---
# System prepended metadata

title: 'Episode 170: December 2nd, 2021'
tags: [G&R]

---

---
tags: G&R
---

# Episode 170: December 2nd, 2021

## Agenda

- [00:03](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=4): Introduction
- [01:39](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=99): Votes and Polls
- [04:52](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=99): MIPs Update
- [08:28](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=508): Forum at a Glance
- [12:22](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=742): Discussion - Delegates 
- [38:25](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=742): Discussion - Collateral Offboarding
- [1:01:40](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=3700): Open Discussion
- [1:17:11](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=3700): Conclusion

## Video

https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA

## Introduction 

### Agenda and Preamble

#### Payton Rose

[00:04](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=4)

- Hello, welcome everybody to the scientific Governance and Risk Meeting #170 here at MakerDAO. My name is Payton, and I go by Prose11 online, one of the governance facilitators. Please note that this meeting is being recorded; please be mindful and not speak over each other. However, we encourage all open participation, and everyone is welcome to drop the question in the chat. We have quite the agenda today, so I will get us to get it. We will end with an open discussion.

## General Updates

### Votes

#### Payton Rose

*Polls:*
- 7 Weekly Polls - PASSED
    - Increase the Dust Parameter for Most Vault Types 1
    - Increase the Dust Parameter for ETH-B Vault Type
    - Use the MakerDAO Treasury to Fund MKR Expenses
    - Add GUNIV3DAIUSDC2-A as a new Vault Type
    - One Time Payment to the GovComms CU
    - Parameter Changes Proposal - MakerDAO Open Market Committee
Add CurveLP-stETH-ETH as a new Vault Type
- 2 Greenlight Polls - PASSED
    - MONETALIS (Monetalis Wholesale SME Green Growth Lending) 1
    - SB-frOGI (SolidBlock Red Frog Digital Coin)

*Executive:*
- Last Week’s executive - PASSED & EXECUTED
    - WBTC-C and GUSD PSM Onboarding
    - Surplus Buffer and D3M Parameter Changes
    - Core Unit Budget Distributions and Streams
- Executive proposal is up for vote tomorrow. Will include:
    - Delegate Compensation Payments
    - OMC and dust Parameter Changes
    - GUNIUSDCDAI-2 Onboarding
    - COM-001 Budget Transfer

### MIPs

#### Pablo

[4:57](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=297)

[Weekly MIPs Update #64](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/governance-and-risk-170-thursday-december-02-17-00-utc/11899)

![](https://i.imgur.com/XqqYchk.png)

![](https://i.imgur.com/Ga6A3FK.png)

![](https://i.imgur.com/8QvmfKs.jpg)

![](https://i.imgur.com/zwT5C4a.jpg)

### Forum at a Glance

#### Artem Gordon

[8:36](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=516)

Post: [Forum at a Glance: November 25th - December 2nd](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/forum-at-a-glance-september-10th-16th/10344)

Video: [Forum at a Glance](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/forum-at-a-glance-november-25-december-2/11967)

## Team-led Discussions

### Delegates

![](https://i.imgur.com/4QqUQC2.png)

[12:50](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=770)

LongForWisdom: To give everyone a chance to comment on how delegates are going and how the conversation is going. I am going to provide a brief overview. We have 8-9 delegates right now. One of our concerns was not being able to attract recognized delegates. It is fantastic that we have people in this new community and take this role in Maker. While debatable if this was attributed to the trial compensations, we still want to see these positive outcomes. As Payton mentioned, the first batch of delegate compensations will be part of the executive proposal tomorrow. There are only four delegates that we are distributing to this week. We are leaving some out based on the current metric cutoff at 90%. Some are eligible, but they are new, not focused, and have not accrued much MKR to delegate to. We will skip some payments, about 50 Dai, for gas reasons. We will roll that over into next month, assuming this accumulates more.
- We have a couple of delegates receiving the full amount and a couple receiving close to the full amount. We have a spreadsheet that we will post to the forum to make public before the exec. It will be linked. However, this has not been smooth sailing. In retrospect, the initial plan to set the compensation based on a hard cutoff of 90% on the metrics was a mistake. I believe Makerman has ended with a figure close to 89% for participation. This is a bit unfortunate in terms of the rule. We are proposing to sort of soften that out a bit. There is a request in the forum now about this. We should gradually cut this towards 75% delegate participation and communication, which is we are around now. Feel free for anyone to comment.

