Self-Modelling Group Meeting 09/05/2024 === ###### tags: `OSMG`, `consciousness`, `selfhood`, `Daniel Dennett` :::info - **Reading:** Dennett, D. C. (2014). The self as a center of narrative gravity. In Self and consciousness (pp. 103-115). *Psychology Press*. - **Date:** May 09, 2024 15:30 PM (OXFORD) - **Participants:** - Matan - Noam - Nicole - Maya - Zoe - **Note-taking:** - Zoe & Matan ::: # summary > "In fact we have to posit selves for ourselves as well. The theoretical problem of self-interpretation is at least as difficult and important as the problem of other-interpretation." We spoke about the relationship between the self and consciousness, about authenticity, and about unity of experience. The premium that people place on unity is evident in the behaviour of split-brain patients, the confabulations made by amnesic patients, and behaviour of healthy adults in cognitive dissonance and choice blindness experiments. We agreed with Dennett that the self cannot be located in one brain area; instad, it is an abstraction and narrative fiction which constrains action and thought. We considered the function of having a single narrative, for ourselves (predicting the self and what we prefer) and our interaction with others. We agreed to read more philosophy papers: this was enjoyable and can help inform us about how to contruct our studies and what questions to ask. clarification questions: --- - [name=Zoe] Why do we use so few selves if it's apparently so advantageous? What's the point of a single narrative? Is his argument about the self being 'emergent' (sure?) or is it about the degrees of freedom ? Is his argument ‘merely’ about the self being a (possibly fictional or abstract) notion that ‘emerges’ from interacting physical components of the brain and cannot be reduced to one area or cell … or is his argument about the variability of the self, i.e. it is not as fixed as the small difference between me as a child between me as an adult might suggest - it is in fact much more flexible and controllable via narration. After the discussion I now think he argues for it being a fiction rather than an ‘emergent but real phenomenon’ and that he also argues the second point. I find the second point more interesting, because I find it hard to imagine what else the self could be if not an emergent, abstraction notion that is at least in parts constrained by narration. - [name=Matan] There is absolutely no emergence in this story. Just like there is no emergence of a center of gravity! - [name=Noam] What type of self is Dennet referring to? i.e the experiencing self of the narrative self - [name=Matan] Noam, is it fair to say that for Dennett there is no such a distinction? - [name=Nicole] Is there a distinction between perception of self and actual self that is made in the paper? - [name=Matan] Nicole, I think the answer is No. There is no True Self in Dennett's account. Just stories. - [name=Nicole] I honestly was a little confused about how he ties consciousness into it... I found it interesting: --- - [name=Noam] Bicameral Mind - [name=Matan] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bicameral_mentality - [name=Nicole] His relation between fictional and real... ie referring to one's self as the central fictional character of an autobiography... - [name=Matan] 👍 - [name=Matan] the idea of "bifurcation" of a self as a way to resolve contradictions. - [name=Zoe] found that interesting too, reminded me of cog dissonance /repressing(?) I wanted to discuss together: --- - [name=Zoe] maybe there is a more physical constrain on the 'self' abstraction than his argument about it being completely fictional assumes? I think it's empirically more sticky/constraining than his comparision would suggest. - [name=Matan] I think he does agree that it is constrained (just like the POMDP paper). - [name=Zoe] empirical question, what's the current state of research on MPD? - [name=Matan] The abstract [here](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/095269519200500202) seems to suggest MPD was almost a historical phenomenon of the seventies and eighties. - [name=Maya] I found the evolutionary theory to be the weakest part of his argument. There were several points he made: (a) the self as narrative construct and (b) conscious thought as a solution to internal communication problems of separate brain modules. The latter is a bit of a hot take as it is, to postulate it as a sufficient explanation of the former maybe even more. - [name=Maya]Maybe not super relevant but there's theories in evolution that some traits might be spandrels etc. To say that mental "modules" all fit some design purpose is a big claim to make - implications for mental disorders? - [name=Matan] That's an excellent point. Dennett famously rejects the splanders story and adopts a Panglossian paradigm , assuming that everything is designed for a reason (he defends this view in From Bacteria to Bach and Back). A good criticism of Dennett's Panglosian approach to consciousness was given by [Churchland and Ramachandran](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203773659-10/filling-dennett-wrong-patricia-smith-churchland-vilayanur-ramachandran), regarding his elegant, but empirically false, story about filling in in the visual system. - [name=Maya] Is conscious thought verbal per se? You might think that what makes thoughts "thoughts" is content and meaning which can take many other forms other than talking to oneself. - [name=Nicole] Interesting comparing self to centre of gravity, but then discussing how you can manipulate somethings centre of gravity although the essence of what is gravity would stay the same? So perhaps applying that to a fully flexible, unfixed notion of self doesn't quite work? - [name=Noam] Is center of gravity is actually an abstraction ? I mean when I think about abstraction other things come to mind like numbers and perhaps emotions like love. Not sure about the terminology of abstraction. I think he plays with it really loosly. - [name=Matan] We can define "the point in space that is exactly half-way between Noam and Matan" (this point constantly moves as we move in space. Now it is probably somewhere around Iffley Road). Is this point an abstraction? Random thoughts here: --- - [name=Zoe] who do mothers love? - [name=Zoe] meditation? why is it apparently nice to loose that abstraction of the self? - [name=Matan] his discussion of interetminate facts reminded me of J.K. Rowling revealing the sexual identity of Dumbledore - [name=Noam] Many of Dennet examples are trying to convey the idea that the human mind has a fragmented nature. If the self is fragmented does it mean that it is an illusion or a fiction? - [name=Nicole] I quite like the notion that sense of self-arises from narratives etc... not sure if I understand it correctly, but it seems very reminiscent of post-modernist arguments? E.g. the emphasis of subjectivity... - [name=Maya] The centre of gravity as a metaphor of the self is really beautiful (also: as the physical thing changes its centre of gravity changes and that kind of matches the construction of the self) but apart from that it's not all that analogous? How does the fiction comparison work here? - [name=Noam] He wrote this paper in 1992, kind of predicting the idea of AI writing stories.