---
# System prepended metadata

title: 'Episode 175: January 20th, 2022'
tags: [G&R]

---

---
tags: G&R
---

# Episode 175: January 20th, 2022

## Agenda

- [00:05](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=5): Introduction, Votes, and Polls
- [04:35](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=275): MIPs Update
- [07:26](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=446): Forum at a Glance
- [13:16](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=796): Discussion - Offboarding CUs and Facilitators
- [1:06:44](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=4004): Open Discussion

## Video

[Link](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8Tk6Ie1ko4)

## Introduction 

### Agenda and Preamble

#### Payton Rose

[00:05](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=5)

- Hello, everyone, and welcome to the 175 Scientific Governance and Risk meeting here at MakerDAO. I am Payton, I go by prose11, and I am one of the governance facilitators. I am happy to be here today, joined by many awesome Maker people and others interested in the protocol. In our weekly call, we talk about what is going on in governance some of the risks the protocols face, and try to factor in some open discussion so the community can talk about the points that matter to them. This meeting is being recorded. We encourage you to speak up and engage in the conversation we have today.
- You can drop a note in the chat as we will monitor and incorporate things when appropriate. 

[02:03](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=123)

- We start with a Governance round-up going over current votes in MIPS and the forum activity in the last week. Then, a presentation/plan discussion board. We will talk about the offboarding process for CoreUnits and facilitators, what we can do better, their lessons learned, and general discussions on improving. If the time allows, there will be an open discussion to ask other questions at the end of the call.

## General Updates

### Votes

#### Payton Rose

[02:51](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=171)

*Executive:*
- Last Week’s Executive - Passed and Executed - Recover DAI from Optimism Escrow, Changes to Uniswap LP Vault Debt Floor Parameters, Delegate Compensation 
- Tomorrow’s Expected Executive Contents:
    - MOMC Parameter Changes
    - GUNIV3DAIUSDC2-A Liquidation Ratio Change

*Polls:*
- 2 weekly polls - Passed
    - Open Market Committee Proposal
    - Decrease the GUNIV3DAIUSDC2-A Liquidation Ratio
- 5 ongoing Greenlight Polls, ending on Monday, January 24th.
    - OGN, OUSD, RBLD, TUSD, USDAP.
- 11 Ongoing Ratification Polls

### MIPs

#### Sebix

[04:35](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=275)

[Weekly MIPs Update #70](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/weekly-mips-update-70/12695)

![](https://i.imgur.com/ijXuQs9.png)

This is the second week of ratification polls!
:calendar: — RFC and FS Dates for reference and existing proposals can be seen [here.](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/10qxaRjm9T5LCgnYwwYqPqEjKu9yl2F1YHqdDD5SktJc/edit?usp=sharing)

- The Ratification polls for the January Governance Cycle are in their last voting week. Please, be sure to cast your vote before the week’s end! Here is the list of the eligible proposals:

![](https://i.imgur.com/nUazn9G.png)

![](https://i.imgur.com/a45sfIk.jpg)

![](https://i.imgur.com/P2djIKq.png)

![](https://i.imgur.com/nXlSK8q.png)

![](https://i.imgur.com/g4umgeN.png)

![](https://i.imgur.com/qD1OS6e.png)

![](https://i.imgur.com/THzUXth.png)

![](https://i.imgur.com/BmWDmtX.png)

### Forum at a Glance

#### Artem Gordon

[07:26](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=446)

Post: [Forum at a Glance: January 14th - 20, 2022](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/forum-at-a-glance-january-14th-20-2022/12752)

Video: [Forum at a Glance](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=446)

## Team-led Discussion

### Offboarding Process for CU’s and Facilitators

![](https://i.imgur.com/LUgHatQ.png)


[13:16](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=796)