[16:43](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=1003)

- David Utrobin: One thing that I find interesting about this development is that delegates themselves have a natural floor for participation. But then, some delegates also have a grander view of a single recognized delegate. I will use GFX labs as an example. They have multiple people on their singular delegate platform. When you are delegating to them, you are not delegating to one person but rather to a team of people. This is an interesting and higher level of participation than an individual trying to be a sole delegate. It makes sense to introduce a sliding compensation scale regarding your behavior and participation. I like where things are going and the current delegates’ engagement. This has been helpful for the DAO.

#### Roles of Delegates

![](https://i.imgur.com/DUJfgkQ.png)

![](https://i.imgur.com/FaTPMlk.png)

[18:31](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=1111)

- David Utrobin: Is there any issue apart from the 90% participation threshold? Are there any other things popping into people’s minds that they have a problem regarding delegate compensation?
    - LongForWisedom: What do delegates generally do?

[18:55](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=1135)

- David Utrobin: I briefly mentioned the recognition of delegates as teams versus individuals. There is an emerging meta that delegates are the role of overseers, even though they do not want to micromanage core units. Their responsibility is to ensure a high level of integrity with what is said versus the actions taken. That is an aspect of a delegate. There is also the aspect of delegates being proactive starters on new initiatives. A great example is in our following discussion is the offboarding and communication standards for vault offboarding. A user came and told their story on Governance call last week. They posted once again on the forum for reference. This produced a MIP that paper Imperium with GFX labs spearheaded by inviting several DAO members to come in and contribute to these requirements. How do we codify our communication standards around offboarding?
- Thus, we see delegates also as these proactive starters. For example, Schuppi has been proactive on so many of the signal requests pretty much since Maker started. At the very least since the MCB started. I am noticing that aspect. Then I am curious, what other roles do delegates fit into aside from overseers and proactive starters? What roles should they not work? Should there be an overseer?
    - LongForWisdom: Those questions are difficult to answer at this stage regarding what delegates should be doing versus what they are doing. We only had the delegates for a few months; it is still early. Once we get more delegates and the landscape starts getting more competitive, we will see the changes you are talking about. So, what are the delegates doing? I am worried about looking at the current situation and extrapolating beyond what it is or assuming it will carry on in that vein.
    - David Utrobin: Are you worried about more disagreements between delegates in the future?
    - LongForWisdom: I am not worried about disagreements necessarily, just that the current state does not necessarily represent the larger future state of delegates.
    - David Utrobin: Two newly recognized delegates evidence your statement came and applied these past two months. We have JustinCase and another that applied yesterday.

[22:35](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=1355)

- Dereck: As a facilitator, I see that we are moving in a good direction. To David’s point around proactive starters, several delegates reached out to me with questions. I have only been able to respond to some, but it has forced me to reach to the team and come back with responses. It is a positive move to have someone ask us questions on the various protocols. I am happy to have that dialogue but would like it to be more transparent—transparency ties back to our mandated actor discussions and evolution. Delegate involvement is also an important piece to move towards as well. I am happy to see higher delegate participation. Thank you, guys.
    - David Utrobin: Do you have any cautions or mindful notes to share for existing delegates? Are you noticing anything not being addressed or not being paid attention to?
    - Dereck: That is difficult to say. Our current questions that hold us accountable for our work and actions are good. As a facilitator, I find transparency, openness, discussion, and positive questions. Although it may take time away from other topics, I find asking questions and participating 100% important. 

[24:56](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=1496)

- Wouter: I want to second one there. I am happy with the current state of how delegation happens at Maker. Transparency is and will remain important. Due to its power centers, we have not gotten to the stage of delegates attempting to abuse their power. The current setup begins with the expectation set around transparency. This high standard set by the delegates we see today properly motivates voting behavior. This process has created a good environment. There is quite a bit of transparency right now. However, I am worried that this may not continue later because no guardrails are in place. Transparency is encouraged but not supported. When it becomes clear how the delegate power can be used and abused, we might see more exciting situations where conflict of interests starts to play a role. Individual delegates might choose not to be transparent. Then, we will begin to see the limitations of the current framework. But in all, I am happy about the current state of delegation at Maker; it has improved things tremendously.

