###### tags: `Reading sessions`

[toc]

# 2021

<https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/CSF2021/accepted.html>

## [Fixing the Achilles Heel of E-Voting: The Bulletin Board](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/109.pdf)
* By Lucca Hirschi, Lara Schmid, David Basin
* [LH] Most prior work looks at idealized BBs. They claim BBs for Belenios, Civitas and Helios fail to provide sufficiently strong guarantees for verifiability, with a centralized entity needing to be trusted for verifiability to hold. This assumption is claimed to be unreasonable and at odds with minimising trust assumptions in e-voting. They want to look at BBs under adversarial control and which requirements must be satisfied for BBs for verifiability to hold. The main concern seems to be *equivocation*, where the BB displays different contents to different parties. An attacker can remove $k \leq n$ ballots corresponding to targeted voters, without being detected by the verifiability checks. These are detecable if the voters compare their read BB contents, but the authors dismiss this as not being part of the verifiability checks.
* [LH] The authors propose a new protocol that satisfies *final agreement*: any contents read from the BB at any point are contained in a distinguished final version of the BB with the election result. This aims to deal with the problem of equivocation for malicious BBs.
* [BB] Short review by BB

###### tags: `e-voting` `verifiability`