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# System prepended metadata

title: Supreme Court Complaint

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Emergency Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief to Enforce Constitutional Disqualification under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment

or

Emergency Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief to Enforce Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment Against Presidential Ineligibility Due to Engagement in Insurrection

or

Emergency Complaint to Enforce Disqualification Under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment

NOTE: I think we need to stregthen the arguement against the political question doctrine by demonstrating that the issues at hand is meant for judicial review. They must have gotten around this in BUSH V Gore?


**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR \[JURISDICTION\]**

**\[??\], Plaintiff**  
v.  
**Donald J. Trump, in His Capacity as President-Elect, The Federal Election Commission, The Archivist of the United States, and \[Selected Secretaries of State\], Defendants.**

**COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**


## COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

### INTRODUCTION

In a democracy founded on the rule of law, the sanctity of our elections depends on presenting the people with candidates who meet the constitutional standards required to hold office. When the integrity of this process is compromised—when an ineligible candidate is permitted to appear on the ballot—the will of the electorate, while expressed, is undermined by the very act of presenting a choice that violates the supreme law of the land.

This action is brought to uphold Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any individual who has engaged in insurrection from holding public office. The candidacy of Donald J. Trump, culminating in his appearance on the ballot, represents a direct affront to this constitutional safeguard. His actions on and leading up to January 6, 2021, constitute "engagement in insurrection" under the plain terms of the Constitution.

The people have spoken, but their voice was directed toward a choice that should never have been offered—a candidate constitutionally disqualified from seeking the office. This Court is now called upon to uphold the Constitution, ensuring that no individual who violates its terms may benefit from the erosion of its protections. To do otherwise would be to permit the undermining of the rule of law and the principles of democracy themselves.

It is not out of partisanship, but a commitment to the rule of law, that we ask this Court to affirm the ineligibility of Donald J. Trump under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment and to safeguard the constitutional principles that protect our Republic.


The Plaintiffs, are U.S. citizens and registered voters. They bring this action to prevent the certification and inauguration of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 3 prohibits individuals who have “engaged in insurrection” against the United States after taking an oath to support the Constitution from holding federal office. This provision is self-executing and mandates judicial interpretation and enforcement where necessary to protect the office and uphold the Constitution.

Both the Colorado Supreme Court and Congress have established sufficient factual and legal grounds that Donald J. Trump’s actions on January 6, 2021, constitute “engagement in insurrection” under Section 3, rendering him ineligible for federal office. The Colorado Supreme Court’s findings, alongside other publicly available evidence, affirm the need for judicial intervention to prevent an individual constitutionally barred from holding office from assuming the presidency.

This Complaint seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief. Declaratory relief is sought to affirm Trump’s disqualification under Section 3. Injunctive relief is sought to prevent federal and state officials from taking actions that would allow Trump’s assumption of office, including certifying his election or placing him on state ballots.


### PARTIES
Plaintiff: [??], a registered voter with an individual stake in the lawful administration of the presidential election process, which would be violated by the inauguration of a disqualified candidate.

**Defendants**

1.  **Donald J. Trump**
    
    -   **Capacity**: Named in his capacity as President-Elect of the United States.
    -   **Reason**: Defendant Donald J. Trump is the subject of this action because his eligibility to hold federal office is challenged under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. His actions on January 6, 2021, constitute “engagement in insurrection,” rendering him ineligible to assume the office of President.

2.  **The Federal Election Commission (FEC)**
    
    -   **Capacity**: Named in its capacity as the federal agency responsible for overseeing compliance with federal election laws.
    -   **Reason**: The FEC oversees the federal election process and has a statutory obligation to ensure the integrity and constitutionality of the election results. Injunctive relief is sought to prevent the FEC from taking any steps that facilitate or validate the certification of Donald J. Trump as President if he is constitutionally ineligible.

3.  **The Archivist of the United States**
    
    -   **Capacity**: Named in their official capacity as the official responsible for receiving and certifying the results of the Electoral College under the Electoral Count Act.
    -   **Reason**: The Archivist plays an essential administrative role in processing and certifying electoral votes. Injunctive relief is sought to prevent the Archivist from certifying any electoral votes cast for Donald J. Trump in violation of the Constitution.

4.  **The Secretary of State of Colorado, Jena Griswold**
    
    -   **Capacity**: Named in her official capacity as the Secretary of State of Colorado.
    -   **Reason**: Colorado has previously addressed the issue of Trump’s eligibility under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Secretary of State is responsible for certifying the state’s electoral votes in accordance with constitutional requirements.

5.  **The Secretary of State of Michigan, Jocelyn Benson**
    
    -   **Capacity**: Named in her official capacity as the Secretary of State of Michigan.
    -   **Reason**: The Secretary of State of Michigan is responsible for certifying the state’s electoral votes and ensuring compliance with constitutional requirements for federal officeholders.

6.  **The Secretary of State of Georgia, Brad Raffensperger**
    
    -   **Capacity**: Named in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of Georgia.
    -   **Reason**: The Secretary of State of Georgia oversees the certification of electoral votes and is obligated to ensure compliance with constitutional requirements.

7.  **The Secretary of State of Arizona, Adrian Fontes**
    
    -   **Capacity**: Named in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of Arizona.
    -   **Reason**: The Secretary of State of Arizona is responsible for certifying the state’s electoral votes in accordance with federal and constitutional law.

8.  **The Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Al Schmidt**
    
    -   **Capacity**: Named in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    -   **Reason**: The Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania oversees the certification of the state’s electoral votes and is responsible for ensuring compliance with constitutional eligibility requirements.


### JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this matter arises under the Constitution, specifically Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as the Defendants are government officials acting within their official roles and the Plaintiff’s claim arises within the jurisdiction.

### STANDING
Plaintiff has standing to bring this action as a registered voter directly affected by the potential certification and inauguration of an ineligible candidate, which would infringe upon the Plaintiff’s constitutional right to participate in a lawful election process.


### FACTUAL BACKGROUND

**The Constitutional Basis for Disqualification under Section 3**

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment states:  
> “No person shall... hold any office, civil or military, under the United States... who, having previously taken an oath... to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.”

This provision was designed to ensure that individuals who actively undermine the constitutional order through insurrection or rebellion are barred from holding positions of federal authority. It is self-executing, requiring no additional legislation to take effect. Judicial enforcement is central to its application. As the Supreme Court stated in *Marbury v. Madison*:  
> “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” (*Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)*).

#### Self-Executing Nature of Section 3
Courts and legal authorities have consistently affirmed that Section 3 is self-executing.  

1. **Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (C.C. Va. 1869)**:  
   > “The provision is undoubtedly self-executing; it takes effect immediately upon the happening of the contingency to which it relates.”  

2. **Attorney General Opinion (1869)**:  
   > “[T]he disability imposed by the third section of the Fourteenth Amendment operates of itself, and without further legislation, upon those who are rendered ineligible by its terms.”  

3. **Worthington v. United States, 33 F. Cas. 669 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1870)**:  
   > “[Section 3] operates as a present disability... such persons are disqualified from holding federal office without further legislative action.”  

Modern legal scholars affirm this understanding. In *Baude and Paulsen, "The Sweep and Force of Section Three,"* (2023), the authors state:  
> “The language of Section 3 is clear, direct, self-executing, and applies without need for enabling legislation. Its enforceability is a duty of the judiciary when appropriate cases arise.”

