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# 28 Sept
### Interesting questions
* Is it possible for the metaverse to be a public goods?
* How big is the video game community to be a metaverse?
* Directing Public Funding--How?
* What are the terms other orgs and companies do to capitalize on your work?
* Do you see a pathway to decentralize Apple?
Stayed because
- interested in community
- how to fund open source
Content
* [https://numinous.productions/ttft/](https://numinous.productions/ttft/)
* [https://kernel.community/en/track-gaming/module-1/](https://kernel.community/en/track-gaming/module-1/)
* [https://kernel.community/en/track-gaming/module-3](https://kernel.community/en/track-gaming/module-3)
* [https://polats.com/blog/blog/goodbye-flash-hello-modern-web](https://polats.com/blog/blog/goodbye-flash-hello-modern-web)
crypto projects have money but they dont know whom to give the money to
live off of donations from people
queston--when a restaurant shuts down, thats when peole realize the value.Incentives.
Partnerships keeps it going , influencers.
Reddit, twitch model. (Web2)
Not everything needs to be paid, not everything needs to be a full time job. Volunteering concept, doing things for fun.
Motivation to do open source--
free rider problem---crypto tryng to solve the free rider problem. Public goods.
People pushing back against centralization. Public goods discussion may help people get more involved.
Is it possible for the metaverse to be a public goods?
Eg FB nnounced that its going to be a metaverse
How big is the video game community to be a metaverse?
Not a culture of sharing public goods is happening at the design front not at the code front
Not normal for people to release their codes
Open source tool, under incentivized.
Software as a service, (model)
What are the terms other orgs and companies are capitalize on your work?
Retain value if you are the first person, even if other people copies you. Uniswap is huge because they are legitimate
Loot project example
--Set the terms in a restricted way
Lot of things my be open sourced, incentives would decide.
Various models
Wikipedia
--Ask Linh to put the second model here
--Swags
Flash - anyone can create, decentralised.
App stores now, much more fixed.
Workflow was easier for creators
Disconnect between game ou want and what you can
OS and ego, legitimacy
Blockchain games --may be a new model coming up.
Building games on role playing perspective
Incentivizing people to build on top of loot
Loot is open source, modular design
Built by the community, uses the same smart contract.
The games which we are seeing now are not similar to ealier days.
How the lego pieces fit together?
Will we be able to change the model? How we may be able to keep it open source? Is it even possible?
Directing Public Funding--How?
Funding the real world public goods.
Creating relationships--
Geo location data on block chain (Pokemon go and similar projects)
Building a good narrative around it, eg pokemon go
Game design and public goods---space for a public wide reputation layer and that has game elements (MC--coordinator)
Eg if you help your neighbor, in real world, your points go up
Do you see a pathway to decentralize Apple?
A path to open source their product?
Android good chunk open sourced
# 9 Sept Public Library session

## Question of the week: How might we (public goods workstream, public goods library) be a force for public good?
## 1. :cat: Level 3 article: HARD, but this won a Nobel
Elinor Ostrom: [Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action](https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1848&context=nrj)
*Summary:*
Ostrom argues for a third approach to resolving the problem of the commons: the design of durable cooperative institutions that are organized and governed by the resource users.
1. First principle is **demarcation of clearly defined** boundaries to **identify the members of the user pool** as well as the **physical boundaries of the CPR**.
2. Second, **congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions**. Rules have to make sense when applied.
3. Third, **all individuals can participate in collective-choice arrangements**.
4. Fourth, either the appropriators themselves or persons accountable to the appropriators are **responsible for monitoring compliance** with collective decisions.
5. Fifth, **sanctions should be graduated to reflect the severity, frequency, and context of the violation**.
6. Sixth, low-cost and readily available **conflict-resolution mechanisms** must exist to mediate conflicts among appropriators and between appropriators and officials.
7. Seventh, users must have **recognition of their own rights to organize institutions**.
8. Finally, **nested enterprises**, i.e., sets of rules established **within a hierarchy** of appropriator institutions, must be established for common-pool resources that are within larger resource systems and political jurisdictions.
## Do we have the tools to manage common resource pools?
But first, what is a common resource pool to you?
Go to menti.com 9053 2024
You can submit multiple times
1. managing attention, hard to have thing seen by people. buy ads in fb, twitter, memes. bitclout (early phase of a dSocial network, mostly people that shill or already popular), idea market. jamcloud open source clubhouse clone. distribution (airdrop) to just popular people. million pixel nft page.
