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title: 《美國國會「美中經濟與安全審查委員會」2018年度報告》第三章中國和台灣全文翻譯計畫
image: https://i.imgur.com/QaZcJP5.jpg
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# 《美國國會「美中經濟與安全審查委員會」2018年度報告》第三章第三節中國和台灣全文翻譯計畫

美國國會於2018年11月14日釋出[年度報告](https://www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2018-annual-report)，其中第三部分有關中國與台灣。為了讓更多人看到年度報告，在此發起第三章「中國與台灣」Key finding之外全文的翻譯計畫。

下方許多翻譯是google翻譯的成果，歡迎大家協作修改成信達雅的翻譯。翻譯者若願意具名，請自行在下方「貢獻者」區域加上您的大名。

翻譯成果未來將會以CC0的方式釋出，方便各界利用。

:::danger
本文非常長，如想翻譯Key finding部分請[點此](https://hackmd.io/s/r1o9j2i6X)。
:::

## 協作方式

請點選右上角筆狀符號即可進入編輯介面。


## 貢獻者：

雨蒼
ysw (部分審訂)
Eric Liao (部分審訂)
曾小工（部分審訂）
Hsin-Hsin Liu（部分審訂）
S.-H. Tseng（部分審訂）
LKS（部分審訂）
Adoor Yeh（部分審訂）
Fang-Yu Chen（部分審訂）
Martinet Lee (部分審訂)
jt
Nisemono Liāu (部分審訂)
Po-Chao Lai(部分審訂)
方怡 （部分審訂）

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## 名詞統一區：

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## 翻譯全文：

# Introduction

導言

Following the election of President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2016, Beijing has dramatically increased its coercion against Taiwan. A major reason for China’s increased coercive efforts is the DPP administration’s unwillingness to explicitly endorse the exact verbiage of the “one China” formulation that Beijing demands for maintaining cross-Strait relations, despite President Tsai’s use of another framework that includes a number of elements that contain the idea of “one China.” As part of this framework, during her inaugural address President Tsai said her administration would conduct cross-Strait affairs “in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution [and] the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area,” while recognizing and praising the benefits of the two sides’ historical efforts to set aside differences and find common ground. Since her inauguration, President Tsai has persisted in seeking to maintain stability in cross-Strait relations and rejecting a “return to the old path of confrontation.” She has followed a cross-Strait policy of maintaining the status quo, pursuing neither formal independence for Taiwan nor unification of Taiwan and China, and has repeatedly demonstrated goodwill toward Beijing and sought to reassure her counterparts across the Taiwan Strait. During a May 2018 meeting with the Commission in Taiwan, one Taiwan government official stated that Taipei has “strategic tenacity.” The official explained that Taipei will “maintain a predictable policy” and not provoke Beijing.

2016年民主進步黨（DPP）的蔡英文當選總統後，北京大幅增加對台灣施壓的力道。中國加強施壓的主要原因，是民進黨政府不願意明確支持「一個中國」——北京要求以維繫兩岸關係的辭彙——儘管蔡總統使用了另一包含若干帶有「一個中國」思想要素的框架。作為這個框架的一部分，蔡總統於就職演說中說她的政府將「依據中華民國憲法[和]兩岸人民關係條例」處理兩岸事務，同時也認知並讚揚兩岸雙方在歷史上能夠擱置分歧、尋求共同點的努力。蔡總統自就職以來，一直堅持維護兩岸關係的穩定，拒絕「走回對抗的老路」。她延續維持現狀的兩岸政策，既未追求正式的台灣獨立，也不求台灣和中國的統一。她一再對北京表現善意，試圖消除海峽對岸掌權者的疑慮。2018年5月，台灣政府一位官員與本委員會開會時表示，台北當局具有「戰略上的堅持」。這位官員解釋說，台北將「保持可預期的政策」，避免挑釁北京。

In contrast, Beijing has taken significant actions to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and advance its broader goal of eventual cross-Strait unification. The coercive measures Beijing is employing against Taiwan include suspending official and semi-official cross-Strait communication and meetings, and the use of economic pressure such as reducing Chinese tourism to Taiwan. Additionally, Beijing has ended the cross-Strait “diplomatic truce” and returned to enticing Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners to cut off official relations with Taiwan, put pressure on Taiwan’s presence in countries with which it has unofficial relations, and intervened in the repatriation of Taiwan citizens from abroad. In the latter case, Beijing demanded that Taiwan citizens accused of telecommunications fraud in countries with which Taiwan does not have diplomatic relations be sent to China, and refused to honor Taipei’s request that they be sent to Taiwan. Other coercive measures Beijing has taken include blocking Taiwan’s participation in certain international fora in which it could previously participate, pressuring U.S. and other foreign companies to change the way they characterize Taiwan on their websites and products, and expanding and intensifying Chinese military training activities near Taiwan.

相較之下，北京採取了重大行動來改變台灣海峽現狀，以促進其更宏大的目標：最終實現兩岸統一。北京針對台灣的脅迫，包括暫停兩岸官方或半官方的對話和會議，以及在經濟上施壓，如減少中國遊客赴台觀光。此外，北京結束了兩岸「外交休兵」，重新誘使台灣剩餘的外交夥伴切斷與台灣的官方關係，並打擊台灣在非正式外交合作國家中的能見度，更介入遣返境外台灣公民事務。在後一種情況中，於台灣非邦交國內，遭指控犯下電信詐騙的台灣公民，被北京要求送往中國，並拒絕台北當局將他們送往台灣的訴求。北京方面採取的其他脅迫措施，包括阻止台灣參與其先前得以參加的國際論壇，迫使美國和其他外國公司改變台灣在網站和產品上的顯示名稱，以及擴大和加強中國在台灣附近的軍事演練活動。

As Beijing has reduced contact with and sought to isolate President Tsai and her administration, who Beijing views as seeking independence through both formal and “soft” means, it has continued its outreach to opposition politicians at the party and local government levels as a way to constrain the DPP and promote China’s preferred cross-Strait policy. Beijing’s approach also includes efforts to undermine Taiwan’s democracy through collaboration with various individuals and groups in Taiwan, such as organizations that support cross-Strait unification, and spreading disinformation through social media and other online tools.‡

有鑑於北京方面認為蔡總統試圖以正式和「軟」手段追求獨立，北京減少與蔡總統及蔡政府的接觸、試圖將其孤立，與此同時，北京持續擴大接觸反對黨的政治人物，從反對黨的黨中央到地方政府層級壓制民進黨，並促進中國屬意的兩岸政策。北京削弱台灣民主的做法，還包括與台灣一些個人和團體（如主張兩岸統一的組織）通力合作，並透過社交媒體和其他網路工具來傳播假訊息（disinformation）。

To respond to Beijing’s increasing pressure, President Tsai has continued her efforts to pursue economic growth, find new markets and trade partnerships, and support new innovative and job-creating industries. Simultaneously, Taiwan is seeking to enhance its defensive capabilities to counter China’s military coercion. To aid in these efforts, Taiwan is looking to strengthen its partnership with the United States.

為因應北京不斷增加的壓力，蔡總統持續努力追求經濟成長，尋找新的市場和貿易夥伴，並支持新創產業和創造就業機會的產業。與此同時，台灣也在謀求加強防衛能力，以對抗中國的軍事脅迫。為了助成這些努力，台灣正在尋求加強與美國的夥伴關係。

This section explores recent developments in cross-Strait relations, cross-Strait trade and investment, Taiwan’s international engagement, the cross-Strait military balance, and U.S.-Taiwan relations. It is based on consultations with experts on Taiwan and cross-Strait relations, the Commission’s fact-finding trip to Taiwan in May 2018, and open source research and analysis.

本節探討近期兩岸關係、兩岸貿易投資、台灣的國際參與、兩岸軍事平衡、及美台關係等方面的最新發展，內容基於與台灣和兩岸關係專家的磋商、委員會於2018年5月進行的台灣實況調查、公開來源的調查研究與分析。

# Beijing Formalizes Increasingly Hardline Policy

北京正式採取漸趨強硬的對台政策

In his remarks on Taiwan at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held in October 2017, Chinese President and General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping signaled that the hardline approach the CCP has taken toward Taiwan and cross-Strait unification in recent years had become official policy. Linking together and expanding on some of the most forceful language any of his predecessors had used at previous CCP congresses, including during earlier periods of elevated cross-Strait tensions, President Xi declared:

中國國家主席暨中共中央總書記習近平，在2017年10月舉行的中國共產黨第十九次全國代表大會上發表講話，表明中共近年來對台灣及兩岸統一所採取的強硬做法，已成為正式的官方政策。習主席採用並擴大了前任主席曾在共產黨全國代表大會上（包含兩岸緊張局勢升級的早期階段）使用過的強烈措辭，宣布：

We have firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability to defeat any form of Taiwan independence secession plot. We will never allow any person, any organization, or any political party to split any part of Chinese territory from China at any time or in any form.

我們有堅定的意志、充分的信心、足夠的能力挫敗任何形式的台獨分裂陰謀。我們絕不允許任何人、任何組織、任何政黨在任何時刻、以任何形式把任何一塊中國領土從中國分裂出去。

Furthermore, President Xi did not directly mention either of his immediate predecessors’ ideological contributions to China’s crossStrait policy, signaling that he is increasingly confident in reshaping cross-Strait relations along his own lines. In their policy remarks, then Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had included relatively conciliatory language on Taiwan’s engagement with the international community and what Beijing would grant Taiwan in a future unification arrangement. The new language used by President Xi suggests that while China may continue efforts to develop cross-Strait economic and social ties, its overall approach has become more intolerant of any opposition from Taipei on the terms of cross-Strait relations and eventual unification dictated by Beijing. Moreover, China’s policy appears to reflect a shift from focusing on deterring Taiwan from seeking de jure independence, and a patient stance toward unification, to actively pushing toward unification.

此外，習主席並未直接提及前幾任主席對中國的兩岸政策意識形態的貢獻，表明他愈來愈有信心按照自己的方針重塑兩岸關係。在江澤民主席和胡錦濤主席的政策發言中，他們談及台灣在國際社會的參與時，採用相對懷柔的語言，並表明北京將在未來的統一中能夠給予台灣的支持。然而，習主席使用的新措辭，則呈現了在兩岸關係與北京當局定義的最終統一條件下，雖然中國可能會繼續發展兩岸的經濟和社會聯繫，但總體方針已經趨向不能容忍台北的任何反對意見。由此，中國的政策似乎反映了對台立場的轉向：從阻止台灣尋求法理獨立、耐心等待統一，到積極推動統一。

The formalization of a more uncompromising cross-Strait policy at the 19th Party Congress is even more concerning in light of the sense of urgency and militarized nature of the approach Beijing has taken toward Taipei since President Xi assumed office, and which has intensified since President Tsai’s election in 2016. In 2013, for example, long before President Tsai was elected, President Xi publically stated that “the longstanding political differences between the two sides of the Strait ... must not be passed down from generation to generation.” This statement went beyond what other Chinese leaders have said about the urgency of resolving cross-Strait political differences and suggests President Xi may feel a personal responsibility to make significant headway toward advancing unification between the two sides.

有鑑於自習近平主席任職以來，北京對台北採取更加急迫和軍事化的態度，並且在蔡總統就任後態勢愈演愈烈，在第十九次黨代會上正式提出強硬兩岸政策的舉措，則更令人擔憂。例如，早在蔡總統當選以前，2013年習主席便曾公開表示：「海峽兩岸長期存在的政治分歧……絕不能代代相傳。」就解決兩岸政治分歧的緊迫性上，這項聲明比前任諸位中國領導人更為激進，並暗示習主席可能認為自己有責任在推進雙方統一方面取得重大進展。

China has also increased the use of military intimidation against Taiwan under President Xi’s administration. In 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a major amphibious assault exercise in the then Nanjing Military Region across from Taiwan after having refrained from carrying out these types of provocative training events during much of the Hu Jintao era. Bonnie S. Glaser, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ China Power Project, writes that “between 2006 and 2012, it is difficult to find exercises overtly and explicitly aimed at intimidating Taiwan.” In 2015, still during the term of President Tsai’s predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), China broadcast footage of a military exercise where the PLA practiced storming a mock-up of Taiwan’s Presidential Palace in Taipei. Since this time, PLA exercises and other training activities targeting Taiwan have expanded and intensified, suggesting Beijing may now be more willing to countenance the threat of military force against Taiwan to achieve its political objectives.

在習主席主政後，中國也加強了對台灣的軍事恫嚇。2013年，人民解放軍在台灣對面的南京軍區進行一次重大的兩棲攻擊演習，然而在胡錦濤任職的大部分期間，則未曾實施這類挑釁的訓練活動。華府智庫「戰略與國際研究中心」的「中國軍力計畫」主任葛來儀（Bonnie S. Glaser）寫道：「在2006年至2012年間舉行的演習中，很難找到恐嚇台灣的公開、明確意圖。」2015年，在蔡總統的前任總統，中國國民黨（國民黨）馬英九總統的任期中，中國曾放送一段解放軍模擬突襲台灣總統府（位於台北）的軍事演習畫面。從那時起，解放軍已陸續增強、擴大針對台灣的演習和其他軍事演練活動，此舉表明北京現在為了實現政治目標，可能更願意採取對台軍事威脅。

# The Struggle for Taiwan’s International Space

台灣國際空間的掙扎

## Beijing Steps up Efforts to Restrict Taiwan’s Participation in the International Community

北京加強限制台灣參與國際社會的力道

While Beijing has pursued a more uncompromising cross-Strait policy since President Xi assumed office, its efforts to compress Taiwan’s international space by undermining Taipei’s efforts to participate in the international community accelerated and intensified in 2018, as Beijing took significant new steps in the following areas.

雖然習主席上任以來，北京已經實施更加強硬的兩岸政策，但在2018年，北京在以下領域採取重大新舉措，阻止台北參與國際社會，台灣的國際空間愈來愈受到壓迫。

Ending the cross-Strait “diplomatic truce”: Beijing has long sought to cut off Taiwan’s ability to independently access the community of nations as a peer to other states, seeking to force others to treat Taiwan as a sub-sovereign part of Beijing’s China. Beijing has pursued the goal of reducing or removing Taiwan’s space in the international community with varying degrees of aggressiveness. During the Ma Administration (2008–2016), China paused its efforts to poach Taiwan’s diplomatic partners, as a reward for Ma’s cross-Strait policy, which Beijing saw as more in line with its views. However, since President Tsai was elected, Beijing has ended its tacit “diplomatic truce” with Taipei, resuming its campaign of eliminating Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. Beijing has returned to pursuing deals to entice the few remaining states who recognize the government on Taiwan as an independent sovereign state, the Republic of China (ROC)—Taiwan’s official name. These deals require governments to drop recognition of Taipei as the ROC and recognize Beijing as the sole legal government of China, including a statement with some formulation of Beijing’s “One China Principle” that implies Taiwan is under Beijing’s sovereignty.

