SigUSB: Fingerprinting USB Devices using Distinctive Characteristics of Electrical Signals
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Keywords: fingerprint, authenticate, identify, usb, devices, voltage, signals
## Introduction
* USB protocol and devices
* Insecurity of USB protocol
* Challenges of USB device identification
* Our approach
* Robustness (two graphs in a figure showing variations across devices of different models and consistency of the same devices across different runs)
* System design and result highlights
* Contributions
* The rest of this paper is...
## Background and Motivation
* Signals -> packets (figure)
* Initialization sequence
* Motivation
## Threat Model
* Attacker is able to:
* Fabricate a USB device that impersonates a benign device
* E.g., BadUSB, FaceDancer, BashBunny
* USBee [X]
* Attacker is not able to:
* Steal an authenticated device and change the firmware
* We trust known devices
* Our focus: authenticating a USB devices when plugged-in (but not monitoring their behaviors after that)
* Compromise our authentication mechanism
* There exist solutions [DeviceVeil, FPGA]
* Host machine has only one USB port available for SigUSB
## Design
* Overview [Figure]
* Logic analysis -> Noise filtering -> Sequence aligning -> Feature extraction -> ML classification -> Device authentication
* Logic analysis & noise filtering
* Sequence aligning
* Feature extraction
* What features are most effective?
* ML classification
* Device authentication
## Implementation
## Evaluation
* Questions
* Q1: How accurate is this device fingerprinting?
* \# of devices in training and accuracy
* With a small # of devices in training, can SigUSB detect many unknown devices?
* \# of samples in training and accuracy
* How does # of samples in training and testing affect the accuracy?
* What classifiers give better accuracy?
* Q2: Is this robust against an impersonating device (1) of the same model, (2) across models, (3) consistent across plug-in times?
* Q3: Is SigUSB effective against real impersonating devices?
* Q4: What is the performance impact of SigUSB?
* Setup
* Machine spec., experimented with XXX devices (models, types, etc.)
* Focus on keyboards and mice because...
* Biggest targets for impersonating devices [CITE]
* The mechanism is general and can be applied to other types of USB devices
* Accuracy of USB device fingerprinting
* Robustness of using electrical signals
* Experiments with real-world attacks
* Performance impact
## Related Work
* USB attacks & device authentication
* Attacks
* BadUSB ...
* Authentication
* DeviceVeil (closest)
* Dave Tian's work: USBFilter, etc.
* Figerprinting devices based on electical signals
* Automotive ECU fingerprinting
* XXX
## Discussion and Future Work
* Source of small inaccuracy
* Stealing and reprogramming an authenticated device
* Retraining after degradation of hardware
* Protection of our mechanism
## Conclusion