2. fair launches? community generated advertising. advertising is an attention market
3. funding- governance alloc how community believe it should be distributed. columbus5 in terra luna network (pan says good ui and ideology) theyll take seignorage and burn it (deflationary). continuously harder to use the system eventually. tx capacity vs payment to miners. most just use gnosis and dauhaus/snapshot
4. governing the network itself, the native token. burnt tokens could be used for other stuff too
5. community conversations- is discord a good place? dDiscord? money managed through discord is massive, could they make it community owned? functionally yes ethically not? tailor built space? do we have a neutral zone? perfect enemy of good. status messaging app. mobile first, privacy centric but a lot of people not actively on it. web3 ux not there. decentralised twitter clone were mostly called slow twitter + cost gas. start one thing and do it well first. this section of discord very focused on topic at hand. such a short timespan we lose ability to focus on things. convivial society ideas. discord taking it slow (have threads now yay) to manage info
6. discord v tele? tele can do a single communication stream. but if its a whole discord its hard to keep up. focus in some channels and how to get action out of these channels. chaos engine because too many channels. what kind of communication do you want?
7. kernel chose thread because good for deep conversations. tele for banter
8. ostrom, managing commons has some limit when too saturated. public library section kept separate out of the chaos. splintering that occurs is still available but tele when splinter happens only a few even know happened. community gardening.
9. eth research/ core devs forum. threading. propose idea and people can follow then it lets people allocate attention accordingly. people who can put in the time to start a thread you need to have some content/comment/qn. dont want to miss information.
## 2. :bird: Level 2: Medium, shares about how public sector may work with commuities
Jocelyn Bourgon: [The New Synthesis: Preparing Government for the Challenges of the 21st Century](https://www.csc.gov.sg/articles/the-new-synthesis-preparing-government-for-the-challenges-of-the-21st-century)
*Summary:*

Public servants need to work to leverage its collective capacity for better results. This gives particular importance to the stewardship role of government to promote and defend the collective interest in all circumstances — both predictable and unpredictable — and in particular when the costs of failures would be borne by society as a whole.
* a strong **emergence** function to **anticipate** what might be, with the ability to **take proactive action** and **tap collective intelligence** so as to shape emergent solutions and co-create **responses to complex policy issues**;
* an efficient **compliance** function to **set priorities**, help forge societal and political **consensus** and **conserve energy** within a context of constrained actions and behaviours;
* an effective **performance** function to **think across systems** and work across boundaries, sectors and disciplines;
* a powerful **resilience** function to co-produce public results, encourage the **active participation** of citizens, families, communities as value creators, and to **build the adaptive capacity** of society to prosper and adapt in all circumstances.
## Consider GitcoinDAO as Web3's public servants, do we have these key functions?
1. back to how you manage a commons, we're getting there.
2. management of attention and resources. creator economy or the "economy" economy
3. UN-like organisation! between DAOs, we are already aligned.
4. governance- iutf doesnt have a voting process, goes by consensus. people generally agreed on it and was resolved efficiently/amicably. consensus mechanism with no end? people just fork if theyre not agreeing. churchill on democracy.
5. what is the failure case for voting. representation? if you cant implement it your point isnt considered
6. reboot-criticism of the risks of tech. crypto expanding beyond what it was and is going to a new group that might challenge some core assumptions of the space. can create inclusive world onchain but just .001% of the population
7. tokenisation might make DAOs communes that succeed but need to heavily reward early adopters. what do you do when original adopters control a big chunk of the wealth. partydao gave 50% of the tokens for 80k only but only have that in treasury
8. proof of action? contribute to community measurably. idea! deflationary mechanism for your initial allocation. burn for participating. simp (solana)
9. MC, those that joined the mmm meeting get qtips for showing up. reward proof of action
## 3. :dog: Level 2: Medium, reflective piece about how people start contributing to DAOs
Peter: [Hard things about communities](https://medium.com/1kxnetwork/hard-thing-about-communities-4f58d8b53d9c)
*Summary:*

People need to trust that…
* Their contributions are going to be put to good use
* The intentions behind the community are earnest
* The community is capable of achieving and making progress on its goals
* The people in the community share the same values as they do
Communities only become real when they achieve their first win.
