---
# System prepended metadata

title: Self-Modelling Group 16/05/2024
tags: [self-signaling, self, OSMG]

---

Self-Modelling Group 16/05/2024
===

###### tags: `OSMG`, `self-signaling`, `self`

:::info
- **Reading:** Bodner, R., & Prelec, D. (2003). Self-signaling and diagnostic utility in everyday decision making. *The psychology of economic decisions*, 1(105), 26. 
- **Date:** May 016, 2024 15:30 PM (OXFORD)
- **Participants:**
    - Matan
    - Noam 
    - Maya
    - Nicole
    - Zoe
    - OSMG Team <3
    
- **Note-taking:** Nicole & Matan


:::
- [name=OSMG Team]: 
The paper’s central focus is on self-signalling, an action Bodner and Prelec define as “an action chosen partly to secure good news about one’s traits or abilities, even when the action has no causal impact on these traits and abilities”. The paper is written from a mainly economics perspective, with the authors discussion the concept of self-signalling in terms of a rational conception of action. They propose that diagnostic signals are an endogenous part of the equilibrium of choice. Their model investigates whether pure self-signalling is separate from any desire regarded well by others and the notion of purely diagnostic motivation. They find that when diagnostic motivation is strong, the person’s actions exhibit a rigidity characteristic of personal rules. The authors conclude by discussing the difficulties and intricacies of self-signalling, such as the difficulty in discerning who is signalling and who is being signalled to. 

Themes highlighted below are: 
    1. Motivation & Utility
    2. Thoughts on elements of the theory of self-singalling and associated equations
    3. Links to Dennett's work
    4. Links to other papers
    5. Thoughts about future, open questions & random thoughts

clarification questions:
--- 
- [name=Noam]: The use of 'equilibrium' in the paper. 
    - [name=Matan] : This is a term from economics, meaning "a condition or state in which [economic] forces are balanced. In effect, [economic] variables remain unchanged from their equilibrium values in the absence of external influences. "

        In the context of this paper, the equilibrium is between the likelihood that I would choose a certaion action, given its self-signaling utility, and the self-signaling utility of an action, given my likelihood of choosing it. I found this helpful:
        ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BySlAbBmC.png)
        This is not an equilibrium because "low" can do better by abstaining instead of conuming lightly (it would then be interpreted as having a low disposition), which will lead the other dispositions to follow (if low -> abstain, than anything that is not abstraining is interpreted as moderate or high). 

Points for discussion:
---
- [name=Noam]: Besides– not having any basis in reality– what makes the “moral-placebo” a placebo effect? 
- [name=Zoe]: 
    - Can we have preferences over preferences over preferences? 
 
    - When are people just gathering evidence about their disposition by checking 'how I feel when I take the kind of action'? 
         - [name=Matan] so interesting
    - How useful is it to apply game theory in psychology? 
    - Great concept and I'm curious to learn more: excessive virtue
    - What was the role of formalisation in this paper? They didn't run any simuations. To clarify the theory?  
    - really interesting direction of studying relationship to self is to focus on what people do alone
    - I'm not sure I buy that many people actually worry about how they might self deceive themselves about being the kind of person who has disposition x 
    - Would be interesting to how to know how to change a person's diagnostic utility to affect their action
- [name=Nicole]: very curious as to people's thoughts on the real-life applications of this



### I found this intereting: 

#### Motivation & Utility 

- [name=Matan] That people may interpret their actions at face value, that is, not taking into account their self-signaling utility. 
- [name=Matan] This sounds right to me:
    > The subject population apparently divided into a self-satisfied, face-value interpretations majority, and a pessimistic, true-interpretations minority.
    - [name=Maya] Do you think this is how people are? Maybe it's not super relevant, but  I do feel like there is a difference between the Quattrone-Tversky experiment and e.g. gambling - in that there may be less opportunity for transparency in the former as participants are being told/fooled about some medical diagnosis (by researchers they presumably trust), so more people would unconsciously self-signal than would be the case in personal vices/dispositions. (But maybe having "true interpretations" of actions regarding one's vices also self-signals towards a virtue of self-awareness)
        - [name=Matan] This last point is so interesting. 🪆Meta-self-signaling🪆.
- [name=Matan] That caring about diagnostic utility may irrationally radicalize people to take extreme actions (like never walking into a casino even when there is some utility for everyone in going into a casino).
- [name=Noam] Motivational “short circuit” The idea that "Motivation does not require causality, even when the lack of causality is utterly transparent."
- [zoe: I found that interesting too]
- [name=Noam] For me, these citations touches on the essence of self-signaling: 
    >“the true interpretation model require a weird combination of self-ignorance (i.e., of one’s own dispositions) and self-awareness (i.e., of one’s propensity to self-signal)? 

    And this also 
    > “it is hard to discern two agents, the one who signals and the one who is signaled to” 
- [name=Nicole]:I like the distinction they make between outcome utility (as being anticipated causal consequences) and diagnotics utlity (as being the valueof adjusted estimate of one's disposition) - although i wonder how explicit/implicit that estimation actually is...
- [name=Nicole]: the idea of diagnostic motivation. 