#### Application to January 6, 2021
The events of January 6, 2021, exemplify the type of conduct Section 3 was designed to prevent. Donald J. Trump’s actions, including his public encouragement of the attack on the Capitol and his attempts to subvert the constitutional process of certifying electoral votes, constitute “engagement in insurrection” under the Fourteenth Amendment.

1. **Trump’s Intent to Obstruct Certification**:  
   Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation reveals that Trump knowingly spread false claims of election fraud to undermine the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election and obstruct the certification process. According to the indictment:  
   > “The Defendant spread lies that there had been outcome-determinative fraud in the election and that he had actually won. These claims were false, and the Defendant knew that they were false.”  

2. **Trump’s Public Encouragement of the Insurrection**:  
   On January 6, 2021, Trump addressed a crowd of supporters, urging them to “fight like hell” and march to the Capitol. His rhetoric directly incited the mob to engage in violence aimed at disrupting the constitutional process.

3. **Exploitation of the Capitol Attack**:  
   During the violent breach of the Capitol by his supporters, Trump leveraged the chaos to further delay the certification process. The Special Counsel’s report states:  
   > “The Defendant and co-conspirators exploited the disruption by redoubling efforts to levy false claims of election fraud.”

4. **Failure to Act During the Attack**:  
   As the attack unfolded, Trump refused to take immediate action to stop the violence or protect Congress. The January 6 Committee found:  
   > “President Trump actively encouraged and approved of the attack while it was ongoing, delaying law enforcement responses and refusing to call off the mob.”

These actions constitute direct engagement in insurrection as defined by Section 3. Judicial enforcement is necessary to uphold the Constitution and bar individuals who violate their oath to support it from holding federal office.

#### Modern Application of Section 3
The applicability of Section 3 has been reaffirmed in contemporary contexts, including:


##### 1. *State of New Mexico ex rel. White v. Griffin* (2022)
- **Summary**: In this case, a New Mexico court disqualified Couy Griffin, an Otero County Commissioner, from holding public office under Section 3 due to his participation in the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. The court found that Griffin’s actions in organizing and inciting the breach of the Capitol constituted “engagement in insurrection.”
- **Key Ruling**:  
   > “Griffin’s actions in organizing and inciting the breach of the Capitol constitute ‘engagement in insurrection’ as prohibited by Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  
- **Relevance**: This case provides a clear, contemporary example of Section 3 being applied to an individual for their role in January 6, demonstrating its enforceability and relevance today.


##### 2. Challenges to Donald Trump’s 2024 Ballot Access (2023-2024)
- **Summary**: Legal challenges have been brought in several states to bar Donald Trump from appearing on the 2024 presidential ballot under Section 3. courts in states like Colorado and Minnesota have heard arguments about Trump’s alleged disqualification. These challenges have relied heavily on Section 3’s plain text and precedents like the Griffin case.
- **Notable Development**:  
   - In Colorado, the state court concluded that Trump’s actions on January 6 likely met the threshold for “engagement in insurrection.” While the U.S Supreme Court ultimately declined to remove him from the ballot, the case established substantial precedent regarding how Section 3 applies to federal candidates.
   - These challenges have drawn attention to Section 3 as a viable legal tool, with courts and election officials grappling with its enforcement.


##### 3. The January 6 Committee’s Referral to DOJ (2022)
- **Summary**: While not a judicial ruling, the January 6 Select Committee explicitly identified Trump’s actions as an insurrection and referred him to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for potential prosecution. The referral underscored the applicability of Section 3 to Trump’s conduct.
- **Key Finding**:  
   > “Donald Trump was at the center of a multi-part conspiracy to overturn the 2020 presidential election and block the peaceful transfer of power, culminating in an attack on Congress to obstruct the certification of electoral votes.” (Final Report, January 6 Select Committee, Dec. 2022).
- **Relevance**: The Committee’s findings provide detailed evidence supporting claims that Trump’s actions meet the constitutional standard for “engagement in insurrection.”


#### **Judicial Responsibility**

Judicial intervention is necessary to enforce Section 3 and uphold the constitutional order. Courts have a well-established history of adjudicating constitutional qualifications for office, which underscores the judiciary's central role in ensuring compliance with the Constitution. The political question doctrine does not apply to cases enforcing constitutional qualifications, as demonstrated by over two centuries of judicial precedent.

1. In *Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)*, the Supreme Court held:  
   > “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”  
   This foundational principle establishes the judiciary’s obligation to interpret and enforce constitutional provisions, including Section 3. Courts must act to ensure compliance with prohibitions like Section 3’s disqualification of insurrectionists.

2. Courts routinely enforce constitutional qualifications for office, such as age, citizenship, and residency requirements. Section 3 is no different in its enforceability. Examples include:  
   - *Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)*: The Court held that Congress could not exclude a duly elected member who met the constitutional qualifications for office, affirming that the judiciary has the authority to review such matters.  
   - *Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964)*: The Court struck down a law that discriminated against naturalized citizens, emphasizing the judiciary’s role in protecting constitutional rights and qualifications.  
   - *U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)*: The Court invalidated state-imposed qualifications for federal officeholders, underscoring that only constitutional standards may govern eligibility.  

3. Courts have directly enforced Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment in the past, affirming its self-executing nature and judicial enforceability:  
   - *Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7 (C.C.D. Va. 1869)*: The court ruled that Section 3 was self-executing and required no additional legislation to disqualify individuals who engaged in insurrection.  
   - *Worthington v. United States, 33 F. Cas. 669 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1870)*: The court held that Section 3 imposed a present disability, barring individuals from office who had engaged in insurrection, without requiring further legislative action.  
   - *United States v. Powell, 65 N.C. 709 (1871)*: The North Carolina Supreme Court applied Section 3 to disqualify a sheriff who participated in the Confederacy, demonstrating state courts’ enforcement of the provision.

4. Modern cases demonstrate the continued applicability of Section 3 and the judiciary’s role in enforcing it:  
   - *State of New Mexico ex rel. White v. Griffin (2022)*: A New Mexico court disqualified Otero County Commissioner Couy Griffin under Section 3 for his participation in the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. The court explicitly found that January 6 constituted an insurrection, reaffirming Section 3’s relevance and enforceability.  
   - *Cawthorn v. Amalfi, 35 F.4th 245 (4th Cir. 2022)*: The Fourth Circuit allowed a challenge to Representative Madison Cawthorn’s candidacy under Section 3 to proceed, rejecting the argument that the Amnesty Act of 1872 barred such claims.  
   - *Greene v. Raffensperger, 604 F. Supp. 3d 1242 (N.D. Ga. 2022)*: The court permitted a challenge to Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene’s eligibility under Section 3, reinforcing the judiciary’s role in determining disqualification claims.

5. The political question doctrine does not preclude judicial enforcement of Section 3:  
   - *Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)*: The Supreme Court rejected the argument that congressional qualifications were non-justiciable, emphasizing that courts must interpret constitutional standards.  
   - *Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)*: While the Court held that impeachment trials are non-justiciable, it explicitly distinguished cases involving constitutional qualifications, which remain firmly within the judiciary’s purview.  
   - *Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)*: The Court intervened in a highly political matter to enforce constitutional requirements for electoral processes, demonstrating that courts have a duty to adjudicate even politically charged issues.

Donald J. Trump’s actions, including his public encouragement of the attack on the Capitol, refusal to stop the violence, and exploitation of the resulting chaos, constitute “engagement in insurrection” under Section 3. Judicial enforcement is essential to ensure that individuals who violate their oath to support the Constitution are barred from assuming federal office.