結束兩岸「外交休兵」：北京長期以來一直試圖削弱台灣以獨立國家的身份進入國際社會的能力，試圖迫使其他國家將台灣視為北京當局所謂的中國次主權。北京以不同程度的好戰性，打算減少或消除台灣在國際社會中的空間。在馬政府（2008-2016）期間，由於北京認為馬政策與其觀點相一致，中國暫停挖走台灣外交夥伴的作為，當作對馬兩岸政策的獎勵。但是，自蔡總統當選以來，北京結束了與台北心照不宣的「外交休兵」，繼續消除台灣外交夥伴的活動。北京再度設法與少數幾個承認台灣政府作為獨立主權國家——中華民國（台灣官方名稱）——的國家達成交易。這些交易要求他們不再承認台北當局為中華民國政府，只承認北京是中國的唯一合法政府，必須有一項聲明基於北京的「一個中國原則」，這條原則表示台灣主權屬於北京。

Since President Tsai’s election, Beijing has established relations with six countries that broke ties with Taipei. In 2018 alone, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador broke with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with China. In an example of Beijing resuming efforts to entice countries to break ties with Taiwan, an unnamed Taiwan official said that Beijing offered the Dominican Republic financial assistance, low-interest loans, and investments worth at least $3.1 billion in exchange for breaking ties with Taiwan and establishing ties with China.

自蔡總統當選以來，有六個國家與台北當局斷交，與北京建立邦交。光在2018年，就有多明尼加共和國、布吉納法索和薩爾瓦多與台灣斷交，並與中國建交。一位不願透露姓名的台灣官員表示，北京方面提供多明尼加共和國財政援助、低息貸款以及價值至少31億美元的投資以換取與台灣斷交並與中國建交。

After the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador established diplomatic relations with China, there are 17 countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, concerns are now growing that other countries will follow suit in severing their diplomatic ties. For example, in September 2018, Beijing and the Vatican reached a provisional agreement on the appointment of bishops—one of the longstanding areas of disagreement that the two sides have been seeking to address through talks for years—which could set the conditions for the Vatican to switch diplomatic recognition. A resolution of these issues puts Taiwan’s relations with the Holy See at risk.

在多明尼加共和國、布吉納法索和薩爾瓦多與中國建交之後，有17個國家仍與台灣保持邦交。然而令人更擔憂的是，其他國家有可能會跟風與台灣斷交。例如在2018年9月，北京與梵諦岡就雙方談判多年的主教的任命問題達成暫時性協議，而這可能達成了梵蒂岡轉移外交承認的條件。這些爭端的消除，將置台灣與羅馬教廷的關係於險地。

Although recognition by other states is widely viewed as a component of state sovereignty, the importance of the total number of countries that recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan) is an open question. Symbolically, these relationships confer legitimacy on Taiwan’s position on the world stage in the face of marginalization by Beijing. Practically, their advocacy for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations helps Taiwan in its pursuit of greater international space. However, Taiwan almost certainly gains more from its unofficial relations with countries that have extensive international influence than it gains from official diplomatic relationships.‡ Even without formal diplomatic relations, a country like the United States can promote expanded opportunities for Taiwan to participate in the international community and support Taiwan in other ways.

雖然他國的承認普遍被視為構成國家主權的一個要素，但承認中華民國（台灣）之國家總數的重要性，是一個可議的問題。在北京邊緣化台灣的情況下，這些邦交關係象徵著台灣在世界舞台的地位合法性。而這些邦交國對台灣參與國際組織的支持，也有助台灣追求更大的國際空間。然而，幾乎可以肯定地說，比起正式邦交國家，台灣從那些具有廣泛國際影響力的非邦交國獲益更多。即使沒有正式外交關係，像美國這樣的國家可以為台灣促進更多參與國際社會的機會，以及透過其他方式支持台灣。

Continuing to block Taiwan’s participation in international fora: For the second year in a row, Beijing prevented the Taiwan government from participating as an observer in the UN World Health Assembly; previously, Taipei received an invitation each year between 2009 and 2016. Since April 2016, Taiwan officials and citizens have been prevented from participating in numerous international fora in which they participated in preceding years.

持續阻礙台灣參與國際論壇：北京連續第二年阻止台灣政府以觀察員身份參與聯合國世界衛生大會；此前，自2009年至2016年之間，台北當局每年都會收到邀請。自2016年4月起，台灣官員和公民遭阻止參與前幾年曾參與的眾多國際論壇。

Although Beijing has increased its pressure on Taiwan’s presence in certain international fora since President Tsai’s election, Taiwan has long been unable to participate in many other inter-national meetings and organizations, such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and most meetings of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between 2009 and 2017, the World Health Organization only granted Taiwan access to 46 of the 154 technical meetings to which it applied to attend. Notably, INTERPOL’s most recent president was Meng Hongwei, China’s vice minister of public security. He was elected at the general assembly in November 2016. (For more information see Chapter 2, Section 1, “Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs.”)

儘管自蔡總統當選以來，北京對台灣參與國際論壇加大施壓，但台灣其實在此之前早已長期無法參加許多其他國際會議和組織，如國際刑事警察組織（國際刑警組織）和大多數「聯合國氣候變化綱要公約」的會議。據台灣外交部稱，2009年至2017年，台灣曾154次申請參加技術會議，世界衛生組織僅批准46次。值得注意的是，國際刑警組織最近的主席是中國公安部副部長孟宏偉。他於2016年11月在大會上當選。（更多訊息請參閱第2章第1節「年度評論：安全和外交事務。」）

Pressuring foreign companies to change references to Taiwan and Taiwan companies to support Beijing: Since January 2018, Beijing has pressured numerous foreign companies, including several U.S. corporations, to change the way they categorized or depicted Taiwan on their customer service literature, websites, or products. Beginning January 11, the Shanghai branch of the Cyberspace Administration of China shut down Marriott’s Chinese website for a week as punishment for listing Taiwan as well as Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet as separate from China on a questionnaire for customers. It also ordered companies Zara and Medtronic to apologize for their characterization of Taiwan on their websites after Zara included Taiwan in a list of countries and Medtronic listed Taiwan as “Republic of China (Taiwan).”

迫使外國公司改變對台灣和台灣公司的分類或描述以支持北京：自2018年1月以來，北京已迫使眾多外國公司，包括數家美國公司，改變他們在客戶服務文件、網站或產品上分類或描述台灣的方式。從1月11日開始，中國上海市互聯網信息辦公室¹關閉了萬豪酒店中文網站一週以作為懲罰，該公司在客戶問卷調查表上列入台灣、香港、澳門和西藏，被指為分裂中國領土。在Zara將台灣列入國家名單和美敦力（Medtronic）將台灣列為「中華民國（台灣）」之後，北京也責令這兩家公司為其網站上對台灣的分類予以道歉。

> 譯註¹本處翻譯根據新華網新聞〈上海網信辦：萬豪國際集團推出八項整改措施〉

On January 12, China’s Civil Aviation Administration announced it had ordered Delta Airlines to change its inclusion of Taiwan on a list of countries on the airline’s website and issue a public apology. The agency also announced it would demand that all foreign airlines with flights to China inspect all information for customers, such as websites and apps, and to “strictly follow China’s laws and regulations.” Later, the agency demanded that 44 foreign airlines change their designation of Taiwan to indicate that Taiwan is part of China by July 25; as of August, all but three had done so. Those airlines (American Airlines, Delta Airlines, and United Airlines), all U.S.-based, have changed the designation from “Taipei, Taiwan” to “Taipei,” but have not added “China” after it as Beijing demanded.

1月12日，中國民用航空局宣布下令達美航空公司（Delta Airlines）將台灣移出該航空公司網站上的國家名單並發布公開道歉。該機構還宣布，將要求所有有中國航班的外國航空公司檢查所有提供給客戶的資訊，如網站和行動應用程式（apps），並「嚴格遵守中國的法律法規。」後來，該機構要求44家外國航空公司於7月25日前更改台灣名稱以表明台灣是中國的一部分；截至8月，除三家公司之外，其他公司皆已照辦。那些以美國為基地的航空公司（美國航空公司、達美航空公司和聯合航空公司）已將名稱從「台北，台灣」改為「台北」，但未照北京要求的在「台北」之後添加「中國」。

In another case, President Tsai’s August 2018 visit to a branch of Taiwan bakery chain 85C in Los Angeles, during which an employee asked her to sign a pillow, incurred a harsh reaction in China.

在另一起事件中，蔡總統於2018年8月訪問洛杉磯台灣麵包連鎖店85℃的一家分店，其間一名員工請她在一個抱枕上簽名，此事在中國引起嚴厲的反應。

Although it is unclear whether the Chinese government had a role, the response included outrage and calls for a boycott by Chinese netizens, some Chinese e-commerce companies notifying partners that they should remove 85C from their sites, and an article in the Global Times denouncing the chain.

雖然尚不清楚中國政府是否有參與，但其反應包括：引起中國網民的憤怒與呼籲抵制、一些中國電子商務公司通知合作夥伴應該從他們的網站上刪除85℃、以及環球時報刊登一篇譴責85℃的文章。

Pressuring unofficial diplomatic partners: Two more countries— Jordan and Papua New Guinea—downgraded their unofficial relations with Taiwan in 2018 due, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to pressure from Beijing. In February, Taiwan announced that the Papua New Guinean government ordered Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby to remove “Republic of China (on Taiwan)” from its name and to remove consular license plates from its cars. Then, in April, the Ministry said the Jordanian government requested the Taiwan representative office in Amman change its name from the “Commercial Office of the Republic of China (Taiwan)” to the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office.” Since 2017, the governments of all six countries in which the name of Taiwan’s representative office includes “Taiwan,” “Republic of China”, or “ROC” have requested the office change these parts of the name to “Taipei.”

壓迫非正式的外交夥伴：台灣外交部表示，由於北京的壓力，又有兩個國家（約旦和巴布亞紐幾內亞）於2018年降級與台灣的非正式關係。 2月，台灣宣布，巴布亞紐幾內亞政府下令位於莫士比港的中華民國（台灣）駐巴布亞紐幾內亞商務代表團刪除其名稱中的「中華民國（台灣）」，並從車上移走外交領事車牌。然後，4月，台灣外交部表示，約旦政府要求位於安曼的中華民國駐約旦商務辦事處更名，改為駐約旦臺北經濟文化辦事處。自2017年以來，六個國家的政府都要求國內的台灣代表處辦公室將名稱中包含「台灣」、「中華民國（Republic of China）」或「中華民國（ROC）」的部分更改為「台北」。

Restricting Chinese tourism to Taiwan’s diplomatic partners: Beijing has used travel bans to punish Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and incentivize them to switch ties to China. In November 2017, China’s National Tourism Administration banned Chinese tourist companies from offering group tours to Palau and the Vatican, two of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. The ban came two days after Taiwan and Palau announced they would be increasing the number of direct flights between them.

限制中國旅遊業者前往台灣友邦：北京使用旅行禁令懲罰台灣的友邦，並鼓勵他們改變與中國的關係。 2017年11月，中國國家旅遊局禁止中國旅遊公司組團旅遊帛琉和梵蒂岡（台灣的兩個邦交國）。這條禁令發布於台灣和帛琉宣布將增加雙方直航航班量的兩天後。

Treating Taiwan as Chinese territory through unilateral activation of new flight routes: In January 2018, Beijing expanded use of the M503 commercial air route§ near the median line of the Taiwan Strait to allow northbound traffic, and opened three extension routes near some of Taiwan’s outlying islands, without consulting with Taipei—treating Taiwan as a subordinate entity rather than a separately administered area. Previously, in 2015, Beijing attempted to open the M503 route and the extension routes unilaterally, but later engaged in negotiations with Taipei and agreed to only allow southbound flights on M503.

藉由片面啟用新航路將台灣視為中國領土：2018年1月，在沒有諮詢台北的情況下，北京擴大使用台灣海峽中線附近的M503商業航路，允許北上交通，並在台灣一些偏遠島嶼附近開通三條延伸航路——可見其將台灣視為屬地，而不是分開獨自管理的地區。此前，2015年，北京試圖單方面開通M503航路和延伸航路，但後來與台北進行談判，並同意僅使用M503的南下航路。

Hong Kong: Views from Taiwan

香港：來自台灣的觀點

Some observers in Taiwan, as well as the Taiwan government, are concerned about the fate of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. Broadly, the idea of adopting Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” framework—Beijing’s stated framework for crossStrait unification—as a model for Taiwan has long been unpopular among the Taiwan public. However, developments in Hong Kong have intensified the Taiwan public’s opposition to Chinese rule and the “one country, two systems” framework. In 2017, around the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover from the United Kingdom to China, Chen-Shen Yen, an international relations researcher at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, told CNBC, “The Hong Kong experience provided a glimpse of what might happen to Taiwan should the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula apply (to Taiwan). So far, it is not very optimistic.” The erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy in recent years casts further doubt on whether Beijing would abide by any agreement to protect political and civil liberties in Taiwan. (See Chapter 3, Section 4, “China and Hong Kong,” for more information on developments in Hong Kong.)

台灣的一些觀察者和台灣政府都在關注香港自由與民主的命運。綜觀來看，採用香港「一國兩制」框架——北京所說的兩岸統一框架——作為台灣模式的想法長期以來一直不受台灣民眾的歡迎。然而，香港的發展加劇了台灣民眾反對中國統治與「一國兩制」框架。 2017年，在香港從英國回歸中國20週年之際，台灣國立政治大學國際關係研究中心研究員嚴震生告訴CNBC，「香港經驗讓我們一睹萬一『一國兩制』的框架套用在台灣的可能後果。到目前為止，情況並不樂觀。」近年來香港自治權遭受侵蝕的狀況，使人進一步懷疑北京是否會遵守任何保護台灣政治與公民自由的協議。 （有關香港發展的更多訊息，請參閱第3章第4節「中國和香港」。）

## Taiwan’s Efforts to Expand Unofficial Partnerships

台灣努力擴大非正式夥伴關係

Despite Beijing’s efforts to constrict Taiwan’s international space, Taipei continues to pursue greater participation in the international community through official diplomatic relations, efforts to expand involvement in international organizations, and initiatives to strengthen economic and unofficial diplomatic partnerships with other countries.

儘管北京努力限制台灣的國際空間，但台北持續藉由官方外交關係、努力擴大參與國際組織以及鞏固與其他國家的經濟和非正式外交夥伴關係的舉措，更多地參與國際社會。

Among the Tsai Administration’s foreign policy priorities has been enhancing unofficial relations with like-minded countries. In addition to the United States, Taipei has undertaken significant efforts to strengthen ties with Japan. These efforts include establishing a dialogue on maritime cooperation and deepening cooperation between Taiwan and Japanese think tanks. Another notable development was the visit to Taiwan in March 2017 by Jiro Akama, Japan’s senior vice minister of internal affairs and communications, to promote Japan as a tourist destination. Vice Minister Akama was the highest level Japanese official to visit Taiwan since the termination of the two sides’ official diplomatic ties in 1972. According to Satoru Mori, professor at Hosei University, the two countries are also trying to integrate Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Policy. Furthermore, Tokyo recently elevated the name of its representative office in Taiwan from the “Interchange Association, Japan” to the “Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association.”