- David Utrobin: I worked hard coming up with the six prompt questions. As a note, it would be helpful when we post up the discussion segment for the GNR calls. I typically post before the call in the Governance chat, asking for feedback and suggestions on prompts. Feel free to respond in the Governance channel if you want something specific listed. Today’s topic is about the offboarding process for CUs and facilitators.
- We will focus on general issues, improvements, and suggestions. Delegates and facilitators, I encourage you to be the primary commenters on this and other stakeholders voters who might not be delegates necessarily. This is a question of organizational improvement, ways to make things better and less disruptive. Also, Paper Imperium is in partnership with GFX labs; they are putting together a MIP that has been shared with a few people about amending the existing offboarding process outlined in MIP 39, 40, and 41. Here is the first prompt.
- What components of an ideal policy for offboarding CUs proven to be unvital or unworthy of the spend? In the current cases, like with DUX, it was voluntary, where two team members essentially agreed to switch positions. Then we had a couple of different involuntary proposals where people external to a team, a given MakerDAO stakeholder, will propose a facilitator or a CU offboarding. We saw that with Seth from Real World Finance, and we are seeing it now with Seth, from marketing content production. Would anyone jump in?
    - Mariano Ventura: I recently joined Maker in September. It was surprising how the onboarding process is; it affects a person's opportunity to find a new opportunity outside another DAO. I strongly believe that we should keep the offboarding the way it is as the very last option, and the policy that we create has to follow different processes that we need to follow.
    - Keep the voting because it looks like a public execution from the outside. We are in an entire niche, and everybody knows everything. It is hard to see a person being voted. The second thing is, I have an idea: let us set a small commission with delegates and assess the situation. I think that the power of delay could be helpful if we could use it here. Try to avoid the problem as much as possible and reach an agreement with the person. I think it could be a good way of starting this conversation to see if this person voluntarily wants to leave or return the agreement or, maybe, make time to find another opportunity in another CU. This is just a general point of view from someone who has joined recently.

[17:31](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=1051)

- David Utrobin: Basically, you want to make sure that there is as little involuntary offboarding as possible; you want to take the steps beforehand so that even if the facilitator might not want to be offboarded, they recognize the reasons whether they are valid or not. Eventually, they come and resign, essentially. You never really want to fire a person, you want to work with them to fix it, and if it can not be fixed, there should be a kind of amicable resignation. That is an interesting idea. Also, if you are coming on the mic, please briefly introduce yourself. Mariano, do you want to mention which incubating CU you are part of and where you are?
    - Mariano Ventura: My name is Mariano, and I am from Maker talent. SES is currently creating our Core Unit. We started in September. We had our lunch boat session yesterday, which you can see on YouTube if you are interested. I have been attending these permanent sessions that I found interesting. I am happy to receive any comments that you might have about Maker talent because our voting process will start on the second Monday of February. We are working a lot to make it happen.

[18:56](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=1136)

- David Utrobin: Something that you said relates to the second question of the prompt: who would enforce or perform a policy of review? This has been a previos question. Before somebody goes and posts a proposal to offboard somebody; there has to be valid reasoning. There should even be an investigation - I do not want to say delegated party but by a related party. You mentioned forming a review committee that is a mix of the delegates and some key facilitators. I want to note that interesting point.
    - Justin: I agree with the larger points that Mariano is making. What is missing from the process right now is signaling and predictability. The vote should probably be the ultimate expression of the MKR holder’s displeasure, resulting in the facilitator’s removal. My opinion is that the process leading up to that vote is way too short. In a more traditional organizational environment, you will have performance reviews; going through this probably will be some chain of command that will signal their displeasure with you in some way, long before you even get the performance review. There are going to be small nudges along the way.
    - This reveals a bit of the weakness of the very flat structure that Maker has organized along because it is essentially just two levels of the organization: you have Maker holders at the DAO level, and you have a facilitator level. There are no intermediate steps there. I think a process will have to extend the offboarding process into smaller steps along the way; there should be some chance for a facilitator to change course. There should be some way to signal disagreement by the community with the facilitators’ actions before getting to the offboarding vote. We can do that through forum posts signal requests - there are some ways to do it, but I think there should be longer and more formal loops we should jump through before we get to offboarding someone.
    - It seems incredibly harsh and extremely public compared to the traditional organization, as Mariano shows here. I am not sure we can avoid some of the public parts as long as we are doing this as a DAO, but I think we should do everything in our power to try to make this as voluntary as possible before we get to that point. Managing the community’s expectations versus what the facilitator and the unit are doing is key to a successful offboarding process. It should not come as a surprise. The vote should not surprise the person being put up for a vote.

