a principal identified by did:mailto
identifier.
It MUST be a DID identifier as opposed to mailto:
URI to be a valid prinicipal in the UCAN protocol.
User MAY authorize an agent to represent their account by delegating capabilities to it. However since right now we have no way of creating or resolving did:mailto
documents, there is no supported way to issue such a delegation.
In the future we intend to address this by implementing support for ucan mailto specification.
To address this limitation service MUST provide ucan/issue
capability, that user agent MAY invoke
to get an authorization to act on behalf of the account.
Exmaple illustrates authorization request to represent
alice@web.mail
withdid:key:zAgent
agent fromweb3.storage
{
iss: "did:key:zAgent",
aud: "did:dns:web3.storage",
att: [{
with: "did:key:zAgent",
can: "ucan/issue",
nb: { as: "did:mailto:alice@web.mail" }
}]
}
with
Resource MUST be a did:key
URI. It represents a public key that user wishes to use for signing UCANs issued by DID in the nb.as
field. It SHOULD represent user agent DID.
as
Field MUST be a an account agent wishes to represent via did:key
in the with
field . It MUST be a valid did:mailto
identifier
Service MUST perform an out of bound email verification to ensure that user requesting authorization has access to the requestd email address.
For example, the service could send an email email with a link asking user to authorize an agent When link is clicked, agent will be delegated UCAN with requested authorization.
On succesful verification service MUST delegate ucan/sign
capability to the did:key
it was requested with
.
Delegation represents authorization to issue UCANs with did:mailto
account prinicipal, which MAY be signed with did:key
of the agent.
{
iss: "did:dns:web3.storage",
aud: "did:mailto:alice@web.mail",
att: [{
with: "did:dns:web3.storage",
can: "ucan/sign",
nb: { as: "did:key:zAgent" }
}],
exp: null
sig: "..."
}
with
Authorization context, implying that this authorization MUST be considered valid by this recipient (aud
matches this with
).
Other recipients MAY also recognize authorizations issued by trusted principals.
aud
Audience of the UCAN MUST be did:mailto
identifier of the account principal. This ensures that principal alignment requirement can be met when authorization is used as proof by an account.
as
MUST be a did:key
of the principal which MAY sign UCANs issued by an account principal in aud
.
Below sequence diagram illustrates complete authorization flow as described above.
When user agent creates a new space, it MAY delegate full or subset of the capabilities to desired account. This would allow user in different agent to reclaim delegated capabilities there.
Example below illustrates delegation of capabilities to
did:key:zAliceSpace
space to the user accountalice@web.mail
{
iss: "did:key:zAliceSpace",
aud: "did:mailto:alice@web.mail",
att: [{ with: "did:key:zAliceSpace", can: "*" }],
exp: null,
sig: "..."
}
Agent MAY account delegation to a serivce so that it is persisted and can be retrieved later with a different agent.
Invokes
access/delegate
asking web3.storage to record delegation fromdid:key:zAlice
space to thealice@web.mail
account.
{
β iss: "did:mailto:alice@web.mail",
β aud: "did:dns:web3.storage",
β att: [{
β with: "did:mailto:web.mail",
β can: "access/delegate",
β nb: { ["bafy...prf1"]: {"/": "bafy...prf1"} }
β }],
β prf: [
β // proof that did:key:zAgent may represent
β // did:mailto:alice@web.mail
β {
β iss: "did:dns:web3.storage",
β aud: "did:mailto:alice@web.mail",
β att: [{
β with: "did:dns:web3.storage",
β can: "ucan/sign",
β nb: { as: "did:key:zAgent" }
β }],
β exp: null
β sig: "..."
β },
β // bafy...prf1 referenced in the delegation allowing
β // account to access space
β {
β iss: "did:key:zAliceSpace",
β aud: "did:mailto:alice@web.mail",
β att: [{ with: "did:key:zAliceSpace", can: "*" }],
β exp: null,
β sig: "..."
β }
β ],
β sig: "..."
}
Recipient validation requires wrapping actual delegation(s) in a access/delegate
invocation. In the future we may hope to remove wrapping requirement.
with
Field MUST be did:mailto
identifier of the account to which capabilities are been delegated.
nb
Field is a set of delegation links encoded as JSON where keys are CID strings of the values.
When user is authorizing new agent, service MAY include all the valid (not yet expired or revoked) delegations with an authorization proof, which will give agent access to all of the capabilities across all the spaces.
However user may also add new delegations on one device and expect to have access to them on another device without having having to go through another email authorization flow. To address this service MUST provide access/claim
capability, which agent MAY invoke to collect (new) delegations for the account
{
iss: "did:mailto:alice@web.mail",
aud: "did:dns:web3.storage",
att: [{
with: "did:mailto:alice@web.mail",
can: "access/claim"
}],
prf: [
// proof that did:key:zAgent may represent
// did:mailto:alice@web.mail
{
iss: "did:dns:web3.storage",
aud: "did:mailto:alice@web.mail",
att: [{
with: "did:dns:web3.storage",
can: "ucan/sign",
nb: { as: "did:key:zAgent" }
}],
exp: null
sig: "..."
}
],
sig: "..."
}
Using delegation from specific authority as an authorization proof limits it to the contexts in which signing authority is trusted. It is reasonable compromise when receiver of the proof and issuer is the same authority (as is the case for web3.storage).
However we wish above described account system to be useable in global context, whech we plan to accomplish by upgrading authorization to use UCAN mailto specification, so that email ownership could be verifiable without email verification step.
web3.storage offers one "free provider" per account. It will be denied if consumer
space is not specified or is the one that already has it.
Note that adding "free provider" to the space is more than once has no effect (even when obtained through different accounts), because space has set of providers, and "free provider" is either in that set or it is not.