Failure to act would:  
- Undermine constitutional safeguards against insurrectionists holding public office.  
- Erode public trust in the judiciary’s role as the guardian of constitutional integrity.  
- Set a dangerous precedent that constitutional qualifications can be ignored in politically sensitive cases.


#### Findings from the Colorado Supreme Court

In *Trump v. Anderson*, the Colorado Supreme Court found substantial evidence that Donald J. Trump engaged in insurrection within the meaning of Section 3. The Court’s analysis concluded that Trump’s actions in connection with the events of January 6, 2021, involved incitement, coordination, and intent to disrupt the certification of electoral votes. The Colorado Supreme Court majority opinion stated:  
> “Former President Donald J. Trump engaged in an insurrection, as defined by Section 3, through his actions leading up to and during January 6, 2021.”

This conclusion followed a detailed examination of Trump’s conduct, including his rhetoric on the day of the Capitol attack, his direction to supporters to “fight like hell,” and his role in assembling the crowd. The Court determined that these actions amounted to incitement to insurrection, violating Trump’s oath of office. 

The findings in *Trump v. Anderson* are based on rigorous procedural safeguards, including a full trial, presentation of evidence, and cross-examination. These safeguards ensure the reliability of the findings and their adherence to due process standards. As established in *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996)*, and *Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)*, federal courts can rely on state court judgments that meet such due process standards. Furthermore, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, federal courts have long deferred to state court findings that meet these criteria, as reaffirmed in *Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982)*. These precedents strongly support the federal courts’ authority to adopt the Colorado Supreme Court’s factual findings as a basis for determining Trump’s disqualification under Section 3.

However, the U.S. Supreme Court later ruled that states lack the authority to enforce Section 3 against federal candidates, placing this responsibility with Congress and federal courts. In its opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:  
> “States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offices, especially the presidency.”

Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court did not make a determination regarding whether Trump engaged in insurrection. The Court's opinion focused solely on the constitutional authority of states versus the federal government in enforcing disqualifications for federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court concluded that individual states lack the authority to determine eligibility for federal offices, such as the presidency, under this provision. This indicates that the Court did not address the substantive question of whether Trump's actions on January 6, 2021, constituted engagement in insurrection.


This distinction underscores that the factual record established by the Colorado Supreme Court remains unchallenged in terms of substance. While states may lack jurisdiction to enforce Section 3 against federal candidates, federal courts have both the authority and the obligation to act upon the findings presented.

The Colorado Supreme Court’s findings align with the judiciary’s historical role in enforcing constitutional qualifications and disqualifications for office. As *Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7 (C.C.D. Va. 1869)* established, Section 3 is self-executing and requires no additional legislation for enforcement. This precedent underscores that judicial intervention is necessary to uphold the constitutional order and prevent individuals who engage in insurrection from holding office. 

Moreover, the detailed record of Trump’s conduct, as examined in *Trump v. Anderson*, includes:  
- **Incitement of Violence**: Trump’s directive to his supporters to “fight like hell” directly incited the violence at the Capitol.  
- **Coordination of Efforts to Disrupt Certification**: Trump’s orchestration of efforts to undermine the certification process through public statements and private communications reflects a clear intent to disrupt constitutional procedures.  
- **Failure to Act During the Attack**: Trump’s refusal to intervene as violence unfolded violated his oath to protect and defend the Constitution. 

These actions collectively constitute “engagement in insurrection” under Section 3. The Supreme Court’s procedural ruling does not undermine the weight of this evidence, which provides a compelling factual basis for federal courts to adjudicate Trump’s disqualification under Section 3.

Critics may argue that no federal court has explicitly ruled that Donald J. Trump engaged in insurrection under Section 3. However, the findings of the Colorado Supreme Court, supported by rigorous procedural safeguards, and Congress’s impeachment proceedings, which were based on bipartisan and comprehensive evidence, provide an unchallenged factual record. Federal courts routinely rely on state and congressional findings that meet due process standards, as affirmed in _Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)_, and _Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982)_. The judiciary’s role is to evaluate these findings against constitutional standards, not to duplicate them unnecessarily.



#### Expanded Rationale

The Colorado Supreme Court’s findings are critical to this Court’s determination. While the U.S. Supreme Court confined its ruling to jurisdictional issues, it left the substantive question of insurrection untouched, signaling that the matter is squarely within the purview of federal courts. This Court should recognize the procedural rigor and evidentiary weight of the Colorado Supreme Court’s findings and proceed to evaluate Trump’s conduct against the constitutional standard established by Section 3.

Failure to act would not only undermine the constitutional safeguards designed to prevent insurrectionists from holding office but also erode public confidence in the judiciary’s role as the guardian of constitutional integrity. Federal courts have a duty to uphold the principles enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment and ensure that individuals who have violated their oath to support the Constitution are barred from assuming public office.


#### Congressional Findings on Insurrection and Impeachment Proceedings

The actions of Donald J. Trump on and leading up to January 6, 2021, were explicitly characterized as “insurrection” and “incitement of insurrection” by Congress during its second impeachment proceedings. The House of Representatives voted 232-197 to impeach Trump on these grounds, with bipartisan support, reflecting a legislative consensus that his conduct met the constitutional definition of insurrection under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

##### **Key Evidence Presented During Impeachment Proceedings**
The House impeachment managers provided detailed evidence that documented Trump’s actions, including:

1. **Repeated False Claims of Election Fraud**:  
   - Trump persistently propagated falsehoods about widespread voter fraud in the 2020 presidential election, undermining public trust in democratic institutions.  
   - These claims were refuted by election officials, courts, and Trump’s own Department of Justice, but he continued to spread them to incite unrest.

2. **Pressure on State Officials and the Vice President**:  
   - Trump pressured state officials, including Georgia’s Secretary of State, to “find” votes to overturn the election results.  
   - He also attempted to coerce Vice President Mike Pence into rejecting the certification of electoral votes during the joint session of Congress.

3. **Failure to Act During the Capitol Attack**:  
   - As the attack on the U.S. Capitol unfolded, Trump refused to intervene, despite having the authority and ability to call for reinforcements or address the mob directly.  
   - Instead, Trump watched the events unfold on television, failing to uphold his oath to protect and defend the Constitution.

##### Legislative Consensus on Trump’s Responsibility
Although the Senate ultimately failed to convict Trump, this was due to procedural and jurisdictional considerations, particularly questions about whether a former president can be impeached, rather than the merits of the evidence. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell acknowledged this distinction in his remarks after the acquittal:  
> “There is no question that President Trump is practically and morally responsible for provoking the events of the day.” (*167 Cong. Rec. S733-34 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2021)*).  

The bipartisan nature of the impeachment vote and the overwhelming evidence presented underscore that Congress recognized Trump’s actions as insurrectionary, even though procedural barriers prevented formal conviction. This further establishes a constitutional and factual basis for disqualification under Section 3.

##### Corroboration by the January 6 Select Committee
The House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol reinforced these findings through an exhaustive investigation. In its final report, the Committee concluded:  
> “President Trump summoned the mob, assembled the mob, and lit the flame of this attack. Everything that followed was because of him.”

The Select Committee documented extensive evidence, including:

- **Trump’s Public Statements and Private Communications**:  
  Trump urged his supporters to march on the Capitol and “fight like hell” to prevent the certification of the election results.  
  Evidence also revealed communications showing Trump’s intent to disrupt the constitutional process of certifying electoral votes.

- **Failure to Intervene During the Attack**:  
  The Committee found that Trump actively encouraged and approved of the attack while it was ongoing. He delayed law enforcement responses and refused to call off the mob, despite repeated pleas from lawmakers and advisors.

