The early part of 2021 was fantastic for Sushi, the team, the holders, and the community. We were leading the way with a number of innovative product releases and pulling off what felt like the impossible. However, we were plagued with consistent issues for most of the remaining year which hurt the morale of the team, trust was lost with the community, and productivity was at an all-time low. 2022 will be better. We have composed an ambitious roadmap of some of the key product releases, improvements, and ideas from the team that we'd like to tackle. Three core overriding goals: Scalability Sustainability Efficiency Hybrid Exchange Permissionless AMM is a great model, it works, it scales, but has its own trade-offs and drawbacks. Moving to a hybrid model which combines the benefits of a permissionless AMM, and of decentralized order books, both on and off-chain is the way forward. It unlocks a huge volume potential by capturing the positive flow from aggregators, by offering the best execution prices which by default incentivizes volume. Even more, can be done though. Utilizing abstractions of layers & networks, liquidity could be utilized cross-chain via various solutions such as Layer Zero, for example, to provide the lowest execution price no matter what network you live on. The same idea can be replicated among various products in the Sushi ecosystem.

SushiXSwap - Cross Chain Swap Sushi-X-Swap enables cross chain swaps on Sushiswap on the supported networks. It supports all combinations of wallet, bentobox, trident and legacy AMM. It supports Stargate bridge as of now. Scenarios We assume that the tokens and bentobox approvals are already done. If not, add that at the start of the action. Asset Transfer - Stargate Supported Assets - USDC, USDT, STG BentoBox - Stargate - BentoBox In this case, use ACTION_SRC_TRANSFER_FROM_BENTOBOX and unwrap the tokens to this contract address. After this add action STARGATE_TELEPORT. On the dst chain, use ACTION_DST_DEPOSIT_TO_BENTOBOX, which deposits it to the bentobox.

Postmortem: 26th April, 2022 Participant: Sushi Core Team (Sarang, Matthew, Ramin, Jiro), Synthetix (JJ, Ethernaut) On April 26, 2022 at 11:33 PM UTC Sushi was alerted of a bug at handling of SNX token inside Bentobox. TLDR: ALL USER FUNDS ARE SAFE. DON'T DEPOSIT SNX OR ANY SYNTHETIX BASED ASSETS ON BENTOBOX Bentobox Contract: https://etherscan.io/address/0xf5bce5077908a1b7370b9ae04adc565ebd643966

Incident Report: Integrating the new SushiMaker contract While testing efforts to improve the operations of bridging of LP fees back to SushiMaker on Ethereum Mainnet from an expansive list of networks, a portion of fees was sent to the pool itself resulting in a loss of $400,000 fees from Polygon to the SushiBar. The new SushiMaker offers a variety of advantages including prevention of potential sandwich attacks when unwinding LP positions to buy SUSHI. During a particular unwinding action to deal with an edge case, $600k worth of fees were sent back to the pool address, due to wrongful encoding. The relevant transaction can be found here: https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x5610e8b733e371c1277458cf860a600f6c39c35f79fb2b7358d69118d27771cf

Postmortem: August 16th, 2021 Participants: samczsun, Georgios Konstantonopoulos, Dan Robinson, Duncan Townsend, Mitchell Amador, Joseph Delong, Mudit Gupta, Keno, Omakase Tech Team: samczsun, Georgios Konstantopoulos, Duncan Townsend, Keno, Mudit Gupta, Omakase Comms Team: Mitchell Amador, Joseph Delong, Omakase On August 16th, 2021 at 17:40 UTC Sushi was alerted of a vulnerability within the Miso Dutch Auction contract submitted by samczsun, Georgios Konstantopoulos, and Dan Robinson. The contract in question is here: https://etherscan.io/address/0x4c4564a1FE775D97297F9e3Dc2e762e0Ed5Dda0e#code No user commitments or creator minted tokens have been lost. The contracts were not pausable or upgradeable, however since the auction had reached its max commitment we recommended the auction creator immediately finalize the auction, thereby safeguarding funds from any potential harm. No user action is required. No funds have been lost. The current BIT-SUSHI auction remains unaffected and no outstanding auctions are affected by this vulnerability.

Postmortem: Miso supply chain attack Yesterday MISO suffered a supply chain attack. All funds have been recovered, the interface code updated, and we have taken concrete steps to fully secure access controls. A full postmortem can be found below: Sushi has a culture of building community-driven teams. We have a large, dedicated community contractors team. While we are humbled by our community of contractors, on Friday, September 17, Miso suffered a supply chain exploit, whereupon the fund wallet address was fixed to 0x3dDD8b6D092df917473680d6C41F80F708C45395 for ETH and WETH auctions. Upon finalization of the JayPegs auction, 865 ETH was transferred to the exploit address as the parameters were unrealized. The studio repo had a procedure to open PRs on the dev branch and go through review to merge into the master branch. However, this process was not enforced by git branch protection settings. In response, subsequent git branch protections were applied. Additional review to integrate with LavaMoat and automated diff checker implementations have been scheduled. Master or main branch protections also apply to administrators as well. This allows the pull request approval and signature policy to be put into effect.