Central Limit Order Books (CLOBs) are often referred to as ~Only Possible On Solana~ #OPOS, and numerous CLOB implementations already exist. Even on L1's like solana, CLOBs have limitations on scalability: Problem with CLOBs: Write locks:Across makers in a single market only a few place/cancel operation can occur per slot. If you have N makers, they have to compete with each other, potentially leading to less competitiveness, which ultimately affects takers. Liquidity Bootstraping

Be slow and patient ~not fast and furious~ In the ever-accelerating realm of high-speed transactions, where the pace of light and rapid bot operations often surpass our human capacities, a counterintuitive strategy emerges: be slow and patient. Our intentions are intricate and far from atomic, demanding a nuanced approach to navigating the fast-paced landscape. Rather than attempting to match the speed of hyper-fast bots, the key lies in transforming your intent into an auction, allowing you to capitalize on those vying to fulfill your demand. One phenomenon that exemplifies this dynamic is the existence of Miner Extractable Value (MEV). The relentless demand for a single unit creates arbitrage opportunities, turning every user into a potential MEV. However, the savvy participant seeks to avoid being the MEV and instead identifies the most cost-effective supplier for their demand. This journey involves a deliberate and gradual ascent along the supply curve, accomplished by incrementally increasing the price—a strategy akin to a Dutch auction. image This principle of "be slow to win" is encapsulated in Paradigm's TWAMM (Time-Weighted Average Market Maker). Beyond the evident savings in execution costs and the intricacies of 'in-between blocks logic,' this approach grants suppliers the luxury of time to compete and construct an offsetting TWAMM order. The result is a competitive environment where the premium charged to the less price-sensitive directional trader gradually diminishes to its minimum viable size.

A flexible system that includes a system of checks and balances can create long standing and successful governing operations. 'trickle' refers to the gradual emission of funds to this sytem. A specific round of 'trickle' cannot and should not be undone. 3 branches: Executive: A committee (multisig) of N risk managers that own the fast admin of the protocol deploy. Congressional: Futarchy voting for approving expenditures from a select budget Judicial: token-weighted voting that selects the risk committee. otherwise, locked stake required for submitting proposals: program upgrades, slow admin functions, and expenditures.

Below is a proposed technical design for a sybil-resistant onchain giveaway for a DEX. This can be repurposed for a lot of giveaway designs. note: this is solely a mechanism spec for educational/research purposes. any interest should consider the risks of running , especially one that acts more like a lottery sponsor: a sponsor can be anyone with a token 'stake' in the smart contract program who wishes to offer it as a giveaway this ensures "alignment of interests" between the participants in the giveaway, the sponsor, and the rest of the smart contract program can be any kind token staked really (stable, L1, etc), not just a governance one

primer insurance funds (IF) are method to avoid having participant(s) pays off another's bad debt (either through a social loss (explicit) or supply expansion / inflation (implicit) event) bad debt: is a liability with insufficent assets to cover at time t. it's possible that time t+1,...,N the assets will suffice but the uncertainty or 'opportunity cost' still makes it bad debt at time t. in defi protocol's: traders pay portion of fees when positions get altered to insurance fund (taker fee, liquidations fee, can depend upon level of leverage, undercollateralized agreements) insurance assets sit idle when bad debt occurs, gets bailed out by the insurance fund

Interested in contributing to the Drift Protocol? There are multiple ways to make valuable contributions, from documentation to code and more. Below are some of the primary avenues you can explore: Table of Contents Documentation Bot Code TypeScript SDK Expanding SDK Language Support Composing Programs on Top of Drift Main Program Contributions

First, what's a vAMM? A Virtual Automated Market Maker (vAMM) is just as customizable as a spot AMM, except the underlying is a "virtual" contract cleared between parties (perps!), not a fungible token. So there is nothing exchanged upfront, just future settlement. Why is this an attractive mechanism? Because it allows a DeFi protocol to have a built-in designated market maker. Designated market makers provide guaranteed liquidity, which helps to bootstrap markets and makes trading / liquidations safer. So what's the FUD?

This is a draft writeup for informational purposes only Introduction This piece explores the potential risks and rewards associated with employing a Margined Staking strategy. The objective of this strategy is to collect more blockchain staking rewards while minimizing the initial capital investment required. To achieve this, the strategy involves utilizing a Liquid Staking Token (LST), which serves as a tradable token representing locked or staked cryptocurrency, thereby granting liquidity to the previously illiquid tokens. screenshot from this Margined Staking Calculator note: these are constantly varying rates "Margined Staking" is also under terms like:

0 Introduction Prerequisite / Assumptions: a DeFi Protocol requires formalized on-chain governance desire for sufficient decentralization desire for no single point or group for 'issuance' Decentralized finance (DeFi) projects typically undergo a transition from centralized control towards decentralized governance, with decision-making power shifting from a select few to a broader community. This process is crucial to ensure that DeFi projects align with the principles of openness, permissionlessness, and credible-neutrality [0]. At the same time, a protocol must strike a delicate balance between competing priorities: the need to maintain a high degree of decentralization while also ensuring its functionality, security, and attractiveness to participants. 1 Challenges for Initialization Experimental smart contract software prior to formalized governance should undergo rigorous testing, including testing in a production environment to simulate real-world scenarios. While risks are involved, responsible testing can be achieved by imposing hard limits on the total account creations / tokens used (to limit maximum potential downside in an exploit event). A cautious and responsible approach to "field testing" can improve the software's reliability and resilience, crucial for its eventual success.

overview Unless a protocol wants to be an immutable public utility, it will require some form of governance. Governance is essential for maintaining and improving any protocol. However, decentralized governance can be a cumbersome process that requires careful consideration before implementation. Therefore, most teams seek user validation of a protocol's design before diving into governance structures. Once a protocol is established, governance becomes crucial to sustain its growth and development. This may involve revenue distribution for contributors, bug fixes, and the introduction of new features. However, governance cannot exist in a vacuum; it needs to be supported by some form of currency management. The more significant the currency pool, the more attractive the protocol becomes to potential contributors. This phenomenon is rooted in the human instinct to seek relative resource abundance. A new token is often created to facilitate the governance process. This governance plays a critical role in bootstrapping this new cryptocurrency by establishing its legitimacy as a means of exchange and providing the necessary infrastructure to support its use in the economy. problems to solve Current on-chain governance suffers from several issues:

Within Drift Protocol, all token deposits are held in a global collateral vault. This is required for seamless cross-margin and borrow-lend. The only exception to this is the insurance fund vault residing outside. Ensuring proper accounting across users requires a robust settlement mechanism. The protocol uses intermediate Pool Balances to facilitate transfers and ensure that claimed gains are required to come from settled offsetting losses. https://archbee.imgix.net/ps_9Ff-LBbQB7IaXI3f3F/7o9CDj7ho4pmKHiTI8_aD_img9824.png Perpetual Market An individual perpetual market has two pools:

thesis The best reward for a protocol user who had paid fees from the protocol treasury is reimbursement. This post proposes a rebate program involving the protocol's native token. primer Many cryptocurrency exchanges offer fee discounts on trades for user stakes of the native token. Whatever the scheme, the most active/fee-paying user attempts to reach the configuration that pays the lowest total fee (by acquiring the native token etc). Whether this fee paid is access to more latent subsidies from other users of the protocol and how to detect this is out of the scope for this proposal. Many deployed protocols lack a clear use case for their tokens or governance mechanisms, but may still choose to implement them due to market demand and to incentivize ongoing development and adoption. However, compensating token holders for fees without any associated burden or risk raises regulatory concerns and does not necessarily benefit the protocol's users, who are responsible for generating revenue.