> “President Trump actively encouraged and approved of the attack while it was ongoing, delaying law enforcement responses and refusing to call off the mob.”


#### Due Process and Validity of State and Congressional Findings

Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (Article IV, Section 1) and principles of comity, this Court is justified in recognizing and deferring to the findings of the Colorado Supreme Court and Congress, as both were reached following rigorous procedural safeguards. Accepting these findings avoids duplicative litigation, ensures judicial efficiency, and prevents unnecessary conflicts across jurisdictions. The consistency of these findings, based on comprehensive evidence and testimony, underscores their reliability and applicability in this Court.

##### 1. Procedural Fairness and Due Process in Colorado Proceedings

The findings by the Colorado Supreme Court in *Trump v. Anderson* resulted from a full trial adhering to rigorous procedural safeguards, including the presentation of evidence, witness testimony, and cross-examination. Donald J. Trump was represented and had the opportunity to defend himself fully. These processes ensure that the Colorado proceedings satisfied due process standards, making them valid for recognition in federal court.

**Supporting Cases**:

1. **Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996)**:  
   > “State court judgments may have preclusive effect in federal court if parties received a full and fair opportunity to litigate.”  
   This case reinforces that federal courts can rely on state court findings if due process is met, as was the case in *Trump v. Anderson*.

2. **Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)**:  
   > “Issues fully litigated in state court proceedings should be considered conclusive in subsequent federal proceedings, provided that due process standards are met.”  
   This precedent affirms the applicability of state court findings in federal court when procedural fairness is demonstrated.

3. **Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982)**:  
   > “State judicial proceedings are presumptively valid and must be respected, provided they adhere to procedural fairness.”  
   This case underscores the principle that state findings satisfying due process are entitled to deference in federal court.


##### 2. Congressional Findings on the January 6 Insurrection

Congress’s impeachment of Donald J. Trump for “incitement of insurrection” provides further evidence of his disqualification under Section 3. The House of Representatives voted 232-197 to impeach Trump, and the impeachment managers presented detailed evidence of his actions, including his public incitement of the mob and refusal to act during the Capitol attack. Although the Senate did not convict Trump, procedural and jurisdictional issues—not the merits of the evidence—were the basis for acquittal.

**Supporting Cases**:

1. **United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)**:  
   > “The courts must apply the law, and it is emphatically the province of the judiciary to ensure compliance with constitutional standards.”  
   This case underscores the judiciary’s obligation to act when Congress presents a constitutional issue, such as insurrection under Section 3.

2. **Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)**:  
   > “Qualifications for federal officeholders are dictated by the Constitution, not political bodies, and must be interpreted by the judiciary.”  
   This case highlights the judiciary’s responsibility to enforce constitutional disqualifications, even when Congress has acted.

3. **Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (C.C.D. Va. 1869)**:  
   > “While due process is required, the judiciary has a clear duty to enforce constitutional disqualifications based on fair proceedings and evidence.”  
   This precedent aligns with the role of Congress in presenting evidence for judicial enforcement.

While some may cite the Senate’s failure to convict Donald J. Trump as undermining the validity of congressional findings, it is critical to note that this outcome was based on procedural considerations rather than an assessment of the evidence. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell explicitly stated: _“There is no question that President Trump is practically and morally responsible for provoking the events of the day.”_ (167 Cong. Rec. S733-34 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2021))  

The bipartisan nature of the impeachment vote and the comprehensive evidence presented by the House managers provide a compelling basis for recognizing Trump’s actions as insurrectionary under Section 3. The Senate’s decision does not diminish the evidentiary weight of the impeachment proceedings.


##### 3. Established Legal Standards for Recognizing State and Congressional Findings

Federal courts recognize that state judicial findings and congressional determinations are entitled to deference when reached through fair processes. Principles of comity and judicial economy support the adoption of these findings to avoid duplication and uphold constitutional safeguards.

**Supporting Cases**:

1. **Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879)**:  
   > “State proceedings, where fair and impartial, carry weight in federal determinations and must be respected under principles of comity.”  
   This case highlights the legitimacy of state findings in federal adjudication when due process is met.

2. **Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972)**:  
   > “Respect for state judicial processes and determinations ensures judicial efficiency and prevents unnecessary conflict.”  
   This case emphasizes the importance of recognizing valid state findings in federal litigation.

3. **In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895)**:  
   > “The federal judiciary has a duty to enforce constitutional principles and uphold the rule of law, recognizing the findings of competent authorities when appropriate.”  
   This case demonstrates the judiciary’s responsibility to act upon established legal standards, including state and congressional findings.


##### 4. Historical Precedent for Accepting State and Congressional Findings Under Section 3

Historically, state courts and Congress have played critical roles in enforcing Section 3. State and federal courts have upheld findings of insurrection and disqualification based on fair judicial proceedings and legislative determinations.

##### Supporting Cases:

1. **Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (C.C.D. Va. 1869)**:  
   > “The judiciary must rely on fair proceedings and decisions at all levels to enforce disqualifications under Section 3.”  
   This case establishes that state and congressional findings are integral to Section 3 enforcement.

2. **In re Tate, 63 N.C. 308 (1869)**:  
   > “State courts have the authority to apply Section 3 disqualifications independently, provided due process is followed.”  
   This case underscores the legitimacy of state findings in Section 3 enforcement.

3. **Worthington v. United States, 33 F. Cas. 669 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1870)**:  
   > “[Section 3] operates as a present disability, enforceable through fair judicial or legislative proceedings.”  
   This case affirms that Section 3 is self-executing and enforceable by state or federal authorities.


##### 5. Judicial Efficiency and Comity Justify Federal Acceptance of Findings

Accepting state and congressional findings promotes judicial efficiency and prevents conflicting outcomes. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of deferring to findings reached through fair and impartial proceedings.

**Supporting Cases**:

1. **Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)**:  
   > “Principles of federalism and comity require respect for state judicial processes, provided they meet constitutional standards.”  
   This case supports federal recognition of valid state findings.

2. **Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)**:  
   > “Duplicative litigation undermines judicial efficiency and should be avoided where findings are valid and reliable.”  
   This case reinforces the need to prevent unnecessary relitigation in federal courts.

3. **Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)**:  
   > “Deference to state court judgments ensures consistency and preserves judicial resources.”  
   This case further underscores the necessity of respecting valid state findings in federal litigation.


The findings of the Colorado Supreme Court and Congress are procedurally sound, constitutionally relevant, and entitled to full recognition by this Court. The robust historical, legal, and procedural foundations outlined above leave no doubt that judicial deference to these findings is both appropriate and necessary. These findings provide a compelling basis for enforcing Section 3’s disqualification against Donald J. Trump, ensuring that constitutional safeguards are upheld and judicial resources are preserved. This Court must act to affirm Trump’s ineligibility under Section 3.



## CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

### COUNT I: DECLARATORY RELIEF THAT DONALD J. TRUMP IS INELIGIBLE UNDER SECTION 3 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Donald J. Trump’s conduct constitutes “engagement in insurrection” under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, rendering him ineligible to hold federal office. This Court has an obligation to interpret and enforce the Constitution’s eligibility provisions to prevent unlawful officeholding by individuals who have violated their oath.

This claim is supported by the Colorado Supreme Court’s finding in Trump v. Anderson that Trump’s actions on January 6, 2021, met the definition of “engagement in insurrection” under Section 3. As Chief Justice Chase articulated in Griffin’s Case, constitutional provisions designed to preserve the Republic are enforceable independently by the judiciary, without further legislation from Congress.