加強與理念相近國家的非官方關係是蔡政府外交政策優先事項之一。除美國外，台北也為加強與日本的聯繫作出重大努力。這些努力包括召開台日海洋事務合作對話會議，深化台灣與日本智庫之間的合作。另一個值得注意的進展是日本總務副大臣赤間二郎為促進日本的旅遊產業，於2017年3月訪問台灣。赤間副大臣是日本自1972年雙方斷交以來，訪問台灣的最高級官員。根據法政大學教授森聡，兩國也在努力整合台灣的「新南向政策」與日本的「自由開放的印度─太平洋戰略」。此外，東京當局最近將台灣代表處的名稱從「日本交流協會」提升為「日本台灣交流協會」。

Taipei’s efforts to enhance unofficial ties with Japan and other like-minded countries are growing in response to Beijing’s coercive measures. Following Burkina Faso’s severing of official diplomatic ties with Taiwan, President Tsai said, “We will simply redouble our resolve and continue to engage with the world, and continue establishing more and more substantive, economic and security partnerships with like-minded countries to garner the international community’s acknowledgement and support.” In June 2018, as an example of these growing efforts, Taiwan Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu called for a security dialogue between Japan and Taiwan.

台北正努力加強與日本及其他理念相近國家的非官方聯繫，以應對北京的強硬措施。在布吉納法索與台灣斷交之後，蔡總統說：「我們……只會更加堅定決心，繼續走向世界，繼續與理念相近國家在經濟與安全層面上建立更多實質夥伴關係，爭取國際社會的認同與支持。」這些日益努力的一個例子是，2018年6月，台灣外交部長吳釗燮呼籲日本與台灣進行「對中安保對話」。

> 譯註：對中安保對話名稱來自日本媒體產經新聞

Taiwan is also enhancing cooperation with India, including in the security realm. In September 2018, Reuters reported that senior Indian military officers regularly visit Taiwan, and Taipei has stationed an unofficial military attaché in its representative office in New Delhi. According to Reuters, an unnamed Indian source reported that India is interested in information on Chinese military deployments, saying, “We are dependent on Taiwan because they are watching the Chinese.”

台灣也在加強與印度的合作，內容涵蓋安全領域。2018年9月，路透社報導，印度高級軍官定期訪問台灣，台北在位於新德里的駐印度代表處配置一名非官方武官。據路透社報導，一位未具名的印度人士稱，印度對中國軍事部署的情報感興趣，他說：「我們依賴台灣，因為他們正在關注中國人。」

## U.S.-Taiwan Unofficial Ties

美台非正式關係

The Taiwan government has been appreciative of the steps taken by the U.S. government to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan ties, yet it also fears that the Trump Administration could use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in its relationship with Beijing. For its part, Beijing believes that the Trump Administration’s actions in support of Taiwan are efforts to pressure Beijing to make concessions, in particular on issues in the U.S.-China trade relationship.

台灣政府一向感激美國政府為加強美台關係所採取的措施，但也擔心川普政府可能會利用台灣作為與北京討價還價的籌碼。北京方面認為，川普政府支持台灣的行動是為了施壓北京在美中貿易關係議題上做出讓步。

U.S. pushback on Beijing’s actions: The U.S. Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) expressed concern about Beijing’s expansion of flight route M503 in the Taiwan Strait without consultation with Taipei; the increase in activities by the Chinese military around Taiwan; and China’s establishment of diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador. In remarks in May 2018, AIT Chairman James Moriarty said, “Let me underscore that Beijing’s efforts to alter the status quo are unhelpful and do not contribute to regional stability.... The United States urges China to work to restore productive dialogue and to avoid further escalatory or destabilizing moves.” Furthermore, in response to China’s Civil Aviation Administration’s letter to foreign airlines regarding their categorization or depiction of Taiwan on their websites, the White House issued a press statement in which it decried Beijing’s demands as “Orwellian nonsense.” Then, following El Salvador’s break with Taiwan, the White House said, “The El Salvadoran government’s receptiveness to China’s apparent interference in the domestic politics of a Western Hemisphere country is of grave concern to the United States, and will result in a reevaluation of our relationship with El Salvador.” In September, the State Department called the U.S. chiefs of mission in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama back to the United States for “consultations related to recent decisions to no longer recognize Taiwan,” and to engage in discussion with other U.S. officials on “ways in which the United States can support strong, independent, democratic institutions and economies throughout Central America and the Caribbean.”

美國對北京行動的反制：美國國務院和美國在台協會（AIT）對數起兩岸事件表示擔憂：北京未與台北協商就增加台灣海峽M503航路；中國軍隊在台灣周圍的活動增加；中國與多明尼加共和國、布吉納法索和薩爾瓦多建立外交關係。 美國在台協會主席莫健（James Moriarty）於2018年5月的講話中說：「讓我強調，北京試圖改變現狀的行動無助於東亞地區的穩定性……美國敦促中國恢復有效對話，避免進一步升級衝突或破壞穩定的舉措。」此外，針對中國民用航空局就網站上關於台灣的分類或描述，去函外國航空公司，白宮發布了一份新聞聲明，其中譴責北京的要求是「歐威爾式胡言亂語（Orwellian nonsense）」。 在薩爾瓦多與台灣斷交之後，白宮說：「薩爾瓦多政府接受中國顯然干涉西半球國家內政的做法令美國嚴重關切，將導致我們重新評估與薩爾瓦多的關係。」9月，國務院召集駐多明尼加共和國、薩爾瓦多和巴拿馬的大使返回美國討論「最近不再承認台灣的決定」，並與其他美國官員討論「美國如何在中美洲和加勒比地區支持堅強、獨立和民主的制度與經濟。」

High-level visits: In March 2018, President Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act into law after it was unanimously passed by both chambers of Congress. The act states that the U.S. government should allow visits to Taiwan by officials at all levels and visits to the United States by high-level Taiwan officials. While the U.S. government has sent officials up to cabinet level to Taiwan, the general practice has been to limit routine visits to Taiwan to midor lower-level U.S. officials and senior U.S. officials who have typically held an economic, cultural, or technical focus. Visits to the Washington, DC area by senior Taiwan officials have been limited. Although the Taiwan Travel Act is nonbinding, its passage and signing by President Trump have strong symbolic significance.

高層訪問：2018年3月，川普總統在國會兩院一致通過後，簽署「台灣旅行法」。該法案規定，美國政府應允許所有層級的官員訪問台灣，並允許台灣高級官員訪問美國。雖然以往美國政府曾派內閣官員前往台灣，但一般的做法是限制對台灣的常規訪問，以及通常派以美國中低階官員或以經濟、文化或技術為重點的高級官員。台灣高級官員對華盛頓特區的訪問受到限制。雖然「台灣旅行法」沒有約束力，但其通過和川普總統的簽署具有強烈的象徵意義。

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) Alex N. Wong, who has been the Department’s lead on the Indo-Pacific strategy, visited Taiwan several days after the signing of the Taiwan Travel Act. In addition to meeting with Taiwan officials—as other EAP officials have done quietly—Mr. Wong’s visit was publicized, and he delivered a public address at an event hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei. President Tsai also spoke at the event. The visit was significant in that past senior State Department officials who visited Taiwan were typically from bureaus with an economic, rather than a political or security, focus. The publicized nature of the event was also unusual. In addition to announcing Mr. Wong’s visit, AIT published the text of his address at the American Chamber of Commerce event on its website. Although Deputy Assistant Secretary Wong’s visit shortly followed the signing of the Taiwan Travel Act, it appears to have been planned well before the legislation was signed.

國務院東亞暨太平洋事務局（EAP）副助理國務卿黃之瀚（Alex N. Wong），負責印度-太平洋戰略，他在台灣旅行法案簽署幾天後訪問台灣。除了與台灣官員會面外──不像其他EAP官員那樣悄悄進行──黃先生的訪問是公開的，他在台北美國商會舉辦的一個活動上發表公開談話。蔡總統也在該場合發言。這次訪問具有重要意義，因為過去訪問台灣的國務院高級官員通常來自經濟部門，而非政治或安全部門。該活動公開宣傳的性質也不同尋常。除了公布黃先生的訪問外，AIT還在網站上發布他在台北美國商會活動上的演講文本。儘管亞太副助理國務卿黃之瀚的訪問是在簽署「台灣旅行法」之後不久進行的，但他的訪問似乎在立法簽署之前便已經計劃好了。

President Tsai’s U.S. transits reflect strengthening U.S.-Taiwan ties: In August 2018, on her way to and from Paraguay and Belize, President Tsai transited in Los Angeles and Houston. During those transits, she became the first sitting Taiwan president to visit a U.S. federal government agency (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center) and a Taiwan representative office in the United States (the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office’s Culture Center in Los Angeles). While in Los Angeles, she also delivered public remarks at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, the first time a Taiwan president has spoken publicly in the United States in 15 years.

蔡總統過境美國反映了美台關係的增進：2018年8月，在往返巴拉圭和貝里斯的途中，蔡總統過境洛杉磯和休斯頓。過境期間，她成為首位訪問美國聯邦政府機構（美國國家航空暨太空總署林登·詹森太空中心）和台灣駐美國代表處（洛杉磯台北經濟文化辦事處）的台灣現任總統。過境洛杉磯期間，她還在雷根總統圖書館發表公開談話，這是15年來台灣總統第一次在美國公開發表言論。

Global Cooperation and Training Framework enters third year:The most recent event in the Global Cooperation and Training Framework was held in August 2018, when the U.S. and Taiwan governments held a workshop on transnational crime and forensic science. The framework, which the two countries established in June 2015, allows the United States and Taiwan to jointly train experts from the Asia Pacific in areas such as public health, energy, the digital economy, the empowerment of women, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. During a visit to Taiwan in April 2017, Chairman Moriarty said, “We consider [the Global Coopera-tion and Training Framework] one of the signature programs in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, built on our long history of strong cooperation.”

全球合作暨訓練架構進入第三年：全球合作暨訓練架構的最新活動於2018年8月舉行，當時美國和台灣政府舉行跨境犯罪與鑑識科學研習營¹。這個架構由兩國於2015年6月建立，允許美國與台灣聯合培訓亞太地區公共衛生、能源、數位經濟、培力婦女以及人道援助和災害救濟等領域的專家。在2017年4月訪問台灣期間，莫健主席說：「我們認為[全球合作暨訓練架構]是美台長期合作關係的代表作。過去數十年來我們成為志同道合的夥伴，合作密切……。」²
> 譯註¹「打擊跨境犯罪及美鈔、護照鑑識國際研習營」。
> 譯註²譯文摘自美國在台協會網站〈美國在台協會主席莫健 登革熱/茲卡/屈公病鑑別診斷國際研習營致詞〉，2017年04月25日。

AIT dedicates new office complex: In June 2018, AIT dedicated a new office complex in Taipei. Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Marie Royce attended the ceremony and, in her public remarks about the complex, said, “I also want to acknowledge that it represents much more than steel and glass and concrete. The new office complex is a symbol of the strength and vibrancy of the U.S.-Taiwan partnership in the 21st century.”

AIT新館落成：2018年6月，AIT在台北啟用新辦公大樓。主管教育文化事務的助理國務卿瑪麗·羅伊斯（Marie Royce）出席落成儀式，她在致詞時說：「我也要指出，新館不只是一棟鋼筋水泥和玻璃的建築物，它更象徵著21世紀美台夥伴關係的穩固與活躍。」¹

> 譯註¹譯文摘自美國在台協會網站〈教育文化事務助理國務卿瑪麗·羅伊斯美國在台協會新館落成典禮致詞〉。

Taiwan and the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy: At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vietnam in November 2017, President Trump announced his administration’s policy of promoting a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Since then, the Trump Administration has begun to elaborate on the concept. In his remarks in Taiwan, Deputy Assistant Secretary Wong explained that Taiwan is strengthening the rules-based order—part of the Administration’s concept—by enhancing its legal and regulatory environment and by building relations with other countries in the region through the New Southbound Policy. In a speech in July 2018, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Randall Schriver said, “We do believe Taiwan is a partner in promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific and can make valuable contributions.” Taiwan officials, including President Tsai, have expressed their willingness to play a role in the strategy.

台灣和自由開放的印度─太平洋戰略：於2017年11月在越南舉辦的亞太經濟合作會議高峰會，川普總統宣布了其政府推動「自由開放的印度─太平洋」的政策。從那以後，川普政府開始詳述這個構想。亞太副助理國務卿黃之瀚在台灣發表講話時解釋，台灣正在鞏固區域內以規則為基礎的秩序──「自由開放的印度─太平洋」的部分內容──藉由持續改善台灣的法規環境及透過其新南向政策，加強與區域內各國的關係。¹國防部亞太安全事務助理國防部長薛瑞福（Randall Schriver）於2018年7月的一次演講中說：「我們確實相信台灣是促進自由開放的印度─太平洋地區的合作夥伴，並且可以做出寶貴貢獻。」台灣官員，包括蔡總統，皆表示願意在戰略中發揮作用。

>¹譯註：譯文參考美國在台協會網站〈美國國務院東亞暨太平洋事務局副助卿黃之瀚 台北美國商會謝年飯演講 台北君悅酒店 2018年3月21日星期三（致詞稿）〉。

# Economics and Trade

經濟和貿易

Since coming into office, President Tsai has sought to accelerate Taiwan’s economic growth while diversifying trade and economic ties away from an overreliance on China. To achieve these objectives, the Tsai Administration has prioritized efforts to spur innovation in key domestic industries such as green energy, smart machinery, and biotechnology; reform Taiwan’s labor, pension, and judicial systems; and support increased wages and new opportunities for younger workers. Yet even as Taiwan’s economic growth has accelerated due to strong domestic consumption and increased exports, political opposition continues to hinder many of these reform objectives.

自上任以來，蔡總統一直致力於加速台灣經濟成長，同時著手貿易和經濟聯繫的多樣化，遠離對中國的過度依賴。為實現這些目標，蔡政府優先考慮推動綠色能源、智慧機械和生物技術等國內主要產業的創新；改革台灣的勞工、國民年金和司法制度；並支持調漲薪資和為年輕工人創造新的工作機會。儘管由於強勁的國內消費和出口增加，使得台灣經濟成長加速，但政治反對派持續阻礙許多上述的改革目標。

In 2017, Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased 2.9 percent year-on-year, up from 1.4 percent growth in 2016 and 0.8 percent in 2015. In the first and second quarters of 2018, Taiwan’s GDP expanded 3.1 percent and 3.3 percent year-on-year, respectively, with official government estimates forecasting 2.7 percent yearend growth. Economic growth has been buoyed by domestic demand (increasing around 2.6 percent year-on-year in the first half of the year) and exports (increasing around 6.5 percent year-on-year in the first half of the year). Consumption activity was primarily fueled by increased spending on transportation, recreation and culture activities, and financial services, while export growth was largely due to increased foreign demand for electronic components and machinery.

