---
# System prepended metadata

title: 'Consciousness And Moral Status Reading Group: Week 3'
tags: [Philosophical Zombies, Ethics, Phenomenal Consciousness]

---

Consciousness And Moral Status Reading Group: Week 3
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###### tags: `Ethics` `Phenomenal Consciousness`, `Philosophical Zombies`

:::info
- **Reading:**  Levy, N. (2014). The value of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 21(1-2), 127-138 
- **Date:** Aug 18, 2020 12:00 PM (LONDON)
- **Host:** MM
- **Reference:** - [Last week meeting](/@tanzor/value2)

:::

Difference between phenomenal and access consciousness:
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- I didn't understand the **difference between phenomenal and non-phenomenal experience/conscious states**. It seems to me that every conscious state is "phenomenal" in a way. Maybe a discussion on this definition could clear that issue.
- When you take away phenomenal consciousness, what is left? What does it mean to have only access consciousness? Could we even ask “what it feels like”? Or is qualia gone once we remove phenomenal consciousness? (Uri)

By definition, qualia (and 'what it is like') is gone once we take away P. consciousness. However, it is contestable whether taking away P consciousness without affecting functional propoerties is possible.

- **Levy's philosophical Zombie seems to have a lot of phenomenological qualities**: it can feel emotions, have desires, appreciate easthetic beauty, etc. Does it still make sense to talk about phenomenological Zombie then? **What is the difference with a non-zombie?**
- Same point as above, specifically about '**subjectivity**' and '**experience**', which Levy seems to think are different from just 'phenomenal consciousness'.


Non-derivative value
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- In the context of a philosophical zombie not having the experience of e.g. taste, the text compared it to a machine having salt detectors but not being able to experience saltiness. This reminded me of our very first discussion about experiences having non-derivative value and made me wonder **if such a philosophical zombie could even assign non-derivative vaue to things**.


- TL;DR: **How can my zombie twin value things**? 
Longer version: When speaking of my zombie twin, Levy describes him as being able to “believe”, “feel”, “hope”, “fear”. What do these terms mean, in the lack of phenomenal consciousness? Sure, someone looking from the outside could conclude from his behavior that my zombie twin values beyond-meat burgers and devalues pins being inserted into his eyeballs. But in what sense does the zombie “value” things? If it doesn’t have an internal experience of things, if it merely behaves according to a set of rules (does it?), then could he himself be said to be able to assign “value”? (Uri)

Pain
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- **If the badness of pain does not lie in its phenomenal character then what is it exactly that makes us experience pain?** 
- For the canse of pain asymbolya: is it a double dissociation or just one-directional?** Are there examples of 'badness' without a phenomenal character**?

A similar point was made about valence being one among many phenomenal aspects of pain, and losing this aspect in pain asymbolia is actually losing a phenomenal property of pain.

- The notion that behaviour itself is a part of "what it is like". feelings of pain/love/happiness are comprised from bodily states and their interpretation. manipulation of bodily states changes the quality of experience.

Mata-points
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- When speaking of the value of being conscious (or of being anything, e.g. alive, for that matter), Levy doesn’t ask whether there is such a value that is independent of an observer. He rather tries to understand, with the reader, what is the value that we, as conscious creatures, assign to being conscious. “Do unto others what you would have them do to you” sort of point of view. (Uri)




