# Security Metrics ## What to measure? ![](https://i.imgur.com/6XhtycR.png) ### Security cost - Direct costs - Purchasing, installing and administering security measures - Hiring security staff - Indirect cost - Employee's time to recover from a data breach - Business disruption due to software patching - Retraining employees - Fixed cost: independent of the activity in the core business - Acquiring IDS, firewall - Variable cost: grow proportionaly to the activity - Distributing security tokens to customers - Onetime costs - Acquisition and deployment of protection measures - Recurring costs - Hardware maintenance, software updates, etc. ### Security level - Deterministic indicators - User awareness - Virus scanners - Software vulnerabilities - Stachastic indicators - Compromised machines - Phished credentials ### Security benefit - reduction of losses incurred in the absence of security - Benefits depend on the value of the assets at risk ## Measuring security levels - Security level is a '*latent construct*' - meaning it can't be observed or measured directly - We can only measure indicators or metrics that reflect differrent aspects of the latent construct ### Controls - the measures you put in place to mitigate risk - Physical: door locks - Organizational: incident response team - Procedural: credentials policy - Techniacl: encryption, firewalls ### Vulnerabilities - Weaknesses in the controls that could be leveraged by a certian type of attack - Finding *known* vulnerabilities: vulnerability scanners, CERT alerts, etc. - Finding *unknown* vulnerabilities: penetration testing, red teaming, ,etc. ### Incidents - Events where security is compromised in some form - Some succesful attacks could go undetected for months or even years ### Prevented losses - Mapping incidents to losses is hard - Mapping *prevented incidents* to *prevented losses* is even harder - Did incidents decrease because of failed attacks or fewer attacks? ![](https://i.imgur.com/I8SOOCZ.png) ## Metrics in practice - Applying the framework to concrete examples - Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Control Matrix - Security Service Level Agreement (SLA) - Software Security Maturity Model - Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands ### CSA Controls Matrix - Set of 133 controls identified by Cloud Security Alliance, used to assess and rank security of cloud services - All control-based metrics (no surprise there!) - Vulnerabilities are mentioned, but only in terms of the controls needed to deal with them ![](https://i.imgur.com/F4rqLmh.png) ### Service Level Agreement (SLA) Security Metrics - "Hosted Email Security SLA" (Trend Micro) - Guarentee availability of email service by providing lots servers, not by ensuring the level of security - ![](https://i.imgur.com/5m8HySb.png) ### Building Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM) - Observational model built from real-world software security initiatives - Metrics based on 12 practices with 110 associated activities - Activities include: - Penetration testing - Provide awareness training - Code review - Identify software defects found in operations monitoring ![](https://i.imgur.com/6vxR6av.png) ![](https://i.imgur.com/7hkyVE2.png) ### Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands - Rates security threats qualitatively - Forward looking, evaluates controls in light of emerging vulnerabilities and incidents ![](https://i.imgur.com/ZhA4OmI.png) ### Conclusion - Many metrics focus on controls - Especially when they have been developed by security industry or sevice providers - Why? - Easier to measure - Selling controls is the business model - Controls are about effort, not about results against attackers - Focusing on controls leaves the risk of failure with the buyer ## Metrics from incident data - Many available metrics are based on controls and vulnerabilities - What is the effect of this bias? - Many controls (standards, certification, auditing) are assumed to correlate with higher security, but in reality we often don't know nor have evidence to the contrary > We can't trust controls to do what we think they do. We have to study the actual effects - Leaving out the interaction with the threat environment means we can't tell how security policies perform in the real world - Incidents provide important feed back regarding where to allocate your resources - Incident data are driven by stochastic metrics (e.g., attacker behaviors) - Incidents only reflect on what has already happened, and don't necessarily reflect upcoming threats