與去年同期相比，2017年台灣國內生產總值（GDP）年成長率為2.9％，高於2016年的1.4％和2015年的0.8％。與去年同期相比，2018年第一季和第二季，台灣GDP成長3.1％和3.3％。政府預測全年成長率為2.7％。國內需求（上半年較去年同期成長約2.6％）和出口（今年上半年較去年同期成長約6.5％）推動經濟成長。消費活動主要是由於運輸、娛樂和文化活動以及金融服務支出的增加，而出口成長主要是由於電子元件和機械的海外需求增加。

Taiwan’s improved economic growth figures—as well as recent legislative achievements—have not led to increased employment, but have led to modest improvements in wages. In August 2018, Taiwan’s unemployment rate averaged 3.87 percent, up from 3.76 percent at the beginning of the year. Unemployment remains particularly high among younger workers; as of August 2018, 12.8 percent of workers aged 20 to 24 years were unable to find jobs, up from 11.8 percent at the beginning of the year. Meanwhile, wage growth has accelerated following a decision in September 2017 to raise Taiwan’s monthly minimum wage 4.7 percent to $730. Between January and July 2018, regular employee earnings increased 2.6 percent compared to the same period in 2017. In 2017, wages increased only 1.8 percent year-on-year.

台灣經濟成長數據的改善以及近期的立法成就並未導致就業增加，但對薪資水準有所改善。 2018年8月，台灣的失業率平均為3.87％，高於年初的3.76％。青年失業率仍然特別高；截至2018年8月，在年齡20至24歲的工人中，有12.8％無法找到工作，高於年初的11.8％。與此同時，由於遵照2017年9月決定將台灣的最低月薪提高4.7％至730美元的政策，薪資成長加快。自2018年1月至7月期間，正職雇員的收入與2017年同期相比成長了2.6％，在2017年，同期薪資僅成長1.8％。

Improved economic growth has not lessened opposition to many of President Tsai’s proposed reforms. The Labor Standard Reform Act,* which came into effect in March 2018, did not fully satisfy either the business community or labor advocates. Similarly, discussions over pension reform remain fraught, with a deeply entrenched constituency—namely from teachers, civil servants, and military veterans, who had generous pension provisions under the previous law—protesting against the policy. However, a majority of Taiwan’s public (64 percent, according to one poll conducted in June 2018) has indicated support for reforming the pension system, which remains one of the most generous in the world despite growing pressures from demographic aging. Taiwan government data indicate that without reform such generous pensions may be unsustainable, with pensions for civil servants estimated to default by 2030, teachers by 2031, and other workers by 2048. In June 2017, Taiwan legislators passed a bill reducing the stipends of civil servants, and in June 2018 passed a bill cutting military veterans’ pensions. Both bills came into effect on July 1, 2018. The unpopularity of President Tsai’s economic reform proposals has contributed to a fall in her overall approval rating, which dropped to 33 percent in June 2018.

經濟成長的改善並沒有減少對蔡總統提議之許多改革的反對意見。2018年3月生效的「《勞基法》修正案」並未完全滿足商界或勞權倡議團體的要求。年金改革同樣爭議不斷，遭到一群根深蒂固的選民強烈反彈——即從優渥的原退休金條款中受益的退休教師、公務員和軍人。然而，台灣大多數民眾（根據2018年6月進行的一項民意調查顯示，64％）表示支持改革年金制度，儘管人口高齡化帶來愈來愈大的壓力，該年金制度仍然是世界上最優渥的退休金制度之一。台灣政府的數據表明，如果沒有改革，如此豐厚的養老金可能無法持續，估計至2030年，公務員的退休金將無法如期發放，教師及其他勞工則將分別於2031年及2048年面臨相同困境。2017年6月，台灣立法委員通過一項法案，削減公務員退休金，並於2018年6月通過了一項削減退伍軍人退撫待遇的法案。這兩項法案於2018年7月1日生效。蔡總統的經濟改革提案不受民意歡迎，導致其總體支持率下降，在2018年6月降至33％。

## Cross-Strait Trade and Investment

兩岸貿易與投資

Taiwan continues to rely on trade with China as a key driver of its economy: China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, export market, and source of imports. As seen in Figure 1, cross-Strait goods trade totaled $130.8 billion in 2017—a 17.6 percent increase compared to 2016 levels—accounting for 23.8 percent of Taiwan’s total goods trade. Through the first seven months of 2018, Taiwan exported $49.2 billion worth of goods to China (up 14.7 percent from the same period in 2017) and imported $30.8 billion (up 12.5 percent year-on-year).

台灣持續依賴與中國的貿易作為其經濟的主要推動力：中國是台灣最大的貿易夥伴，出口市場和進口來源。如圖1所示，2017年兩岸貨物貿易總額為1308億美元 ——比2016年成長17.6％ ——佔台灣商品貿易總額的23.8％。在2018年的前七個月，台灣向中國出口了價值492億美元的商品（比2017年同期成長14.7％），進口額為308億美元（比同期成長12.5％）。

Much like in previous years, Taiwan’s top trade products with China were primarily circuit products and other electrical devices. In 2017, Taiwan’s largest exports to China were electric circuits ($24 billion), liquid crystal display (LCD) devices ($6 billion), and television and radio parts ($3.2 billion). Taiwan’s top imports from China consisted of electric circuits ($9.5 billion), telephones ($4.1 billion), and machine parts ($2.4 billion).

與往年非常相似，台灣與中國的首要貿易產品主要是電路產品和其他電子設備。 2017年，台灣對中國的出口主力是電路（240億美元）、液晶顯示器（LCD）設備（60億美元）、電視和無線電零組件（32億美元）。台灣從中國進口的主要商品包括電子電路（9.5億美元）、通訊設備（41億美元）和機械零組件（24億美元）。

China remains Taiwan’s top destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), although investment flows have declined in recent years amid Taiwan’s efforts to diversify economic ties (for more on Taiwan’s efforts to diversify its economic ties through the New Southbound Policy, see “Taiwan’s Economic Growth Initiatives,” later in this section). In 2017, Taiwan invested $9.2 billion in China, down 15.7 percent from 2015 levels, but still comprising 44.4 percent of Taiwan’s total outbound investments. Electronic parts manufacturing made up the largest share (20.7 percent) of Taiwan’s approved FDI in China in 2017, while nonmetal manufacturing (12.2 percent) and financial services and insurance (11.6 percent) accounted for the secondand third-largest shares, respectively. From January to August 2018, Taiwan invested $6 billion in China, a decline of 1 percent from the same period in 2017.

中國仍然是台灣的外資直接投資（FDI）的首選目的地，儘管在台灣努力開闢與更多國經濟聯繫的情況下，對中國投資流量於近幾年有所下降（關於台灣推動新南向政策，使其經濟聯繫多樣化的努力，請參閱本節後面的內容「台灣經濟成長倡議」）。 2017年，台灣在中國投資92億美元，比2015年下降15.7％，但仍佔台灣對外投資總額的44.4％。 2017年電子零件製造業占台灣對中國投資總額比重20.7％，非金屬礦物製品製造業（12.2％）和金融及保險業（11.6％）分別佔第二和第三大份額。從2018年1月到8月，台灣在中國投資60億美元，比2017年同期下降1％。

Meanwhile, Chinese FDI in Taiwan increased from $247.6 million in 2016 to $265.7 million in 2017. Through the first eight months of 2018, Chinese FDI in Taiwan reached $152.6 million, a decline of 9 percent compared to the same period in 2017.

與此同時，中國在台灣的外資直接投資從2016年的2.476億美元增加到2017年的2.657億美元。2018年的前八個月，中國在台灣的外資直接投資達1.526億美元，與2017年同期相比下降了9％。

## Chinese Economic Coercion

中國的經濟恫嚇

Due to China’s outsized influence on Taiwan’s economy, Beijing’s policies can have a significant impact on Taiwan’s economic development. For instance, recent policy decisions by the Chinese government have contributed to reduced Chinese tourism to Taiwan and led top experts and businesses to leave Taiwan for more lucrative opportunities in China.

由於中國對台灣經濟的巨大影響，北京的政策可能對台灣的經濟發展產生顯著衝擊。例如，中國政府最近施行的政策，減少中國遊客至台灣旅遊，並誘使頂級專家和企業離開台灣到中國追求更多利潤豐厚的機會。

Reducing tourism to Taiwan: In 2017, the Tourism Bureau in Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and Communications reported that the number of visitors to Taiwan from China dropped 22 percent year-on-year after declining 16 percent year-on-year in 2016. The decline is due in part to a 2016 change in Chinese travel laws, which requires leaders of Taiwan-bound tour groups to obtain a special license. In 2017, China also reduced the number of Chinese students permitted to study in Taiwan by half, approving only 1,000 applications for the 2017–2018 academic year (down from 2,136 the previous year). Although Taiwan still saw a record number of international visitors in 2017 (with more than 10.7 million tourists coming from around the world), the declining number of visitors from China has impacted profits in Taiwan’s tourism industry.

減少赴台旅遊：台灣交通部觀光局報告指出，2017年赴台觀光的中國遊客人次與同期相比下降22％，而2016年與同期相比下降16％。部分原因是2016年中國旅遊法的變更，要求赴台旅行團的領隊須獲得特別許可。 2017年，中國還將獲准在台灣學習的中國學生人數砍半，僅批准2017-2018學年的1,000份申請（少於前一年的2,136份）。儘管台灣於2017年的國際遊客人數仍然創下新高（來自世界各地的遊客超過1070萬），但來自中國的遊客人數下降影響了台灣旅遊業的利潤。

In 2015, Chinese tourists in Taiwan spent an average of $228 per day (the second-highest daily expenditure behind tourists from Japan). After the new travel regulations were implemented, Chinese tourists’ daily expenditures dropped to $208 per day in 2016 and $184 per day in 2017. In particular, Chinese tourists’ average daily spending on retail and shopping in Taiwan has declined, dropping from $157 per day in 2015 to $136 per day in 2016.

2015年，在台灣的中國遊客平均每天花費228美元（僅次於日本的遊客，每日支出第二高）。新的旅行規定實施後，中國遊客的每日消費於2016年降至每日208美元，2017年降至每日184美元。特別是，中國遊客在台灣的零售和購物日均消費下降，從2015年每日157美元下降至2016年每日136美元。

Many local Taiwan businesses and shops only receive a fraction of the total money spent by Chinese tourists because most of the spending goes to the Chinese tour organizers. Although this has lessened the economic impact of the decline in tourism from China, Taiwan shopkeepers and other tourism-related businesses still feel the effects of Beijing’s new tour group regulations. In 2016, some 20,000 tourism sector workers staged a protest demanding Taiwan’s government make efforts to boost tourism in response to reduced tourism from China.

許多台灣當地公司行號和商店只從中國遊客的消費中獲得鳳毛麟角的收入，因為大部分金流都進入了中國旅行社的口袋。雖然這減輕了中國遊客下降造成的經濟衝擊，但台灣店家和其他旅遊相關企業仍然感受到北京的新旅遊團規定造成的影響。2016年，約2萬名旅遊業者進行抗議活動，要求台灣政府努力推動旅遊業，以應對中國旅客的減少。

Attracting workers from Taiwan: In February 2018, the Chinese government unveiled a package of 31 “incentives” to attract workers and students from Taiwan, including tax breaks and subsidies for high-tech companies, research grants for academics, and promises to allow Taiwan companies to bid for government infrastructure projects. The academic community in Taiwan characterizes these efforts as an attempt to “dig out [Taiwan’s] roots.” Even before the 31 incentives plan, many workers from Taiwan were pursuing opportunities in China. In 2015, 58 percent (420,000 people) of all people from Taiwan working abroad were based in China. The exodus of talent creates another source of pressure Beijing can impose against Taipei as it threatens to hollow out Taiwan’s economy. On a Commission trip to Taipei, Kristy Hsu, director of the Taiwan ASEAN Studies Center, indicated that the 31 incentives alone will have limited impact on Taiwan’s economy. However, if China further increases incentives for Taiwan citizens and businesses to relocate to China, it could have a real impact on Taiwan’s ability to retain talent. Beijing continues to encourage Taiwan citizens to work or study in China.* In August, the Chinese government removed a policy requiring Taiwan citizens to hold a permit to work in China. Effective September 2018, Taiwan citizens who are working or studying in China can also apply for a residence card that conveys benefits related to employment, insurance, housing, and travel.

吸引台灣工作者：2018年2月，中國政府公布了一系列共31項的「激勵措施」，吸引台灣工作者和學生，包括對高科技公司的減稅和補貼，為學者提供研究經費，並承諾允許台灣公司競標政府基礎建設項目。台灣學術界將這些措施描述為「（將台灣）連根拔起」。即使在31個激勵措施實施之前，台灣的許多工作者已在中國尋求工作機會。 2015年，赴海外工作的台灣勞工中，有58％（420,000人）在中國工作。台灣人才外流可能成為北京對台北施加壓力的另一個來源，因為這有可能動搖台灣經濟的根基。在本委員會某次造訪台北時，中華經濟研究院台灣東南亞國家協會研究中心主任徐遵慈表示，31項激勵措施本身對台灣經濟的影響有限。但是，如果中國進一步擴大鼓勵台灣公民和企業移轉到中國，它可能會對台灣留住人才的能力產生實際影響。北京繼續鼓勵台灣公民到中國工作或學習。8月，中國政府取消了一項要求在中國的台灣公民需持有工作許可證的政策。從2018年9月開始，在中國工作或學習的台灣公民也可以申請港澳台居民居住證，以獲得有關就業、保險、住房和旅行的福利。

Chinese Firms Could Sideline Taiwan in Global ICT Supply Chains

中國企業可能讓台灣在全球ICT供應鏈中邊緣化

Taiwan’s information and communication technology (ICT) firms are facing rising competition in global supply chains as a consequence of China’s efforts to develop its own ICT industry. China aims to become a global leader in semiconductors by 2030 and uses government-backed funds such as the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund—which has raised $41 billion to date—to support the development of its ICT industry. Although Taiwan still holds an edge in precision manufacturing and cutting-edge ICT, Chinese investments in the industry could lead Taiwan firms’ share of the market to decline. To date, however, these fears have not been realized; in 2017, Taiwan’s industry revenue increased to $81 billion, up 0.5 percent from 2016, and is expected to reach $85.8 billion in 2018.

由於中國努力發展自己的資訊與通信科技（ICT）產業，台灣的ICT企業在全球供應鏈正面臨日益激烈的競爭。中國的目標是在2030年成為半導體領域的全球領導者，並使用政府支持的基金，如國家集成電路產業投資基金 —— 迄今為止已籌資410億美元 —— 支援其ICT產業的發展。雖然台灣在精密製造和尖端訊息通信技術方面仍佔據優勢，但中國對該產業的投資可能會導致台灣企業在市場中所佔比重下降。不過目前為止這些隱憂尚未成真； 2017年，台灣ICT產業營收增加至810億美元，比2016年成長0.5％，預計2018年將達到858億美元。

Although growing competition with Taiwan’s ICT firms is a natural consequence—rather than intent—of China’s technological development, Chinese firms are also resorting to coercive measures to gain technological know-how from Taiwan firms. In a meeting with the Commission, John Deng, Minister without Portfolio in the Taiwan government and Taiwan’s lead trade official, said “China still comes to Taiwan to steal our talent and intellectual property,” especially in the semiconductor industry. Taiwan’s Trade Secrets Act was amended in 2013 to address trade secret theft by China,* but Minister Deng indicates the law’s increased penalties still have not deterred Chinese actors.

