# Cost of Fee Switch _activating the protocol fee comes at a cost_ --- ## Agenda 1. Uniswap model 2. Attack 3. Funding mechanism 5. Teachings --- ## Uniswap model πŸ¦„ --- ### Uniswap v2 fork competition game Model: - 2 competing AMMs - A ↔ B pools - Swappers allocation: cost ≃ price impact - LPs allocation: revenue ≃ volume ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/Syq0JWP76.png) --- ### Swappers allocation Price impact: ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/SJgYcWvQ6.png) --- ### Swappers allocation Utility: ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/SkIfAWPmT.png) See Angeris et al: "An analysis of Uniswap markets", 2019 <!-- ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BkU_TB87p.png) --> --- ### Swappers allocation 🧈 allocate more towards AMM with larger reserves --- ### LP allocation ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/HyNIqcPX6.png) 🧈 marginal allocation 100% towards AMM with larger volume --- ### Equilibrium under network effects ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BkZR7cv7T.png) ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/ByQBQ9P76.png) --- ## Attack Simple model: - fee switched on forever Intuition: - If fee switched on, then no-fee competitor captures more than its fair share. - Use this extra volume to fund a subsidy. - With enough subsidy, network effects move equilibrium towards competitor. --- ### Fee switch ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/SyhFu9Pm6.png) --- ### Subsidy (vampire attack) 🧈 at equilibrium, subsidy makes LP allocation indifferent 🧈 equilibrium +Ξ΅ counteracts network effects: **liquidity flight** ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/SJF9i9vXa.png) --- ### Total cost As a function of ratio of LP re-allocating: ⚠️ ratio will be lower because of switching costs (brand, smart contract risk, legal…). ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BJRq35wQ6.png) V = 10^8 USD R = 10^7 USD R_1(0) = 100% --- ## Funding mechanism Intuition: - AMM 2 has **no fee switch in its capture surface** - raise debt rather than equity to fund the subsidy - funding via governance mechanism or crowdfunding --- ### Subsidy funding ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BJyzFovm6.png) --- ### Source of funds 🧈 avoid equity-like funding: capture via wealth condensation 🧈 if governance surface: `Debt(GovernanceFutureRevenue)` - parameter auctions - proposal auctions - auctions & futarchy: https://ethresear.ch/t/governance-mixing-auctions-and-futarchy/10772 🧈 crowdfunding: LPs and swappers will fund if more efficient (coasean argument) ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BkAv2ovmp.png) --- ## Teachings _what does this prove about governance?_ --- ### Upper limit on eXtractible Value 🧈 XV is the present value extracted by UNI tokenholders out of the protocol 🧈 XV is limited by the attack: - either ρ > 0 is fixed: volume will be reduced ultimately to 0 - either ρ is moduldated to limit liquidity flight ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/H1-Sx2wQ6.png) --- ### Internalize externalities 🧈 forking & smart contracts pressure actual governance 🧈 grim trigger on UNI tokenholders --- # πŸ‘‹ 🧈 twitter.com/butterymoney twitter.com/lajarre https://bit.ly/3QvNsQj ![image.png](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/rJ9NzhvQa.png)
{"title":"Cost of the Fee Switch","description":"yes, activating the protocol fee has a cost!","contributors":"[{\"id\":\"ffd4c12d-9295-4469-9c84-145f40f08df8\",\"add\":5660,\"del\":2379}]"}
    82 views