---
# System prepended metadata

title: MATHLETE PARSING ATTEMPT

---

# MATHLETE PARSING ATTEMPT

### This nerd here
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x060c88431464162a67f7390f7a15df50f096d67b07c849893949a7407b4f0a5a

#### So, I've broken this down by "sections"

We found the very first 4byte in the deployed contract, see below

0x<span style="color:blue">c348eaf7</span> : check decompiled contract shits

![](https://i.imgur.com/YbwrDaZ.png)


```
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000605c11ada422151c47400 #flash loan size
0000000000000000000000001111111254fb6c44bac0bed2854e76f90643097d #1inch v4
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000060 # offset dynamic data
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000408 # 1032 bytes of data
```

Above, you can see the params, and the 1032 bytes matches approx the lengh of the whole message (there's some zero padding at the very end)

Next section, we hit the 1inch 4byte.

<span style="color:orange">7c025200</span> : swap(address,(address,address,address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,bytes),bytes)
```
000000000000000000000000220bda5c8994804ac96ebe4df184d25e5c2196d4 # Weird 1inch contract
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000060 <-- what is happening
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000180 <-- in these two lines
```

I don't understand the `0x60` and `0x180` up above -- I would expect the `0x60` to be `0x40`

#### 
#### The four addresses of the 1inch swap
```
0000000000000000000000006b175474e89094c44da98b954eedeac495271d0f # DAI
000000000000000000000000a0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48 # USDC
000000000000000000000000220bda5c8994804ac96ebe4df184d25e5c2196d4 # Weird 1inch contract
0000000000000000000000004bba760285eddc7d64060298fe683fe443b1b806 # Hacker contract
```

Why is he using this **other** 1inch contract for this swap?

####
#### The 3 uints in the call
```
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000002f39f6d3a2ddd7a392c00 # QTY DAI
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000033dfc35c22a # MIN USDC RCVD
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004 # 4 args in array
```

#### The last bytes arg to 1inch swap

```
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 # Zero
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 # Fucking
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000260 # Clue
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040 # WTF

0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 # 2 args in array
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040 # ??
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000140 # ??
```

This next section is very unusual -- I don't understand the whole mess...

#### The unknown bytes
```
8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000060
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000064
```

Now this is how we interact with the DSS PSM

The `64` is saying `4byte + 3 32bit words`
<span style="color:orange">eb5625d9</span> :  	safeApprove(address,address,uint256)
```
0000000000000000000000006b175474e89094c44da98b954eedeac495271d0f # DAI
00000000000000000000000089b78cfa322f6c5de0abceecab66aee45393cc5a # DSS PSM
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000002f39f6d3a2ddd7a392c00 # QTY
```

#### More unknown shit
```
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080000000
000000000000000089b78cfa322f6c5de0abceecab66aee45393cc5a00000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000044
```

The `44` is saying `4byte + 2 32bit words`

<span style="color:orange">8d7ef9bb</span> : buyGem(address,uint256)
```
0000000000000000000000001111111254fb6c44bac0bed2854e76f90643097d # 1inch router
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000033ed0e61dd8 # QTY Gems to buy
```

#### Yet more unknown shit
```
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000cfee7c08
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
```