# Thoughts on PEPC-Boost as a Product

[PEPC-Boost](https://hackmd.io/5nG7DptdRUqkYuG00G-GSA) is a proposed out-of-protocol relay design where the top-of-block and rest-of-block are auctioned separately. This contrasts with the current MEV relays, where the complete block is auctioned wholly.

The problem with full-block auctions is that integrated searcher-builders can easily win the auction because they have high top-of-block extraction capabilities like CEX-DEX arbitrages. This becomes a major centralising factor in the [builder market](https://www.rated.network/builders?timeWindow=all&network=mainnet&page=1). PEPC-Boost aims to reduce the competitive advantage of these top builders by splitting the full block auction into a partial block auction where the top-of-block and rest-of-block are built separately. This [article](https://hackmd.io/5nG7DptdRUqkYuG00G-GSA) contains all the technical details of PEPC-Boost. In this article, let's discuss PEPC-Boost as a product. This talks about the following:
1. How PEPC-Boost could fit into the Ethereum eco-system.
2. The demand-side and supply-side of PEPC-Boost.
3. How we could roll out PEPC-Boost to get a good mass of validators, searchers and builders connecting to it.

# Demand and supply side of PEPC-Boost

Let's analyse PEPC-Boost as a product. We will explore where it receives demand and the supply it needs to receive to cater for the demand. We will also discuss what we need to do to increase the supply and demand side of PEPC-Boost.

**PEPC-Boost Demand-side**

The actors who will use PEPC-Boost are validators. Validators would ideally add PEPC-Boost as another relay to their MEV-Boost setup. They will expect the highest value block from the MEV-Boost relay. So, for PEPC-Boost to meet its demand, it has to produce high-value blocks. Validators will have to be incentivised to add PEPC-Boost to their MEV-Boost setup. PEPC-Boost has to make the following decisions to meet validator demand:

1. Conform to the [builder specs](https://github.com/ethereum/builder-specs) to have no changes with validator interactions.
2. System design should ensure we extract maximum value from the block for validators to consider the proposer a block relayed by PEPC-Boost.

If we have a stable relay deployed that has been well audited, validators shouldn't face too much risk in adding PEPC-Boost to their MEV-Boost setup.

**PEPC-Boost Supply-side**

PEPC-Boost tries to high-value blocks for validators. Traditional MEV-Boost relays have only one builder constructing the complete block, meaning they have to incentivise only one actor. The incentivisation is very clear because builders have no other way to submit their blocks to validators without the relay unless they run their own validators.

In the case of PEPC-Boost, a builder and searcher are both required to produce the highest value block. PEPC-Boost must also be bootstrapped in an environment where traditional MEV relays exist. So, we will have to understand what incentives the searcher and builders have to connect to PEPC-Boost.

For searchers, PEPC-Boost guarantees them a place at the top-of-block if they win the auction by submitting the highest value ToB bundle with CEX-DEX arbs to PEPC-Boost. Searchers currently need guarantees from builders if their bundles get included at the top of the block, and they also have to trust the builder to ensure they correctly include the bundle. They are not incentivised to submit their bundles to the public mempool since most validators propose blocks offered by the MEV-Boost relay as they usually have a higher value. We can only allow specific searcher contracts to be included in the ToB in PEPC-Boost to incentivise searchers further. This can incentivise searchers to participate in the PEPC-Boost ToB auction.

We do not expect builders like Beaverbuild or rsync to connect to PEPC-Boost. Smaller builders can submit RoB blocks combined with high-value ToB bundles submitted by searchers to produce a combined high-value block with the RoB builder txs. This can help improve the inclusion rate of smaller RoB builders who currently have difficulty getting their block proposed because [most searchers flock towards the more prominent builders](https://frontier.tech/builder-dominance-and-searcher-dependence) with better block inclusion rates.

# Potential PEPC-Boost rollout plan

We can do the following to roll out PEPC-Boost:

1. Start development for mainnet with the focus that it should be well audited with only a few issues to be uncovered from the audit.
2. We will have to market PEPC-Boost to the Ethereum community to build awareness about it with validators and staking pools.
3. We will have to partner with staking pools to include PEPC-Boost as a relay with their validators.
4. We will have to initially partner with big searchers to win their trust to submit their ToB bundles to PEPC-Boost.
5. We will have to encourage RoB builders to add PEPC-Boost as one of the relays to which they can submit their blocks.
6. We could run incentive campaigns to give incentives to validators who propose a block with PEPC-Boost. We could also subsidise the initial blocks of PEPC-Boost by artificially bumping their values to ensure the blocks are included to attract more searchers.

# PEPC-Boost in Ethereum Eco-system

A one-line pitch for PEPC-Boost is "it is a trustless way to become an integrated searcher-builder". Currently, only a few big players can run both a searcher and builder because they are well-capitalised and have good R&D teams. Builders who could be more capitalised can submit their blocks to PEPC-Boost to piggyback off searchers to get their taxes included. This will improve the decentralisation of the builder market.

Big builders like Beaverbuild, etc, will not be incentivised to connect to PEPC-Boost since they are already integrated searcher-builders. Smaller builders who already have poor inclusion rates can connect to PEPC-Boost.