雖然與台灣ICT企業競爭加劇是中國技術發展的自然結果──而非有意為之──中國公司也採取強制措施來獲取台灣公司的技術知識。在與台灣委員會的會晤中，台灣政務委員和首席貿易官員鄧振中表示，「中國還在從台灣竊取我們的人才和智慧財產」，特別是在半導體產業。台灣的「營業秘密法」於2013年進行了修訂，旨在解決中國的商業秘密盜竊行為，但鄧政委表示法律的加重處罰仍然無法阻止中國。

## Taiwan’s Economic Growth Initiatives

台灣的經濟成長計劃

Taipei has prioritized economic initiatives aimed at strengthening key engines of its economy and diversifying its economic and trade partnerships beyond China. At home, Taiwan is pursuing its “5+2” Innovative Industries program to create new, profitable businesses in key economic sectors, and a Forward-looking Infrastructure Program to develop the infrastructure needed to ensure stable energy supplies and attract top-level talent. Abroad, Taiwan prioritizes the New Southbound Policy, which is aimed at diversifying Taiwan’s economic ties beyond China to countries in Asia and Oceania.

台灣政府已優先採取了能夠加強其經濟關鍵動力的舉措，並增加其經貿合作夥伴數量。在國內，台灣正在推行其「5 + 2」產業創新計畫，以在關鍵經濟領域創造新的盈利產業，以及推行前瞻基礎建設計畫，以發展確保穩定的能源供應與吸引頂級人才所需的基礎設施。在國際方面，台灣將重心放在新南向政策，旨在與中國以外的亞洲和大洋洲國家發展經貿合作。

“5+2” Innovative Industries program: Taiwan is attempting to shift its industrial base away from manufacturing and toward high-value-added, innovative, and service-oriented businesses that will spur job creation. Under the “5+2” Innovative Industries program, Taiwan is seeking to develop five pillar industries (green energy, defense, the Internet of Things, biotechnology, and smart precision machinery) and two auxiliary sectors (high-value agriculture and the “circular economy”). The initiative is backed by Taiwan’s Industrial Innovation and Transformation Fund, which will invest $3.3 billion to develop new technologies and promote innovation in pillar industries. According to Roy Lee, deputy executive director at the Taiwan World Trade Organization Center and Regional Trade Agreement Center, the initiative is also aimed at creating local ecosystems to encourage Taiwan companies to stay in Taiwan rather than moving facilities to China.

「5+2」產業創新計畫：台灣正試圖將其工業基礎從製造業轉向高附加價值、創新、和服務型企業，以創造就業機會。在「5 + 2」產業創新計畫下，台灣正在發展五大支柱產業（綠能科技、國防產業、物聯網（亞洲‧矽谷）、生醫產業和智慧精密機械）和兩個輔助部門（高價值農業（新農業）和「循環經濟」）。該計畫得到國發基金編列的「產業創新轉型基金」支持，將投資1000億台幣用於開發新技術和促進核心產業的創新。根據台灣世界貿易組織中心和區域貿易協定中心副執行長李淳（Roy Lee）的說法，該倡議的重點之一是要創造在地的經濟生態系統，鼓勵台灣公司留在台灣，而不是將設施轉移到中國。

To date, the “5+2” program has focused on investments in artificial intelligence (AI), with the government approving a plan in January 2018 to invest $1.2 billion over the next four years in AI. Under the plan, funds will be dedicated toward fostering and recruiting top AI talent, creating an international AI innovation center, and promoting new regulations to facilitate AI testing and verification. As part of the program, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs is also working with the Ministry of Finance to provide tax incentives to help small and medium firms incorporate digital production systems into their facilities.

迄今，「5+2」計畫的重點是人工智慧（AI）投資，政府於2018年1月批准了一項計畫，在未來四年內投資12億美元用於人工智慧。根據該計畫，資金將用於培養和招募頂級人才，創建國際AI創新中心，並推廣新法規以促進AI測試和驗證。作為該計畫的一部分，台灣經濟部還與財政部合作，提供稅收優惠，幫助中小企業將數位生產系統納入其設施。

Forward-looking Infrastructure Program: The program, which began in July 2017, is aimed at improving Taiwan’s infrastructure over the next 30 years. It includes $13.9 billion in funding over the first four years for the development of eight areas: railway projects, water environments, green energy infrastructure, digital infrastructure, regional development, child care facilities, agriculture, and human resources infrastructure. The program seeks to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation, spur innovation, and create a more competitive business environment.

前瞻基礎建設計畫於2017年7月開始，旨在改善台灣未來30年的基礎設施。它包括在頭四年內為發展八個領域提供約8824億新台幣（139億美元）的資金：軌道建設、水環境建設、綠能建設、數位建設、城鄉建設、因應少子化友善育兒空間建設、食品安全建設、人才培育促進就業建設等。該計畫旨在提高資源配置效率，刺激創新，並創造更具競爭力的商業環境。

New Southbound Policy: Taiwan’s government is seeking to reduce Taiwan’s reliance on China by expanding economic, educational, and cultural ties with ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand, and seven South Asian countries. Under the New Southbound Policy, “Taiwan desks” will be opened in target countries and overseen by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs to coordinate local resources and cluster Taiwan investors abroad. The policy also creates special loans for exports under Taiwan’s Export-Import Bank, increases branches of Taiwan banks in target countries, and promotes technology collaboration and agricultural technology assistance abroad. To further integrate Taiwan with target countries, the New Southbound Policy also prioritizes forming and updating bilateral investment agreements. Ms. Hsu explained to the Commission that the policy prioritizes soft power diplomacy, with the Taiwan government allocating resources to programs that promote tourism, attract foreign students, and promote think tank exchanges.

新南向政策：台灣政府正尋求透過擴大與東協國家、澳大利亞、紐西蘭和七個南亞國家的經濟、教育和文化聯繫，來減少台灣對中國的依賴。根據新南向政策，政府將在目標國家設置「台灣投資窗口」，並由台灣經濟部監督，以協調當地資源，並讓台灣投資者在國外得以形成群聚。該政策還為台灣的進出口貿易銀行創造特殊貸款，增加台灣銀行在目標國家的分支機構，並促進國外的技術合作和農業技術援助。為了進一步將台灣與目標國家融為一體，新南向政策還優先制定和更新雙邊投資協議。徐女士向本委員會解釋說，該政策優先考慮軟實力外交，台灣政府將資源分配給促進旅遊、吸引外國學生和促進智庫交流等項目。

To date, the New Southbound Policy has led to mixed results fostering increased trade between Taiwan and target countries (see Table 1). A 2018 study by the National Bureau of Asian Research found that in 2016 (the first year of the policy’s implementation), Taiwan’s outbound investment to seven ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) reached a record $3.5 billion, versus $9.1 billion invested in China. By comparison, Taiwan invested $10.4 billion in China in 2015, while investments in the ASEAN countries totaled only $2.6 billion. Target countries’ tourism to Taiwan also increased; in 2017, the number of visitors to Taiwan from Southeast Asia was up 29.4 percent year-on-year (2.1 million visitors), and the number of visitors from Australia and New Zealand was up 9.9 percent yearon-year (105,000 visitors).

迄今為止，新南向政策為台灣與目標國家之間的貿易，帶來一些不同的效果（見表1）。美國智庫「國家亞洲研究局」（NBR）2018年的一項研究發現，在新南向政策實行的第一年，即2016年，台灣對七個東協國家（柬埔寨、印尼、馬來西亞、菲律賓、新加坡、泰國和越南）的對外投資達到了創紀錄的35億美元，而在中國的投資額為91億美元。相比之下，台灣於2015年在中國的投資額為104億美元，而在東協國家的投資總額僅為26億美元。目標國家的赴台旅遊也有所增加； 2017年，來自東南亞的赴台遊客數量較去年成長29.4％（訪客人數210萬人次），澳大利亞和紐西蘭遊客數量較去年成長9.9％（訪客人數105,000人次）。

Taiwan’s total trade with ASEAN countries reached $86.1 billion in 2017, lower than 2013 ($88.2 billion) and 2014 ($91.3 billion). Through the first seven months of 2018, Taiwan’s exports to ASEAN countries increased 6.1 percent compared to the same period in 2017. Because increased investment is not creating a proportional increase in export orders for Taiwan businesses in ASEAN countries, Taipei may prioritize efforts to negotiate new economic cooperation agreements to boost trading volumes.

台灣與東協國家的貿易總額在2017年達到861億美元，低於2013年（882億美元）和2014年（913億美元）。在2018年的前七個月，台灣對東協國家的出口比2017年同期成長了6.1％。由於增加投資並未使東協國家對台灣企業的出口訂單同等地按比例增加，台北可能將優先考慮就新的經濟合作協議進行協商，以提高貿易量。

Table 1: Taiwan Share of Global Trade and Investment Ties with Select Partners, 2010–July 2018

表1：2010年至2018年7月台灣與精選合作夥伴的全球貿易和投資關係份額


## U.S.-Taiwan Economic and Trade Relations

美台經貿關係

In 2017, U.S.-Taiwan economic ties were defined primarily by the trading relationship, with overall goods trade increasing relative to 2016 levels on the strength of trade in electronic products. To foster increased engagement, Taiwan is seeking to expand ties with U.S. businesses, particularly in the technology sector. In June 2018, Taiwan sent the year’s largest foreign delegation (comprising 120 representatives from 60 industries) to the U.S. government’s annual SelectUSA Investment Summit promoting increased foreign investment in the United States. Despite these positive developments, no progress has been made securing commitments on a few longstanding issues such as market access for U.S. pork and beef products.

2017年，美台經濟聯繫主要由貿易關係決定，隨著電子產品貿易走強，整體商品貿易較2016年成長。為了促進增加貿易活動，台灣正在尋求擴展與美國企業的關係，特別是在科技產業。 2018年6月，美國政府主辦一年一度的「選擇美國」投資高峰會（SlectUSA Investment Summit），推廣外資在美國境內的投資，台灣方面派出該年度規模最大的外國代表團（包括來自60個產業的120名代表）參加。儘管取得了這些積極進展，但在確保一些長期議題上的承諾方面沒有取得任何進展，例如開放美國豬肉和牛肉產品進入市場。

According to U.S. Census data, bilateral goods trade between the United States and Taiwan totaled $68.2 billion in 2017—an increase of 4.3 percent year-on-year—making Taiwan the United States’ eleventh-largest trading partner. In 2017, U.S. goods exports to Taiwan fell slightly to $25.8 billion (down only 0.8 percent from 2016 levels), while U.S. imports from Taiwan increased 8.1 percent yearon-year to $42.5 billion. The leading U.S. exports to Taiwan were semiconductor and electronic components ($3.8 billion), industrial machinery ($3.6 billion), and aerospace products and parts ($3 billion). U.S. goods imports from Taiwan were led by semiconductor and electronic components ($6.2 billion), telecommunications equipment ($3.6 billion), and computer equipment ($2.8 billion).

根據美國商務部人口調查與統計局數據，2017年美國與台灣的雙邊貨物貿易總額為682億美元 —— 較去年成長4.3％，使台灣成為美國的第11大貿易夥伴。 2017年，美國對台出口略有下降至258億美元（較2016年水準僅下降0.8%），美國自台灣進口較去年成長8.1％至425億美元。美國對台出口的主要產品是半導體和電子元件（38億美元）、工業機械（36億美元）、航空航太產品和零件（30億美元）。美國自台灣進口的商品主要以半導體和電子元件（62億美元）、電信設備（36億美元）和電腦設備（28億美元）為大宗。

The United States and Taiwan have deepened cooperation in high-tech industries in recent years, forging business and government connections in next-generation technologies. For example, in January 2018, Microsoft Corporation launched a $33 million investment to create an AI research and development center in Taiwan. The center will collaborate with Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Education to develop “intelligent input, audience intent recognition, and AI vertical industrial integration” technologies. Taiwan’s National Development Council also established an Asian Silicon Valley Development Agency in September 2016 to promote the growth of tech startups and connect them with firms in Silicon Valley and around the world.

近年來，美國和台灣加深在高科技產業的合作，在下一代技術方面建立了產、官合作。例如，2018年1月，微軟公司投資3300萬美元，在台灣成立人工智慧研發中心，該中心將與台灣經濟部、科技部和教育部合作，開發「智慧輸入、使用者意圖認知和人工智慧垂直產業應用」技術。台灣國家發展委員會更於2016年9月成立亞洲·矽谷計畫執行中心，以促進科技新創公司的發展，建立與矽谷、世界各地的公司間的連結。

Taiwan and the United States continue to discuss bilateral economic issues primarily through the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) established in 1994. However, progress on certain issues discussed in TIFA talks between the United States and Taiwan has been stalled for many years. Outstanding issues in the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship include intellectual property rights protection, trade barriers, and investment opportunities, as well as a decade-long dispute over U.S. pork and beef imports. Intellectual property concerns center on online copyright infringement; a 2017 white paper by the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei noted that pirated content is prevalent in Taiwan and highlighted the need for an improved legal framework to prosecute copyright infringers.

在以1994年達成的貿易暨投資框架協定（TIFA）為主的框架下，台灣和美國繼續討論雙邊經濟議題。然而，美台TIFA談判中的某些議題的協商進度已停滯多年。美台經濟關係中的主要議題包括保障智慧財產權、貿易壁壘、投資機會，以及長達十年的美國豬肉和牛肉進口爭議。智慧財產權的問題在於線上版權侵權；2017年台北美國商會在一份白皮書中指出，盜版內容在台灣很普遍，並強調需要改進法律框架來起訴著作權侵權者。

The disputes over beef and pork center on Taiwan’s unwillingness to fully open its pork and beef market to U.S. producers due to U.S. farmers’ use of ractopamine, a feed additive that produces leaner meat products. Taiwan, along with the European Union and China, has banned the use of ractopamine due to health and food safety concerns. U.S. policymakers and trade negotiators view Taiwan’s ban on ractopamine as a protectionist measure, and have criticized the policy as being “not based upon science.” In 2012, Taiwan loosened some restrictions on residual levels of ractopamine in some U.S. beef imports, but continues to enforce a ban on certain U.S. beef products and all U.S. pork products. A Taiwan government official told the Commission that U.S. pork products still do not meet Taiwan’s health and food safety standards, indicating any breakthrough will require more dialogue between Taiwan and the United States.