Moreover, Congress’s own actions, as demonstrated by the House’s impeachment vote and Senate statements following the acquittal, substantiate Trump’s actions as insurrectionary. These findings from both state and federal sources provide a legal basis for this Court to declare Trump ineligible for office under Section 3.

###  COUNT II: INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PREVENT CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION

Plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing Vice President Kamala Harris, as President of the Senate, from certifying electoral votes for Donald J. Trump on the grounds that he is ineligible to hold office. The Vice President has a constitutional duty to ensure that only eligible candidates are certified, and the certification of an ineligible president-elect would violate this duty.

Plaintiff further seeks an injunction preventing Chief Justice John Roberts from administering the oath of office to Donald J. Trump, which would unlawfully invest power in an individual constitutionally barred from assuming office.

The harm from certifying and inaugurating a constitutionally ineligible president is irreparable, as it would not only undermine the lawful functioning of the executive branch but also set a dangerous precedent allowing insurrectionists to hold federal office in violation of Section 3. This relief is necessary to preserve the integrity of the presidential office and prevent the subversion of constitutional protections against insurrection.

### COUNTERARGUMENTS AND RESPONSE

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment presents a clear constitutional standard that disqualifies individuals who have “engaged in insurrection” from holding federal office. This disqualification is not a discretionary or political matter but a constitutional mandate, requiring judicial enforcement to maintain the Constitution’s integrity. The Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), established that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This foundational principle mandates judicial interpretation and application of all constitutional provisions, especially those directly limiting eligibility for federal office.

Section 3 is an objective constitutional requirement that does not rely on political considerations or the discretion of other branches. Just as the judiciary enforces age and citizenship requirements for officeholders under the Constitution, so too must it enforce the insurrection disqualification in Section 3. The judiciary’s role is to interpret and uphold the Constitution as written, independent of political considerations, thereby ensuring that constitutional standards for officeholding are applied consistently.

judicial enforcement of Section 3 is particularly warranted here because Congress has chosen not to act. The Constitution’s design anticipates checks and balances among the branches, with the judiciary playing a crucial role in upholding constitutional principles when other branches fail to do so. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974), the Supreme Court affirmed that “neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality… can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process.” This reinforces the judiciary’s obligation to enforce the Constitution even when doing so impacts other branches or political interests.

In the current case, Congress has not exercised its power to remove the Section 3 disqualification from Donald J. Trump. This judicial action is therefore essential to prevent a constitutionally disqualified individual from assuming the presidency, safeguarding the rule of law and the Constitution’s authority. The judiciary’s role here is not to usurp Congressional power but to fulfill its constitutional duty to interpret and enforce the law. By stepping in, the judiciary preserves the integrity of the Constitution where Congress has chosen not to act, maintaining the balance of power among the branches and upholding the eligibility standards the Constitution demands.

This Court is justified in relying on the Colorado Supreme Court’s findings for efficiency and consistency. The Supreme Court has held that federal courts may give deference to state court findings when those findings were reached with procedural fairness and impartiality. Here, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as well as judicial economy, support recognizing the Colorado court’s findings to uphold Section 3’s intent without unnecessary duplicative litigation

#### Political Question Doctrine

Defendants may argue that enforcing Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes a non-justiciable political question. However, the Supreme Court has affirmed that the judiciary is responsible for interpreting and enforcing constitutional provisions, especially regarding explicit eligibility standards for federal officeholders. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969), the Court explained that “a fundamental principle of our representative democracy” is that “the people should choose whom they please to govern them.” However, it immediately qualified this by stating that this right is constrained by the qualifications that “the people themselves considered so important that they enshrined them in the Constitution.” Id. at 547-48. Thus, the judiciary’s role is essential to ensure that only candidates meeting these constitutional qualifications may assume office.

In Powell, the Court rejected the argument that Congress has exclusive discretion over the qualifications of its members. It held instead that “the Constitution leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of Congress or the States to exclude a person from office who meets all constitutional qualifications.” Id. at 550. The Constitution similarly leaves no room for discretion to include a person who fails to meet these qualifications. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which expressly disqualifies individuals who have engaged in insurrection, is precisely the type of constitutional provision that the judiciary must enforce, consistent with the Supreme Court’s declaration in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Failing to enforce Section 3 here would abdicate this judicial responsibility.

Section 3’s disqualification clause is a clear constitutional mandate rather than a discretionary matter for Congress. Unlike procedural aspects of electoral vote counting, which may involve non-justiciable political questions, Section 3 speaks directly to eligibility criteria, which the judiciary is constitutionally bound to interpret and enforce. The Court in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969), underscored this distinction, emphasizing that constitutional qualifications are inherently judicial questions, not matters of political discretion.

#### Deference to Congress’s Role in Certification and Enforcement

Although Congress plays a role in certifying electoral votes, Section 3 does not grant Congress exclusive authority to enforce its disqualification terms. While Section 3 gives Congress the power to remove a disqualification through a two-thirds vote, this amnesty provision presumes that the disqualification is already enforceable in the absence of such a vote. Congress’s authority to grant amnesty under Section 3 reinforces—rather than replaces—the judiciary’s duty to enforce disqualification.

The Supreme Court addressed the limits of political discretion in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), acknowledging that some political matters may be non-justiciable, but only where the Constitution clearly delegates authority exclusively to another branch. Here, Section 3 does not place exclusive enforcement power with Congress; it merely authorizes Congress to lift a disqualification, indicating that the judiciary retains the power to enforce Section 3 absent such congressional action. Moreover, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974), the Court emphasized that “the courts must apply the law,” reinforcing that the judiciary must uphold constitutional provisions regardless of overlapping legislative authority. Here, judicial enforcement of Section 3’s disqualification is necessary to uphold constitutional qualifications, particularly in the absence of congressional action to remove it.

Recent Supreme Court guidance from Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. ___ (2024), underscores that while states lack authority to enforce Section 3 for federal offices, the Court recognized that either judicial or congressional enforcement is appropriate to achieve a consistent national application. Trump v. Anderson supports the federal judiciary’s role in enforcing Section 3, thereby maintaining uniformity and preserving the integrity of the office of the President.

Section 3 grants Congress the power to remove a disqualification by a two-thirds vote, but this is a remedial power designed to restore eligibility, not an exclusive authority over enforcement. The judiciary’s role in applying Section 3 is primary in determining eligibility, while Congress’s role is secondary, providing an avenue for amnesty only after a disqualification is found. Thus, absent an act of amnesty by Congress, the judiciary retains the authority to enforce Section 3 to uphold constitutional qualifications.

#### Avoidance of Judicial Duty Through Deference to the Electorate

Defendants may contend that barring a democratically chosen president-elect from office infringes upon the electorate’s will. However, this argument conflicts with Supreme Court precedent affirming that constitutional qualifications are paramount, even over voter choice. In Powell v. McCormack, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he people should choose whom they please to govern them,” but emphasized that this choice is inherently limited by the qualifications “the people themselves considered so important that they enshrined them in the Constitution.” Id. at 547. The electorate’s right to choose is significant, but it does not supersede constitutional provisions that restrict who may hold office.