[22:33](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=1353)

- MakerMan: When I looked at how this goes, it seemed appropriate to have a forum post where someone can bring up a performance issue. And then do so in a way that it can be answered, so you would expect some give or take. The idea of going into a poll without even a discussion, much less going to an on-chain poll and making it formal with Maker governance voting, is too rushed. If I am a CU or working here - that will scare me. That is not what happens in traditional appointments, as Justin said. In the place where I work, when we hire, there is a formal probation period where you can be let go for any reason at any time.
- Now, contractors and Maker are a bit different. One of the things we do not have out of the gate with a CU is what we expect out of them. You look at el pros posts and demos on marketing, and they both have different views of what they expected. However, that was never delineated when we brought the CU online as to what the timeline and expectations were.
- How can you meet performance requirements if you do not have expectations when bringing people in, much less how you can question it? At some point, you can question it. When I look at this, I look at Maker and the stuff that we take on, and it is like we can make a half a million or a million-dollar mistake in a year’s budget.
- We are looking at potentially making $10 million mistakes bringing on collateral, so it has been a wash of a fair amount of money. I have dealt with media and production content producers in some sense, and they are very different beasts. Some of them are very slow and methodical. Other ones are just going to jump right in and start producing content. What you get will vary dramatically.
- I want to see a better process to have a review team. Still, if people have questions, we should bring them out in the forum before polling. We need to have an honest discussion that involves the people being questioned and the questioning people, and then move this to a more formal process after sufficient time, and discussion has been had.
- The only criteria for a fast on offboarding are if someone is damaging the protocol, we are losing money, or there is some real, tangible hurt. Otherwise, we can buy a little time with a couple of weeks to a month. In any organization, unless you are under probation, you can not get rid of someone within three months; you have to retrain them or somehow be able to bring up their performance to match before you can even think about getting rid of that. 
    - David Utrobin: Thank you for sharing those comments. Feel free if anybody in the chat wants to bring up some of the things you mention. In the meantime, Nick brings up an interesting point: an alternative to public governance-driven offboarding is for governance to select something like an executive branch to do performance reviews, correction, and eventual firing. Makerman is mentioning perhaps not on a one-month timeline, but a three to four-month timeline. That is an idea.
    - I wanted to note that LongForWisdom also mentions a one-month RFC period for any given proposal that comes through. Although the initial proposal does not have a vital requirement for listing out the reasons for offboarding, there is some argument that one month is a decent amount of time. I tend to agree with Makerman that this is not enough time.

[27:11](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=1631)

- Kianga: In terms of us being a DAO, public versus private, we should hold space to be thoughtful about what may be helpful or appropriate for the bigger context of this protocol scaling and operating for the long term. If, as a group, there is a public discussion and agreement to have a committee, we can put parameters around what is private and what the accountability is around reporting of things that happened privately. I would not want us to say, "Oh, it is a DAO; nothing can be private." I think there should be some consideration of what may be helpful in a situation like this. I resonate with some of the comments about how this could harm us in attracting the best talent if we do not handle this? This process is super important.
    - Mariano: I want to highlight how important the initial part is to consider all the scenarios. We are too focused on performance and do not have policies; this is also in my pipeline as a major challenge for diversity or harassment, which could be reasons for offboarding a delegate or facilitator. We need to think about what scenarios will lead to this situation? Who are the members of this committee that we are thinking about? One of the best ideas should be a third party, someone neutral. In terms of performance, we do not have anything in place to score the performance or say if someone is not performing well. The third scenario that I see is suspicious activity regarding funds. So this, I see three scenarios that will lead to entirely different investigations and completely different actors involving the offboarding process.

[29:47](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=1787)

- David Utrobin: Yes, that is why there is a case to be made for the DAO granting somebody responsibility for making that judgment. There is an entirely different context for different kinds of offboarding.
    - Mariano: We need to be clear on the conditions that put you on one side or another. It reminds me of the policies that they use in social media. When you are there judging, it must be clear that you are on one side or another. We need to delegate this because the whole community needs to play a part. I believe that having a harassment policy is something that we need as a diversity policy when it comes to hiring, which leads to another question: we can not have policies, and we can not have CU that forces them to apply to those. Maybe this has to be another MIP. Maybe we will need to put together some guidelines of something that we will apply to, and then this will be connected to a new policy and harassment and diversity policy. We will put these in a new context if that is possible. Is that possible?
- David Utrobin: I want Payton or Long to answer because they are the government’s facilitators. They know a lot better than me with regards to that question.
- Payton Rose: The simple answer is that we go off of what we have, and if we do not have anything, we need a new policy. The CU MIPset defined what would need to happen for offboarding. In some cases, an amendment to that right might make much sense. Maybe you want to define an exit package or some of the other issues we are talking about today, where those would probably make sense as a new MIP entirely. Because they are not necessarily going on with the direct offboarding of the CU itself.
    - David Utrobin: I also think there is a point to be made about strict policies around hiring. I would rather see recommended policies than strict policies enforced because at DAO; it is all independent teams. There should be a level of autonomy, especially regarding hiring decisions. I would not like a tough diversity requirement; I will use that in my hiring practice, I will look for a diversity hire, absolutely, but at the end of the day, I want to prioritize meritocracy about everything.