A lot of the time, this will look like asking your community what goals they want to achieve and executing upon it on their behalf. While others might help, the reality with new communities is that you will most likely be pulling most of the weight.
## What are our first wins like as a contributor?
1. sid, feeling accepted nontangible but valuable. give stranger responsibility for part of the dao
2. linh, aha moment was on an airmeet. qz sid talking 3h?! fun to meet other members. community experience. meeting more people and it feels welcome. new to crypto
3. kris, see a lot of things i can do. so much that it gets a bit overwhelming. connect opportunities with specialists, need to build the DAO itself +1 from linh on tangible impact
4. lani, previously have a hierarchy but the openness is a great experience
5. pan, tangible sense of action is exciting. build out things for ideas. feeling like youre making things and solving problems together.
*dm scott or linh for more work :)*
7. stef, community aspect. living flat hierarchy, focus on public goods. building for the collective.
8. tua, being a part of the community was in a project for the last 3y. met and had htht keeps me moving forward
## 4. :fish: Level2: Medium, no clear answer to this
MakerForum: [How Can We Help Our Core Unit Teams and Maker Community Members Avoid Burnout?](
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/how-can-we-help-our-core-unit-teams-and-maker-community-members-avoid-burnout/10168)
*Summary:*
Open questions:
1. What are some of the strategies we can implement to reduce burnout?
2. How can we decrease and mitigate stress? How can we emphasize that quality is a journey and not a destination?
3. Can we keep our CUs and community members engaged, fulfilled, and as resilient individuals who are connected and supported by a network of similarly engaged colleagues with a shared purpose?
4. In my opinion, these are all questions and hurdles that we must tackle in-order to help establish our “esprit de corps” mission for MakerDAO.
No conclusion...
## Share with us which problem do you think is most important, and why?
1. crypto never sleeps. we lose sleep! distributed nature = late meetings
2. physically and mentally healthy. rescheduling this meeting is a great step towards that
3. process of finding HR people, coaches that people can go to and check in
4. belongingness
5. overwhelming feeling of not being on top of anything
6. stress!
7. dont let people enter that state of stress
8. onboarding is super impt!!! what level they are at -> how to contribute
9. gaming industry- lots of passion so they work there. but they become exploited. help people self-actualize
10. checking in with each other
11. artist conditioned to believe they are lucky to be making their work
12. well rewarded
13. creator economy- realising this whole web2 generation has been exploited
14. could start to think about invisible labour, historically undervalued work, how to cultivate support for this. practice is very solitary, see final product but everything else is unvalued.
15. nft artists are engineers. dev+artist. same people in web3 nfts making lots of money. what models could get non engineer artists
crypto contractor artist job!
## 5. 🦒 Level 1: Easy: different revenue models for funding OSS
[Open Source Guides: Getting Paid for Open Source Work](https://opensource.guide/getting-paid)
*Summary:*
1. Some companies explicitly encourage working on open source
2. Raise money independently
3. Bounties
4. Crowdfunding or sponsorships
5. Revenue streams eg. support, managed service
6. Grants
7. Build a case
* Impact of your project
* Traction of your project
* Value to funder
* Use of funds
* How to receive funds
## Which ones do you think suit Web3 best?
---
# [A Prehistory of DAOs](https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/t4F5rItMw4-mlpLZf5JQhElbDfQ2JRVKAzEpanyxW1Q) Reading Notes

>While networks have existed throughout history, new information technology emphasizes cooperative relations that greatly impact institutions, through cutting across jurisdictions, and through markets, “facilitating the growth of keiretsus and other distributed, web-like global enterprises and, increasingly, so-called ‘virtual corporations’”, Ronfeldt notes (4). Yet multi-organizational networks’ primary domain is neither the public nor private sector, at least as both are traditionally conceived. Instead, they will most transform a third, “autonomous social sector” (5), identified in the report as civil society. Painted in the 1995 landscape to include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), grassroots organizations, and private voluntary organizations, civil society will be strengthened by multi-organizational networks and perhaps address issues surrounding inequality, bureaucracy, and accessibility where preceding organizational forms failed.
QZ:
In Singapore, the our social sector is very much funded by the government. I've been in many meetings where social organisations' biggest priorities were to lower government funding and be more sustainable (some organisations are funded upwards of 80%).
We take the "many helping hands" approach as highlighted [here](https://www.psd.gov.sg/heartofpublicservice/our-institutions/supporting-singaporeans-and-ensuring-no-one-is-left-behind/) but a lot of it is public sector driven. This has led to some warped incentives. Example: during COVID-19 we had a grant program for laptops. When schools went full home-based learning, lower income students didn't have a laptop (you can imagine how much this would exacerbate the learning gap). The existing grant program would take 2-3 months to roll out, completely missing the home-based learning period. [Engineering Good](https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/heroes-unmasked-engineers-fix-donated-laptops-give-students-low-income-families-home-based) stepped up to collect laptops from corporates and helped close this gap, serving a public need.
> from 2014, a DAO could be described then as a capitalized organization in which a software protocol informs its operation, placing automation at its center and humans at its edges. For example, a software protocol could specify the conditions upon which an organization automatically distributes capital to its members. This led to the idea that organizational values could be automated and executed by code, a lingering idea that perhaps falsely suggests tacit knowledge can be fully expressed in a software protocol.
QZ:
I'm curious how some of these grants have been administered. [Cough Cough uniswap's education grant.](https://cointelegraph.com/news/concern-as-uniswap-backed-defi-education-fund-dumps-10m-worth-of-unil). I like MakerDAO's approach with [weekly updates for large workgroups.](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/growth-cu-weekly-update-august-6-12/9824). Polkadot's grant milsetone delivery
>In 2021, a DAO could be described as a voluntary association with the operating principles of digital cooperativism. As voluntary associations, they are a cross-jurisdictional way for strangers, friends, or unlikely allies to pseudonymously come together toward common goals, supported by a token model, incentives, and governance. Members of a DAO can have representative ownership of its digital assets through a token, which often simultaneously acts as a governance right.
QZ:
How can we help people understand this better? The idea of tokens as a store of value (money, reputation, decision-making) is usually made analogous to stocks/board positions/equity. I tend to see tokens as a barometer of a community's health as it represents demand and supply to be associated with it. But definitely a lot to learn!

>The International Cooperative Alliance adopted these operating principles, which still guide cooperatives globally:
Voluntary and Open Membership
Democratic Member Control
Member Economic Participation
Autonomy and Independence
Education, Training, and Information
Cooperation among Cooperatives
Concern for Community
QZ:
Was reading a book about Amazon and the focus was on the mechanisms to make the "Amazonian-ness" of the organisation be carried out day to day. I suppose in DAOs membership isn't free (voting power) but viewing is free and all can take part. One could also influence discussions but might not be able to contribute a vote.
>Tokenization introduces a powerful cultural norm into early stage organizations: the expectation of transparent co-ownership of its assets from the start.
QZ:
I think this is really key. What sort of tokenomics influence the types of culture? As Charlie Munger put it, show me the incentives and I'll show you the result. Price is such a factor.
>Just as DAOs can learn from case studies of cooperatives, in a two-way exchange DAOs could introduce more forms of decentralized governance into cooperatives. This is the case made by Morshed Mannan in Fostering Worker Cooperatives with Blockchain Technology: Lessons from the Colony Project, which cites how cooperatives often face “coordination problems as the entity scales across borders,” with a “negative trend in participatory management, mutual monitoring, and solidarity” as they internationalize. Dilemmas that cooperatives face, such as funding, governance, and alignment across jurisdictions, DAOs directly address. Embracing cooperativism as a protocol rather than as a corporate structure, in their neologism, DAOs could encourage a cultural space that can be crafted beyond traditional divisions.
QZ:
Colony's whitepaper was what got me started on blockchain in the first place! I saw it as a way to clear out the bureacratic groupthink/pain that I experienced when working in gov... Blockchain is naturally inclined towards competition as coordination, what I mean is that you coordinate effort by selecting the best. eg. Hackathons. Wonder if there's a more socially optimal way without tedious vetting.
>As Rawson writes, “As long as the collective memory freely circulates within a given [DAO network], discovered solutions to problems can be reused.” When we view DAOs as multi-organizational networks aligned by token ownership, the purpose of DAO tooling becomes not only to support the operations of one team but to facilitate collaborations across many. Funded by PrimeDAO, DAO-to-DAO (D2D) collaboration mechanisms appear the most forward thinking work along these lines, which may eventually overtake traditional business-to-business (B2B) products. A new squadlike entity emerging from stealth mode, the Gnosis Guild team embraces a similar emphasis on DAO-to-DAO tools, with a new constellation of DAO tools launching in early August.