由於美國養殖場主使用萊克多巴胺（一種生產瘦肉類產品的飼料添加劑），台灣不願意向美國生產商全面開放豬肉和牛肉進入市場。由於健康和食品安全問題，台灣以及歐盟和中國已禁止使用萊克多巴胺。美國決策者和貿易談判代表認為，台灣禁止使用萊克多巴胺實為保護主義措施，並批評該政策「缺乏科學根據」。2012年，台灣局部鬆綁對進口美國牛肉中萊克多巴胺殘留水準的限制，但仍繼續對某些美國牛肉產品和所有美國豬肉產品實施禁令。一位台灣政府官員告訴委員會，美國的豬肉產品仍然不符合台灣的健康和食品安全標準，這表明需要台灣和美國之間進行更多的對話，才有可能取得突破。

# Cross-Strait Military and Security Issues

兩岸軍事和安全問題

The primary objective of China’s military deployments and posture directed at Taiwan is to pressure Taipei into eventual unification with Beijing and, if that fails, to subjugate Taiwan through military action. Since Taiwan remains the PLA’s “main strategic direction,”* one of the principal objectives of China’s military modernization program is to build the necessary force and prepare operational plans for a forceful takeover of the island.

中國針對台灣的軍事部署與態勢的主要目的是迫使台北最終與北京統一，如果失敗，將通過軍事行動征服台灣。由於台灣仍然是解放軍的「主要戰略方向」，中國軍事現代化計劃的主要目標之一是建立必要的部隊，並為強力接管該島制定行動計劃。

## Increasing PLA Exercises to Intimidate Taipei

增加解放軍演習以恫嚇台北

The scope and frequency of PLA training activities near Taiwan have expanded and intensified in recent years. In addition to gathering intelligence and enhancing the PLA’s preparations for Taiwan-related military contingencies, these activities are also intended to coerce Taiwan into agreeing to Beijing’s preferred terms for crossStrait relations and eventual unification. A Taiwan government official noted to the Commission in May 2018 that PLA exercises near to or targeting Taiwan are intended to influence Taiwan voters to not vote for the DPP. This official added that Beijing also seeks to “deter U.S. determination to rescue Taiwan.” These activities are primarily comprised of the following:

近年來，台灣附近的解放軍訓練活動的範圍和頻率不斷擴大和加劇。除了蒐集情報和強化解放軍對台灣相關軍事突發事件做準備外，這些活動還意圖脅迫台灣同意北京就兩岸關係和最終統一方面所屬意的措辭。一位台灣政府官員於2018年5月向本委員會表示，解放軍在台灣附近或以台灣為目標的演習，意圖影響台灣選民不投票給民進黨。這位官員補充說，北京還企圖「遏止美國拯救台灣的決心。」這些活動主要包括以下內容：

• PLA Air Force training flights: As part of a trend of increasing long-distance over-water training on China’s periphery, the PLA Air Force has been conducting training flights near Taiwan. At least twelve of these flights have occurred since November 2017 alone (for a depiction of these flight routes, see map in Chapter 2, Section 1, “Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs”). These flights began with transits from China over the Bashi Channel (between Taiwan and the Philippines) and the Miyako Strait (to the northeast of Taiwan between the southwestern Japanese islands of Miyako and Okinawa) to the Western Pacific for the first time in 2015. A new flight path was established in November 2016 when PLA Air Force aircraft flew around Taiwan, first flying south of Taiwan over the Bashi Channel, then flying north, and returning to China over the Miyako Strait. Since then, flights following this path or its reverse have become a regular occurrence.

•解放軍空軍訓練飛行：中國周邊長程海上訓練有增加的趨勢，其中包括，解放軍空軍一直在台灣附近進行訓練飛行。自2017年11月以來至少有12次訓練飛行（有關這些航路的敘述，請參閱第2章第1節「年度回顧：安全和外交事務」中的地圖）。這些訓練飛行始於2015年，經過路線起於中國，越過巴士海峽（台灣和菲律賓之間）和宮古海峽（台灣東北部，日本西南部的宮古島和沖繩島之間）至西太平洋。從那以後，沿著這條路徑或反向的飛行經常發生。

• Aircraft carrier transits of the Taiwan Strait: In 2018, China’s only operational aircraft carrier sailed through the Taiwan Strait twice as part of its training activities. Following its commissioning, the carrier transited the strait for the first time in November 2013 and again the next month. After not transiting the strait for several years, it did so three times in 2017. It is worth noting that passing through the Taiwan Strait is the most direct route for the carrier to reach the South China Sea for training, and the carrier has stayed on China’s side of the center line. Nonetheless, these transits carry significant symbolic meaning, particularly in the context of China’s actions on multiple fronts to pressure and intimidate Taiwan.

•航空母艦過境台灣海峽：2018年，中國唯一運作中的航空母艦兩次航經台灣海峽，作為其訓練活動之一。正式服役之後，該航空母艦於2013年11月首次經過台灣海峽，並於次月再度航經海峽。在未航經海峽數年之後，它在2017年三度經過海峽。值得注意的是，穿越台灣海峽是該航空母艦前往南海進行演練的最直接路徑，該航空母艦一直走的是海峽西側靠近中國大陸的航道。儘管如此，這些過境海峽的舉動具有重大象徵意義，特別是在中國多方面採取行動壓迫和恫嚇台灣的背景下。

• Exercises in the Taiwan Strait: In April 2018, the PLA Navy held its first live-fire exercise in the Taiwan Strait since 2015. In July, the PLA Navy conducted an amphibious landing exercise near the Taiwan island of Kinmen as part of an international amphibious landing competition that saw participation from Iran, Russia, Sudan, and Venezuela.

•台灣海峽演習：自2015年以來，解放軍海軍於2018年4月第一次在台灣海峽舉行首次實彈射擊演習。7月，解放軍海軍在台灣金門島附近進行兩棲登陸演練，此為國際軍事比賽海上登陸賽的其中一部分，伊朗、俄羅斯、蘇丹和委內瑞拉參加了此次競賽。

## A Shifting Cross-Strait Military Balance

改變兩岸軍事平衡

As the Commission has noted in past reports, the cross-Strait military balance has shifted toward China and continues to shift even further in China’s direction. The PLA possesses many quantitative and qualitative military advantages over the Taiwan military and is currently capable of conducting a range of military campaigns against Taiwan short of a full invasion of the island.

正如本委員會在過去報告中所指出，兩岸的軍事平衡已傾向中國，並持續朝中國方向發展。解放軍比台灣軍隊擁有更多數量和質量的軍事優勢，目前能夠針對台灣進行大範圍軍事行動，但不足以全面攻台。

• Missiles: The PLA Rocket Force has approximately 1,200 shortrange ballistic missiles and 200–500 ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles. A preponderance of China’s shortrange ballistic missiles is deployed across from Taiwan. The primary purpose of the majority of these missiles is to intimidate Taiwan into submitting to Beijing’s political objectives and, if that fails, to force submission through a military campaign to destroy Taiwan’s command and control infrastructure, radar sites, air defense, ports, and airfields. Although it has not greatly expanded in size since the late 2000s, China’s shortrange ballistic missile arsenal has become more lethal with the introduction of new missile variants with improved accuracies and warheads.

導彈(Missiles)：解放軍火箭軍擁有大約1,200枚短程彈道導彈和200枚至500枚陸射對地攻擊巡航導彈。中國短程彈道導彈大多部署在台灣對面。這些導彈大多的主要目的是恫嚇台灣屈服於北京的政治目標，如果失敗，則透過摧毀台灣指揮中心、基礎設施、雷達站、飛彈防禦、港口和機場之軍事行動逼降。雖然自2009年以來（譯註：原文是「since the late 2000s」），規模沒有大幅擴充，但因改良精準度與彈頭的新型導彈，中國的短程彈道導彈武器庫變得更加致命。

• Aircraft: The PLA Air Force and Navy have more than 2,000 combat aircraft, of which approximately 600 are modern. Fewer than 330 of Taiwan’s combat aircraft are modern. As part of the PLA’s efforts to further enhance the capabilities of its fleet of combat aircraft, the Su-35 fighter entered service with the PLA Air Force in 2018. The Su-35, with its advanced avionics and targeting and passive electronically scanned array radar systems, will improve China’s counter-air and strike capabilities. China has received 14 Su-35s from Russia and will receive the remaining 10 that were ordered by the end of 2018.

•飛機：解放軍空軍與海軍擁有2000多架戰機，其中大約600架是現代化戰機。台灣的現代化戰機不到330架。解放軍為進一步提升戰機性能，其中一項努力是蘇愷35戰機於2018年加入解放軍空軍服役。蘇愷35具有先進的航空電子和目標標定以及被動式電子掃描陣列雷達等系統，將提高中國的空中反擊和打擊能力。中國已接收來自俄羅斯的14架蘇愷35，並將於2018年底前接收訂購的剩餘10架。

• Ships: The PLA Navy has more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, and missile-armed patrol craft, in addition to China’s highly capable coast guard and maritime militia. Taiwan, on the other hand, has 92 naval combatants, comprising four submarines—two of which are only used for training—and 88 surface ships.185 As China’s efforts to improve its navy continue, its new ships are increasingly modern‡ and feature advanced weaponry making them capable of conducting operations in more than one warfare area. (See Chapter 2, Section 2, “China’s Military Reorganization and Modernization: Implications for the United States,” for more information on developments in Chinese military modernization.)

•船舶：解放軍海軍擁有超過300艘水面艦艇、潛艇和導彈巡邏艇，此外還有高裝備的海岸巡防隊¹和海上民兵。另一方面，台灣有92艘海軍艦艇，其中包括四艘潛艇──其中兩艘僅用於訓練──和88艘水面艦艇。隨著中國持續改進海軍，其新型艦艇愈來愈現代化並配置先進的武器裝備，使它們能夠在多個戰區進行作戰。（有關中國軍事現代化發展的更多訊息，請參見第2章第2節「中國的軍事重組與現代化：對美國的影響」。）

> ¹譯註：中國人民武裝警察部隊海警總隊

## Intensifying Political Warfare Efforts

強化政治作戰工作

In addition to its military modernization and intimidation, Beijing is carrying out extensive United Front work§ and other political warfare activities against Taiwan, including supporting opposition political parties and spreading disinformation. These activities are intended to build alliances between individuals and groups within Taiwan and the CCP, and undermine the Tsai Administration and Taiwan’s democracy in general.

除了軍事現代化和恫嚇之外，北京正在針對台灣開展大規模統戰工作和其他政治作戰活動，包括支持反對黨和散佈假訊息。大致而言，這些活動意圖建立台灣個人和團體與中共的聯盟關係，並損害蔡政府與台灣民主。

In August 2017, Peter Mattis, research fellow at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, wrote that “Beijing’s effort to shape or even destabilize [Taiwan] society itself through United Front work is intensifying. The aim, according to several [Taiwan] interlocutors, is to create a ‘fake civil society’ that can be used against Taiwan’s democratic system.” He added that his “recent discussions in Taiwan indicate that covert Chinese activities have increased in scope, sophistication, and intensity. For the first time in many years, Taiwan’s national security officials see change rather than continuity as a hallmark of Beijing’s intelligence and subversive operations.” In his testimony to the Commission, Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute, explained that CCP United Front work against Taiwan is focused on “10 constituencies that include grass-roots villages, youth, students, Chinese spouses, aboriginals, pro-China political parties and groups, religious organizations, distant relatives, fishermen’s associations, and retired generals.”

2017年8月，共產主義受害者紀念基金會（Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation）研究員彼得．馬提斯（Peter Mattis）寫道：「北京正在強化藉由統戰工作以形塑甚至破壞台灣社會本身的工作。據幾位[台灣]對話者說，其試圖建立『假公民社會』來對付台灣的民主制度。」他補充說，他「最近在台灣的討論表明，中國提高（在台）地下活動的範圍、複雜度與強度。多年來，台灣國安官員首次見到北京對台情報與顛覆活動不再延用過去多年的手法，出現了顯著變化。」華府智庫全球台灣研究中心（GTI）執行長蕭良淇也在國會聽證會指出，中共對台統戰聚焦「基層民眾群體、青年、學生、中國配偶、原住民、親中政黨與團體、宗教機構、陸人在台遠親、漁業協會及退休將領等10個選民範圍。」

> 譯註：譯文參考、摘自中央社〈美報告指中國在台散布假消息 意圖建立假公民社會〉2018/11/15

In July 2017, Taiwan’s Liberty Times reported, based on Taiwan government information, that “Chinese influence” was involved in protests and the spread of disinformation against the Tsai Administration’s pension reforms. In addition, that year there were several instances of individuals with ties to organized crime and pro-unification organizations protesting and even engaging in violence against individuals whose views run counter to Beijing’s. Furthermore, in 2017, J. Michael Cole, chief editor of the Taiwan Sentinel website, wrote that China “is now using bots, various social media (e.g., LINE, WeChat) and content farms (also known as content mills) to saturate Taiwan with pro-Beijing agitprop.”

2017年7月，台灣自由時報報導，根據台灣政府情報，「中國影響力」涉及參與抗議活動並散布相關假訊息來反對蔡政府的年金改革。那一年也有數起組織犯罪、支持統一組織等相關份子與反對北京觀點的人士發生暴力傷害事件。此外，2017年，台灣守望網站（Taiwan Sentinel）主編寇謐將（J. Michael Cole）寫道，中國正利用聊天機器人、各種社群媒體（如LINE、微信）及內容農場，在台灣散布支持北京的文宣資訊。

> 譯註：譯文部分內容參考、摘自中央社〈寇謐將：中共持續對台造謠攻勢應密切注意〉2017/08/05

Beijing’s Espionage against Taiwan

北京對台灣的間諜活動

Beijing’s aggressive intelligence activities against Taiwan pose a threat to Taiwan’s security and to the security of U.S. military information and equipment to which Taiwan has access. In June 2018, Taiwan prosecutors indicted the spokesperson of Taiwan’s New Party and two executives of the party’s youth wing on charges of attempting to obtain classified materials from active and retired Taiwan military personnel on behalf of the Chinese government. William Stanton, former director of AIT and current director of Taiwan’s National Tsinghua University’s Center for Asia Policy, said in 2013 that cases of Chinese espionage against Taiwan “have been harmful not only because of the potential loss of unknown quantities of classified information, but also because their success and frequency serves to undermine U.S. confidence in security cooperation with Taiwan.” However, while recognizing Beijing’s intelligence successes, David Major, former director of counterintelligence, intelligence, and security programs at the National Security Council, testified to the Com-mission in 2016 that “if the [United States] begins to slow down or stop the transfer of needed technology and information with Taiwan for fear of espionage loss then the PRC wins and Taiwan is doomed.”