[33:30](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=2010)

- Mariano: When you talk about hiring, you decide to onboard someone from outside DAO. What happens if you are promoting someone on diversity policy? There has to be covering situations like this as well.
    - David Utrobin: Let us bring it back to the CU offboarding and how we manage that. I see Tim Black and Will Renmore had their hands up, so Tim as he is at the top of my screen.
- Tim Black: I want to echo something you said earlier, David because I think we got off track from that. There is a balance to be struck here because there are situations where we do want offboarding to be relatively swift if there are bad actors, malicious intent, or things that adversely affect the DAO. We also want a better process for offboarding either a CU or the facilitator leading it. One of the things you brought up as a prompt question, which I think is a better part of our process, is the voluntary versus involuntary nature of onboarding a facilitator. I genuinely believe this is just a revision to the facilitator myth, which is in the process.
- I think PaperImperium put a doc down there. I want to add a callout that would be helpful if I have some more eyes there. I think that might solve many of our problems if part of offboarding is that you have to be very specific about the problems and fill out a template. These are somewhat of a set of guardrails around removing someone versus the set of subjective arguments put into a public forum, which is less than ideal.
    - Unknown: This discussion brings on many policy-related discussions that have been happening for a significant amount of time. There have also been concerns of mine for a very long time; I have had numerous discussions around these topics. We tend to have those conversations out of time, in private, being a private person. I do not want to harm anyone in particular by having a discussion that is a concern. This is not necessarily related only to facilitating onboarding or offboarding, but more policies that can be good or best practices. These two levels here will depend on the teams involved in the CU. They will most likely create policy around defining, for example, the definition of serious misconduct for facilitators or contributors. Contributors are engaged in much important indirect decision-making for the job. Otherwise, facilitators would not be doing the whole work for everybody. It is essential to have a bit of definition on the DAO level and one more on the CU level. It is probably harder to define policies that should apply across the floor. 
    - For example, in areas closer to real word financing, I am thinking about practices related to codes of conduct around conflicts of interest and an end. Those codes of conduct must be drafted up, even if it is just for a specific CU because this specific CU has many implications in things that should be found at a DAO. At the same time, facilitators are involved in any misleading real-world assets and relationships with counterparties to be checked by conduct policies. If we were to be considered a serious protocol in this space with institutions and larger counterparties involved, we need to put our big boy pants on. We need to keep an eye out and care more about the DAO. We must show our seriousness in what we are doing. Maybe the code of conduct for us lies specifically in real-world assets. I do not know whether that applies across the floor. This has been a long-term concern, and this is maybe something that then abides by those related.

[40:09](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=2409)

- Unknown: I want to mirror a bit of what Bill was touching on. This also ties in our needed discussion of facilitators' autonomy. The organization form we have will give the facilitators big room for autonomy. Offboarding, as mentioned, is not only a process that happens at the DAO level, but it also happens in the CUs.
- We need to distinguish which kind we are talking about. We have been dealing with the MakerDAO level. We have not seen anything from inside the CUs so far. That is something that we will also have to handle down the line. It also touches on another bigger issue: who can make commitments on MakerDAO’s behalf. Like it was said, when someone is talking to someone from CU, it is a natural reaction to assume that that person is speaking for all MakerDAO when that person may or may not be in a position to do so.
- We have also seen these troubles surface with counterparties contacting delegates and CU members and finding someone at MakerDAO to speak to randomly. That is a bit of a tangent, but it is still essential to recognize several levels here.
    - David Utrobin: These are my notes for what the components of an ideal offboarding policy seem to be, based on what everybody has said. 1. Desire for a better review process and a fair review process. 2. Desire for definitions for explicitly bad behavior that warrants swifter offboarding versus intermediary issues that might require repair. 3. Prioritizing actions that make offboarding voluntary when possible. This ties into the private and public conversation that we were having that Kianga was bringing up. Where is privacy appropriate? At what level? Does it get escalated? These are vital things that I am hearing to focus on everybody at a high level.

