Cerezbzns + TW UH WarGames Braindump

--- ###### tags: `WarGames` --- # Cerezbzns + TW UH WarGames Braindump *Cross reference with [Dekan's idea about NFT/POAP incentive for UH retention](https://hackmd.io/@daohaus/rJH7zy7U9).* Initial prompt: * Users can stake HAUS to receive 1x voting power * Users can stake HAUS/WETH DXS for 2x voting power * Unstaked HAUS generates 0 voting power * In addition to the LP modifier, voting power grows quadratically proportionate to how long HAUS has been staked up to a 10x multiplier at maximum, reaching the max voting power asymptote at 365 days * Unstaking any amount has a 28 day thawing period Future features that could be useful but not necessary to start: * Incorporating Hedgey time lock NFTs to generate voting power proportionate to locked HAUS at some multiplier * Enabling users to collect/receive liquidity mining rewards from Swapr or whichever dex we decide to partner with for HAUS LP token staking * Cross-chain staking to provide voting power to LPDAO szn3 members, proportionate to loot held * Cross-chain staking to provide voting power to HAUS/WETH balancer LPs Initial Objectives: - Design objective is to strongly incentivize users to stake their HAUS tokens or LP and reward them for keeping it in the stake for years. - Under this regime, someone who stakes LP for a year would receive 20x voting power to someone who stakes straight HAUS for a day. - We could consider a rage quit provision for ending the thaw period early for stake withdrawal, maybe at some penalty (5-10%) - Might be approximated with Snapshot strategies, using time held in wallet/address as a proxy for staking. Good first step. ### Audience - UH DAOs and individuals ### Overview / Setup - Problem: how do we want to share a governance voice in UH 1.5? - We want to create a way for DAOs to provide governance voice in proportion to their HAUS stake, but also *individuals* to have voice/governance without having to go through the DAO-only bicameral model. - Problem space of the HAUS token: outside of UH, *there is no utility to the HAUS token.* Can't use it for anything, doesn't incur yield, it's just there. UH as a platform for identifying and implementing token utility. ### Initial Scope - If we lower the barrier to entry to make UH more accessible, then HAUS token becomes more meaningful for people and there is an incentive to accumulate. - One incentive might be increased governance voice in Uberhaus. Not the core/main use, but one of potentially many reasons to hold and use the token. - There are 2 problems to consider so we don't make new issues down the road: 1. We are moving closer to token voting (Snapshot, multisig, etc) that we have historically avoided. There's a strong risk of plutocracy. 2. On utility: a large token holder that has a proportionally large governance voice... but what does that mean? UH is currently only oriented towards distributed of HAUS supply. What kind of real impact would an individual and/or DAO have in this say? Why should they care to participate? - There are a set of aligned behaviors that we want to incentivize and encourage. - We don't want HAUS = voting power. Because all of the problems of token-weighted voting. - We want to encourage peeps to accumulate, hold, and provide liquidity for the HAUS. - We want to reward the behavior we want by providing a multiplier for voting based on the way HAUS is held: - Balance of HAUS in a wallet, or - Holding a HAUS LP position in a wallet - It is better for DH as a community if we can drive more liquidity for the token = provides more stability and allows us to use it as a supplier of value while avoid destabilizing gyrations of price in market volatility (the negative externalities of volatility). We are already bound to ETH volatility, so it is to our advantage to create as much stability as possible. - All of this amounts to a utility use case for the token. Proposed solution: - We give LP stakers a 2x voting multiplier. We will incentivize LPs. - Person has 1000 HAUS. They receive 1000 voting power. - Second person has 1000 HAUS staken in an LP pool. They received 2000 vote power on UH proposals. - We want to incentivize long term alignment. Let's incentivize folks to hold their positions, to avoid selling or buying in opportunistically, sniping, dumping, etc. We want to support a stable and loyal position. Reward this alignment with a proportionally higher share of voice. - Reward 1 year holders at 10x. - 2x multiplier stack: someone holds HAUS for a year = 10x. Holding HAUS in an LP position = 2x from LP + 10x for time = 20x increase voting power. - At the end of a year, there would be a scale of voting weights based on stability and loyalty. --- - The velocity of the game is a key factor here. - There is a time crunch for booting UH, so this will have to be weighed against the consideration of *how much time does the game/test need to provide useful results?* - We need more understanding on the structure of UH v1.5 to proceed: voting shares vs loot shares, and also Snapshot voting power - Snapshot: runs based on the math we program in - DAOhaus side: can be managed through a Shaman = share/loot ratio changes over time based on what has been contributed - Are individuals able to join UH? Are they only going to have Snapshot vote? - Individuals will be able to hold shares. ### Scenarios / Attack Vectors / Points of Friction 1. The vast majority of out liquidity is on mainnet. Everyone that provided liquidty to the LP DAO will not have shares using those tokens. We will be able to give them Snapshot voice (since this is held within the UH minion on mainnet). This is soft gov, not hard, so less than optimal. 2. If a lot of liquidity farms on GC require staking into a farm. HAUS/WETH on the pool in Swappr = swappr token = farming contract to receive rewards = this is non-trivial. Problem: do I choose the reward return on Swappr or do I choose to stake LP on UH? One solution: Give them Snapshot equivalent to their position on Swappr (but soft gov vs hard gov, again). Second solution: we devise a meta-farming contract in collaboration with Swappr to incentivize the individuals to join our efforts because they have higher yields than they could pull alone. 3. Time weight scenario: For the Snapshot, there will be people not tracking these events, or don't understand, and when they move their tokens around they will be upset when their voting power is penalized (cut in half) due to their own lack of information. 4. Farming: If an individual is holding tokens in their wallet to participate in Swappr, Swappr has a policy that forces you to move your farm every two weeks. They setup new contracts with unique positions on a regular basis. Literally: pull tokens out of one farming contract and deposit into another. This will cause conflict with our longer-term holding incentives and slash individual governance power. Proposed solution: UH could setup a custom contract with Swappr so individuals deposit into UH and UH handles their deposit. Alternatively, we could work with Swappr to setup a farming contract that runs for a year so we can setup a stable rewards schedule, reliable time preference power distribution through Snapshot. 5. UH is very slow: 14 days voting/14 days grace = month-long proposal periods. This might cause friction with previous mentions of high-velocity. 6. Liquidity in Balancer: the liquidity is staked into the veBAL guage by the UH avatar (a multisig wallet address) which is the majority holder. In Snapshot, this address would have proportionate majority soft gov voting power. 2 potential solutions to distribute voice power based on their mainnet positions: 1. if you have LP in Balancer on mainnet, in the veBAL guage, we can give you Snapshot power based on that position. This would include all holders, but the UH wallet would also have a massive voice. 2. Instead of vote power based on LP tokens, we could distribute vote power based on the loot that is held in the LP DAO. ### LARPing Ideas