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### Abstract
Kant’s Categorical Imperative claims that certain immoral actions—such as theft or lying—are self-undermining when universalized, and thus irrational. This paper offers a critical examination of this claim through the lens of Ludwig von Mises’s theory of rational action. I argue that Kant's appeal to contradiction in conception does not reflect a logical impossibility, but instead relies on deeply embedded normative assumptions about autonomy and lawgiving. By presenting a counterexample wherein universalized theft leads not to social collapse but to stable, mutually beneficial interactions, I demonstrate that the supposed contradictions in Kant’s system are conditional on his moral metaphysics. This reframing opens the door to reevaluating Kant’s formal ethics as a specific ethical vision, not a logically necessary one.

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### **1. Introduction**

Kant’s deontological ethics, particularly the Categorical Imperative, stands as one of the most influential formulations of moral reasoning in Western philosophy. Central to his framework is the idea that moral duties derive from the *form* of reason itself, not from consequences or desires. A key tool in this system is the test of **universalizability**: a moral maxim must be capable of becoming a universal law without contradiction.

This paper challenges a core claim Kant makes about so-called “perfect duties”—notably the prohibition of theft. Kant asserts that maxims like “I will steal when it benefits me” cannot be universalized because they result in a *contradiction in conception*: they destroy the very conditions that make the action possible. However, I argue that this conclusion is not logically necessary, and instead reflects **Kant’s normative presuppositions about the moral status of consent, autonomy, and universal law**. Drawing on Misesian rationality and a novel counterexample, I show that Kant’s framework does not uncover a contradiction inherent in the maxim of theft, but rather reasserts a value-laden conception of moral community under the guise of logical necessity.

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### **2. Kant’s Conception of Contradiction in Perfect Duties**

In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant distinguishes between **perfect** and **imperfect duties** based on whether the universalization of a maxim results in a **contradiction in conception** or merely a **contradiction in the will**. The former leads to strict prohibitions, such as against lying or stealing, while the latter allows for latitude in how duties are discharged (e.g., beneficence).

According to Kant, the maxim “I will steal when it benefits me” cannot be universalized because, if universally adopted, the practice of theft would dissolve the very institution of property. If no one respects ownership, then “stealing” ceases to refer to the wrongful taking of property—it becomes meaningless. The contradiction lies in willing a practice that depends on a norm (property) which the practice simultaneously undermines.

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### **3. Instrumental Rationality: The Misesian Contrast**

Ludwig von Mises offers a markedly different view of human action. For Mises, any **purposeful behavior**—that is, any action aimed at achieving an end—is **rational by definition**. Rationality in this view is not tied to duty or moral law, but to the internal coherence of means and ends. This is a **value-neutral** model: even actions we consider immoral (e.g., theft, violence) can be rational if they are chosen with intent and serve a purpose.

This view undercuts Kant’s reliance on moralized definitions of rationality. From a Misesian standpoint, **universal theft may be chaotic or inefficient, but it is not logically contradictory**, nor is it “irrational” in any robust sense. It simply reflects a different strategic environment.

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### **4. A Thought Experiment: Harmonious Theft**

To test Kant’s theory further, consider a hypothetical society in which everyone adopts the maxim “I will steal when it benefits me.” However, this society exhibits an uncanny symmetry: whenever one individual steals, the other unknowingly reciprocates with a theft of equal or greater benefit. Through this strange equilibrium, both parties leave each encounter **more satisfied**, despite technically stealing.

This scenario challenges Kant on several fronts:

* The **institution of property does not collapse**, even under universal adoption of the maxim.
* There is no **logical contradiction**, since the concept of “stealing” remains intelligible.
* The outcome is **mutually beneficial**, even in the absence of explicit consent.

Kant might object that such mutual “stealing” still violates the principle of autonomy. But this objection reveals the **true foundation** of the contradiction in his system: not logic, but **a deontological commitment to consent and lawgiving**.

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### **5. Is Kant’s Contradiction Moral or Logical?**

The problem, then, is that Kant appears to **conflate normative failure with logical contradiction**. The contradiction in “I will steal when it benefits me” arises **not from the structure of the maxim**, but from Kant’s insistence that morality must be grounded in universal, law-like respect for rational agency.

But what if rational agency can be respected differently? What if moral norms evolve in cultural systems where **consent is not sacrosanct**, but mutual benefit is? In such a system, universalized theft may not undermine the institution of exchange or justice—it might simply **reshape it**.

This shows that Kant’s so-called “contradiction” is **conditional**, not necessary. It follows from a specific moral vision—namely, that persons must be treated as autonomous lawgivers, not merely as ends or beneficiaries. If one adopts a **different theory of normativity**, the contradiction evaporates.

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### **6. Implications for Moral Theory**

This critique has significant implications for how we evaluate deontological ethics:

* **Universalizability cannot stand alone** as a test of morality unless the background moral metaphysics is accepted.
* The **structure of rationality** itself must be examined before we take Kantian contradictions as decisive.
* Competing models—such as Mises’s theory of action or rule-based consequentialism—can produce **coherent, non-Kantian** moral systems without generating internal contradictions.

Kant’s ethics remains a powerful and elegant model, but it should not be mistaken for a logically necessary structure of reason. Instead, it should be understood as a **normative construct**, grounded in specific assumptions about the moral importance of autonomy and formal universality.

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### **7. Conclusion**

The Categorical Imperative, particularly in its role in generating perfect duties, presents itself as a rational test for moral permissibility. However, this critique shows that its apparent logical rigor masks a deep dependence on **non-derivable normative assumptions**. By introducing a counterexample in which universal theft leads to stable, even beneficial interaction, and by contrasting Kant’s notion of rationality with Mises’s purposive action, we see that the Kantian contradiction is not conceptual, but **ethical in disguise**. The ethics of universal law is not illogical to reject—it is merely one among many possible moral architectures.

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### **References**

* Kant, Immanuel. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
* Mises, Ludwig von. *Human Action: A Treatise on Economics*. Yale University Press, 1949.
* Hegel, G.W\.F. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Trans. H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge University Press, 1991.
* Foot, Philippa. *Virtues and Vices*. Oxford University Press, 1978.
* Herman, Barbara. *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. Harvard University Press, 1993.