[43:26](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=2606)

- MakerMan: I have been a freelance contractor for a good chunk of my life. I had very formal contracts with all the clients I worked with, including exit clauses, complaints, and performance measures. These contracts were enforceable in a court. They were signed by a client and possibly by an intermediary in a jurisdiction. We do not have this on the DAO; we do not even have a mechanism. This leaves contractors in a weird position with the DAO. Governance can do what they want and dump a contractor at will for no cause. Then, what is the recourse? I will leave it there because I see the real issue sitting here is that we need a mechanism to manage that kind of relationship in a contractual obligation way that is well defined.
    - LongForWisdom: The DAO can not directly offboard contributors. We do not have votes for that. I agree it is not so simple to define contractors and facilitators regarding contractors or employees. The contracts have a relationship with the contributors or a relationship with a facilitator, which might be legally enforceable. The position that does not have this option is the relationship between the facilitators and the DAO. The DAO can not execute legal agreements; I would not say it is the case that the DAO can go out of contractors and then get rid of the facilitators or CU as a whole.

[45:39](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=2739)

- David Utrobin: There is also something to say about at-will employment being the default instead of such a rich set of contract production. I am sure CUs can produce those contracts as many CU have their entities and relationships with their contractors. I do not know if everybody is at doing at-will employment. Some might not be. It is an interesting topic to consider.
    - Payton Rose: From the governance perspective, it is a question of scale. We have talked about several different reasons why the DAO, why Maker holders might want to remove CU, and several different levels or reasons that can lead to that. When writing our processes for the future, it is important to keep in mind that we are trying to pick something that is both flexible, where it needs to be, and rigid, where it does not. You have to go through many of these things once to see the flaws or the holes in what you initially propose as like text versus when it happens in real life.

[47:06](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=2826)

![](https://i.imgur.com/O57s8av.png)

- David Utrobin: I have a second prop slide if people are interested. We covered a lot of these questions, so I am sanity-checking myself. People have already answered the second question asking what general issues we can bring up. We covered sufficiently how to navigate these instances with minimal PR damage. This applies to would-be hires and the disruption of morale within the organization of existing core units. Let us go back to my first prompt, which is more fundamental. Rimmer asked an interesting question: should we at least have some form of contract between core unit facilitator entities and contributors enforced by the DAO? That is an interesting one. Niklas, do you want to comment?
    - Niklas Kunkel: The DAO should stay out of the internal affairs of core units. The DAO does not have the opportunity to hire or fire contributors. Instead, the DAO offers people the opportunity to be facilitators who present them with a plan and budget to the DAO. From that point on, the facilitators can run that operation however they see fit. This is the only way a DAO can work with the previous discussion regarding public executions. You have corruption behind the scenes, or you are transparent in public. Those are the ropes for being in a DAO. This is not a corporation. 
    - To an extent, facilitators take a career risk with everything being aired out in public. You could get fired, and then everyone sees your actions. This could affect your career. A simple solution for this is called self-selection for people. If people see the consequences of being a facilitator, fewer people will want to. That is fine. In a free-market economy, the DAO adjusts by offering people more compensation in those positions. This is the same relationship that contractors versus employees have in a traditional corporation, where contractors are typically paid more because they have less job security. This dynamic is similar. I want to get away from centrally managed policies from the DAO for internal affairs. The DAO should handle the macro side and not get involved on the micro side.
    - Justin: I agree with what Nicolas just said. The DAO should deal with facilitators, and facilitators should deal with the CUs. That should be the default setting and basic workings. I can see occurrences happening inside the CU that would be serious enough for the DAO to prompt the facilitator. However, these scenarios would be extremely severe. We will drown in micromanagement if we start meddling into the CUs as a DAO. This will be inefficient. Niklas is making a valid point stating that we need to react appropriately. As I have seen in traditional organizations, higher management’s temptation to micromanage increases as more information becomes available. As a DAO with essentially full access to information, there will be greater temptation to micromanage. This means we must show restraint and allow the facilitators to autonomy. Of course, with great authority comes great responsibility. There is a greater chance of the DAO removing a facilitator that mismanages a CU. 
    - Regarding the public versus private discussion, Niklas also has a point. There will be difficulty in getting this into private channels in an organized manner without empowering agents. This would threaten the decentralization of the whole protocol. When it comes to processes, we can do better. The keyword is predictability. We could keep the public discourse if we had more steps along the way, such as raising and discussing issues publicly before launching the onboarding process. We would also normalize negative discussions before they become so damaging that we undergo an involuntary offboarding process. If we do this enough, facilitators will see the writing on the wall. If someone complains about their actions every second week, facilitators will likely take the hint and step down voluntarily. They will see that they are not a great fit for what the community wants. A forced offboarding should be a last resort from the DAO when handling a facilitator or Core Unit.

[54:07](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=3247)

- Mariano: There is an agreement that nobody wants policies that will micromanage. I agree as these policies go against the spirit of the DAO. But Jesse talked about scenarios that realistically and necessarily calls the DAO to act. We need to take this direction because we will never distinguish the different cases if we only focus on the general image. When working for traditional company startups, we cared about employees after they disconnected. For example, we started an outplacement program to help people find another opportunity. Although this is not the current case, it is a brief idea on how to stop the collaboration between a contributor and the DAO in a good manner. As Niklas said, there is a status quo for public execution. How would we position ourselves when offboarding a facilitator that contributed much to the DAO? What are the reasons beyond the general idea? Some scenarios call for DAO intervention into the core units because our public image can be compromised at a different level by important internalities in the core unit. There are cases where it is vital to have some guidelines and good practices. We have the general idea and processes in place, so it is important for us to now go into the details.
    - David Utrobin: It sounds like you are arguing for an internal affairs type core unit that allows contributors to raise an issue if they feel unfairly offboarded. Then this core unit can investigate. Is that about right?
    - Mariano: Yes. They could be a community for different situations. The idea is that the core units will be completely independent, but their actions towards the markets, social media, and product management can affect one another. We should have an internal affairs core unit if you want to call it that. However, we should distinguish the type of situations where this is important.

[57:56](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=3476)

- Prose11: The sidebar was talking about a previous topic we had with the ability of pseudo-anonymous people to raise these own to raise these proposals, particularly with offboarding. That messes with the game theory a bit. 
    - David Utrobin: The offboarding requirements revisions, particularly the template for a higher standard for presenting reasons, will make troll offboarding requests less disruptive. When somebody brings up an offboarding request, it takes time for the facilitator being off-boarded. They must respond. You could DDoS a facilitator’s time by spinning an end on their account and forcing them to make a case for themselves every couple of months. Even if it is invalid, that creates negative sentiment around the core unit; to an extent, we saw that with the marketing core unit.

[59:19](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=3559)

- LongForWisdom: That action is a lot more effective in some cases than in others. I imagine someone doing that for PE or GovAlpha. I do not think it would result in the same impact. I am unsure how much of this is a global problem versus a situation when they are vulnerable to that. 

[1:00:06](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=3606)

- Derek: Thinking about everything said today, I am leaning on radical transparency for facilitators and not team members. Anyone in the community, such as delegates, MKR holders, or interested individuals, can come to the forum or Discord to ask me directly as an accountable and responsible individual for the protocol engineering CU. I am open to that to continue happening. We should be accountable for anything that the Core Unit does. Nik’s point was great: that should stop at the facilitator and not the team’s individuals. If there is a problem with the team, it is my problem. That discourse discussion must happen.
- I also like the point around expectations and predictable steps. We need to know our goals and discuss the performance over time. It would be beneficial to have a checklist that states where people lie on the performance scale. We do have KPIs, although these can be improved. I like Elpro’s recent comments on various posts copied to different core units. I am taking that on board for our potential new term for the PE team and answering those questions upfront. I am not saying anything new but merely leaning on the side of transparency for facilitators. I will be happy to have the dialogue continue. The discussion is not overly noisy or time-consuming, but it has to happen because facilitators are for it. I am happy to work with anyone on what the predictable steps may look like.