QZ:
Got to say, Owocki's Egregore concept was alluded to here. I suppose DAOs thrive on talent. Can/how/will Gitcoin attract talent to the right projects...or how can Gitcoin groom talent for these projects?
# [Positive Sum Worlds: Remaking Public Goods](https://otherinter.net/research/positive-sum-worlds/)
>The vernacular term "public" is understood to be something of the people, freely available for use—such as parks, roads, and common lands. Crypto protocols' strongest claim to publicness is based on this principle of open and permissionless access. Blockchains overcome a key limitation of Web 1 and Web 2 publics: their failure to satisfy the criteria of inalienable access. The internet's so-called "public spaces" are nothing like our cities' public parks. They are merely someone else's private server, where access can be revoked at will. By contrast, crypto protocols deliberately enforce unimpeded access. But a public is more than a means of access to public space. Another key definition is a public as body of people, defined in relation to some political association.
Different from the economic version of what a public good is
>The social media platforms which dominate the web today claim to be tools made for "communities" of users who have opted to participate—but these platforms have also produced wide-reaching negative externalities: effects on third parties who did not agree to incur their costs. The externalities of platforms include incursions on personal privacy, the spread of misinformation, the devaluation of creative labor, even destabilization of the democratic process. These effects are often cited as a primary motivation for those now working in Web 3 to now establish sovereign spaces built on a foundation of public accountability.
Remaking a new world that's more ethical
>When we think of the public, we should think expansively. This is not to say that we must consider everyone in the world as a part of our public. As we emphasized in our essay on squads, we also celebrate small, self-selective communities and trust-based groups. But by considering the effects (positive and negative) that we might have on groups at the margins—whether nocoiners, non-technical family members, or simply future participants in this public domain—we increase the potential for greater public upside and decrease the risk of negative externalities.
Education! You cannot simply create a world of crypto just for existing crypto people
> Public libraries, public education, national artifacts, and clean running water are four public things that exemplify the moral basis of public goods. Public libraries are built by communities that value self-directed learning and spaces of shared knowledge. Public schools are valued when a culture believes a shared basis of mathematics, science, language, and history enriches civic life. Nations designate and protect historical artifacts because their people hold connection to their heritage to be something of intrinsic worth. Lastly, we provision clean water for all because of our belief that all lives are equally valuable.
What are the equivalent of these things in crypto? We seem to rely on newsletters (that people can influence with ads) and videos, and places like earn.com/binance Academy
> Without a specific idea of the good to build towards, the financial interests of large tokenholders have become over-represented in protocol governance. In our view, this constitutes a centralization risk. When protocol politicians have no mandate or formal responsibility to represent anyone's interest but their own, the result is that a homogenous and self-interested group of whales can dictate what is deemed to be of benefit for the network. Crypto still has no concept of a "public servant."
What would a crypto public servant look like? How we would determine it? You'll need to DAO-ify it too
# [Automating Ostrom for Effective DAO Management](https://medium.com/commonsstack/automating-ostrom-for-effective-dao-management-cfe7a7aea138)
>1. Commons need to have clearly defined boundaries.
One of the benefits of using blockchain technology in commons management is that the boundaries of inclusion are clear: token holders are part of the system, non-holders are not. Tokens can represent a holder’s contributions to a community, giving appropriate access rights and proportional decision-making power in that group, as well as fractional ownership. The Commons Stack’s Augmented Bonding Curve (ABC) takes it even further by creating an economic boundary that insulates the internal economy of the Commons from the external economic world. All interactions with the outside world happen by interacting with the bonding curve.
So how do we decide what kind of education we should do? I suppose if someone contributes resources then there might be a commensurate return
>2. Rules need to fit local circumstances.
For example, in addition to deciding what funding streams are appropriate for its specific context (such as whether to implement an ABC or an alternative funding tool), a community can also choose an appropriate governance template (such as Conviction Voting, or a simple majority vote multisig), among other customizations. The flexibility that Commons Stack components offer in defining different types of Commons ecosystems satisfies Ostrom’s second principle of adaptability to suit local conditions.
Can do this for localisation of education
> 3. Participatory decision-making is vital.
Conviction Voting offers us the opportunity to eliminate time-based attack vectors on our community voting systems and increase voter engagement. By designing our decision-making systems with a modular approach, we can allow communities to implement the right governance solution for each type of decision being made, instead of reusing the same limited yes/no time-boxed voting method every time. For example, whether participants contribute time or money, their skin-in-the-game will be rewarded with tokens from that community, which means that more engaged members will earn a larger say in the direction of the community.
