WGMI <> Yeeter Meeting 1 (3/9/22)

--- tags: yeeter, wgmi --- # WGMI <> Yeeter Meeting 1 (3/9/22) ## WGMI Needs - Matt is at ConsenSys and is doing work with DAOs - Focused on Developer Community -- organizing hackathons, Dev Rel type work - Built dev communities - Teams are looking for community folks for their products and projects, and there is a huge talent gap - Created a DAO with the mission to "bring more community folks to web3" - Launching a ServiceDAO and was a part of MetaPod - Received grant funding and have a MetaCartel proposal in action - Investigating governance structure and are interested in using DAOhaus to help contributors have skin in the game and tighten up the core contributor group - Looking for incentive mechanisms as well - Exploring funding options, and are interested in the Yeeter for this purpose ## All About the Yeet! - Yeeter uses a feature from Baal that we pulled into v2.5 (Shamans) that adds ability for a MolochDAO to approve an external contract to have direct modification rights after DAO shares and loot - This circumvents the regular proposal process for creating shares and loot - Allows for sending money through the Yeeter for shares and loot instead of needing to go through the proposals - Similar to similar crowdfunding platforms like Mirror or JuiceBox, but instead of receiving a token (usually w/o direct governance power beyond Snapshot signalling) folks get loot shares in the DAO which represent Rage Quit (exit) rights - Massively decreases the barrier to contributing since they have Rage Quit protection, but this *is very impactful* - Folks working on a project are held accountable to those who contributed - Always a risk that folks can pull funds out right away, but we haven't seen this yet - Can move the funds into non-RageQuittable Minions as the DAO, but we haven't seen this specifically with a Yeeter project - Similar to the process for what DAOhaus is doing with the CCO funds - As the team spends the funds they are no longer Rage Quittable, but investors can remove funds that remain in the treasury at any time ## WGMI Questions and Thoughts - As they build the treasury how do they segregate it so that no one can Rage Quit once joining? - Good distinction is between *core Rage Quittable treasury* and other vaults that are controlled that aren't Rage Quittable - If all revenue and all funds go into the core treasury this is a sizeable risk - Funds can enter into a side vault that is not Rage Quittable - What is the process for creating a DAO with core contributors: - Possible to not start with any funds and summon the DAO with initial members and initial amount of shares - These can be set upon summoning - How do these shares grow in value? What is the incentive? - If there aren't funds in the core treasury then these shares may still be valuable if funds exist in a side vault (similar to value of Governance Tokens) -- value in being able to control a treasury with funds in it ### WGMI and the Yeeter - Core contributors spin up DAOhaus DAO -> start a Yeeter - Does the DAO value go up or is this not relevant if it's not Rage Quittable? How are Yeeter funds managed? - Yeeter funds go into the DAO main treasury, so they are RQable - People who put these shares in they get loot shares which have no voting weight but have exit rights - If no one else got loot shares when money came in then the folks with initial shares could RQ for their portion, but this is protected against since any contributor get loot shares representing their right to RQ - At what point are folks encouraged to bring value *back* into the DAO? - Different DAOs do this differently depending on the purpose: some folks aren't expecting a return but are getting control over how funds are spent, whereas others are investment oriented and are expecting a degree of return - One approach includes a token (Community Contribution Opportunity -- such as DAOhaus just did) - As funds are spent, these funds are replaced with the token (such as $HAUS) and folks who put in the funds can RQ these tokens that represent their stake in the DAO - Yeeter can be the genesis launch of the DAO and they can define how it looks - DAOhaus doesn't officially advise on tokenomics and strategy in an advisory role - Distinction between Yeeter as a tool and token treasury management (such as transmutation) - With investors contributing to the Yeeter: - Is there a permissioning mechanism? Is there a cap or minimum? Is there any legal implications? - Can set a cap - Have lawyers look over the plan (have we encountered feedback from anyone about securities issues) - Can you approve or deny anyone who is Yeeting? Can you gather a whitelist? - Is there a way to whitelist vs. having it be an open CCO - This is a future feature -- right now, it's designed to be open - Folks won't have governance shares, so they wouldn't have outsized influence - There are some workarounds to this: - If you don't want someone involved at all you can pass a proposal to kick someone out (they'll get their funds, but won't be part of the DAO at all) - This may open up a lot of potential for using the Yeeter for VC raises - Can also do this with a DAOhaus DAO -- Yeeter is circumventing the membership proposal process - If it's imperative to have full control, can go the route of a traditional DH proposal process where folks vote - Can share the link (can we look into password protecting the routes?) - Reject funds from non-whitelisted address? - We'd need to build this feature - Connections at ConsenSys -- can pitch DAOhaus to folks there ## Next Steps - [x] Create [wgmi](https://discord.gg/BAKQ8MfbHn) DAOstillery channel - [] Move forward with soundchecking WGMI's Yeeter plan if they decide to use the Yeeter - [] Help with fact checking the communications related to a raise, the DAO, or anything else