#### Thoughts on elements of the theory of self-singalling and associated equations

- [name=Zoe]: distinction between a standard unknown parameter and a parameter like q which has the property of being “known” by the decision-making mechanism but which cannot be introspected before the choice.
    - [name=Matan] I think we had a similar thing in the Melnikoff & Strohminger model!
- [name=Nicole]: How much is the self-signalling and its value to estimates of the self mediated/influenced by what our actions might mean other people end up thinking of us? The examples on page 7 (ie climbing a dangerous mountain versus perseverance) seems a lot like shifts in narrative rather than maybe self-signalling? Because the behaviour there is the same it is just framed differently. Whereas an actual change in behaviour related to self-singalling seems slightly different? They do acknowledge this at the end and say it is hard to discern who singals and who is signaled to.
- [name=Nicole]: not sure if I agreed with the point that every current self know it's own preferences such as willpower; aren't there a lot of studies which on the contrary show that we really aren't very good at assessing things like this about ourselves
- [name=Nicole] The idea of engaging with behaviours even though they might not have an explicit causal effect

### Links to other papers and ideas:

#### Links to Dennett's work
- [name=Matan] Does Dennett's Gilbert choose actions based on their diagnostic utility about itself? Does this tendency for self-signaling appear in the narrative that it constructs about itself? 
- [name=Maya] That having a pessimistic self-image may reinforce decisions that are worse for you, which "constitutes an argument for positive thinking" - this feels related to Dennett's narrative self and hints at some (evolutionary?) advantage of optimistic self-signalling behaviour.
- [name=Nicole]: concerning remark 6, true intepretation model - it feels link its maybe tapping into some kind of objectivity that maybe we don't really have? really nice like to Dennet's writing on sense of self...  and especially as it links through to the idea of the ideal self

#### Other papers & ideas
- [name=Matan] Relevant authors that are mentioned in the paper:
    - George Ainslie (e.g., Beyond microeconomics: Conflict among interests in a multiple self as a determinant of value)
    - Benabou & Tirole (e.g., Self-knowledge and self-regulation: An economic approach)
- [name=Noam] Seeking proxies for internal states [SPIS](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0005796721001868) - How people with OCD are using  proxies for unaccessible internal states. Performing an action mostly for its diagnostic utility. Mostly related to Bem's self-perception (Bem, 1972) and James-Lang theory. 
- [name=Noam] “After the Actions the Hearts are Drawn” - Changing the behavior will affect the self-perception. A practical principle in CBT therapy.  
- [name=Nicole]: A lot of the ideas and themes really seem reflective of cognitive dissonance...

### Open questions, ideas for future work:
- [name=Matan] If I consistently abstrain from gambling because I value being the kind of person who does not gamble, and despite having a strong natural disposition to gamble, in what sense am I disposed to gambling? Would [Dennett's account of the self](https://hackmd.io/@tanzor/OSMG20240509) be able to make this distinction? Is it real? 

- [name=Maya]Would "natural disposition" mean being more sensitive to addiction (i.e., something physically determined?) Even so, I think Dennett would say that as soon as such a disposition enters into conscious thought, it can be woven into your narrative (and comes to mean something different). 


Random thoughts here:
---
- [name=Matan] A couple of months ago I ran some simulation's following Bernard Williams' [Moral Luck](https://watermark.silverchair.com/aristoteliansup50-0115.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAA38wggN7BgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggNsMIIDaAIBADCCA2EGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMYOmsve13Cu160DnMAgEQgIIDMocm7XKn2R5c5sVoUKI_2KPpTnJpsVpiYt7spTwzWr-7JxhKDo9de2UsAEgne-ZIO2V0tlFkSupUlGlLzPe9gmN99svKAGE8rkerObQNRuPi21Rt1OR15ZLJPUKeweAQL8FGPDYfJ7Q8ROu7P11vj7jdf6aQc3WO5Q-tYk-xoRr6WHHx9Hp4AG_zyOOUYCigGMVjHRMfuNvoeCy_NpDnyGJejPWB6EPhVGKY72I-ruiTj4HaCzabiwRjfYsni9rOXmeizh7AHkcdlcFhWCc5x_RAjunahWqp_tl0uI5wQTHE545kAOU3i47Kh54gPLayJPVvRpKoIqyNSUHqfvAwLgIBWKetlGB4UKeAn-2CPjTOcm0YlWCjUXMQIA798YAdaSv3JEvuRtpSeRJlQThLZ2cSyi_uSt4Tmbc_0MUFVCLaFniUQ58JHJPH4DokBP0y79GqSZJWD-0cm5BNOczJL88dg-kjdqrwjp4FGsM_Z09mCKLmdOgCfGGcWMj_xvK-ADcje4c6Vtur2RNrcnbST9GuNu7Wr7pOneYPcndlI6IS8SSo0s_ODV0d5Z2_G3zUiF0ODMTQ_0J_VRsjcb6hJ2-YQiYpJG0IPAbAiLGtcA_tnHpQYIUuhZYmexQkOKjw0OKhQPU11OaOpLGcyS94Wr3PnxrdA8S71fGTpQSNxMELhfl1YC7XrLvOE3vRg3yjWlBiqxKU7qu0KLMPGsXBWBgoUT-jAh8mPHATdzXGu3PSc4WE_MoZ3Gatrm_1M2BsSXDhXem_CMkMlPJNJRpuveyd-pc9HzUl3oD5X62HiMO5SuD7eJr_E61L_nkMmeNuW6QFbXbgwRVo_pI2XnqmnMp36V_PxrgIJD3kuhHJPpeGVPmOLn4g_4FWDSFdHeNh3tpli3b9egEX9KsEkUuSPB6psI1rYLqm6HdiXwTsOyiPUMr8bbCv5tEW0mWatGpsqsAPULEBDh_CYMN0kGpqxxT33HBxzxM0_TEwWHd7R2ztmhJiKHSR89gmr2P7CczOlNhZQ7ueOlqOwhp48YW-8t0GcEKDRANtZnw2IyHyG-rEuAB-6VY_0nqz7XltvwJpJqVT) paper (which I wholeheartely recommend). The key insight there was that consequences of our actions can reveal something about our motivation if we don't have perfect insight into out motivations (a [rough draft](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1qBArPyc9UUJWMSxbrw2IqhQs28jCUd1R2VAzqExb4QQ/edit?usp=sharing)). Reminded me of some ideas here.

