Data Always - March 23, 2024 tl;dr By examining the distribution of MEV block values we footprint min-bid usage across major proposer sets. We combine this footprinting with Tornado Cash transaction data and find that min-bid contributes at least 7% of all censorship resistance, while the majority (79%) comes from non-censoring MEV-Boost builders. Among these builders, Titan builder stands out, facilitating the inclusion of 56% of all sanctioned transactions on the network. Assumed Audience: Ethereum researchers and validators. You are aware of the current state of censorship on Ethereum and know what the min-bid parameter in MEV-Boost does. Data Sources:

Supplementing Censorship Resistance Today Data Always - July 10, 2024 tl;dr The potential for significant missed income from localBlockValueBoost edge cases and the lack of empirical study of its efficacy has led consensus clients into making opinionated decisions for their users without meaningfully contributing to censorship resistance. In its current state, full network adoption of localBlockValueBoost would revert less than 1% of MEV-Boost blocks to local building, while concentrating over half of missed proposer income into less than 1% of those reversions. To allow for localBlockValueBoost to be increased and to provide powerful censorship resistance, consensus clients should introduce a limit on missed proposer income to prevent the most expensive edge cases. With proper tuning, a capped local value boost can provide better resilience than min-bid at a lower cost and without modifying out-of-protocol software. Assumed Audience: Ethereum researchers and core developers. You have a conceptual understanding of how min-bid and localBlockValueBoost work. You are aware of the low level of min-bid adoption by proposers and the state of censorship on Ethereum.

Distortion of MEV Auctions by Withdrawals Data Always - Feb 20, 2024 tl;dr MEV-Boost auctions are distorted by withdrawals much more frequently than most people realize, but the losses to proposers tend to be very small. The majority of these distorted auctions go unseen and involve partial withdrawals. Over the past month the median loss to proposers has been $7 and the total loss has been $4,300. Improvement Proposal | Dune Dashboard | Raw Data Motivation:

Data Always - February 23, 2024 tl;dr In an effort to allow decentralized consensus participation, the Ethereum network inadvertently rewards latency to the benefit of less efficient block proposers. High-quality validators are intrinsically penalized by the system and struggle to compete on yield unless they simulate latency by playing timing games. Although these games are frequently vilified for degrading the health of the network, proposer sets (ex-CoinSpot) that intentionally delay their getHeader() requests empirically see few of their blocks reorged. By contrast, large entities like Coinbase often have extremely high-variance setups and see their blocks frequently reorged despite not playing timing games. Assumed Audience: Ethereum researchers and stakers. You understand the MEV supply chain, have a basic understanding of the phases of a slot, and are comfortable with the roles played by builders, relays and proposers. You know what timing games are and are versed in the negative externalities that they cause for the network.