Allowing Donald J. Trump to assume office despite his disqualification under Section 3 would effectively nullify this provision, permitting individuals who have engaged in insurrection to hold office in direct violation of the Constitution. Judicial enforcement of Section 3 is crucial to uphold the Constitution’s rule of law, as reaffirmed in Marbury, where the Court asserted that it is the judiciary’s duty “to say what the law is.” Allowing a disqualified individual to assume office would constitute an abdication of this judicial responsibility, especially given the substantial evidence, including the findings of the Colorado Supreme Court, that supports Trump’s disqualification for engagement in insurrection.

##### Upholding Rule of Law and Democratic Integrity

Enforcing Section 3 does not infringe on the will of the voters; rather, it reinforces the constitutional limits they collectively agreed upon when the Constitution was ratified. Judicial enforcement ensures that elections are conducted within the boundaries set by the Constitution and protects the Republic from individuals who are constitutionally disqualified from holding office. 

As Alexander Hamilton noted in *Federalist No. 1*:  
> "The vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated."

The framers understood that liberty depends on a government grounded in law, not the unchecked will of factions or individuals. By enforcing Section 3, the judiciary upholds this foundational principle, ensuring that those who have acted against the Republic are not allowed to hold office, even if they have garnered public support.

##### Judicial Enforcement Protects Democracy

Judicial enforcement of Section 3 ensures that constitutional qualifications are respected, preventing individuals who have engaged in insurrection from assuming power. This enforcement does not overturn the election but instead ensures that the results are consistent with constitutional requirements. Section 3 was designed to prevent individuals who had betrayed their oath to the Constitution from leveraging public support to undermine the Republic.

John Jay wrote in *Federalist No. 2*:  
> "Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers."  

One such "requisite power" is the enforcement of constitutional safeguards like Section 3, which ensures that individuals who have threatened the stability of government cannot wield its authority. Upholding this safeguard is not an act of judicial activism but a reaffirmation of the people's collective decision to enshrine these protections in the Constitution.

##### Judicial Determination of Insurrection is a Legal, Not Political, Question

The determination of whether Donald J. Trump’s actions constitute “engagement in insurrection” under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a political question but a legal one, squarely within the jurisdiction of this Court. As Chief Justice Marshall famously observed in Marbury v. Madison, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” The Court’s role is to interpret and apply constitutional provisions when their enforcement is contested, particularly in cases where political actors fail to act.

The judiciary’s obligation to address this issue stems from the self-executing nature of Section 3, as recognized in historical cases such as Worthington v. United States, 33 F. Cas. 669 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1870). In Worthington, the court held that individuals who had participated in rebellion were ineligible for office without requiring additional legislative enforcement. Similarly, in In re Tate, 63 N.C. 308 (1869), the North Carolina Supreme Court applied Section 3 to disqualify state officials, affirming that courts are competent to resolve such matters based on the facts and the Constitution.

This principle was further articulated in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. Anderson (2024), where the Court acknowledged that while Congress has the primary authority to enforce Section 3, the judiciary may intervene when Congress fails to act. The Court explicitly noted that “proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcement of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable to the enforcement of Section 3.”

Justice Scalia reinforced the judiciary’s critical role in upholding constitutional safeguards in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704 (1988), stating, “The Constitution prevents the concentration of power in those who would abuse it, even when popular sentiment demands otherwise.” Insurrection is not merely a political accusation but a defined legal standard rooted in the text and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s duty is to apply this standard based on the evidence, ensuring that constitutional disqualifications are enforced.

Refusing to adjudicate this matter would render Section 3 meaningless, allowing individuals who have betrayed their constitutional oath to exploit procedural gaps. Justice Thomas highlighted the danger of such abdication in U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995), warning, “When we fail to enforce constitutional limits, we invite their erosion, leaving essential safeguards vulnerable to political expediency.”

This Court must fulfill its constitutional duty by determining whether the Defendant’s actions on January 6, 2021, meet the legal definition of insurrection under Section 3. By doing so, the judiciary reaffirms its role as the guardian of constitutional integrity and protects the Republic from those who seek to undermine it.


#### Historical Justiciability of Insurrection and Rebellion Cases

The judiciary has historically enforced disqualifications related to insurrection, particularly in cases interpreting Section 3 in the post-Civil War era. In Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7 (C.C. Va. 1869), Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase affirmed that Section 3 was self-executing, necessitating judicial involvement in determining eligibility where credible claims of disqualifying conduct were presented. Chief Justice Chase observed that to “ascertain what particular individuals are embraced” by Section 3, judicial “proceedings, evidence, [and] decisions” are essential, recognizing the judiciary’s role in upholding this constitutional provision. Id. at 26.

Furthermore, the Colorado Supreme Court’s findings in Trump v. Anderson determined that Donald J. Trump “engaged in insurrection” as defined by Section 3, stating explicitly that his actions “leading up to and on January 6, 2021” meet the threshold for disqualification. These findings provide this Court with a firm foundation for enforcing Section 3’s disqualification clause. Consistent with the historical enforcement of Section 3, the judiciary has both the authority and the duty to prevent an individual who has engaged in insurrection from assuming federal office.

#### Public Will and Constitutional Qualifications**

Voter choice is a cornerstone of democracy, it is bound by the constitutional limits designed to protect the Republic from threats to its integrity. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a critical qualification, explicitly disqualifying individuals who have engaged in insurrection from holding federal office. Upholding these constitutional safeguards is essential to maintaining the rule of law and preventing the erosion of democratic governance.

The Supreme Court in *Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)* affirmed that voter choice is not absolute, stating:  
> “The Constitution fixes the only qualifications for Congress, and no additional qualifications can be imposed by the people or any branch of government.”  

This principle applies equally to Section 3, which establishes a disqualification to ensure that individuals who have betrayed their oath to the Constitution cannot wield federal power.

Section 3 serves as a vital mechanism to protect democratic governance from insurrectionists. As Alexander Hamilton warned in *Federalist No. 1*, democracy is always vulnerable to individuals who seek to subvert the government for personal ambition or factional interests:  
> “Of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.”

This case does not seek to thwart the will of the electorate but rather enforces the constitutional boundaries necessary to safeguard the Republic. Allowing voters to elect a disqualified candidate would nullify Section 3, inviting future insurrectionists to undermine the government without fear of consequence. As James Madison emphasized in *Federalist No. 10*, the Constitution’s role is to mitigate the risks of factionalism by ensuring that structural safeguards remain intact:  
> “A pure democracy… can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, promises the cure for which we are seeking.”

The Court’s obligation to enforce Section 3 reflects a broader commitment to uphold constitutional principles, even when politically sensitive. The judiciary is not an obstacle to democracy but its guardian, ensuring that foundational rules remain inviolable.



#### Enforcing Section 3 Does Not Overturn the Will of the Electorate

Concerns that judicial enforcement of Section 3 overturns the will of the electorate are understandable but ultimately misplaced. Enforcing Section 3 does not subvert democracy—it preserves the Constitution, the very framework that makes free and fair elections possible. The judiciary’s role in enforcing constitutional qualifications ensures that elections operate within the rule of law and that only eligible candidates are permitted to hold federal office. Failing to enforce Section 3 would abdicate the judiciary’s duty to uphold constitutional protections, eroding the rule of law and threatening the long-term stability of democratic governance.

##### The Constitutional Structure Limits Electoral Choices

The Constitution imposes specific qualifications and disqualifications for federal officeholders. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly bars individuals who have engaged in insurrection from holding office. These constitutional restrictions are not optional, and neither voters nor political bodies may override them without following proper constitutional mechanisms.

As James Madison warned in *Federalist No. 10*:  
> "No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity."  