I wonder what sort of commons stack this might result in
> 4. Commons must receive legal recognition in the jurisdictions where they operate.For example, the Commons Stack is exploring options around legally registering DAOs internationally which would limit the personal liability of the participants, just like many types of legal entities do today.
Could get public funding for support?
> 5. Rules are enforced by effective & accountable monitoring.
Two components of the Commons Stack in particular contribute to the successful monitoring of a Commons: the Giveth Proposal Engine brings transparency and accountability to funds paid out for work that advances the cause(s) of the Commons, and the Commons Analytics Dashboard makes transactions and their impacts observable to all relevant community members.
We have snapshot but its currently really just a snapshot
> 6. Sanctions for violations should be graduated.It is important to consider the systemic impact of particular sanctions, which is why we see holistic simulation of agent interactions using cadCAD as a core component of the Commons Stack. The difficulty of enacting sanctions should increase with the severity of the response, to ensure these decisions are not taken lightly.For example, a community may implement a reputation system that penalizes wrongdoing with a loss in social credibility, while others may go for metrics based on experience, where a history of unsuccessful proposals leads to a higher bar for passing future ones.
Great to check if you can get people jobs?
>7. Conflict resolution should be easily accessible and low-cost.When users opt in to a smart contract, the agreement is enacted according to programmed conditions. Looking past the technical aspects, however, conflict resolution at the social level will still remain a necessity. Along with our Trusted Seed, we are pioneering a set of cultural best practices that will include establishing a deliberative ‘space’ for conflict resolution, so that communities using the Commons Stack can implement similar, tailor-made solutions in their own projects.
In the most extreme cases, conflict resolution can be handled through graduated levels of future decentralized court systems similar to Aragon Court and Kleros, with escalation to real-world legal systems where necessary.
Okay simple enough
> 8. Commons should be in nested ecosystems within larger commons. Although the Commons Stack library is initially intended for use by small community groups, our design is fractal in nature. Each participant in a Commons could be another Commons, allowing for the creation of federated community structures, a tactic suggested in the DisCO manifesto. This facilitates polycentric governance with a sociocratic structure, enabling flexible decision-making networks of nested responsibility that could operate under a hierarchical structure, a horizontal ‘leaderless’ structure, or anything in between.
Blockchain is an ecosystem of ecosystems approach. Because small ecosystems pop up like bubbles all the time, each one an experiment.
# [The difference between Public Goods Problems and Coordination Problems… and whether it matters.](https://s.mirror.xyz/djByMntM2rQF4tqUISYS2MAO3oCfSWoOZSOpZjsYwaw)
> This is the essential difference between Public Goods Problems and Coordination Problems: in a Coordination Problem the optimal outcome is stable, whereas in a Public Goods Problem the optimal outcome is not. More technically, we can say that coordination games exhibit multiple pareto-ranked equilibria which include the social optimum (Dutta, 2012) whereas public goods games have a non-equilibrium social optimum (Hichri & Kirman 2007).
Non-equilibrium social optimum so you need to keep adjusting the equilibrium

Reduce payoff to the defector to turn public good game into a coordination game instead.

Free rider problem: they benefit from the public good without giving anything and this gives them an edge over others

Solve it by turning it into a coordination game
It means that the socially optimal outcome is the only stable equilibrium! This is not even a coordination game--it’s a solved problem.

So you make it such that it is socially optimal for you to contribute and help
# [Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks (TIMN): A framework for societal evolution](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P7967.pdf)
>Its key principle is heterarchic (or, to offer another term, “panarchic”) collaboration among members who may be dispersed among multiple, often small organizations, or parts of organizations. Network designs have existed throughout history, but multiorganizational designs are now able to gain strength and mature because the new communications technologies let small, scattered, autonomous groups to consult, coordinate, and act jointly across greater distances and across more issue areas than ever before.
Organisation of organisations (DAO of DAOs) and each DAO specialises in what it does, much like index coop specialising in creating financial products
>The rise of the network form is at an early stage, still gaining impetus. It may be decades before this trend reaches maturity. But it is already affecting all realms of society. In the realm of the state, it is facilitating the further development of interagency mechanisms to address complex policy issues that cut across jurisdictional boundaries. In the realm of the market, it has been facilitating the growth of keiretsus and other distributed, web–like global enterprises and, increasingly, so–called “virtual corporations.” Indeed, volumes are being written about the benefits of network designs for business corporations and market operations—to the point that casual (and some not-so-casual) observers might presume that this is the realm most affected and benefited.