[27:07](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=1627)

- Prose11: One question coming is up is delegates voting on their compensation. This has happened previously and will occur in the future, assuming our present signal request does go through on an upcoming poll. GOV Alpha view and the response to our setup around that may be interesting to some on the call. There are special rules set aside for how and when representatives can vote on their compensation, like in many governments. We do not have them in the protocol partly to maintain this permissionless structure that allows anyone to set up a delegate contract. Anyone can propose any change to Maker protocol through our governance systems. In terms of concerns, several actions can occur when people feel that delegates are abusing their ability to vote on their compensation. You can instantly redelegate or unassign your delegation. This is a check on that type of behavior. Please keep in mind these people were being delegated to make big decisions with billions of dollars of capital in the protocol. Self-interest and compensation can be an area of corruption if you are unwilling to trust a delegate voting honestly, transparently, and responsibly. It would help if you thought about your willingness to delegate to them for other issues.
    - David Utrobin: How do governments and other organizations deal with voting on compensation? Is there a special committee that is created? Is there a sub-voting structure?
    - Prose11: Sure, I did work on different ones across the world. Here in the US, several rules vary depending on government structure. A standard amount is one can vote on a raise, but it will not occur until the next election cycle. Caps are common. The cap increases are capped to cost of living, inflation adjustments, or something similar. 

[30:39](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=1819)

- LongForWisdom: We can do a couple of things to make the protocol less of a problem; it has not been the highest priority. During the trial period, I am less worried about the long term. The long term is important, but we will not lock ourselves out of fixing that later.

[30:43](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=1843)

- Wouter: Compensation is so open and obvious that it is a lesser risk. Delegates have an incentive to be reasonable to attract MKR votes. Delegates are also impacted by their own decisions, for example, how the delegation system works and delegate limits on being executives in the DAO. One of the longer-term, creeping, and problematic risks are maintaining the power balance between core units, the delegates, other power centers. Why would delegates ever vote to restrict their power? We started with high standards and exemplary behavior, but it may soon be clear that there are certain things that delegates can vote for that would significantly increase their influence. In general, we need to determine how much power they have. That is the key question.

[33:26](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=2026)

- Joshua: Someone raised the question of how other political systems work with delegation? There are not many good comparisons out there. With the MakerDAO system, Maker holders can undelegate at a moment’s notice. That is a unique feature of the way delegation works at MakerDAO.  Once you delegate in most other political systems, it must go through Congress. Congress members hold that position for two years, six years in the Senate. You are stuck with them. But in MakerDAO, you can undelegated at a moment’s notice.

[34:22](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=2072)

- David Utrobin: The challenge is that most delegators are not actively paying attention unless there is a big campaign or controversy on the forums. I also wanted to comment on Wouter’s point about delegates as power centers and the general governance representation. There are other parties at Maker. There are various stakeholders in addition to core units and delegates. There is also a level of representation for Vault users, Dai holders, and other stakeholder types at Maker. Should we consider different ways to represent them in the sister system or given power? I had this idea of Phantom voting MKR. It is not actual MKR, and you cannot redeem it for MKR. In addition, to if you are a mandated actor, you will have a certain base voting weight on the vault. This is a far-out idea that I did not see talked about anywhere. I am curious about people’s general thoughts on governance, power, and representation for other stakeholders beyond delegates and regular MKR voters. 
    - LongForWisedom: Let’s save that for another time as we could talk about that for an hour and a half. 
    - David Utrobin: I am happy to put it out there as a seed to an idea. The meta of the governance that Maker is the plutocracy. You need skin in the game to have some say in governance. If you own MKR or are a delegate, you have skin in the game the same as a vault or Dai user. That was my thinking behind the idea.
    - LongForWisdom: I want to talk briefly about institutional delegation; its anchorages are awkward for institutional users to delegate. Several larger holders are in the process of setting that up now. Hopefully, more MKR will be coming into the delegates in the next few months, hopefully on the outside.

### Collateral Offbaording

[38:21](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=2301)

- Prose11: We have covered this topic well; we will move on to collateral offboarding. We recently started offboarding unprofitable collaterals or ones that are not seeing much use. We need to find different ways to improve. David mentioned the testimonial we got last week regarding how our procedure and practice have affected people. We are thinking about how to avoid that in the future and systems for collateral offboarding to follow more properly. This is not delegated to the mandated actors, which was the single request and poll for a little while in Maker history. Months ago, we had this point to investigate vault offboarding. It was left to the mandate actors to sort out the how and when of this offboarding. This was not great for transparency, so hopefully, we can talk about clutter offboarding more generally. I got a response. If you do not want to speak, I will just take your silence, Paper. I know you are putting together MIPs for collateral offboarding.

