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tags: Snippets
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# G&R #172 Snippet

This `snippet` includes Governance, MIPs, forum updates, and Core Unit team discussions from the MakerDAO Governance and Risk Call #172.

## General Updates

### Votes

*Executive:*
- Last Week’s executive - PASSED & EXECUTED
- Changes to wstETH-A Debt Ceiling Instant Access Module and Liquidation Parameters.
- Changes to MATIC-A Debt Ceiling Instant Access Module.
- Previously approved MKR Vesting Streams will be replaced with MKR sourced from the Protocol Treasury (Pause Proxy) instead of minting new MKR.
- No Executive Proposal Anticipated until Jan. 7th at the earliest
- Recognized Delegates should keep a batphone handy however

*Polls:*

3 Weekly Polls:
- [Recognised Delegate Compensation Trial Performance Modifier - PASSED](https://vote.makerdao.com/polling/QmbKaHAv)
- [DAI Direct Deposit Module (D3M) Net Rates Spread](https://vote.makerdao.com/polling/QmSgCHbt)
- 44,843.58 MKR YES
- 32,916.98 MKR NO
- [DAI Direct Deposit Module (D3M) Debt Ceiling Targeting](https://vote.makerdao.com/polling/QmNi4qtG)
- 57,501.47 MKR for 30% Real DAI Supply
- 20,210.03 MKR for 20% Real DAI Supply
- 49.06 MKR Neither
- 2 Active Greenlight Polls - Vote Ends Monday, December 20th
- [aUST (Anchor TerraUSD)](https://vote.makerdao.com/polling/QmPBRpCW?network=mainnet#poll-detail)
- [G-UNIv3-DAIUSDP (Gelato UniswapV3 DAI-USDP LP Token)](https://vote.makerdao.com/polling/QmVTiToU?network=mainnet#poll-detail)

### MIPs

[Weekly MIPs Update #66](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/weekly-mips-update-66/12190)


- As per [*MIP51c4: Calendar Exceptions*](https://mips.makerdao.com/mips/details/MIP51#MIP51c4), there will be no Monthly Governance Cycle in December, i.e., no Formal Submission Window and no Ratification Polls.

### Forum at a Glance

[Forum at a Glance: December 9 - 16, 2021](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/forum-at-a-glance-december-9-16-2021/12240)

## Team-led Discussions

### Newcomers, Anons, and Sock Puppets

#### How it’s currently handled

- Not all stakeholders have longstanding and active accounts that will be more seriously recognized or responded to.
- Signal Polls are not civil-resistant because people can create multiple accounts and abuse the community trust process.
- Forum allows newcomers to freely engage,
- Has “Trust level” functionality that we don’t rely on too much.
- GovAlpha makes a note of it when there is suspicious activity on signal votes.
- Censorship or over-moderation has always been avoided.
- What are policies to consider for better controlling malicious or trolling behavior?
- There’s a lot of factors at play; threads, signal requests, internal communications, etc., and the moderation of them.
- A high-quality proposal is objective and can be given by a person who has never posted before; we cannot close the door to outside help and ideas.
- In the non-crypto world, we accept and can fight the accuser.
- In the DAO world, it’s difficult due to the natural environment of anonymity and unknown actors involved.

#### Is a proposal ever considered illegitimate?

- Spamming proposals will be flagged as illegitimate.
- Same response to proposals that stir the pot on sensitive issues in a negative direction.
- Issues with the anonymous culture should be responded with the least negatively affecting action to keep the trust and activity of the remaining anonymous community.

### Core Unit Proposals & Dispute Methods

#### Offboarding vs Correction, and Dispute Methods


- the DAO heavily decides PECU roadmap
- Core Units serve at the pleasure of MKR holders, which influence the drive of those CUs.
- Oracles appreciates defined steps and methods. Something significant like an offboarding proposal should be put under those defined steps and methods.
- Proposals such as budgets and others at that level should be kept natural (as we have right now).
- Facilitator vs. community method for budget proposals is best.
- Core Unit MIP should be redefined with additional guarding processes.
- Is there any good reason for someone outside of a CU to submit a budget proposal?
- This helps prevent a Core Unit from gaining too much power; the community will dispute against it.
- One idea is for GovAlpha to have a set of hard/soft rules for significant proposals, which can pass/block them from going onchain.
- We need to formalize permission granted to Core Units and propose anything within consent. Anything outside of these cant is left as is.

#### Submitting proposals on behalf of another CU

- Lot of controversy on this subject from both sides.
- Community submitting proposals on behalf of CUs cause additional operational overhead and difficulty.
- However, we don’t want to portray that we fight against criticism to the community.
- How do we criticize Core Units more efficiently and operationally?
- Commonly recurring proposals should be restricted to predetermined permissions.
- Eventually, engagement in budget proposal disputes will die out over time.