---
# System prepended metadata

title: 'Meet Your Delegate: Episode #9'
tags: [Meet Your Delegate]

---

---
tags: Meet Your Delegate
---

# Meet Your Delegate: Episode #9

## Agenda

- [00:00](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo): Introduction
- [00:47](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=47): Hasu
- [14:37](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=877): Questions
- [53:41](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=3221): Conclusion

## Video

<https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo>

### General Introduction 

#### Payton Rose

[00:00](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo)

- Hello everyone. Welcome to Meet Your Delegate, episode #9. We are slightly out of order, but it is okay. This is an exciting meeting for the community. We have Hasu joining us. He will be talking about his platform to be a recognized delegate here at MakerDAO. 
- As usual, these will be short meetings. We have allocated 30 minutes for a brief presentation and some Q&A afterward. Please be respectful of that time. Try not to speak over one another as this will be reported on YouTube. If you are not comfortable asking your question, that is fine; just drop it in chat, and someone will be happy to ask it for you. Let us go ahead and kick it over to Hasu.

### Delegate Introductions

#### Hasu

[00:47](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=47)

![Who am I?](https://i.imgur.com/1vEDEHW.png)
![Problem #1: Lack of strategic direction](https://i.imgur.com/ynXllcG.png)
![Problem #2: Lack of good treasury mgmt](https://i.imgur.com/BdXt3u5.png)
![Other](https://i.imgur.com/SKBvkNw.png)

- Thanks, Payton. Hi to everyone who is listening. Here is a very brief slide for those who do not know me. I have been in the crypto space for four years now. Generally, I have been a researcher/blogger/investor throughout a long time horizon and make my investments on that time horizon. I wrote many articles and research papers, mostly looking at things from an adversarial lens. I currently have a full-time job leading Strategy at Flashbots. I also do some research in co-investing with Paradigm. I put out papers on AMMs staking derivatives and recently one on how to design NFT launchers. It is a wide spectrum. I co-host the Uncommon Core podcast with Su Zhu of Three Arrows. Maker has been one of my longest-time holdings. I have had a love/hate relationship with it for a few years as I thought it was the foundational project of DeFi. However, I was unhappy with some of the decisions that have been made over the years, such as focusing on the use of RWA and the vote against negative interest rates in favor of centralized collateral. None of this has turned me off from engaging with the project. I have very respect for the relationship with the Maker community. I love using Dai, and at this point, I am in a position to get engaged more. Hopefully, I have some cool ideas for improving the project. 
- Due to my full-time job, I want to be fully upfront about the number of resources I can dedicate to the project. I want to focus mainly on two ideas. At least initially, Maker has a very flat hierarchy, with the CUs and MKR holders voting on every decision. The delegate system has stepped in the right direction, but I would like to explore a system of executive delegates which would resemble an executive team in a traditional company. However, I would be very careful for them to be accountable to MKR holders and not create a class of privileged managers operators with any privileged information. It is more a way of adding a bit more strategic direction, long-term thinking, and overseeing the work of the CUs. I have been missing from Maker a unified long-term strategy and road map. We have seen many visions expressed for Maker could do, and then they pass on the forum, such as the clean money vision. But then, nobody is in charge of seeing it through and ensuring that all CUs adapt their roadmap to this vision and put it in action. There has been some hope that the delegates will play this role. I have tremendous respect for the delegates' work so far, considering Maker has done that very little in terms of incentive alignment. What delegates are getting paid today is not competitive in the market. To align them with the project, I would try to attract leadership talent with more executive salaries/incentives. I would be careful always to make sure that we do not create any regulatory attack vectors for Maker. These are the two things that must be balanced: more strategic direction and oversight and accountability to MKR holders without creating any additional regulatory attack surfaces.
- I have been passionate about treasury management in the last year. I have written an article about this with Monet-supply, a Maker delegate. Some of you might have read that; generally, DAOs do not think properly about treasury management. The treasuries they run tend to be too small because they view their native token as part of the treasury. I believe this is a great mistake. We have seen why. Maker itself is a good example because we already got into the situation where we had to mint MKR, which then led to the market selling off MKR in expectation of further dilution. The money that we raised from equity when we needed it most has destroyed 1.5 years of MKR buy and burn. You really cannot protect against capital shortfalls by minting more MKR. The time to sell MKR is when MKR is overvalued to what we think the fair value is. What we need is a holistic framework for making good treasury management decisions. For that, I would like us to explore the idea of creating a dedicated Treasury Management CU. I learned recently we have the New Strategic Finance CU. Maybe there is a way to expand their responsibilities to include that. This is not something that I have looked into yet. 
- I can apply the framework I wrote with Monet-Supply. The continuation of burning and the right surplus buffer are controversial topics. I would leave this to dedicated CU, but I have my take on it. If one applies holistic thinking about this, the result must almost be that paying dividends is a very early stage project growing more than 100% year-over-year. Historically, this is a pretty big mistake. One could argue that MKR is undervalued to fair value. I see that. But any money that we can invest in growth today probably has a much higher yield than money that we can pay ourselves in dividends or buybacks. I am very much in favor of stopping the buybacks indefinitely, for now, investing all the money in growth and greatly expanding our capital buffer. As I said, we should not rely on minting MKR in the case of a capital shortfall. Maker is pretty undercapitalized compared to traditional financial institutions. This is not how it should be for a project that prides itself on being more conservative, decentralized, and robust. For 10 billion Dai out sending, we probably want to have at least 500 million Dai, if not a billion, in the capital buffer. 
- It would be very interesting to create a debt offering for Maker. The opposite of an equity offering would be a debt offering. When the rates the market offers are at this low, this is a pretty interesting opportunity for Maker to borrow Dai from the market at a fixed duration. Then we can spend that, for example, on growth. That is something that we could explore more with the Dedicated Treasury CU. I have said that I am against issuing more MKR at the current prices. But other projects have done well partnering with quite strategic partners. That is something that we could do, especially with expansion on other blockchains or core protocols, where we think it makes sense to collaborate closely with them. In that case, we could issue some MKR and sell it below market to gain long-term strategic partners for Maker. 
- Just a few other points. My general position is against running Maker as a public utility. This has also been a long-term divide. There are camps inside the MakerDAO favoring both positions. I am very pro-maximizing growth and future profits for MKR holders. This explicitly does not mean utilizing ponzinomics to boost the MKR price in the short term but rather making decisions that pay off over a 10 to 20-year time horizon. If it pays off earlier, that is great, but that is not the decision I like to make. I am not convinced of the clean money vision for the same reason. The world needs a bank that is independent of political influence, that is truly neutral. Every central bank in the world already has a mandate or is giving itself a mandate that expands to a social agenda, and it is not purely focused on creating good money. Maker could truly separate itself by focusing on providing the best money possible and not being a public utility. That might be my vision alone, and that is fine. I am just putting it out there. 
- Finally, I would say that some of the work we have done in the past of appraising individual borrowers is probably not the most scalable. I favor creating frameworks that can scale to focus on really high-value individual customers and lending to protocols. Maker should not be the source of where people borrow directly, but instead, be a place for other banks and protocols to borrow. This ends up dispersing that credit into the wider crypto-economy eventually to the wider economy. The direct deposit modules have been one of the biggest success stories in the DeFi period. I would like to see them utilized and expanded to a lot more protocols and eventually also to many other blockchains. 
- That is the end of my presentation. I am hoping to get a lot of questions and a good discussion.

### Questions

[14:37](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=877)

- Someone: First of all, I completely agree with what you said about focusing on growth instead of being a public utility. It makes much sense to me, especially if you look at traditional growth companies; it would make no sense to be paying dividends when you could focus on achieving growth. That makes perfect sense. I have two questions. The first one would be that you initially mentioned one of the gripes you had with the strategy, which has been like the movement towards RWA. I was interested to hear your thoughts on that. Secondly, you mentioned the notion of focusing on high-value customers and potentially being the bank for banks. Would that entail a contract to lend, perhaps under or uncollateralized lending? What are your thoughts on how that would look? Thank you.
    - Thanks for your questions. Maker had a pivotal point in the past, where there was a question on how to scale Dai. Dai was consistently above peg. The question was: how can we either disincentivize holding and incentivize borrowing or should we focus on the borrowing side via reward? Can we expand the range of collateral that people want to borrow against fast enough? At least before the invention of the direct deposit module, the only answer that Maker had was: yeah, let us get into RWA. The most scalable solution would have been the implementation of negative interest rates. I have written about that quite a bit in the past. I was sad to see that this was decided against, especially with the role of RWA being so slow that the only actual solution was putting a ton of centralized stablecoins on our balance sheet. For the longest time, this put Maker in between a rock and a hard place where it was not as efficient and scalable as decentralized stablecoins, but it was also not the preferred choice for someone seeking a decentralized form of collateral. By doing that, Maker gave up its unique market position. I was very surprised to see it scale or get the kind of adoption it did. I am totally fine with the decisions that have been taken in hindsight. I am pointing out why I thought that, at that time, that was a wrong choice, and I would have made a different decision. 
    - To your second question: I would leave this to the CUs to figure out how to structure the deals with high-value customers. The direct deposit module has been proven to be very effective. Our deals with Nexo and Celsius are the two of the five largest vaults. There is a lot more that we can do in this regard, including under-collateralized loans. Any form of business that we can do carries a certain amount of risk, and not doing it also carries a certain amount of risk. This inaction is under-appreciated in the Maker community and with regards to growth. We always like to pretend that we take a risk-free approach to things, but suddenly there is a project like Abracadabra, which gets five billion within two months. We are super surprised how this is possible. We can tell ourselves we are taking a risk-free approach by not going to these other chains and not expanding the collateral that we accept, etc. However, in reality, we opened ourselves up to a different kind of risk: a business risk that we leave supply in the market untapped. We create this unfilled demand that somebody else can go into and compete with us. What is missing is more of a holistic way of thinking about risk. I am not saying we are all about minimizing technical risk, but we ultimately leave ourselves open to business risk and get out-competed. 

[20:18](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=1218)

- Kevin: Thank you very much for taking the time. I am excited about this. To follow up on the question about real-world lending, you mentioned a bit about Celsius and Nexo. They are still within the crypto ecosystem, obviously with Centrifuge and some of the initial things happening on the asset-backed finance and in terms of asset-backed real-world non-crypto assets. I am curious to get your opinion on whether or not you think that is the right direction for Maker to diversify its treasury or if you think perhaps it is not worth it. It is an open-ended question. I am just curious to get your thoughts. 
    - For diversifying the treasury, I am definitely in favor of diversifying our USDC exposure. If there is something we can do, I would be curious to explore it. In general, the crypto space is probably in a very bad place if something happens to USDC. I am always willing to take some risks. USDC is a risk that I do not see as particularly strong or dangerous to Maker. Regarding expanding into RWA, I do not have much experience in this. I would rather defer to other delegates here and RWA CU to make this decision.
    - My area of expertise is more within treasury management and hopefully finding a way to make better decisions at Maker, not at this point in RWA. Thank you for the question.

[22:24](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=1344)

- Someone: I caught sort of mid to the end of the presentation. You touched on it a few times here, which is the treasury management side of things. Maybe you put under partnerships, and maybe you do not. I wanted to get your position on DAO treasury swaps and if that is something that you contemplated for this or just your general opinion about treasury swaps. 
	- By treasury swaps, do you mean Maker selling MKR or swapping it to acquire the governance token of another crypto project. 
- Yes. 
    - Generally, this can make sense when you want to develop a strong partnership between two protocols. I am not sure between which protocols this would make sense today. One that I can think of would be Lido. Lido is the originator of staked ETH, which is already supported in Maker. My thesis is that staked ETH will probably replace ETH entirely over the next ten years if all goes according to plan. If Maker can position itself to be the place where you can get the cheapest leverage on your staked ETH, that is probably a potential partnership. But for disclosure, I am also an investor in Lido. Do not count on my words. Apart from that, I do not see any opportunities for Maker to do any treasury swaps. At this point, I am curious if you think I am missing anything. 
- Not particularly. It is a potentially interesting mechanism in terms of partnerships and diversifying treasury holdings, having a percentage allocated to two swaps. That may be a potential way of diversifying the treasury. However, as you said, there will be a risk that comes with that. The swap is one thing but things like clifty and cliffing, vesting, and all those things need to be thoroughly thought through and strong agreements in place. 
    - For diversification, all of crypto is so correlated that I do not see a lot of diversification effect from it. If that changes, that is probably another story. For now, I only think it makes sense if two projects want to develop a close relationship with each other, then you can do a treasury swap as a part of that.

[25:26](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=1526)

- Mariano: Hi, Hasu. Thank you for your presentation. I have two questions. What would you say is the main Maker product: vaults or Dai? What do you think we should focus on to communicate and push? The second one is what do you think about Maker going to Layer2s and potentially other Layer1s? With that opportunity, do you see Maker as the banks of banks or the banks for end-users? Thank you.
    - Hey, Mariano. Thanks for your question. Maker cannot just focus on one product. Maker is a two-sided marketplace between borrowers and holders of Dai. You can also look at it as long and short sight, and Dai is perpetual. It always has to develop both sides. If Maker were to focus only on developing demand for Dai, as arguably it has done for the last one or two years, what you get is that you have excess demand for Dai, and Dai is constantly above the peg. Then you have to make very hard decisions such as backing or putting a lot of centralized stablecoins on your balance sheet to protect the peg. This can make your product unstable and potentially even kill it in the long run. On the other hand, if you focused only on borrowing demand and nobody wanted to hold the coin, you can have the other problem. Although that is arguable, you can have a Dai consistently below the peg. It is a better problem because you can use the Dai savings rate to boost the profitability of holding Dai as a transfer from borrowers to holders. However, you cannot do the opposite. We cannot charge holders of Dai to incentivize more borrowing, and arguably that is a structural problem that makes Dai less scalable. I would have liked to fix this a few years ago, but we did not. We have to make sure that we prioritize both borrowing and lending. Today the number of stablecoins on our balance sheet is a great indicator of the imbalance between the two. Looking at how much USDC pegs dai, we can tell there is much more demand to hold Dai than borrow it. Next year, we should boost the borrowing demand to replace more USDC with other forms of collateral. That was the first question. 
    - The second asked what I think about expanding to Layer1 and Layer2. I answered that question a short while ago. I am very much in favor of expanding to other blockchains. I am a strong believer in a multi-chain thesis. There will be many blockchains that will flourish in the future for crypto. The risk is greatly overemphasized. They will all stick around. They will not be shut down by regulators or anything like that. It is not like Maker is not taking any risk by not going to these chains. It minimizes the risk of Dai on another chain becoming unpegged, but it gains the risk of leaving the market open to a competitor. Abracadabra was a very amateurish attempt at competing with Maker in these regards. There could be a competitor that does not blow up from its incompetence, and suddenly, Maker finds itself on the back foot. That is something that I would like to prevent. There is a lot of borrowing demand on these other chains. This could solve the problem addressed in your previous question, which is that there is not enough borrowing demand, but there is a ton of borrowing demand on these other chains. I would like to see Maker go on these chains, and we can still run. Every new chain we expand to is the CDP. We can run our risk parameters on it and slowly increase the debt ceilings as we become more comfortable with the security parameters of their chain. I would be in favor of seeing more multi-chain expansion here. 

[30:49](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=1849)

- Jeanice: My question is related to your concepts of executive delegates. How do you see that framework in practice? In context, I work on the growth of CU, and I used to be at the foundation. I went from the foundation structure to the decentralized CU structure. I am not opposed to this concept of an executive delegate layer. My immediate thought is how this avoids privileged operators because it feels very hierarchical and centralized. You would have executive delegates overseeing the actual CU and then involved in strategic decision-making, all on behalf of the Maker token holders. However, on paper, that sounds like the foundation to me, more or less. How do you see it in practice, and what problem is it ultimately trying to solve?
    - Hasu: The problem that it is trying to solve is that if you have a too flat hierarchy, you end up with very few people. The reality is that very few holders participate in governance. The ones that do, I think, do not all pull in the same direction. Every year we have a different focus, and there is no long-term plan being executed. I think the plan is almost of secondary importance. It is more important that there is someone to set a plan, and everybody focuses their resources in the same direction. I would hope to achieve that by having someone, almost anyone, set a consistent vision and minimize resources spent on anything else.
    - How this can be implemented is to be determined. I just sense that we need more structure in setting the agenda. You raise excellent points clearly, with how to minimize privileged control and information. I think we would need powerful reporting to MKR with us. We need the ability to remove these delegates if users think that they no longer operate in the best interest.
    - Overall, I think you need a robust system of checks and balances, so nobody should have unilateral control. Everybody should be accountable to someone else in a web of accountability. I have seen other DAOs where if the hierarchy gets too flat, then the result is that nobody is incentivized to think long-term on behalf of the protocol. Many forces start to pull into very different directions, and you end up deluding yourselves and spreading yourself too thin when you should be focusing all your time pushing in one direction. I hope to do more research on this and provide some case studies for what works in other protocols, but I think Maker is, as usual, at the forefront of trying something new in governance.

[35:25](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=2125):

- Clifton: Do you have thoughts on the state of research about cross-collateralizing stable coins, such as a true multi-collateral that emulates a primer road bridge? Is that something that Maker is looking at as far as product-wise goes? Is it execution-heavy? It could be like an excellent L2 star X-type thing. 
    - Hasu: What do you mean by cross-collateralization of stable coins?
- Clifton: I mean cross-collateralization of the collateral that you would be borrowing against. As you said earlier, things are highly correlated. Maybe these correlations matter less as there is more dispersion in those correlations that are much more capital efficient. Essentially, you have a pool of assets that you borrow against.
    - Hasu: A vault that supports more than one asset. Good question. That is how Compound. Aave and others work. You can provide different kinds of collateral, which is counted towards your balance, then you can borrow against it. I think it would be interesting for Maker to research how important this feature is to borrow us?
- Clifton: With CDP-based systems, the interest rates are constructed. They are not necessarily market base rates since you create stablecoins out of thin air. I think that is one of the reasons why something like Abracadabra shot up in popularity. You can borrow close to zero liquidity. If you encourage collateral that collects interest, you could take a cut of the interest-bearing collateral as balances change. You make it cheap for people to borrow while also having that other revenue source. There is some difference.
- If we are just talking about cross-collateral or multi-collateral vaults, you can already put multiple forms of collateral inside other lending markets due to the direct deposit module. You benefit from the same interest rate as you would in Maker. I do not think it is necessary, but I like the general direction of focusing and bootstrapping more of the borrowing side than the Dai holding side. 
    - Nadia Alvarez: I have a question about CUs. We discussed the new CU that we could have on the DAO. This is something that you will be voting for in the following weeks. What did you think about CUs? How many CUs does the DAO need? I understand that you want to grow the protocol, and you will need to increase the workforce, but does that mean that we need to onboard new CUs? Does it matter how many CUs we need to have in the next two years? Should we be more strategic and have a list of CUs that the DAO needs and try to create those CUs? I am curious about how to scale several CUs. Also, do we need different CUs doing the same thing at this stage, or is that something for the future? The original vision of a decentralized organization states we need more than one Core Unit doing the same thing because we do not want to centralize the power in one group. I am curious about what you think about it.
    
[40:32](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=2432)

- Hasu: I do not know how many CUs there are. It is hard to manage the budget of a DAO already at this size unless you are a full-time delegate. This goes back to Maker not incentivizing or incentive-aligning the right kind of full-time delegate. I have seen from the inside the work that delegates currently do. Their work level, given the current level of incentivization, is crazy. I do not know how you are supposed to make these decisions without being a full-time delegate. This is an argument in favor of having a little more centralized control at this layer of making financial decisions with the DAO money. Whom should the CUs be? How many do we need? What is their budget? How do we hold them accountable? In a nutshell, I think this is impossible for the current set of CUs to decide, and it will become even harder over time as we further grow.
- I cannot tell you if we need all the CUs we onboarded in the last six months that are currently being voted on. I do not know how to sense it because too much time is required to think this all through. Do we need different CUs doing the same thing? I think it depends on the work that the CU is doing. The only place where it could make sense is core engineering. They are probably the oldest CU and the most important one. This would be the first thing I look at to avoid political centralization and one CU getting too much control. 
- We want to do many things simultaneously, for example, work being done on different domains versus new vault types. This is where it would make more sense to create a bit more modularity in the CU. For the others, the work is not business-critical enough to advocate for more than one CU doing the same thing. This is half speculative on my part. People that worked in Maker for years know all the existing power structures and the problems with different CUs. I do not give myself the illusion that I can make an informed decision about this. I am just trying to answer the question, but I have no strong confidence in this topic.

[44:28](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=2668)

- MakerMan: I cannot thank you enough for hearing someone else talk about a treasury. I mentioned this for years and thought about how Maker backing the protocols almost guarantees to sell low and buy high by a flat flop mechanics. I look forward to seeing some discussion. At one point, you talked about negative interest rates, creating new value, and encouraging growth. I have a few ideas on how we can do that that are not the run of the mill. I also chuckled when you said the whole five to ten percent backing. I was pushing for a two to five percent surplus buffer, and I was talked down so fast. It is interesting to see. I am happy to see another player thinking about this and looking at growing the protocol. Whenever I looked at a collateral type, I thought we had 100 million Dai out, and we had a one million surplus buffer. So, I guess we could risk a million? You think about every deal you do, every collateral type you add, and it against the surplus. What is our risk? The goal was really to move forward.
- In the ways, it was presented, running negative interest rates was not well received by governance. I think we can address it, but governance was reluctant to do that. You talked about wanting to address governance issues and having an executive team; I look forward to that. It will be interesting and challenging; your web of accountability is also interesting. I will point out something: my analysis suggests DAO expenses perform similar functions to companies or at least two to three times. It will be interesting to hear what thoughts you have on this. The reason is just redundancy in quality assurance.
- I am giving you an example: we can look at RWF and RWA here. You do not want your steel sources to be your team doing the reviewing on the assessments. You would like those to be firewalled options. It is going to make that more expensive. There are other things you might want to duplicate. I look forward to discussions. My question is: what do you think about this trend of CU expense ramp compared to revenue? We can talk more about cross-platform swaps. 
- There are many ways and different things that you can do. It is an exciting topic of discussion. We do not have to address it now. Your last point is under collateralized loans. I think it is interesting to discuss. We should be looking at more prominent players and trying to get some bigger stuff going on. It is an interesting place to look; I think governance will have difficulty dealing with it. I want to thank you again. That would be great if you could address my question on the CU expense ramp compared to revenues. 
    - Hasu: I look forward to working with you to materialize some of these plans. I have not seen the CU expense rate chart versus revenue. I would have to catch up on that and get back to you later. They must be compared, and you cannot decide on expenses without projecting what kind of revenue it generates in the future. My general approach has been to create onboarding a new CU as an investment for the DAO. This has been my approach to treasury management in general; I think we need a holistic framework. Every dollar you spend, as a DAO, you need a sense of how much revenue it can generate in the future. Any decision can be viewed under this lens: borrowing money, buying back tokens, canceling them, or creating a new CU and paying them a budget.
    - o	If it is paying incentives on a new chain to bootstrap liquidity down, I would like to see a holistic framework for thinking about these things. Without that, it is the decision that the delegates need to make will spiral way out of control. That would be my cop-out answer, and I will get back to you on the other questions.

[49:49](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=2989)

- Yakub: In terms of treasury management, what do you think of accumulating some ETH or maybe even stake ETH? I saw it in the forum, but there was an unclear consensus. Within the community, there were other ideas like how to offset Oracle scores via call options on ETH. This is not an intelligent solution as it incurs too much work and hassle. ETH cannot be a better asset for redeemability because Dai is above peg instead of USDC. When I speak to other funds and other big DeFi players, they do not approve of half the Maker balance sheet in USDC because it is against this spirit of decentralization. 
    - Hasu: Accumulating ETH or staked ETH and pulling out USDC from the balance sheet may have an internal market. When Dai is above one, there is an opportunity to have cheaper ETH can sell it elsewhere. 
- Yakub: If you were to sell the USDC from the balance sheet in favor of ETH, that is not a good idea. When ETH goes down, you are under collateralized. It is not good to back Dai. I am a little more indifferent to the surplus buffer. In general, I favor holding all treasury in stable coins, but this is a double-edged sword. What happens in crypto is that companies are willing to take risks. If the risk does not materialize, you are obviously in a perfect spot. Many projects have held a lot of crypto in their treasury. Then, the crypto went way up, so they got into a dominant position. Gnosis is an example. That is not the approach that I would have taken, but it did end up paying off. This makes it tough for a project that arguably did the more sensible thing to complete. They only had stablecoins, focused on their core product, and did not price crypto. 

### Conclusion 

#### Payton

[53:41](https://youtu.be/u7tT3HgAXqo?t=3221)

- Prose11: If you have leftover questions, please hit the Maker forum. That is a great place to organize the questions about delegates and other things MakerDAO. Please continue the conversations in the forums, and we will catch you at the next one.

## Common Abbreviated Terms

`DAO`: Decentralized Autonomous Organization 
`RWA`: Real-World Asset
`DeFi`: Decentralized Finance

## Credits

- Artem Gordon produced this summary.
- Kunfu-po produced this summary.
- Andrea Suarez Camacho produced this summary.
- Larry Wu produced this summary.
- Everyone who spoke and presented on the call, listed in the headers.
