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Generalized Proposal Inverter

The idea is to define the generalized proposal inverter.

State

Name Symbol Definition initial value
Allocated Funds
A
A=iBai
0
Unallocated Funds
R
FA
140
Total Funds
F
140
Committed Brokers
B
Number of Brokers
n
n=|B|
0
Broker Claimable Funds
ai
0
Broker Stake
si
5 (=
smin
)
Total Broker Stake
S
S=iBsi
0
Horizon
H
RΔA
20
(=FΔA)

Parameters

Name Symbol Definition initial value
Minimum Stake
smin
siσ
5
Epoch Length
Δt
1 day
Min Epochs
τ
28
Allocation Per Epoch
ΔA
10
Min Horizon
Hmin
7
Min Brokers
nmin
1
Max Brokers
nmax
5

Mechanisms

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Owner

Owner can be brokers or Payers or both

Deploy

An actor within the ecosystem can deploy a new agreement contract by specifying which proposal the agreement supports, setting the parameters of the smart contract providing initial funds, and providing any (unenforced) commitment to continue topping up the contract as payer under as long as a set of SLAs are met. For the purpose of this draft, it is assumed that the contract is initialized with some quantity of funds

F such that
H>Hmin
and that
B=
.

Cancel

In the event that the owner closes down a contract, each Broker gets back their stake, and recieves any unclaimed tokens allocated to their address as well an equal share of the remaining unallocated assets.

That is to say the quantity

Δdi of data tokens is distributed to each broker
iB

Δdi=si+ai+RN

and thus the penultimate financial state of the contract is

S=0R=0A=0

when the contract is self-destructed.

Forced Cancel

There may conditions under which any address may trigger the cancel but these conditions should be indicative of a failure on the part of the payer. An example policy would be to allow forced cancel when

n<nmin and
H<Hmin
, and possibly only if this is the case for multiple epochs.

Payer

A payer, who may or may not be the owner may contribute funds to the agreement in order to ensure its continued existence.

Pay

A payer takes the action pay by providing a quantity of tokens (split into Stablecoins and DAO tokens)

ΔF which increased the unallocated funds (and thus also the total funds).

F+=F+ΔFR+=R+ΔF

Furthermore, the Horizon

H is increased

H+=R+ΔFΔA=H+ΔFΔA

Synthetic State Change

The synthetic state change is a change the contract state that is not realized until later. In this case the automatic allocation of funds from the pool

R to the pool
A
is implicit. For reference see geyser contracts, although rewards each participant is entitled to are determinstic, they are not actually resolved until they make a claim, see broker actions.

Per epoch

t of length
Δt
, let
Bt
be the set of brokers
iB
for the entirety of the epoch, and if
nt=|Bt|>nmin
then

ai+=ai+ΔAntA+=A+ΔAR+=RΔA

Note that

F+=F so no tokens are actually flowing, this book-keeping reflects the amount of funds broker
i
will recieve in the event that they make a claim or other payout event occurs.

Furthmore, if

nt=|Bt|<nmin, payments are not issued as the terms of the agreement are not considered met, and additional allocations are not accrued for the passage of epoch
t
:

ai+=aiA+=AR+=R

If having one broker suffices then setting

nmin=1 is recommended.

Above, I have considered a very simple conditional allocation policy, that provides a fixed reward of

ΔA per epoch
Δt
evenly over the brokers in the agreement as long as the minimum broker count is met. This is placeholder logic, both the total flow and the allocation rule can be state dependent. An example alternative would be to release an amount of funds which is a scale factor on the total tokens staked up to some cap:
ΔA=max(γS,ΔAmax)
, where each broker received
Δai=ai+at=γsi
unless the cap was met.

Broker

Join

A broker

i can join the agreement by staking
siσ

B+=B{i}S+=S+si

Note that if the act of joining would cause

|B+|>nmax then joining would fail. It is not possible for more than
nmax
brokers to be party to this agreement.

Furthermore, it is possible to enforce addition access control via whitelists or blacklists which serve to restrict access to the set

B. These lists may be managed by the owner, the payers, and/or the brokers; however, scoping an addition access control scheme is out of scope at this time.

Claim

A broker is attached to agreement can claim their accumulated rewards at their discretion.

A+=AaiF+=Fai

Note that while this decreases the total funds in the contract it does not decrease the unallocated (remaining) funds in the conract because claims only extract claims according to a deterministic rule computed over the past.

Many brokers may choose to claim their funds more or less often depending on opportunity costs and gas costs.

Preferred implementations may vary see section on synthetics state.

Leave

In the event that the horizon is below the threshold

H<Hmin or a broker has been attached to the agreement for more than
τ
epochs a broker may exit an agreement and take their stake (and outstanding claims):

B+=B{i}S+=SsiA+=AaiF+=Fai

The broker recieves the balance

si+ai.

However if a broker has not stayed for the entire period

τ or the contract is not running low on funds, the stake will be kept as payment by the agreement contract when the broker leaves

B+=B{i}S+=SsiA+=AaiF+=F+siai

The broker only recieves

ai.

In a more extreme case we may require the broker to relinquish the claim on

ai as well but this would easily be skirted by making a claim action before leaving.