北京藉以對付台灣的激進情報活動不僅威脅台灣的安全，也危及台灣使用的美國軍事情報與設備。2018年6月，台灣檢察機關以涉嫌為中國政府自台灣現役和退役軍人手中獲取機密資料為由，起訴台灣新黨發言人及該黨青年委員會兩名主管。 AIT前任處長，台灣國立清華大學亞洲政策中心現任主任司徒文（William Stanton）於2013年表示，數起中國藉以對付台灣的間諜活動「是有害的，不僅因為可能丟失了未知數量的機密訊息，而且因為間諜活動的頻繁程度以及成功，也打擊了美國對於台灣在安全合作上的信心。」然而，在承認北京情報工作成功的同時，美國國家安全會議反情報、情報和安全項目（counterintelligence, intelligence, and security programs at the National Security Council）前主任大衛·梅傑（David Major）於2016年向委員會作證，「如果[美國]因為擔心間諜活動造成損失，開始減緩或停止向台灣轉移所需的技術和訊息，那麼中共便將取得勝利，台灣在劫難逃。」

> 譯註：譯文部分內容參考、摘自美國之音粵語網黃耀毅〈美國前外交官批評台灣國防不足〉2013年3月19日）
> （譯註：司徒文擔任清華大學亞洲政策中心主任，任職時間為2013年7月-2017年8月。資料來源：清華大學亞洲政策中心網頁。

In the face of the Chinese espionage threat, the Taiwan government and military have implemented measures to impede Chinese intelligence activities. Mr. Mattis wrote in 2014 that “Taiwan has made several substantial efforts to improve security—including trip reporting and routine polygraphs for personnel with sensitive access as well as boosting its counterintelligence staff—and serious offenders can ... receive heavy prison sentences.” The Taiwan government has recently begun requiring government personnel to receive government approval before transiting through an airport in China. Taiwan civil servants are already required to obtain approval before traveling to China.

面對中國間諜活動的威脅，台灣政府和軍方已採取措施阻止中國的情報活動。馬提斯先生於2014年寫道，「台灣已經做出了一些實質努力來改善安全──對可取覽敏感資料的員工要求旅行報告並實施例行儀器測謊，同時也增加反間諜工作人員──情節重大的罪犯會……被判處嚴厲的監禁。台灣政府最近開始要求政府員工在過境中國機場之前需獲得政府許可。台灣公務員之前已被要求，在前往中國之前需獲得許可。

## Taiwan Takes Steps to Enhance Security

台灣採取措施加強安全

Faced with a growing threat from PLA modernization and Beijing’s intensifying political warfare activities, Taipei has responded by taking a number of significant new steps to improve its ability to defend against a Chinese military attack and other threatening activities. Taiwan’s recent efforts have included the following:

在解放軍現代化與北京日益加劇的政戰活動的威脅下，台北採取了一系列重大新措施，以提高抵禦中國軍事攻擊和其他威脅活動的能力。台灣最近的努力包括以下內容：

Developing asymmetric capabilities and a new defense concept:

發展不對稱戰力和新的防衛構想：

Taipei marked a fundamental departure from its previous defense strategies with the announcement of a new Overall Defense Concept, which operationalizes Taiwan’s broader defense strategy, now described as “resolute defense, multi-layered deterrence.”* Unveiled in December 2017, the new concept seeks to emphasize the development of asymmetric capabilities and tactics to capitalize on Taiwan’s defensive advantages, enhance resilience, and exploit the weaknesses of the PLA. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense, the characteristics of the equipment it is seeking to support its new approach are “mobility, stealth, fast speed, low cost, abundance, minimum damage, and high effectiveness.” The new strategy focuses on three areas: (1) preservation of warfighting capability, (2) pursuing decisive victory in the littoral area, and (3) annihilating the enemy on the beach. Notably, the Taiwan military incorporated the concept into this year’s Han Kuang exercise, Taiwan’s most important annual military exercise. During the exercise, Taiwan integrated a number of new components, including Taiwan Coast Guard ships exercising together with the Taiwan Navy, embedding personnel from Taiwan technology companies in Taiwan Army units to operate unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and target acquisition, incorporating civilian construction personnel and equipment into runway repair, and using civilian telecommunication technology to maintain command and control in the face of attacks. In July 2018, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced plans to introduce month-long training exercises involving all the military services once per quarter, which would mark an increase in training.

台北背離先前的防衛戰略，宣布新的整體防衛構想，實施台灣更廣大的防衛戰略，現在稱為「防衛固守，重層嚇阻。」此戰略於2017年12月公佈¹，新構想旨在強調發展不對稱戰力與戰術，以借助台灣的防禦優勢、增強戰力恢復速度和利用解放軍的弱點。根據台灣國防部的說法，用來支持新戰略的裝備特點是「機動、隱匿、快速、價廉、量多、損小、效高。」新戰略側重於三個方面： （1）戰力防護，（2）濱海決勝，（3）灘岸殲敵。值得注意的是，台灣軍方將這一構想納入今年台灣最重要的年度軍事演習──漢光演習。演習期間，台灣整合許多新組件，包括與台灣海軍共同執行操演的台灣海巡署艦艇，以及將台灣科技公司的人員納入台灣陸軍（的軍勤編組），操作無人機以進行監視和目標標定，並將民間營造廠員工與設備納入（軍編）進入跑道搶修，以及在面對攻擊情況下，運用民營（電信公司的）電信技術維持指揮與控制（的暢通）。2018年7月，台灣國防部宣布（announced ）計劃每季開展一次涉及所有軍事人員的訓練演習，為期一個月，這將標誌著訓練的增加。

> ¹譯註：《中華民國106年國防報告書》，資料來源：中華民國國防部網站。
> 譯註：括弧內文字為譯者所加。
> 譯註：譯文參考國防部發布〈「國軍107年『漢光34 號演習』規劃」新聞參考資料〉，107年4月24日。資料來源：同上。
> 譯註：譯文參考中央社記者游凱翔〈反制共軍文攻武嚇 國軍108年起擬恢復戰備月〉2018/07/29

Increasing defense spending: In August 2018, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan submitted a budget to the Taiwan legislature that included an increase of approximately 4.3 percent for the defense budget. To support implementation of the new defense concept, the 2019 budget includes a request to fund the acquisition of small fast-attack missile craft, which provide Taiwan with an important defensive advantage against a PLA naval blockade or amphibious assault. Nevertheless, China’s large defense expenditures are a major challenge for Taiwan, and China’s official defense budget has now ballooned to a size about 15 times Taiwan’s. Even with robust spending, Taiwan cannot match China’s defense budget, which places an even greater premium on Taiwan’s development of asymmetric and effective defensive capabilities.

增加國防開支：2018年8月，台灣行政院向台灣立法院提交預算，其中包括國防預算增加約4.3％。為了支持新防衛構想的實施，2019年的預算包括請求為籌建微型飛彈突擊艇提供資金，該裝備為台灣提供重要防衛優勢以抵禦解放軍的海上封鎖或兩棲攻擊。儘管如此，中國龐大的國防支出對台灣是重大挑戰，中國的官方國防預算現已膨脹到台灣的15倍左右。即使有強勁的支出，台灣也無法與中國的國防預算相提並論，後者甚至更加重視台灣不對稱與有效防衛戰力的發展。

> 譯註：譯文參考中央社記者游凱翔〈建構不對稱戰力 海軍編316億造微型飛彈突擊艇〉，2018/08/31

Elevating Taiwan’s defense industry: A key pillar of the Tsai Administration’s defense policy has been enhancing the government’s support for Taiwan’s defense industry with a focus on aerospace, shipbuilding, and cybersecurity. In May 2018, the Taiwan Defense Industry Development Association co-hosted the Taiwan-United States Defense Business Forum with the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council in Taiwan to explore opportunities for collaboration between Taiwan and U.S. defense companies.

提升台灣國防工業：蔡政府國防政策的關鍵支柱是加強政府支持台灣國防工業，著重在航空航天、造船和網絡安全。2018年5月，台灣國防產業發展協會與美台商業協會（U.S.-Taiwan Business Council）共同在台灣舉辦美台國防產業論壇，探討台美國防產業合作的機會。

Countering Beijing’s interference and disinformation: In September 2018, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau publicly announced it had established a Big Data and Public Opinion Task Force in 2015 in concert with Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice to monitor the spread of disinformation on social media, especially false news stories from the PRC that aim to manipulate public opinion in Taiwan. Another measure Taipei has taken to counter PRC interference is to create webpages on government websites dedicated to dispelling rumors and countering false information. Taipei is also conducting investigations of ties between Beijing and groups in Taiwan. In September 2017, the Taiwan government announced it was launching an investigation into alleged manipulation of organized crime groups in Taiwan by Beijing.

打擊北京的干涉與假訊息：2018年9月，台灣的國家安全局公開宣布，與台灣法務部合作，已於2015年成立了大數據輿情小組，以監控社交媒體上假訊息的傳播，尤其是來自中國的虛假新聞報導旨在操縱台灣的輿論。為打擊中國干涉，台北採取的另一項措施是，在政府網站上製作專門用於化解謠言和打擊假訊息的網頁。台北也在調查北京與台灣團體之間的聯繫。 2017年9月，台灣政府宣布對北京涉嫌操控台灣組織犯罪集團的事件展開調查。

> 譯註：譯文參考中央社記者劉麗榮〈傳加強蒐報訊息 國安局：掌握輿情供政府參考〉2018/09/14

## Taiwan Military Modernization

台灣軍事現代化

Taiwan has sought to enhance its military capabilities as part of its evolving defense strategy to defeat a PLA campaign targeting the island. Advanced antiship cruise missiles, air defense missiles, and fast attack and stealthy catamaran-style patrol ships are among the newest platforms and weapons systems Taiwan has produced. Some of the developments in Taiwan’s procurement of domestic military equipment in 2018 include the following:

作為逐步發展的防衛戰略的一部分，台灣企圖增強軍事戰力以擊敗解放軍的對台戰役。先進的反艦巡弋飛彈（ antiship cruise missiles）、防空飛彈、匿蹤快速攻擊雙船體巡邏艦是台灣建造的最新平台和武器系統。台灣2018年採購國內軍事裝備的一些發展包括：

• Missile corvette: Taiwan is accelerating the production of the TUO CHIANG class of catamaran-style missile corvettes, the first of which was commissioned in March 2015. Taiwan’s Lung Teh Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., will build a total of 12 of these ships. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense recently announced that 8 of the remaining 11 will be completed by 2025 rather than the original target window of 2030 to 2032. The corvette has a reduced radar cross section, longer endurance, and better sea-keeping ability than Taiwan’s other patrol ships. The first corvette is equipped with antiship cruise missiles, two torpedo tubes, and a towed sonar array. These features will enhance the lethality of Taiwan’s anti-surface and antisubmarine forces in a potential cross-Strait conflict.

•飛彈巡邏艦：台灣正在加速建造沱江級雙船體飛彈巡邏艦，其中第一艘於2015年3月投入服役。台灣的龍德造船工業股份有限公司（Lung Teh Shipbuilding Co., Ltd.）將總共建造12艘沱江級巡邏艦。台灣國防部最近宣布，其餘11艘中的8艘將於2025年完成，而非原先預計的2030年至2032年。該巡邏艦的雷達截面積（radar cross section）降低，續航能力更強，保海戰力比台灣其他巡邏艦艇更佳。第一艘巡邏艦配備反艦巡弋飛彈、兩座魚雷發射管和一具拖曳陣列聲納。這些裝備將增強台灣反水面和反潛部隊於潛在的兩岸衝突中的殺傷力。

• Submarines: Taipei is moving forward with a plan to produce diesel-electric submarines, but progress is slow. Taiwan is seeking foreign assistance with the supply of certain components. * In April 2018, Taiwan’s Presidential Office confirmed that the State Department granted a marketing license allowing U.S. companies to conduct commercial briefings for entities involved in Taiwan’s submarine program. Taiwan’s CSBC Corporation, which will build the submarines, estimates the first boat will enter the water in 2024. Of Taiwan’s four submarines, two are operational ZWAARDVIS class submarines (which were built by Dutch company RDM) and two are decommissioned U.S. Navy GUPPY class submarines used only for training.

•潛艇：台北正在計劃建造柴電潛艇，但進展緩慢。對於特定零件的供應，台灣正在尋求國外的協助。2018年4月，台灣總統府（Taiwan’s Presidential Office）確認（美國）國務院授予行銷許可證，允許美國公司為與台灣潛艇計劃有關的實體（entities）進行商業簡報。計劃建造潛艇的台灣國際造船公司（CSBC Corporation）估計，第一艘潛艦將於2024年下水。台灣的四艘潛艇中，有兩艘是劍魚級潛艦（ZWAARDVIS class submarines ）（由荷蘭RDM公司建造），另外兩艘是退役的美國海軍茄比級潛艦（GUPPY class submarines ），僅用於培訓。

• Advanced jet trainer: Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation began assembly of a new advanced jet trainer for the Taiwan Air Force in June 2018, with the completion of a prototype scheduled for 2019. The new trainers will replace Taiwan’s aging AT-3 and F-5 E/F aircraft.

•先進的噴射教練機：台灣的漢翔航空工業股份有限公司（Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation）於2018年6月開始為台灣空軍組裝新式先進噴射教練機，計劃於2019年完成原型。新式教練機將取代台灣老化的AT-3和F-5E/F飛機。

Taiwan also seeks to enhance its military capabilities through the procurement of military platforms and weapons systems from overseas. Recent developments in Taiwan’s military procurement from the United States include the following:

台灣還試圖從海外採購軍事平台和武器系統來增強其軍事戰力。台灣向美國軍事採購的最新進展包括：

• F-16 fighter upgrade: Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation, with U.S. assistance, is upgrading Taiwan’s approximately 140 F-16 A/B fighter aircraft and is scheduled to complete work on the first four aircraft in 2018. The most important part of the upgrade is the installation of active electronically scanned array scalable agile beam radar made by Northrop Grumman. This radar, which is derived from the radar used by the U.S. F-22 and F-35 fighters, will enable Taiwan’s F-16s to detect China’s advanced combat aircraft at a greater range.

•F-16戰機升級：台灣的漢翔航空工業股份有限公司在美國協助下，正在升級台灣大約140架F-16A/B型戰機，計劃於2018年完成前四架飛機的工作。最重要的升級部分是安裝由諾斯洛普·格魯曼公司（Northrop Grumman）製造的主動電子掃描陣列可變敏捷波束雷達（active electronically scanned array scalable agile beam radar）。這是來自美國F-22和F-35戰機使用的雷達，將使台灣的F-16能夠在更大範圍內探測中國的先進戰機。

• Apache attack helicopters: With the commissioning into service of the second of two squadrons in July 2018, all of Taiwan’s 29 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters are now fully operational. Taiwan acquired 30 of these helicopters, which are made by Boeing, but one was destroyed in a crash during training. The AH-64Es can simultaneously track 128 targets and identify the 16 most dangerous, and are each equipped with 16 Hellfire missiles. They would support an effort to counter a PLA invasion force that was approaching or had already landed on Taiwan territory.

