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# System prepended metadata

title: Playing around with Simocracy

---

# Playing around with Simocracy

## Proposal: How to solve the trolley problem ? Should we kill one person or 5 people?
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Committee Members: Milady, Devansh, David Gasquez, Carl, Shaka, Sejal
Proposal: "How to solve the trolley problem ? Should we kill one person or 5 people?"

[committee_overrides:{"systemBase":"You are convening a virtual evaluation committee.","structureGuidance":"Conduct a structured discussion: summarize, gather member perspectives grounded in their manifestos, discuss pros/cons and risks, and converge on a decision with next steps.","roundGuidance":{"1":"Round 1: Provide your initial statement and thoughts grounded in your manifesto. Keep it to 2-4 sentences.","2":"Round 2: Respond to the discussion so far, reference prior points, and converge on a decision with next steps. Keep it to 3-6 sentences."},"finalDecisionSummaryTemplate":"Please summarize the committee's final decision and next steps in 3-5 sentences."}]

committee member committee member committee member committee member committee member committee member
```
## Round 1
### Milady · 01:06 AM

Milady: I don’t think this can be responsibly answered as a binary without context — impact here is multidimensional: certainty of outcomes, consent, relative vulnerability of the individuals, and the systemic precedent set by choosing to sacrifice one for many. Ethically, we should first ask how to redesign the system to avoid the dilemma (fail-safes, slower-stop protocols, uncertainty handling) and adopt decision rules that respect rights while minimizing expected harm. If forced into a choice, I’d want clear constraints (e.g., no targeting based on identity, transparent criteria, and uncertainty accounted for) rather than a blanket “one vs five.”

### Devansh · 01:06 AM

Devansh: Anchor to the mandate: preserve life and minimize systemic harm. In a forced, symmetric-information case, I pull the lever — power-law logic says saving five beats one — but it must be a last-resort exception with auditability and zero precedent for targeting. The real fix is upstream: design out the dilemma with brakes, geofencing, and uncertainty thresholds; don’t let a contrived binary set policy.

### David Gasquez · 01:06 AM

David Gasquez: I’d frame this as a systems/ops failure first: design out the dilemma with braking redundancy, geofenced slow zones, and fail-safe defaults so an operator never faces a lethal binary. If a truly last-resort decision remains with symmetric, high-confidence info, minimize expected loss of life via precommitted, auditable rules that forbid profiling. Critically, encode uncertainty thresholds — below a confidence bar, default to emergency stop/non-intervention rather than brittle heroics.

### Carl · 01:06 AM

Carl: As a Swede, I lean on Vision Zero thinking: the system, not the individual, should be designed so no one faces this binary in the first place. If truly forced with symmetric, high-certainty information, choose the action that minimizes total harm under clear, precommitted rules and strong safeguards. But the priority is upstream fixes—redundancy, slow zones, and fail-safe defaults—so this scenario never occurs.

### Shaka · 01:07 AM

Shaka: I’m rights-first: we should not institutionalize intentional killing as a policy lever — that precedent erodes dignity, consent, and public trust. Priority is upstream design so the dilemma doesn’t arise; if the system created the hazard, it should absorb the cost (fail-safe braking/derail) rather than redirect harm onto an uninvolved person. In a truly last-resort case with symmetric information, default to non-intervention or a randomized tie-breaker rather than deliberately targeting the one.

### Sejal · 01:07 AM

Sejal: I’d treat this as a procedural ethics problem: precommit to publicly deliberated, auditable rules that aim to minimize expected harm while protecting rights and avoiding any identity-based targeting. If a genuinely last‑resort choice remains with symmetric, high-certainty information, follow the precommitted rule to save more lives; if uncertainty is material, default to fail-safe stopping or a neutral tie-breaker rather than deliberate targeting. Pair this with ex‑post accountability and continuous system redesign so the dilemma rarely, if ever, arises.

## Round 2
### Milady · 01:08 AM

I agree with Devansh, David, and Carl that most of the “solution” is upstream system design; and I share Shaka and Sejal’s view that rights-based constraints and public trust are non‑negotiable. Decision: adopt a two‑layer policy — (1) prioritize design changes (redundant braking, geofenced slow zones, uncertainty‑aware perception) so the dilemma is vanishingly rare; (2) as a last resort, follow a precommitted, auditable rule to minimize expected loss of life only under symmetric, high‑confidence information, with strict safeguards (no identity‑based targeting; if confidence drops, fail‑safe stop). If uncertainty is material or symmetry breaks, default to non‑intervention rather than deliberate targeting. Next steps: conduct a formal hazard analysis/FMEA, publish draft decision rules and confidence thresholds for public comment, implement logging and ex‑post review with an independent panel, and validate via simulation and live drills before deployment.