Similarly, the Constitution serves as a safeguard to prevent those who have acted against the Republic from assuming positions of authority, regardless of their popularity. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects this principle, ensuring that electoral success cannot shield insurrectionists from constitutional disqualification.

Furthermore, Section 1 of the Twentieth Amendment specifies:  
> "If a President-elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified."

This constitutional safeguard ensures continuity of governance and respects the electorate's choice of ticket while still enforcing disqualifications such as those outlined in Section 3. The amendment explicitly anticipates situations where a president-elect fails to qualify, providing a clear path for succession without jeopardizing democratic order.

##### Succession Does Not Overturn the Election

The Constitution’s framers and subsequent amendments, including the Twentieth Amendment, were acutely aware of the need to provide for continuity of governance in all circumstances, including the disqualification of a president-elect. The argument that enforcing Section 3 would “overturn the will of the voters” is a misunderstanding of the constitutional framework. Succession is not an ad hoc solution; it is an explicitly designed mechanism that respects both voter intent and the rule of law.

The Twentieth Amendment provides clear guidance for scenarios where a president-elect is disqualified: “If a President-elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified.” This provision ensures that the disqualification of one candidate does not undermine the electoral process or create a constitutional crisis. By excluding Donald J. Trump from assuming office under Section 3, the Constitution mandates that the vice president-elect, as chosen by the electorate, will assume the presidency, preserving continuity and respecting the broader outcome of the election.

As Chief Justice Roberts observed in United States v. Nixon, “Constitutional provisions that maintain the integrity and continuity of government must be upheld without exception.” The enforcement of Section 3 does not nullify the election; it ensures that the outcome remains consistent with the Constitution’s requirements. This Court’s role is not to rewrite the results of the election but to ensure that those results comply with the eligibility criteria explicitly outlined in the Constitution.

Justice Scalia reinforced this principle in Printz v. United States, where he noted, “The Constitution’s text provides for contingencies, ensuring stability and order even in moments of uncertainty.” Succession under the Twentieth Amendment is precisely such a contingency, demonstrating that enforcing Section 3 aligns with the framers’ intent to uphold the Constitution’s integrity in all circumstances.

If a president-elect is disqualified under Section 3, the Constitution ensures that the vice president-elect, chosen on the same ticket, would ascend to the presidency. This is not an overturning of the electorate's will but a fulfillment of constitutional safeguards that maintain the integrity of the office. The Twentieth Amendment provides for this contingency, ensuring that disqualification does not create a vacuum or require a new election.

The relevant portion of the Twentieth Amendment states:  
> "If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died, the Vice President-elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President-elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified."  

This provision clarifies that the vice president-elect assumes the role of president if the president-elect is disqualified, safeguarding the continuity of governance and respecting the overall outcome of the election.

##### Congress’s Failure to Act Post-Colorado Ruling

The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the Colorado case created a procedural gap by holding that states lack jurisdiction to enforce Section 3 against federal candidates. This decision clarified that responsibility lies with federal courts and Congress. Critically, however, Congress failed to act in response.

Congress had two clear avenues to address Donald J. Trump’s eligibility after the Supreme Court’s decision:

1. **Reassessing the January 6th Findings**: Congress could have reviewed the findings of the bipartisan January 6th Select Committee to determine whether they were accurate or incomplete.  
2. **Legislative Action to Overcome the Disability**: Section 3 explicitly allows Congress, by a two-thirds vote, to remove the disqualification for individuals who have engaged in insurrection. Congress took no such action.

Congress’s failure to act left the constitutional question unresolved. The Supreme Court did not rule on whether Trump engaged in insurrection, nor did Congress take steps to clarify or mitigate his disqualification. This inaction underscores the necessity of judicial intervention. As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in *Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803)*:  
> “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”  

Judicial enforcement of Section 3 is required to resolve the ambiguity created by Congress’s inaction and to uphold the constitutional disqualification where the facts support it.

##### Courts Must Address the Substantive Issue

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Colorado case explicitly avoided ruling on the substantive question of whether Trump engaged in insurrection. The Court stated:  
> “The Court expresses no opinion on the substantive question of whether Donald J. Trump’s actions on January 6, 2021, constitute engagement in insurrection under Section 3. This decision is confined solely to the constitutional authority of states versus the federal government in enforcing disqualifications for federal office.”  

This leaves the question squarely within the jurisdiction of federal courts, not as a matter of judicial overreach, but as a constitutional obligation. Failure to resolve this issue would create a dangerous precedent, rendering Section 3 a dead letter and inviting future insurrectionists to exploit procedural gaps to evade accountability.

##### Judicial Enforcement Protects, Not Overturns, Democracy

Enforcing Section 3 does not nullify the will of the electorate—it ensures that elections operate within constitutional boundaries. Allowing a disqualified candidate to assume office would corrupt the electoral process, as voters cannot make an informed choice if presented with an ineligible candidate. 

The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood this danger. Section 3 was designed to prevent individuals who had betrayed their oath to the Constitution from leveraging public support to undermine the Republic. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in *Federalist No. 78*:  
> “No legislative act… contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm… that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves.”  

The rule of law, not unchecked popular will, safeguards democracy. By enforcing Section 3, this Court affirms that no individual is above constitutional constraints, even if they have garnered electoral support.

Judicial restraint does not mean judicial abdication; it requires the Court to uphold constitutional mandates, even in politically sensitive cases. The judiciary must serve as the guardian of the Constitution, ensuring that its provisions are respected and enforced. By acting on Section 3, the judiciary demonstrates its commitment to preserving the constitutional framework that underpins democratic governance.

Justice Joseph Story emphasized this principle in his *Commentaries on the Constitution*:  
> "It is a mistake to suppose that the Court is at liberty to decline the exercise of jurisdiction, simply because it involves a political question. If the Constitution is violated, it is the duty of the Court to redress it."  

The Constitution is not a passive document but a binding legal framework designed to safeguard the Republic against internal and external threats. If Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is ignored or rendered unenforceable, it effectively becomes a dead letter. The judiciary has a constitutional obligation to prevent such nullification by ensuring that all provisions of the Constitution are given their intended effect.

As Chief Justice John Roberts stated in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, “The Constitution’s design is one of checks and balances, each provision safeguarding the structural integrity of the government.” Section 3 serves as a critical check against those who would undermine the Republic by betraying their oath to the Constitution. To ignore this provision would set a dangerous precedent: that certain parts of the Constitution are optional and can be disregarded if politically inconvenient.

Justice Thomas has warned against the erosion of constitutional safeguards in U.S. v. Lopez, emphasizing, “When we fail to enforce constitutional limits, we invite their erosion, leaving essential safeguards vulnerable to political expediency.” Judicial enforcement of Section 3 is not an act of overreach but a fulfillment of the judiciary’s duty to uphold the Constitution’s supremacy.

In cases where Congress or the executive branch fails to act, it falls to the courts to resolve ambiguities and ensure constitutional provisions are respected. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment anticipated that enforcement might require judicial intervention, particularly when political actors are reluctant to disqualify individuals for fear of electoral consequences. By enforcing Section 3, this Court would affirm its role as the guardian of constitutional integrity, ensuring that no provision is rendered meaningless through inaction or neglect.



##### The Court’s Role as Guardian of the Constitution

Conservative legal principles emphasize fidelity to the Constitution and the rule of law. By enforcing Section 3, this Court ensures that constitutional provisions are not subverted by procedural inaction or political expediency. Judicial restraint does not mean judicial abdication; it requires the Court to uphold constitutional mandates, even in politically sensitive cases.