•阿帕契攻擊直升機：隨著2018年7月第二支阿帕契攻擊直升機作戰隊成軍，台灣所有29架AH-64E阿帕契攻擊直升機現已全面投入運作。台灣購入30架由波音公司製造的直升機，但其中一架於訓練期間墜毀。阿帕契AH-64E可以同時跟踪128個目標，並識別出最危險的16個目標，每架阿帕契AH-64E都裝備有16枚地獄火飛彈。這些直升機將用來協助打擊正在接近或已經登陸台灣領土的解放軍入侵部隊。

• Anti-tank missiles: In 2018, the U.S. and Taiwan governments agreed on the sale of 460 tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireless guided anti-tank missiles to Taiwan. With a range of 2.8 miles, these missiles would help the Taiwan Army defend against PLA hovercraft, amphibious landing vehicles, tanks, and mechanized infantry at a distance, broadening the use of these weapons from their standard deployment against tanks.

•反坦克飛彈：2018年，美國和台灣政府簽署同意向台灣出售460枚管體發射、光學跟踪、無線導引型反坦克飛彈（ tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireless guided anti-tank missiles）。這些飛彈的射程為2.8英里¹，可幫助台灣軍隊遠距離防禦解放軍氣墊船、兩棲登陸車、坦克和機械化步兵，從而擴大反坦克標準部署武器的發揮。

> ¹譯註：4.5公里。

## U.S.-Taiwan Security Cooperation

美台安全合作

U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation includes arms sales, training, advising, exchanges, and equipment maintenance. This partnership helps Taiwan enhance its ability to deter and, if necessary, defend against an attack from the Chinese military. Among other areas of training, the United States provides training to Taiwan military personnel with a broad range of military specialties, such as fighter pilots, special operations personnel, and rapid runway repair personnel. In addition, Taiwan military personnel undergo education and training at U.S. military institutions. Moreover, between 2008 and 2015, Taiwan was the 10th largest importer of U.S. military equipment. In September, the State Department approved a potential sale to Taiwan of spare parts for various military aircraft and other related program and logistics support elements estimated to cost $330 million. The notification to Congress of a single foreign military sales order appears to be a policy shift from the practice of “bundling” multiple notifications of potential arms sales to Taiwan to be considered and announced as a single “arms package” decision. The practice of bundling has been criticized as delaying needed sales and complicating Taiwan’s defense budget planning cycles. Addressing individual sales decisions as they arise is more in line with how the United States treats its other foreign security cooperation partners.

美台安全合作包括軍售、培訓、諮詢、交流和設備維護。這種夥伴關係有助於台灣加強威懾戰力，並在必要時防禦來自中國軍方的攻擊。在其他培訓領域，美國向台灣軍事人員提供廣泛的軍事專業培訓，如戰機飛行員、特種作戰人員和機場跑道搶修人員。台灣軍人也在美軍機構接受教育和培訓。此外，2008年至2015年期間，台灣是美國第10大軍事裝備進口國。 9月，國務院批准可能對台灣出售各種軍用飛機及其他相關計劃與後勤支援元件的備用零件，估計價值3.3億美元¹。

向國會發出單一外國軍售訂單的提議顯示政策的轉變，從「捆綁」多個潛在對台軍售案的提議，轉變為將其認為是單一「包裹式軍售」的決定並予以宣布。捆綁的做法被批評為推遲所需的銷售，並使台灣的國防預算規劃週期復雜化。個案式處理軍售的決定更符合美國對待其他外國安全合作夥伴的方式。

> ¹譯註：約新台幣102億元。
> 參考資料：中央社記者鄭崇生〈美宣布對台軍售3.3億美元 著重台灣空防升級〉2018/09/25
> 參考資料：中央社記者游凱翔〈學者：美對台軍售改個案審查 軍事交流朝正規化〉2018/09/25

The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 includes several provisions related to U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation, including directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of Taiwan’s military forces and providing related recommendations. The act also includes a sense of Congress on various aspects of security cooperation, such as arms sales, training and exercises, high-level exchanges, and a potential visit of a U.S. hospital ship to Taiwan. Taiwan’s Premier William Lai said he would welcome a potential joint exercise between the U.S. and Taiwan militaries

〈2019年財政年度約翰·麥凱恩國防授權法〉包括與美台安全合作有關的若干條款，包括指示國防部長對台灣軍隊進行評估並提出相關建議。該法案還包括國會對安全合作的各個方面的意見，如軍售、培訓和演習、高層交流以及美國醫療船可能前往台灣訪問。台灣行政院長賴清德表示，他歡迎美國和台灣軍方之間可能進行的聯合演習。

> 參考資料：中央社記者江今葉〈美參院通過國防授權法 支持強化台灣軍力〉2018/08/02
> 參考資料：中央社記者顧荃〈台灣若加入美國軍演 賴揆：有利周邊聯合防衛〉2018/08/03
> 參考資料：中央社記者鄭崇生〈川普簽了 美國防授權法生效〉2018/08/14
> （參考資料：萊茵〈以後美軍「罩」台灣？美 2019 財年《國防授權法》與台相關條文全文中譯，兼論其「意義」〉，來源：「換日線 Crossing」網站。

Military-to-military contacts between the United States and Taiwan are robust, although in general, State Department practice has limited visitors to Taiwan to midor lower-level U.S. personnel, and U.S. military observer delegations (such as those attending the Han Kuang exercise) are led by a retired general or flag officer. The practice of limiting the highest rank of U.S. military personnel who can visit Taiwan to colonels and U.S. Navy captains (O6 level) prevents the most senior U.S. officers from gaining firsthand knowledge of the Taiwan military and the operational environment in a potential cross-Strait conflict. Furthermore, the U.S. government has not invited Taiwan to the major U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific exercise, Red Flag air-to-air combat training exercise, or the cybersecurity exercise Cyber Storm.

美國和台灣之間的軍事聯繫是強而有力的，儘管國務院通常將前往台灣的參訪者限制在中或低級別的美方職員，以及由一位退役的將領或海軍將級軍官所率領的美國軍事觀察代表團（例如參觀漢光演習的人員）。將能夠訪問台灣的美國軍人最高級別限制在陸軍上校和美國海軍上尉（O6級別）的做法，阻止美國最高級軍官於潛在的兩岸衝突中獲得台灣軍方和作戰環境的第一手資料。此外，美國政府沒有邀請台灣參加由美國主導的環太平洋軍事演習、紅旗空戰訓練演習或網絡安全演習「網路風暴（Cyber Storm）」。

# Implications for the United States

對美國的影響

In the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Congress declared that “peace and stability in the [Western Pacific] area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States.” The Taiwan Relations Act also makes clear that “the United States’ decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” Further, the Act states that it is U.S. policy “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”

在1979年的《台灣關係法》中，國會宣布「[西太平洋]地區的和平與安定符合美國的政治、安全和經濟利益。」《台灣關係法》也明確表示「美國」 「和『中華人民共和國』建立外交關係之舉，是基於臺灣的前途將以和平方式決定這一期望。」此外，該法案規定，美國的政策是「任何企圖以非和平方式來決定臺灣的前途之舉──包括使用經濟抵制及禁運手段在內，將被視為對西太平洋地區和平及安定的威脅，而為美國所嚴重關切。」

> 譯註：譯文摘自美國在台協會網站《台灣關係法》。

Since that time, the United States has encouraged the development of a multi-party democracy in Taiwan and continued a policy of providing defensive arms and services to Taiwan. The credibility of U.S. foreign policy and security commitments is tied in part to U.S. support for Taiwan, especially as viewed by U.S. allies and partners throughout the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, Taiwan’s continued existence as a friendly, democratic partner is of critical geostrategic importance to the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and other countries in the region. James R. Holmes, J.C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that if China were to control Taiwan it

從那時起，美國一直鼓勵台灣發展多黨民主政治，並繼續奉行向台灣提供防禦性武器與服務的政策。美國外交政策和安全承諾的可靠程度，與美國對台灣的支持有關，尤其是美國在整個印度─太平洋地區的盟友與合作夥伴都看在眼裡。此外，台灣繼續作為一個友好、民主的伙伴，對美國、日本、菲律賓和該地區其他國家具有重要的地緣戰略意義。美國海軍戰爭學院J.C.威利海洋戰略教授席位詹姆斯·R·霍姆斯（James R. Holmes）寫道，如果中國控制台灣，

*would extend the Chinese reach eastward into the Western Pacific; turn the southern flanks of Japan and South Korea, giving Beijing newfound geostrategic leverage; enable [PLA Navy] warships to command the northern rim of the South China Sea and also project power to the Luzon Strait and elsewhere in the northern reaches of that expanse.*

*將使中國向東擴張至西太平洋，繞過日本和韓國的南側，給北京帶來了新的地緣戰略槓桿（geostrategic leverage）；解放軍海軍戰艦能夠控扼南海的北緣，並向呂宋海峽與該地區北部其他地方施加影響力。*

PLA writings attest to the importance of Taiwan to China’s broader geostrategic ambitions. The PLA’s calculations on the importance of Taiwan to China’s military posture was revealed in the seminal 2001 edition of its renowned publication, The Science of Military Strategy, which states,

解放軍的許多著作證實了台灣對中國更廣大地緣戰略之野心的重要性。台灣對中國軍事態勢之重要性的計算，顯示在其著名出版物2001年版的《軍事戰略學（The Science of Military Strategy）》中，

If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only our natural maritime defense system would lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to outside forces, but also a large area of water territory would fall into the hands of others. [...] What’s more, our line of foreign trade and transportation which is vital to China’s opening up and economic development will be exposed to the surveillance and threats of separatists and enemy forces and China will forever be locked to the west side of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific.

*假如台灣與大陸疏遠，不僅我們的天然海上防禦體系會失去深度，以致向外部勢力敞開海上大門，而且一個領海和海洋自然資源豐富的廣袤地區將落入他人之手。……對中國的開放和經濟發展來說至關重要的外貿和運輸航線將暴露在分離主義分子和敵軍的監視和威脅之下，中國將永遠被封鎖在西太平洋第一島鏈以西的地方。*

> 譯註：譯文取自網路。《The Science of Military Strategy》編著者為PENG GUANGQIAN AND YAO YOUZHI ，對應的中文是彭光謙，姚有志。

The PLA, as well as China’s highest-ranking civilian leaders, almost certainly continue to maintain this view.

毫無疑問，解放軍以及中國最高級別的文職領導人會繼續保持這種看法。

In sum, the threat China’s military modernization poses to Taiwan’s continued existence as a vibrant democracy and important U.S. security and economic partner presents fundamental challenges not only to the success of democracy in the Indo-Pacific, but to the security of U.S. treaty allies throughout the region. The steady improvements in China’s military capabilities enhance Beijing’s ability to use the threat of military force to coerce Taipei into making political concessions. The shift in the military balance underscores the importance of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S.-Taiwan military exchanges, and other areas of security cooperation.

總而言之，中國的軍事現代化威脅了台灣的存在，尤其是繼續作為一個充滿活力的民主國家與重要的美國安全和經濟夥伴，這不僅對印度─太平洋地區民主制度的成功，也對美國在該地區盟友的安全帶來了根本性的挑戰。中國軍事能力的穩步提升讓北京更能利用武力威脅迫使台北做出政治讓步。軍事平衡的轉變凸顯了美國對台軍售、美台軍事交流以及其他安全合作領域的重要性。

In the economic realm, Taiwan has experienced increased economic growth and gradual improvements in employment and wages while tackling difficult issues such as labor standards and pension reforms. However, Taiwan’s economy remains overly reliant on China, making it susceptible to economic intimidation and pressure campaigns carried out by the Chinese government. Taiwan businesses operating in China also continue to be faced with the ever-present threat of retaliation by Beijing if they do not explicitly endorse the “1992 Consensus.”

在經濟領域，台灣經歷了經濟成長、就業與薪資的逐步改善，同時解決了勞動基準和退休金改革等難題。然而，台灣經濟仍然過度依賴中國，使其容易遭受中國政府經濟恫嚇與施壓的作戰。如果在中國經營的台灣企業沒有明確支持「92共識」，那麼將面臨北京不斷發出的報復威脅。

To address these vulnerabilities, Taipei has worked to diversify its trade and investment ties away from Beijing through the New Southbound Policy and other domestic economic initiatives. Moreover, the United States and Taiwan continue to cooperate on mutually beneficial economic projects—particularly in advanced technology industries like AI—through corporate partnerships and joint research centers. Taiwan is the United States’ eleventh-largest trading partner, while the United States is Taiwan’s second-largest trade partner, signaling the enduring importance of U.S.-Taiwan economic ties. Taiwan’s government continues to recognize the importance of furthering Taiwan’s economic relationship with the United States, as increased trade and investment offer benefits both for Taiwan’s development and U.S. economic interests.

為解決這些弱點，台北致力於新南向政策和其他國內經濟措施，以避免其貿易和投資聯繫過度依賴北京。此外，通過企業合作夥伴關係和聯合研究中心，美國和台灣繼續就互利經濟項目開展合作──特別是在人工智慧等先進技術產業。台灣是美國的第十一大貿易夥伴，而美國是台灣的第二大貿易夥伴，標誌著美台經濟聯繫的重要性。台灣政府持續認識到促進台灣與美國經濟關係的重要性，因為增加貿易和投資可以為台灣的發展和美國的經濟利益帶來好處。

Working with Taiwan to solve international problems and supporting Taiwan’s participation in the international community benefits the United States in many ways. Taiwan’s robust civil society and technology sector and its vast expertise and experience in areas such as disaster response and relief make it a strong partner for the United States. Taiwan also has much to contribute in other areas, such as aviation safety, combating the spread of infectious diseases, environmental protection, and law enforcement and fighting transnational crime. Furthermore, Taiwan’s inability to access information from international organizations such as the World Health Organization, INTERPOL, and the International Civil Aviation Organization creates global health, security, and aviation safety risks.

與台灣合作解決國際問題，支持台灣參與國際社會，在很多方面使美國受益。台灣有健全的民間社會、技術部門、在災害應對和救援等領域豐富的專業知識和經驗，使台灣成為美國的強大合作夥伴。台灣在航空安全、防治傳染病蔓延、環境保護、執法、打擊跨國犯罪等領域，也有重大貢獻。此外，台灣無法獲取世界衛生組織，國際刑警組織和國際民用航空組織等國際組織的訊息，造成了國際衛生、安全和航空安全的風險。

Taiwan has long contended with Beijing’s efforts to influence its policies, and is the target of an intensifying political warfare campaign in an attempt by Beijing to undermine its democracy. The United States and the rest of the world have much to learn from Taiwan about CCP influence and interference in democracies. Finally, Taiwan, with its robust democracy and free-market economy, is a model for other countries and a natural partner for the United States in its free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. A vibrant Taiwan and a strong, multi-dimensional U.S.-Taiwan partnership are of intrinsic value to the United States.

長期以來，台灣一直在抗拒北京對其政治上的影響，同時台灣也是北京政治作戰的目標。北京採取愈來愈激烈的政治作戰以破壞台灣的民主政體。從中共對台灣民主的影響與干涉之中，美國與世界其他國家有許多得以借鏡之處。最後要提到的是，具備穩健民主和自由市場經濟的台灣是其他國家的榜樣，也自然是美國自由開放的印太戰略的夥伴。充滿活力的台灣和穩固的、多維度的美台夥伴關係，對美國具有內在價值。