---
# System prepended metadata

title: Easy DAO

---

# Easy DAO

Imagine a fully decentralized open system that would allow people to ask for a refund of their actions on the ground matching the "statement of intent" of a given community...

## Abie and PoH

[Abie](http://abie.fund/) was developped between March 2017 and February 2019. Back then it was very hard to obtain a successful test (with a real impact), and we actually never got it. The main reason is probably that we were never confident enough in the software (Solidity and React) to invite communities to use it. 

Except now almost every tech bricks are ready AND the skillful devs are available to build with us.

PoH ([Proof-of-Humanity](https://www.proofofhumanity.id/)) apparently can improve the system because we can now set the rules without worrying about Sybil attacks when we design the voting rules. At least that's what I told myself learning about PoH on July 2021 (EthCC conference). 

## Principles

- Membership only requires PoH.
- Proposals are voted 'yes' by default. Members can only vote 'no'. 
- The more is at stake with a proposal, the less 'no' votes are required to reject it. Meaning the more money is asked to the DAO, the easier it becomes to reject (ie. only "one 'no' vote is enough to reject a 10k proposal". Let's call this the "tension ratio". This is an algorythm to design (which can be developped in parallel).
- Fees are taken if the proposal is rejected.
- Members can trigger a vote to slash another member + when it concerns a founding member, it requires even less votes.
- Once a certain cash flow is reached AND/OR at a certain date, the founding members revoke their membership.
- Members can set the "tension ratio" algo.

## Use cases

- Activists & global causes
- Federations of orgs
- A neighborhood (funding mini-projects)
- ...

## Design issues

- How do we avoid collusion between members?
    - We can't. **The worst identified case is "members colluding to reject a legit proposal".**
    - Only the 'no' votes are taken into account, so there can't be a group of people joining, submitting a fake proposal, and just approving a non-legit proposal. 
- How do we avoid bribery when we exactly know who votes what?
    - Votes will be anonymous in a close future, but right now, they're not. 
    - In the context of Easy DAO, bribery don't make much sense: who would bribe members to reject a proposal?