In this case, the interagency mechanisms was more of global organisations or social organisations. But these large organisations are mostly known to be quite inefficient and slow. I think that's because they tried to be an institution of institutions not an organisation of organisations thus facing all the difficulty of coordination and not the benefits of coordinating as much
>The network form seems particularly well suited to strengthening civil-society actors whose purpose is to address social issues. At its best, this form may thus result in vast collaborative networks of NGOs geared to addressing and helping resolve social equity and accountability issues that traditional tribal, state, and market actors have tended to ignore or are now unsuited to addressing well.
I think this is because social issues require social input. Being on the ground in small squads seem to work best. A networked organisation would be closest to when maneouvre warfare where each squad was granted autonomy but worked towards a common strategic objective. Ground situations could be assessed and dealt with tactically without constantly awaiting central command directives.
>Organizational theorist Peter Drucker in particular sees that “the autonomous community organization” is gaining strength as a “new center of meaningful citizenship” in the United States. And he foresees that, the post-capitalist polity needs a “third sector,” in addition to the two generally recognized ones, the ‘private sector’ of business and the “public sector” of government. It needs an autonomous social sector. (Drucker 1993: 171)
I think the key word here is 'autonomous' social sector. A lot of public goods here are heavily funded by governments, thus government also tend to have an outsize say on how things work. Standardised testing, subsidies etc
>The TIMN framework also resembles classic efforts at grand theorizing that seek to span all steps in the evolutionary process. Such theorizing is generally historical. Thus, while it may speculate that evolution has not ceased and new steps may lie ahead, it typically stops short of claiming anything so specific as the rise of network systems of organization.
this being a paper written in 1996 (as old as I am), I can't imagine they could have seen the effects of the internet and how many of these small organisations have popped up already.
> So, when a new form arises, it may well have subversive effects on the old order, before it has additive effects that serve to consolidate a new order. Each form’s emergence will disturb the old order and prevailing patterns of behavior in at least some key respects. Each may initially have radical proponents. Each may be resisted and deemed improper, even illegitimate, by defenders of the old order. Yet each new form is ultimately adopted and exploited by a broad range of actors
The recent efforts to regulate crypto clearly demonstrate this. Bitcoin maxis shutting down Ethreum too.
> Addition spells the creation and consolidation of a new realm: Gradually, an old form of organization gets pushed back by the new as its proponents gain space. As a new form grows in legitimacy and utility, subversion and disturbance give way to adjustment, acceptance, and accommodation—to addition. Thus, over the centuries, tribes and clans, having reached their limits of organizational capacity to cope with changing environments, gave way to hierarchical institutions, then these to competitive markets. Now, this process is recommencing with the rise of multiorganizational networks
I suppose we need to look at multiple paths to integration. The past narrative of 'rebuilding society in a decentralised way' was somewhat idealistic. Perhaps focusing on what web3 can solve best is a better idea.
> Each form’s maturation increases social stratification: Each form is associated with different stratification criteria, and each step in the TIMN progression increases social stratification. Early T-type societies had a single crucial rank: kinfolk. Then, +I dynamics resulted in a division into two strata: the rulers and the ruled. Next, +M dynamics created a middle class and the tripartite system so familiar today: upper, middle, and lower classes. Projection of this progression suggests that +N dynamics will generate new “haves” and “have-nots”—with the defining referent this time being access to information, rather than to blood, power, or capital—and indeed this is already happening.
In this case, it might be the interconnectedness of certain individuals. These folk are thought leaders and generate information or attract information as people ask for their opinion. Their resources would be the ability to carry out coordination efforts by attracting the right people to work on specific problems or identifying problems and helping to prioritise them for the community.
> Successful combination depends on the development of regulatory interfaces: What enables a combination of forms and their realms to work well together? It is partly the regulatory “interfaces” (laws, policies, commissions, etc.) that get developed where the realms and their activities intersect
I don't think one can simply port over regulation. Right now the digitisation of regulation is merely turning paper into pdfs. Members of Parliament still have to travel, sit in a room, and talk things out with allocated time for each speech. In DAOs, this can be done asynchronously and transparently.