![](https://i.imgur.com/YVL8nBD.png)


[39:59](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=2399)

- Paper: I am working on a MIP to have a communication process for users. I am happy to seek input from anybody that wants it. We are in the second round. I will put something up on the forum either tomorrow or next week so people can continue to offer suggestions. It will not be anything controversial. It is shaping up for CES to get a checklist and own the process of running down various media assets and communication channels. We want to give a period to communicate before people get liquidated.

[41:08](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=2468)

- David Utrobin: I am curious about one aspect of collateral offboarding that Richard has discussed in his post and recommendations list. One recommendation spoke of alternatives for softer offboarding instead of our current method of setting the debt ceilings to zero, setting the liquidations penalty to zero, and then increasing the collateralization ratio requirement to push all the votes into liquidation. He recommended the opposite of a zero debt ceiling, zero liquidation penalty, but increased stability fee. You could liquidate people out later, but why not just do an instability fee? Does anybody else have thoughts on what might be a more ideal and softer offboarding tactic? Soft offboarding or taking longer to offboard does incur an Oracle cost. What can we do on the Oracle side for collaterals being offboarded during that time? Is there a way to down tune the Oracle costs in a non-disruptive way, given that liquidation penalties and the debt ceiling are zero?
    - UnknownSpeaker: There are two questions at hand. The first question concerned the same scenario where the debt ceiling was zero and the liquidation penalty was zero. The question is whether to approach the liquidation point by either tuning the stability fee to go up over time or tuning the collateralization ratio. We chose the collateralization ratio because it does not cost the user anything additional. Without communicating to the user, the stability fee would blind them by this massive fee collection on their vaults. This ends in a bad user experience that looks like predatory lending from the Maker perspective. That is the answer to the first question. I leave it to Nik or someone else to discuss the second question. The way to take a lighter approach on Oracles would be not to update them every hour or so? The answer would be updating them in case prices fell, but not when prices were increasing. That may be the answer, but I pass it to Nik.
    - Nik Kunkel: For recent collateral types that were offboarding, we changed the parameters we updated them now. There are risks that the system takes on for a particular collateral type. We give those collateral types of risk parameters based on the liquidity in the markets, the volatility profile, and so forth. When you update the Oracle less, you effectively have the protocol take on more risk. You do not want to do it for the more volatile collateral types when outstanding Dai is still relatively high. That sounds counterintuitive because there is not enough Dai if we are offboarding. We are not earning enough fees. But you can, for example, look at something like uni, which I believe is about 10 million Dai. Due to an estimated 1% stability fee, we only make about 100k on it. The protocol does not want to take a $10 million loss; that is significant. Changing the uni Oracle parameters is more suspicious than the LoopRing token with only 50k or 100k Dai outstanding. We can lower the Oracle costs during the offboarding process, but it has to be treated on a case-by-case basis. Some factors would make us hesitate to do that.

[47:16](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=2836)

- Nikolaj: My point is on a slightly different topic as it is a more general problem that does not relate to collateral offboarding. Instead, I see it as an example of Maker covenant shutting off a service or feature of the Maker Protocol or changing it dramatically. One of my inputs on Paper’s MIP was to make an even more generic process and increase dust limits. I remember this vox MIP came in in the integration team and the foundation. We immediately knew from our integrators that changing the par value in the Maker protocol is not something we should do. This would prorate a lot of integrations. We need to consider end-users and integrators when we either shut off services or substantially change them. This is a general problem we will see with collateral on offboarding.

[48:48](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=2928)

- David Utrobin: In the first prompt I designed for this segment, I asked what other government actions require more proactive comms? That is what you are hitting on. It is offboarding and dust limits and changes to auction parameters. At some level, our team at Gov Coms is mapping the entire stakeholder ecosystem at Maker. The next progression of that project is to take each stakeholder and drill down into their profile to identify the changes that affect this user type or stakeholder type the most. It is not necessarily users but could also be large holders, institutional partners, and people indirectly affected by MakerDAO changes. Getting a good view of that is undoubtedly something the DAO shall be working on.

![](https://i.imgur.com/qFF3koI.png)

[50:09](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=3009)

- Nadia Alvarez: I do not know if Robert is here, but he said something interesting about the MIP on Discord. If we manage the collateral lifecycle as a product, this will be part of the process. We onboard the collateral when we afford it as a clear onboarding criterion. When collateral is at risk to be ordered, what are the next steps for the stakeholder in charge? What are we going to do with users? If we raise the dust limit, for example, that is part of the lifecycle for that product. That was an exciting point of view. I am happy about having a collateral core unit because this treats the issue seriously, views new collaterals as a product, and creates that life cycle. Although this would take a couple of months, this will help us by addressing the communication problems we have now.
    - Robert: There was a discussion going on earlier in the chat. I appreciate Paper for spearheading this. Now that my team is getting up and running, Nikola is doing a fantastic job onboarding the new engineers from a technical perspective. I now get to turn my activities toward these types of issues. One discussion topic I mentioned earlier was the need for offboard signaling to the community as we onboard collateral. Is there something else we should be doing? Once a piece of collateral is onboarded, we must follow a specific process to manage collateral and communication. This is especially the case if we need to offboard it. Until now, we have not seen or experienced collateral management as a product and following a lifecycle. We can hopefully set up objective metrics upfront when we onboard a piece of collateral. This is how I view all our collateral that is currently onboarded and those yet to be onboarded. If done correctly, there is no need for a signal request as we will already be on top of this. It is not a matter of trying to cut the community out but instead establishing consistency in managing our collateral communicating to our stakeholders once we get something in the pinball machine. Then, if we decide to offboard a piece of collateral, this will follow a well-published process to do so. That was the net of the conversation.

[54:01](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=3241)

- David Utrobin: I just wanted also to tack on the culture of the cultural implications of this issue. As a group that manages the protocol, we are all mindful of the numbers, the risk management, and the operational efficiency. One thing that makes companies stand out and succeed is the emphasis placed in our culture about looking after the end-user. At Maker, it is not super straightforward because there are many end-users. There are Oracle users, Dai users, and Vault users. Outside of our technical and quantitative view on managing the protocol, we should try to be mindful about what our actions implicate for the end-user, whoever that might be.
    - LongForWisdom: We should get in the habit of thinking about the possible outcomes of our actions before acting upon them. It was predictable that this was going to happen. A genius is not needed to predict that one of the outcomes of offboarding collaterals such that most users get liquidated within a few days, which causes those users to be upset.

[57:10](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=3430)

- Robert: I want to add one more thought about collateral offboarding that just occurred to me. It is related to the jurisdiction in which you find yourself. You have a house, and you have a loan against your house and a type of HELOC. You do not pay your bills, so your house gets repossessed and liquidated. You now owe taxes and jurisdictions on that liquidating portion. Offboarding through liquidation has bad tax implications, depending on the liquidating jurisdiction. We may want to consider or figure out the collateral offboarding process’s user impact.
    - David Utrobin: How do we get other people with skin in the game or different stakeholder types a type of governance representation? Even having less than 1% of Dai users aware offers a virtual feedback channel. As Long said, we could have caught the offboarding issues. The mindlessness and lack of review reflect a few people’s failures, including my own. Opening lines of feedback and communications to these stakeholder types is important. That is why we have always kept the Governance and Risks calls public. We are moving towards a model for our coordination calls to be more transparent and allow people to request invites for specific initiatives.

### Open Discussion 

#### Questions

[01:01:41](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=3701)

- Juan: I wanted to share a couple of the calls we are having. First, we want to start a conversation about anything related to green or clean money. We invited Adam from Greenbit to talk with us. He will be in our call for Maker Explorer on December 8th. Interestingly, Layer Zero will be leading these calls called Lex Maker. We are working to bring different DAOs, start legal research, and talk about Lex Maker. We technically had the pilot when we had the Dai foundation years ago. We will have the DAO cooperative research from Miles Jennings from a16z and David Kerr from Corey LLC. They have been researching DAOs, and they will be very general. I am looking forward to those, and check for our other calls on the forum.

[1:04:29](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=3869)

- Nikolaj: I posted today in the Oracles budget MIP. I have not thought this through, but we have almost $3 million worth of ENS tokens, and that is how much we owe the Mega Foundation. We should use the ENS airdrops to get that out the way. We can discuss that.
    - Nik Kunkel: There are externalities there. This is the first time that Maker got some significant allocation of tokens from a major project. Do we want to give the image that we will dump your coins if you airdrop them to us? This tells them not to bother trying to get us to participate in their governance because we will not do it. On the other hand, I cannot imagine that ENS is reasonably valued considering little money. We could also be dumping the top, which is something to consider.
    - Nikola: Is it dumping if we give it to a nonprofit foundation?
    - Nik Kunkel: When Nikola suggested this, we would dump Dai to the foundation because our debt is denominated in DAI. If you were to give ENS tokens slippage, it might be challenging to settle on the amount of ENS tokens with the foundation that would make them agree to settle the debt.
    - Brian McMichael: The number works right now. However, as soon as a signal request, a poll, and an executive stated that we are selling ENS, there will be a couple of weeks where people front-run it. You will then not be able to pay off the foundation anyways. The price will bounce right back after the exec is passed.

[1:07:11](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=4031)

- Unknownspeaker: Are we going to get an invoice from the foundation or some type of documentation?
    - Nik Kunkel: That is the due analytics of the documentation that shows ETH in, gas out, and analysis from the blockchain. There is not anything more concrete than that.
    - Nik Kunkel: We can talk to them to send us something. The number is highly dependent on the date we pay them. We are increasing our tab by constantly pushing Oracle updates until that date. Maybe we can get an update after we send it.

[1:08:41](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=4121)

- Unknownspeaker: Nick said this is the first time a major protocol has dumped tokens on another protocol. Maker is credibly decentralized. Even if we do not have a huge stake or an interest in ENS, we could set a precedent that would inform a protocol that we have an interest in. We want to arrange with compound, Aave, or some other L2. It would be beneficial if we had some of their tokens. If we dump the ENS tokens on the market, we may risk telling future projects we will do the same. A good compromise to monetize it is what LongForWisedom brought up in the sidebar. We could create a vault type and form a price for users. We get the vault ourselves, take some Dai debt, do whatever we need to pay the foundation with the Dai debt. We would have the ability to take those tokens and use them and vote with them.
    - David Utrobin: If we create an ENS Vault, other token projects who want to get around the whole collateral onboarding process could give them a sizable allocation. We would probably be at the front of the list.
    - Nik Kunkel: As LongForWisdedom predicted, the Oracle cost would be prohibited in doing that. We would not save anything and would bleed money.

[1:11:09](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=4269)

- Nik Kunkel: We just said that there is insufficient liquidity to dump three million into the market at a competitive price. Now, is our solution is to lever up on that? Do we approach the ENS team to onboard many tokens in our protocol when we cannot liquidate at all? At some point, it does not make sense anymore. Some of these tokens are premature and must build up a good liquidity profile before you can do anything with them, regardless of their treasury’s participation. To clarify what I mean on levering up on the risk, we can mitigate the Oracle costs by having ENS put 20 million worth of treasury in here and mint 10 million Dai. Then, we can make you a vault. The problem now is that the protocol would have trouble liquidating on that kind of scale.
    - Unknownspeaker: I do not favor dumping the tokens for the record because of the precedent. We may get dropped tokens that the DAO would find a major strategic advantage in the future.
    - Nadia Alvarez: I agree with Mooney that receiving an airdrop of a governance token and dumping it will be a terrible message for the community. We currently see many projects proposing token exchanges in close partnerships to have them in the treasury and skin in the game. I will be more interested in having a treasury of the important partners with their tokens rather than dumping them to pay for costs.

[1:15:29](https://youtu.be/Oc51JgPekLA?t=4529)

- Juan: We should separate topics instead of mixing everything in one bag. This makes the decision-making way harder. One topic should be paying the foundation and what to do with the tokens. Our participation in governance should be another topic. We need to avoid mixing issues because this will make it impossible to arrive at a decision.

## Conclusion

### Payton Rose

- Noting the time here, we had a full round with many discussions. This is your last chance to bring anything up. Thank you, everyone, for coming. I look forward to seeing everybody in the future. Let us keep the conversations going in the forum and on the MakerDAO Discord.

[Suggestion Box](https://app.suggestionox.com/r/GovCallQs)

## Common Abbreviated Terms

`CR`: Collateralization Ratio

`DC`: Debt Ceiling

`ES`: Emergency Shutdown

`SF`: Stability Fee

`DSR`: Dai Savings Rate

`MIP`: Maker Improvement Proposal

`OSM`: Oracle Security Module

`LR`: Liquidation Ratio

`RWA`: Real-World Asset

`RWF`: Real-World Finance

`SC`: Smart Contracts

`Liq`: Liquidations

`CU`: Core Unit

## Credits

- Artem Gordon produced this summary.
- Larry Wu produced this summary.
- Everyone who spoke and presented on the call, listed in the headers.​