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# System prepended metadata

title: 6841 f11a Week 5

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# 6841 f11a Week 5

- nsa crypto
- bits of security


## Case Study 
That government / government agencies / law enforcement / intelligence agencies should be allowed to collect and have access to all data and communications of everyone in Australia, for good purposes.

For:  Yes, they should.

Against: No, they shouldn't

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### Group 1
Judge:
- Hao Cheong
- Eric

In favour (yes, collect info):
- Victor
- Abdul

Against (no, dont collect info):
- Mitchell Wallace
- Leighton

Points in favour:
- Improves efficiency in day to day things
- Detect criminals/terrorists
- Find people, either abducted or hiding
- Rebuttals?
    - The Australian Metadata Retention Laws say that agencies that need to access telecommunications data can do so to perform their functions
    - Data from suspected people are allowed to be revealed for the purposes of preventing harm and terrorism
    - Benefits outweigh the problems
    - 


Points against:
- Violation of article 12 in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- All that data could be used nefariously
- Don't need all communications to catch terrorists and find missing people

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### Group 2
Judge:
- Hayley G
- Shuxian

In favour:
- Matthew Su
- Haoming W

Against:
- Matt Li
- Sam S

Points in favour:
- To maintain safety, anti-terrorism
    - e.g. 329 people died on NSW road last year
    - Data collection allows for better safety measures and prevention of incidents
- Convenience
    - e.g. contactless payment using facial recognition
    - Risks are necessary to advance technology
- Improve facial recognition technology with more analysis, so less oversights

Summary
- National safety, monitor behaviour, predict behaviour
- Congestion control brings convenience
    - Quicker flow of traffic through facial recognition
    - Save time
- Less chance of identity theft
- Benefit of medical records
    - Convenient access of medical records
    - Health risk prediction
    - Covid tracking

Points against
- Collection of all data is a breach of human rights
    - Dignity and privacy
- Effectiveness of mass surveillance is in question
    - Accuracy of facial recognition, 98% error rate in one deployment
    - Data is fallible
    - For example, 2451/2685 errors by South Wales Police systems between May 2017 and March 2018 using a facial recognition system.
- Relies on trust in authority
    - Undefined parameters of use
    - Not enough oversight (checks and balances)
    - Potential for incompetence
    - Potential for abuse
    - No way of knowing how it'll be used in the future
    - Data leaks

Summary
- Opposing team didn't demostrate the necessity for collection of *ALL* data
    - ALL data collection goes too far
- Collection ALL data is too big of a risk
    - Risk of stolen data (Type I/II errors)
- Inordinate trust in authority
    - Passing on of data, lack of distruction
- Convenience is not worth the risk as stated by opposing team
- Is it worth collecting new data when current standards are effective