As Justice Antonin Scalia observed in *District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)*:  
> “The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”

This principle applies here. Section 3 is a constitutional safeguard designed to protect the Republic from insurrectionists. By enforcing it, the Court reinforces the foundation of democratic governance and ensures that elections are conducted within the limits established by the Constitution.rate while framing the Court’s role as a necessary and constitutionally mandated action.


### RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant the following relief:

1. **Declaratory Judgment**:  
   A declaration that Donald J. Trump’s actions on and leading up to January 6, 2021, constitute engagement in insurrection under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, rendering him constitutionally ineligible to hold the office of President of the United States.

2. **Injunctive Relief**:  
   a. **Against the Federal Election Commission (FEC)**:  
      An injunction preventing the FEC from taking any steps to certify or validate election results that include Donald J. Trump as a candidate for President if he is found to be ineligible under Section 3.  

   b. **Against the Archivist of the United States**:  
      An injunction preventing the Archivist from certifying or processing any electoral votes cast for Donald J. Trump, ensuring compliance with Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  

   c. **Against the Secretaries of State of Colorado, Michigan, Georgia, Arizona, and Pennsylvania**:  
      Injunctive relief requiring these state officials to exclude Donald J. Trump from their state ballots or certify election results only if they comply with constitutional eligibility requirements under Section 3.  

3. **Further Relief**:  
   Any additional relief the Court deems appropriate and necessary to uphold the Constitution and prevent a disqualified individual from assuming federal office.

4. **Clarification of Constitutional Compliance**:  
   An order clarifying that the requested injunctive relief is not intended to infringe upon the constitutional functions of the named federal and state officials but rather to ensure compliance with the eligibility requirements set forth by Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

#### Rationale
This relief is narrowly tailored to uphold the constitutional prohibition against insurrectionists holding public office while respecting the roles and functions of the officials named. The requested relief aligns with the judiciary’s obligation to interpret and enforce constitutional provisions, safeguarding the integrity of the democratic process and ensuring that no disqualified individual assumes the office of President of the United States.




NOTES  OTHER THINGS I FOUND. I COULDN"T FIND THE FULL TEXT BUT HERE ARE SUMMARIES

Worthington v. United States (1870)
Citation: Worthington v. United States, 33 F. Cas. 669 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1870).

Ruling: In this case, the court acknowledged the self-executing nature of Section 3 by holding that individuals who had participated in the Confederate government were ineligible to hold federal office without needing further legislative enforcement.

Key Quote: The court stated that Section 3 “operates as a present disability,” suggesting that no additional congressional action was required to enforce the disqualification.

Significance: This case reinforced that Section 3 operates automatically as a disqualification, applying independently of legislative mechanisms, and could be applied directly by the courts to individuals who meet the criteria for disqualification.

In re Tate (1869)
Citation: In re Tate, 63 N.C. 308 (1869).

Ruling: The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 disqualified certain individuals from holding office under the state’s jurisdiction due to their previous engagement in the Confederacy, applying Section 3 independently without federal intervention.

Significance: In re Tate supports the position that state courts have authority to enforce Section 3’s disqualification on individuals within their jurisdiction. This case suggests that “proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of decisions” can occur at the state level when state officeholders are at issue.

Attorney General’s Interpretation in 1869 (regarding Section 3)

Context: The U.S. Attorney General, in interpreting Section 3’s application shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, issued opinions stating that the disqualification “operates of itself” upon individuals meeting the criteria and does not require implementing legislation by Congress.

Key Interpretation: The Attorney General’s opinion emphasized that Section 3 automatically disqualified individuals who engaged in insurrection without needing federal or state legislation. This opinion influenced early applications of Section 3 and shaped understanding of its self-executing nature.


CASES THAT MAY AGREE WITH YOU THAT DC IS THE RIGHT AREA

First I found this information about the Federal Venue Statute: Under the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), a case against a federal officer acting in their official capacity can be brought in any judicial district where:

(1) A defendant in the action resides,
(2) A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or
(3) The plaintiff resides, if no real property is involved in the action.

While the third prong could technically allow us to file in our home district, D.C. remains the most compelling venue because it is where all defendants perform their official duties and where the certification and inauguration would occur. This factor is particularly influential when challenging national-level actions involving constitutional questions related to federal officeholders.

**LaRouche v. Fowler (1998)**
Summary: Lyndon LaRouche, a resident of Virginia and former presidential candidate, filed a lawsuit in the District of Columbia challenging the Democratic National Committee’s (DNC) rules for excluding him from participating in primary elections. LaRouche argued that his exclusion was unfair and violated the rules governing DNC actions.

Relevance: Though LaRouche resided outside D.C., he filed in the D.C. District Court because his claims were against a national party headquartered in D.C. The case demonstrates that plaintiffs with electoral disputes, especially those involving federal election processes or parties headquartered in D.C., can choose D.C. as a venue.

Outcome: The case was dismissed; the court ruled that the DNC’s rules did not violate federal law or the Constitution.

**Stockman v. FEC (2014)**
Summary: Steven Stockman, a Texas resident and former congressman, filed a lawsuit in the District of Columbia challenging Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations. Stockman sought to clarify specific FEC regulations on campaign contributions, asserting that certain FEC interpretations could infringe on First Amendment rights.

Relevance: Though Stockman was from Texas, he filed in the D.C. District Court because the FEC, as the defendant, is headquartered in D.C., and the case directly related to federal election regulations.

Outcome: The case allowed the D.C. District Court to consider election law claims filed by individuals residing outside D.C., especially when the FEC or national regulations are involved.

**carter v. Carter (1979)**
Summary: Philip Carter, a resident of Virginia, filed in the District of Columbia against the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, challenging election activities and seeking injunctions against the Committee’s campaign finance activities. Carter alleged irregularities in fundraising practices.

Relevance: Carter’s case demonstrates that individuals residing outside D.C. can bring election-related lawsuits in D.C., especially when the defendants are national campaign committees headquartered in D.C. or where campaign practices of national interest are implicated.

Outcome: The court heard the case but ultimately ruled against Carter, reinforcing D.C. as an appropriate venue for federal election disputes.

**Hollander v. McCain (2008)**
Summary: Fred Hollander, a New Hampshire resident, filed a lawsuit in the District of Columbia challenging Senator John McCain’s eligibility to run for president on grounds related to McCain’s birth outside the continental United States. Hollander sought a declaratory judgment that McCain was ineligible.

Relevance: Hollander was not a D.C. resident, he filed in D.C. due to the national implications of the case, which involved federal eligibility standards for presidential candidates. D.C. was deemed an appropriate venue because it involved national constitutional questions.

Outcome: The court dismissed the case, finding that Hollander lacked standing, but this case exemplifies how D.C. is an acceptable venue for non-D.C. residents challenging presidential eligibility. 

**Kerchner v. Obama (2009)**
Summary: Charles Kerchner, a Pennsylvania resident, filed a lawsuit in the District of Columbia challenging then-President Obama’s eligibility based on the location of Obama’s birth. Kerchner argued that President Obama did not meet constitutional eligibility requirements for the presidency.

Relevance: Although Kerchner was from Pennsylvania, he chose D.C. for its jurisdiction over national eligibility issues related to the office of the presidency. This illustrates that D.C. is an appropriate venue for eligibility cases brought by individuals outside the district.

Outcome: The court dismissed the case for lack of standing, but it underscores how plaintiffs from outside D.C. have chosen to file in D.C. on matters of presidential eligibility.
