[toc]

###### tags: `Reading sessions`

---

# 2019

<https://www.sigecom.org/ec19/>
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/proceedings/10.1145/3328526>

## [Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3328526.3329628)
* By Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm and Ellen Vitercik
* [MN] Approximate Incentive compatibility (γ-IC):
* Mechanism is γ-IC when for each bidder i:
* If everyone except user i is truthful, i can only increase his utility by γ if he bids strategically.
* Literature: Assume distribution is known in advance.
* This paper assumes just some samples from dist. over agents' types (Finite set).

###### tags: `Mechanism Design` `Incentive Compatibility`