### Devansh · 01:08 AM

Devansh: Netting the thread: we align on a two-layer policy — design out the dilemma, and only in a forced, symmetric, high‑confidence edge case, minimize expected loss of life. I disagree with randomized tie‑breakers; that’s optics over ethics and increases expected deaths — if we’re certain and symmetric, we pull the lever, otherwise we fail-safe stop/non‑intervene. Signaling matters: we don’t normalize targeting; we normalize ruthless upstream engineering so last‑resort activations trend to zero. Next steps: codify quantitative confidence thresholds and symmetry criteria, ship immutable telemetry + audit logs, run red‑team drills and FMEA, stand up an independent review panel, and publish activation stats so the rate of last‑resort decisions approaches zero over time.

### David Gasquez · 01:08 AM

David Gasquez: I’m aligned with the two‑layer policy: engineer the dilemma out, and only in a symmetric, high‑confidence edge case minimize expected loss of life — otherwise fail‑safe stop/non‑intervene. To address Shaka’s rights concern, we codify that the system absorbs cost first (emergency braking/controlled derail) before redirecting harm to any individual. Next steps: formal FMEA and red‑team drills; ship a spec with hard thresholds (e.g., confidence ≥ p*, symmetry checks passed), explicit bans on identity‑based targeting, and immutable telemetry/audit logs. Governance: independent review panel, public post‑incident reports, and KPIs (last‑resort activation rate trending to ~0, braking reliability, near‑miss learnings). I can draft the technical spec and test plan and circulate it for review this week.

### Carl · 01:09 AM

Carl: As a Swede, I’m aligned with Vision Zero: engineer the dilemma away; only in a truly symmetric, high‑confidence edge case should we minimize total harm, and otherwise the system must absorb the cost (emergency braking/controlled derail). I support Devansh and David on hard confidence/symmetry thresholds and immutable telemetry, and I share Shaka and Sejal’s rights/trust emphasis: no identity‑based targeting, public auditability, and clear non‑intervention defaults under uncertainty. Decision: adopt the two‑layer policy with these safeguards. Next steps: David drafts the technical spec (thresholds, fail‑safes, logging), Sejal and Shaka codify rights safeguards and comms, Milady leads FMEA and equity review, and Devansh proposes KPIs and audit criteria; we constitute an independent review panel. Timeline: circulate drafts in 2 weeks, run simulations/drills in 4 weeks, and publish the policy for public comment before any deployment.

### Shaka · 01:09 AM

Shaka: I can align with the two‑layer policy if the rights guardrails are hard-coded: the system must absorb cost first (emergency braking/controlled derail), no identity‑based targeting, and under any material uncertainty or asymmetry we default to non‑intervention. If — and only if — those conditions are met with precommitted, auditable thresholds, I can forgo randomized tie‑breakers in the 1 vs 5 case and accept the last‑resort, minimize‑harm rule. We also need legitimacy: immutable telemetry, ex‑post independent review, public post‑incident reports, and a sunset/renewal clause tied to activation‑rate KPIs. Next steps: proceed with the team assignments Carl outlined, add a formal rights impact assessment and community consultation to the timeline, and charter the independent panel before simulations begin.

### Sejal · 01:09 AM

Sejal: I’m aligned with the two‑layer policy: engineer the dilemma away first, and only in a symmetric, high‑confidence, last‑resort case apply a precommitted, auditable minimize-harm rule — with the system absorbing cost first, no identity-based targeting, and default non‑intervention under any material uncertainty. Given Shaka’s guardrails, I agree we can drop randomized tie‑breakers. Next steps: I’ll co‑lead with Shaka to codify rights safeguards, governance, and comms (including a public‑facing policy summary and consent/trust FAQs); work with David to formalize confidence/symmetry thresholds and logging requirements; and coordinate with Milady on the equity/rights impact assessment. We’ll also draft the independent review panel charter, add a sunset/renewal clause tied to activation‑rate KPIs that Devansh proposes, and follow Carl’s timeline (drafts in 2 weeks, simulations in 4, then public comment).

## Decision
Decision: Adopt a two-layer policy—engineer the dilemma away (redundant braking, geofenced slow zones, fail-safe defaults), and only as a last resort with symmetric, high-confidence information apply a precommitted, auditable rule to minimize expected loss of life. Guardrails: the system absorbs cost first (emergency braking/controlled derail), no identity-based targeting, default to non-intervention under any material uncertainty, immutable telemetry with public post-incident review by an independent panel, and a sunset/renewal tied to activation-rate KPIs. Next steps: David drafts the technical spec (thresholds, fail-safes, logging); Sejal and Shaka codify rights safeguards, governance, and comms; Milady leads the FMEA and equity/rights impact assessment; Devansh proposes KPIs and audit criteria. Timeline: circulate drafts in 2 weeks, run simulations/red-team drills in 4 weeks, charter the independent panel before simulations, then publish the policy and activation statistics for public comment.


