# Bibliography for paper-based E2E schemes

###### tags: `bibliography`

# Main Papers

## [Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections (IEEE S&P magazine, 2004)](https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/voting/papers/Chaum-SecretBallotReceiptsTrueVoterVerifiableElections.pdf)
* David Chaum

## [A Practical Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme (EOSRICS 2005)](http://www.computing.surrey.ac.uk/personal/st/S.Schneider/papers/esorics05.pdf)
* David Chaum, Peter Y.A. Ryan, and Steve Schneider
* Introduced a variant of Pret a Voter. In the earlier version (Ryan, WITS'05) the voter was invited to choose which of the leeft and right columns to retain.
* In the new version: 1) ballot forms are generated and printed in advance. 2) the voter always discards thhe left hand column. 3) uses the tellers in **an oracle mode** to enable the checks on the well-formedness of the ballot form.
* There is a base ordering, and the candidate list is encoded as the number of cyclic shifts. So for four candidates, there are four possible values.
* All tellers must be involved to perform the decryption.
* Input to each teller: $(r_i, D_i)$
* Single candidate election -> multi-candidate
* "The idea of providing the voteer with an encrypted rreceipt oes back to the original scheme proposed by Chaum."
* In the book chapter, referred to as "the original version of Pret a Voter".

## [Prêt à voter with re-encryption mixes (ESORICS 2006)](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11863908_20)
* Peter Y A Ryan and Steve Schneider
* Modifies [CRS05]: 1) distributed construction of ballots; 2) on-deemand decryption and printing of of the ballot form; 3) use ree-encryption mixes
* Discusses **chain voting** attack

## [Human Readable Paper Verification of Prêt à Voter (ESORICS 2008)](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-88313-5_25)
* David Lundin & Peter Y. A. Ryan
* Added VVPAT to PAV

## [The Prêt à Voter Verifiable Election System (TIFS 2009)](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=5272310&casa_token=I87RPLLOTEsAAAAA:X066z0IMVmpnyLrWW1z-D-Q8o07eXywZWvws3UvKX-E6comSrIg1xcfBXPomKCtr1nUQ_9Q&tag=1)
* Peter Y. A. Ryan, David Bismark, James Heather, Steve Schneider, and Zhe Xia
* Uses re-encryption mix-nets

## [vVote: A verifiable voting system (ACM TISSEC 2015)](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2746338?casa_token=2xTyPfzzJbwAAAAA:qWqjzsAX47uGduBa7mU1Q3vVnaoZd7sD5WVf7kIJclm5LQVg48-hL4yqcCjvzTgk6KFjI7VDp6s)
* Chris Culnane, Peter Y A Ryan, Steve Schneider, and Vanessa Teague.
* "The system ran successfully in the state election in Victoria (Australia) in November 2014, taking a total of 1121 votes from supervised polling places inside Victoria and at the Australian High Commission in London."
* Printed ballots on-demand
* Used mix-net based on re-encryption
* Used Randomized Partial Checking with modifications proposed by Khazaei and Wikstrom (2013)

trash attack, clash attack, Italian attack

# Secondary papers

## [A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting (CCS 2001)](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/501983.502000?casa_token=Qn-ThkWHrpAAAAAA:l44WRpnF5ewjNM9mQ3q1L9NV7MetaH8LQwZDAbBT00pzHMNqjF9JB07MO8tZln4vkeRjA0TsYTk)
* Andrew Neff
* Proposed Neff's voting protocol

## [Making Mix Nets Robust For Electronic Voting By Randomized Partial Checking (USENIX SECURITY 2002)](https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec02/full_papers/jakobsson/jakobsson.pdf)
* Markus Jakobsson, Ari Juels, Ronald Rivest
* Proposed *randomized partial checkng* (RPC) for mix-net without using zero-knowledge proofs.

## [A better ballot box? (IEEE Spectrum, 2002)](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=1038569&casa_token=GeX5_4qYEK4AAAAA:n1YCIAeenFi8APri8FprmxVg3JXc2tD-AxEuemwkdYwFBVwpBCXNEva7GuqxtsexwFCVvnU&tag=1)
* Rebecca Mercuri
* Desscribes tthe Mercuri method

## [A Varient of the Chaum voter-verifiable Scheme (WITS 2005)](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/1045405.1045414?casa_token=EbypZ0eDIJkAAAAA:psaJHZSjWENNLo3-Cy_O82YGkwYr1RaaGCUt2O7dWOgmqmDQ9FCPKUOZIfIpvFg0BfCPb8-6VPU)
* Peter Ryan
* An early version of Pret a Voter
* It is based on an earlier version published in a 2004 TR by Bryan and Ryan, which replaces the visual cryptography in Chaum's 2004 scheme with a pair of aligned paper strips
* It's later replaced by the ESORICS 2005 version