[1:02:56](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=3776)

- Nadia Alvarez: Firstly, I agree that all facilitators should start conversations with delegates and other coordinates to get feedback. I also know that maybe we are like sub facilitators. We are in the middle of 1000 things and not starting these conversations as frequently as we should. Perhaps, we do not know how frequent a process should be. It would be interesting to work together on our feedback framework. I think that collaboration is missing because we get a lot of comments about it on the forum. We do not know what the community thinks about our actions. We just know that there is much noise in the forums. The community may have difficulty trusting and following directions of the unknown. It may be beneficial to have some feedback framework and checkpoints between Core Units and improve core unit management. In the DAO today, SES creates this standard. We can improve upon that. If we have feedback that we can trust, we can build a better onboarding process if deemed necessary.
    - David Utrobin: The noise on the forum makes it difficult for people to gather all the facts, especially if it is split across several threads. Furthermore, is everyone following the new information added closer to the vote to the appropriate level? I lean towards supporting an internal affairs core unit or an assigned independent party to gather the facts and data to present to voters.

## Open Discussion

[1:06:44](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=4004)

- David Utrobin: While people gather their final thoughts, I want to mention an upcoming change to the format of the G&R calls. As many of you know, GovComs has been working with Wouter and other CU facilitators to map initiatives and to do these coordination calls (stakeholder alignment calls). We are developing this framework to have a more scalable tool to track the different initiatives at the DAO and their progress. These practices of coordinating across various stakeholders help on many different levels. Our planned format change will bring out the status updates that result from stakeholder alignment calls. Starting next week, we will be adding a small section after current events. Depending on the week, cadence, and initiative, we will be giving roadmap and status updates. On the next call, something to look forward to is an update on the L2 roadmap. Much of your feedback has been heard. People have a hard time following the details of various initiatives, so we are addressing this issue. We are doing our best to make things better.
    - Payton Rose: Appreciate that, Dave. This is our big weekly event where we get a lot of talking heads together. So it is great to see so many people interested in making sure it is as good as it can be.
    - David Utrobin: I also want to push for a better culture of feedback. I see a lot of mixed views around feedback, such as who is responsible for giving it. Being proactive and proposing improvements with the proper gate holder will make MakerDAO better. Food for thought is essential regardless of validity. We have many intelligent people here with such diverse perspectives. In various publications, there are feedback surveys. On various teams, there are user interviews you can sign up for. I want to push for that culture of feedback here at MakerDAO.

[1:10:08](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=4208)

- Justin: I found Maker to be a great lecture of incredibly talented people. When you have something good or impressionable to say, say it. It means a lot. We are scattered all over the world. Sometimes you are working in isolation, and having someone recognize your work is noteworthy.

[1:11:38](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=4298)

- Unknown: I just have one last comment. Our superpower is attracting overachievers as we do not need supervision. This is probably our best hedge against poor performance. While core units should be in charge of recruitment, checklists are probably checked candidates from a cultural standpoint. Having some recruitment guidelines that are more on the cultural alignment and soft side will be helpful. Recruiting the best people is our best hedge against the bad experience of boarding. My recommendation is to interview guides. I went through probably 2000 interviews in my life because that was my job. I am unsure of how people answer questions or get information here, but just an one hour long video on these topics could be helpful. 
    - David Utrobin: SES might provide some guidance on interviewing best practices. I believe the Talents may also be cooking something up in that regard.

## Conclusion

### Payton Rose

[1:13:49](https://youtu.be/R8Tk6Ie1ko4?t=4429)

- We have many resources we can leverage. We are going to wrap up there then. I appreciate everyone for coming out. The video will be posted on our YouTube channel shortly. See everyone next week!

[Suggestion Box](https://app.suggestionox.com/r/GovCallQs)

## Common Abbreviated Terms

`CR`: Collateralization Ratio

`DC`: Debt Ceiling

`ES`: Emergency Shutdown

`SF`: Stability Fee

`DSR`: Dai Savings Rate

`MIP`: Maker Improvement Proposal

`OSM`: Oracle Security Module

`LR`: Liquidation Ratio

`RWA`: Real-World Asset

`RWF`: Real-World Finance

`SC`: Smart Contracts

`Liq`: Liquidations

`CU`: Core Unit

## Credits

- Artem Gordon produced this summary.
- Andrea Suarez produced this summary.
- Larry Wu produced this summary. 
- Everyone who spoke and presented on the call, listed in the headers.