Merkle Trees
Extends the hash functions & digital signatures provided by underlying Blockchain
“Participants do not need to manage cryptographic keys
beyond those used in Ethereum.” (Teutsch, Reitwießner, 8)
TrueBit uses Merkle Co-paths ensure computations are valid.
The Verification Game:
Summary:
Yes and No
In section 4.2 the white paper states that,
“in practice the verification tax requires a substantial cushion. We estimate the necessary verification tax to be 500% – 5000% of the cost of performing the given task.”
High fees relative to the computing price are undesirable, but they are still far lower than the gas fees Ethereum would charge for an equivalent computation on chain. This is analogous to benevolent price fixing in TrueBit’s governance system.
Unlike many historical examples of price fixing, TrueBit prices could still implement a measure of real time responsiveness to supply and demand. Instead of voting on a singular price per computation unit, participants would vote on a pricing function \(f\) so that:
\[ f(V,S) = T \]
Where
\(V\) = the average number of verifiers per task on the network
\(S\) = the proportion of solver computation speed to task volume (throughput/demand)
\(T\) = the tax or fee rate relative to the price of cpu cycles for the underlying computation
“the user community can democratically update the interpreter as needed”
But lacks any specification and is not further elaborated in the paper.
The Truebit governance is led by the original founding team. The team has not communicated about how it envisions the future of its governance and if part or all of the authority will be transferred to the community.
The authors claim to “introduce a governance layer whose lifecycles culminates with permanent dissolution into utility tokens, thereby tending the network towards autonomous decentralization.”
minDeposit
and timeOut
ensure terminationProtocols make an assumptions about the calling chain. It claims that censorships are not possible on Ethereum, because users can obfuscate the function of their transaction. That means that “miners cannot easily see where an Ethereum transaction might call without executing it”.
The general concept of safety is build around the incentive for network participant to build truthful. It is more profitable to receive a fair compensation that to break the safety. More of this is discussed in section 6.
It is also worth mentioning that the protocol properties defined in the whitepaper align with the implementation of a protocol.
Truebit is built around the goal of linking web 2 computational resources to web 3 in a trustless way. This is necessary on chains looking to handle either rich data formats or lots of traffic. Off chain actors are tied into the core smart contract via existential deposits which act as levers to ensure the contribution of compute resources without malicious behavior.
The state transition consists of three layers:
The protocol relies on the Layer 1 solution that can correctly perform small computation tasks in order to verify the correctness of the computations. The paper gives Ethereum as an example.
The computation tasks can be stored either on IPFS or blockchain directly.
However, the storage still remains an open problem for the project. Storing data on blockchain is way too expensive whereas IPFS can not guarantee the persistency of data without an incentive.
Both challenger and solver start at first computation step (i.e. 0
)
The challenger submits index i
of the step that differs from its own and then submit it to the network. If i
is outside the boundaries ( i < 1 || i > (n-1)
), the challenger loses the game and deposit immediately.
Otherwise, the challenger selects the configuration to challenge at position between the first step 0
and the first indicated wrong computation at i
.
The solver submit the hash of the computation (or state snapshot) and submits it as a proof of the correctness of the solution. The challenger then computes its own merkle tree and compares the value with its own.
If they are correct, the challenger advances and selects the configuration indexed between i - index_of_first_incorrect_configuration
and i
The game eventually runs for \(O(log(n))\) steps and converged to the first (initial) disputed step.
The configuration is then submitted back to the calling blockchain where validators of the network (e.g. Ethereum nodes) can verify it quickly on-chain.
Positives
Negatives
From 2.2 Assumptions - “There exists a trusted network (i.e. Ethereum) that correctly performs very small computation tasks.” (Teutsch, Reitwießner 9)
TrueBit's ideas could be repurposed to create a new consensus mechanism
Fix two problems with one solution
Fundamentally: runs batched computations to underlie PoW
What we theoretically get: