Network State vs. Coordination: Plurality, Participation, and the Future of Decentralized Governance

Introduction

As the Web3 ecosystem matures, new visions for social and political organization are emerging from its experiments. Two prominent frameworks have captured imaginations: the “network state” – a concept of online communities forming new quasi-sovereign entities – and the ethos of “coordination-first” networks focusing on cooperation and public goods. Both frameworks respond to dissatisfaction with existing institutions, yet they propose very different paths. The network state vision, popularized by Balaji Srinivasan’s The Network State, imagines highly aligned online communities that eventually crowdfund territory and seek nation-like status. In contrast, a coordination-driven approach emphasizes solving collective action problems through distributed networks, without necessarily creating a new state. This essay explores the conceptual differences and tensions between these two paradigms through the lens of plurality, real-world applicability, and democratic participation. We will define and distinguish “network state” and “coordination” models, examine where they overlap or conflict – especially in community governance and infrastructure – and draw on real-world Web3 experiments like Ethereum Localism, regenerative finance (ReFi) rounds, bioregional DAOs, and decentralized science platforms. Along the way, we consider critiques about scale, inclusivity, interoperability, and the dangers of digital feudalism or platform capture. Ultimately, we reflect on how coordination-first approaches can foster pluralistic, regenerative, and democratic local institutions without requiring the instantiation of full-blown network states.

Defining the “Network State” vs. “Coordination” Paradigms

Network state. The term “network state” describes a highly unified online community that aspires to operate like a startup society or digital nation. In Srinivasan’s formulation, a network state begins as an online social network with a shared moral vision, led by a recognized founder, which achieves a capacity for collective action and then crowdfunds physical territory around the world, linking these enclaves into an “archipelago” that eventually seeks diplomatic recognition. In short, *“a network state is a highly aligned online community with a capacity for collective action that crowdfunds territory…and eventually gains diplomatic recognition”*. Each network state is meant to be united by a single, founding ideology or moral innovation. Srinivasan even suggests every network state should have a one-sentence moral “commandment” encapsulating its values. This strong alignment is coupled with a founder-led governance model: the founder is seen as a “moral entrepreneur” who sets the initial philosophy and rules, akin to a CEO of a startup society. The promise of network states is to allow groups of like-minded individuals globally to “exit” existing nations and create new polities aligned with their values, leveraging blockchain as a backbone for governance and collective decision-making. Proponents argue that blockchains and Web3 tools can provide the social contract infrastructure (for example, on-chain governance, an integrated cryptocurrency, and digital identity/census) to run these cloud communities as real jurisdictions. In essence, the network state vision is a startup nation strategy: use the internet to coordinate a diaspora, then materialize it in the real world as a new kind of polity.

Coordination-first approach. In contrast, what we’ll call a coordination-first framework does not seek to create new sovereign states, but rather to improve how people coordinate within and across existing communities and institutions. This approach is rooted in the idea that blockchains and decentralized networks are powerful tools to solve coordination problems – aligning incentives, funding public goods, and managing commons – without needing to secede or form a new nation. Blockchain pioneer Vitalik Buterin often emphasizes the role of crypto as a “coordination mechanism” rather than just a new form of money. Similarly, DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) advocates and commons scholars focus on commons-based governance, where participants cooperatively manage shared resources or goals. In a coordination-first view, pluralism and interdependence are core values: it acknowledges that society is composed of diverse groups with overlapping memberships, and seeks to build networks that let these groups collaborate effectively on shared challenges, from local civic issues to global problems. “Coordination” here implies fostering collective intelligence and cooperation across networks, rather than encouraging ideological enclaves to isolate themselves. As Primavera De Filippi and colleagues argue, we should prefer “commons-based governance” that recognizes our inherent interdependence, over “exit-based governance” that treats independence and opting-out as the default solution. Instead of founding a new state to enforce a single vision, coordination-first models aim to create platforms, protocols, and institutions that enable broad participatory governance and positive-sum collaboration among a plurality of communities. This could mean digital platforms for participatory budgeting, quadratic funding pools for public goods, DAO networks that empower local initiatives, or transnational alliances around common causes (climate, open science, etc.). The emphasis is on voice over exit – improving governance by giving people better ways to organize and cooperate democratically, rather than encouraging them to leave and form separate micronations.

In summary, a network state is a vision of exit – building a new “country” in the cloud – whereas a coordination-first approach is a vision of voice and cooperation – improving how we organize within and between communities. One dreams of cloud cities with their own rules; the other of networked societies that leverage technology to strengthen local communities and global commons without abandoning existing democratic frameworks. These differing starting points lead to substantial divergences in how each framework conceives of alignment, plurality, governance, and real-world implementation.

Alignment vs. Pluralism: Divergent Political Philosophies

Because the network state model prizes ideological alignment, it can come into tension with principles of pluralism and inclusive governance. By design, a Balajian network state is homogenous in its values – “a social network with a moral innovation…a sense of national consciousness, a recognized founder” etc.. Members self-select around a shared ideology (often encapsulated in that one-line founding moral). This high alignment can create strong community bonds, but it also means network states might function like ideological echo chambers or exclusive clubs. Critics note that Srinivasan’s vision “promotes an ideology of ‘exitocracy,’ where individuals exit existing systems for new, ideologically aligned communities”, rather than engaging with difference. In practice, this could lead each network state to be relatively insular – a patchwork of fragmented, homogenous statelets rather than a pluralistic society. Democratic theorists worry that such enclaves would lack internal diversity and robust debate. Indeed, the network state ethos implicitly prioritizes exit over voice: if you disagree, you are expected to leave (fork your own community), rather than stay and dissent. This exit-based governance model raises the concern that minority voices or alternative perspectives get filtered out in favor of maintaining alignment, undermining democratic inclusivity.

Coordination-first approaches argue for almost the opposite philosophy: plurality and interdependence as strengths. Rather than enforce a single worldview within a community, coordination mechanisms try to allow many communities and perspectives to coexist and collaborate. Key thinkers like Glen Weyl and Vitalik Buterin have advocated pluralism in Web3 governance, suggesting that empowering a variety of overlapping networks (identity groups, localities, interest-based communities) leads to more resilient and rich outcomes. The Collective Intelligence Project (CIP) critiques network states for lacking pluralism and “the richness of shared lives,” urging instead *“systems that accommodate diverse affiliations and enable collective intelligence”*. In a coordination paradigm, one goal is to amplify areas of agreement without forcing uniformity. Mechanisms like quadratic voting or decentralized deliberation can surface consensus on actionable ideas while respecting disagreement. This ethos is fundamentally about voice – giving stakeholders channels to be heard and to influence outcomes across differences – rather than exit. As Primavera De Filippi puts it, it’s a shift from an “idealistic autonomy” model to a *“commons-based governance which recognizes the inherent interdependence of the world”*.

In practical terms, this divergence manifests in governance structures. A network state’s governance might resemble a startup or even a feudal structure – with a founder-CEO or small council wielding enormous power over a captive population. Srinivasan explicitly bakes the “recognized founder” into his definition of a network state. Vitalik Buterin flags this as a major concern: *“why do network states need a founder so central?”*. He warns that “small things being centralized is great, extremely large things being centralized is terrifying”, yet Balaji’s model provides no roadmap to transition from founder rule to broader participation. In effect, many fear network states could become digital fiefdoms – *“digital fiefs ruled by founder-kings, lacking in democratic voice and diversity”*. The coordination model, by contrast, prefers distributed governance from the start. DAOs and network communities often experiment with token-weighted voting, quadratic voting, deliberative councils, reputation systems, and other means to spread decision-making power. While early DAO governance has its flaws (e.g. plutocracy in coin-voting), reformers like Buterin advocate moving to non-plutocratic models – soulbound tokens, one-person-one-vote identities, and “proof of personhood” – to ensure governance by people, not just capital. The ideal is to cultivate governance processes where leaders are accountable and new leaders or contributors can emerge organically (what Buterin analogizes to Ethereum’s own community growth beyond just himself). In short, coordination-first communities strive for democratic, commons-oriented governance rather than charismatic founder rule. The guiding principle is that cooperation and shared stewardship yield more robust systems than top-down control.

The tension between these philosophies also appears in how each approach views external relationships. Network states, pursuing autonomy, might be inclined to wall themselves off and focus on self-sufficiency under their own laws. Srinivasan’s book encourages an almost competitive dynamic among network states – if you don’t like one, you fork off another, leading potentially to many micro-states competing for adherents. The coordination mindset sees such competition as counterproductive. Instead, it emphasizes interoperability and mutual aid between communities. For example, Primavera De Filippi and the BlockchainGov initiative propose “CoordiNATIONS” as an alternative: not independent states but networked nations that overlay existing jurisdictions, focused on shared resources and values, and crucially, cooperating rather than competing. The idea is that communities can form transnational networks without seeking exclusive sovereignty – akin to cultural or commons-based “nations” – and these networks would intentionally interconnect and collaborate on global challenges. In Buterin’s words, we need networked organizations to be “friendly” to one another by design, perhaps even granting each other representation in governance. He envisions DAO-governed communities that make credible commitments to cooperation – for instance, agreements not to exploit or “cheat” other communities with similar cooperative commitments. This stands in contrast to a fragmented world of disjointed network states each pursuing their own interest. In summary, the network state vs. coordination dichotomy maps to an ideological divide: exitocracy and enforced alignment vs. pluralism and negotiated coordination. One retreats into new digital city-states; the other builds bridges between diverse communities.

Where Network State and Coordination Visions Overlap

Despite their differences, it’s worth noting that both frameworks share some common ground in diagnosing problems and leveraging technology. Both recognize the power of networks and the internet to mobilize people across distance. Both are responses to the perceived failures of traditional centralized institutions and nation-states in addressing certain needs of communities in the 21st century. For example, Srinivasan’s network state thesis and the various DAO coordination experiments each start from the premise that existing governance systems are too slow, unaccountable, or misaligned, and that new digitally-enabled forms of organization could do better. In this sense, both are part of a broader movement to reimagine social contracts in a networked world. Both also rely on blockchain and decentralized tech as key infrastructure – whether it’s a network state maintaining an on-chain census and currency, or a coordination network using smart contracts for decision-making and funding. Even the vocabulary overlaps: terms like “decentralization”, “community”, “protocols”, “positive-sum games” appear in the rhetoric of both camps. For instance, the Ethereum community’s ethos of decentralization is something a network state proponent and a commons-oriented localist would both celebrate (albeit for different ends). It’s telling that a recent forum on Ethereum Localism noted that “entanglements [of cities] announce loudly the need for coordination tools and positive sum games” in community networks – a sentiment that both a network state founder and a coordination advocate might agree with in principle.

Both approaches also see global and local dimensions intersecting in new ways. Network states are global communities by definition (drawing members from anywhere with internet) that seek local instantiation (buying territory). Coordination networks often connect global resources or knowledge with local action. This interplay of global connectivity and local impact is central to both. For example, both visions might agree that the internet allows diaspora or interest groups worldwide to self-organize for local impact better than ever before. The difference is that network state thinking funnels that toward establishing a sovereign entity, whereas coordination thinking channels it into strengthening communities or addressing issues without secession. Nonetheless, the concept of a globally networked community is foundational to each. In that sense, both challenge the traditional notion that governance must be tied to geographic nation-states – both imagine networked communities that transcend location. As Vitalik Buterin noted, *“rather than staying in their own corner of the internet disconnected from the wider world, blockchains could serve as a centerpiece for a new way of organizing large chunks of human society”*. Whether that means new “countries” or new cooperative networks is the point of departure.

Finally, there is some convergence in recognizing that purely online organization eventually must interface with the physical world. Network states explicitly plan to acquire land and gain legal recognition. Coordination-first projects also realize that digital tools need to connect to “meatspace” governance – whether it’s a DAO working with a city government or a community currency used in local markets. The Ethereum Localism movement, for instance, asserts that “even as a global network, Ethereum’s operations are always local” – nodes run in data centers on local soil, affecting local environments. Both camps see that technology alone isn’t enough; what matters is how these networks engage with real communities, laws, and resources. Thus, a savvy network state founder and a savvy coordination advocate might both work on hybrid arrangements (e.g., charter city experiments, or DAOs that partner with municipalities). The overlap is in the ambition to experiment with governance leveraging Web3 tools – whether through new jurisdictions or new processes. In the real world, the line between the two can blur; for example, a “network society” might form that has some trappings of a network state (an online community with shared values) but chooses to integrate with existing states rather than fully exit. Indeed, some critics of the pure network state idea call for building “network societies, not network states”, meaning communities that leverage networks for cooperation without seeking full sovereignty. Both frameworks are, in a sense, network societies – they diverge on whether to become network states.

With the conceptual groundwork laid, we can now examine how these ideas play out in practice. The next sections explore case studies from the decentralized web ecosystem that illuminate the overlaps and tensions: Ethereum localism efforts, regenerative finance and bioregional DAOs, and decentralized science platforms. Each of these real-world experiments emphasizes coordination and offers insights into what a coordination-first approach can achieve – often highlighting implicit critiques of the network state model.

Ethereum Localism: Grounding Decentralization in Community

One vivid example of the coordination paradigm in action is the rise of Ethereum Localism – a movement to connect the global Ethereum network with local communities and commons. Ethereum Localism emerged from gatherings of “web3 regens, community organizers, and commons economists” exploring how blockchain could empower real communities on the ground. Rather than start a new city-state, Ethereum Localists ask: How can decentralized networks like Ethereum support local resilience, mutual aid, and democratic governance? The premise, as outlined in the Ethereum Localism anthology, is that Ethereum’s technology and values naturally align with localism. *“Inasmuch as the positive way to say the word ‘decentralized’ is local, the localist sensibility is an exemplar of Ethereum values (just as the Ethereum network powerfully embodies the project of localism)”*. In other words, decentralization implies empowering local nodes rather than concentrating power – making “Ethereum Localism” almost a redundant phrase. Contributors like Giulio Quarta and Michel Bauwens argue that the Ethereum ecosystem will be most transformative if it “strategically situates” itself in local contexts and ecologically embeds itself in real communities. This is a direct counterpoint to any notion of Ethereum enabling purely cloud-based micronations divorced from place. Instead, localists see Ethereum as a tool for communities to coordinate solutions to local problems (economic, social, environmental) in harmony with global networks.

At a 2023 General Forum on Ethereum Localism in Portland, Oregon, participants envisioned many ways to apply Ethereum for community governance and public goods. For example, they discussed DAOs as tools of the urban commons – neighborhood DAOs to manage shared resources like community gardens or housing cooperatives. These DAOs could serve as mutual aid networks or local unions, providing collective insurance against crises (a very different use of DAOs than speculation). They also explored Ethereum-enabled local currencies and mutual credit systems. A community could create its own token or mutual credit ledger to encourage buying from local businesses, effectively countering extractive global finance with a circular local economy. Other themes included crowdfunding for civic projects (like local issue-specific fundraising “sprints”) and managing local infrastructure as commons with transparent governance. Notably, these ideas all leverage Ethereum’s coordination capacity – smart contracts, tokens, DAOs – but keep the focus on strengthening existing communities (cities, bioregions) rather than exiting from them. As one convening document put it, “the Ethereum machine is untapped until its creations are touching soil at the local level”, just as local communities should contribute to global networks in return. This captures a cosmo-local vision: marry global tech with local action in a mutually reinforcing cycle.

Michel Bauwens’ essay “The Cosmo-Local Plan for Our Next Civilization” (included in the Ethereum Localism collection) provides theoretical grounding. Bauwens describes cosmo-localism as *“resilient and regenerative localized production, combined with access to global knowledge commons”*. In practice, cosmo-localism means communities produce what they need locally (food, energy, goods) using shared open designs and knowledge from around the world. It is encapsulated by the slogan “design global, manufacture local.” Bauwens argues that modern networks enable “trans-local” peer-to-peer collaboration that transcends the old nation-state model. Ethereum and Web3 can facilitate this by providing open platforms for knowledge sharing, coordination, and financing of commons projects. For example, a local cooperative could download open-source plans for a solar microgrid (global knowledge), build it with local labor, and finance maintenance via a DAO that pays contributors in tokenized community credits – all while sharing improvements back to the commons. Such cosmo-local networks are explicitly plural and cooperative: each locale adapts solutions to its culture and ecology, and no central authority dictates from above. *“There is no global-to-local hierarchy involved: you are free to pick whatever solutions you want from the global commons and modify to suit local needs”*. This stands in contrast to a network state imposing one blueprint everywhere. Ethereum Localism embraces this flexibility: communities from urban neighborhoods to rural bioregions can use Ethereum tools in whatever way fits, whether for community currencies, land trusts, or local DAOs, while tapping into a global developer base and funding pools.

A concrete example is the concept of Regen Hubs or “Regen Local Chapters”, an idea championed by Gitcoin’s Green Pill movement (founded by Kevin Owocki). These are local groups focused on regenerative projects (like climate action, commons, social goods) that receive support through Web3 coordination. In 2024, a Regen Coordi-NATION pilot round on Gitcoin brought together Ethereum localists, ReFi activists, and regional DAO nodes to fund such chapters around the world. We will detail that in the next section, but the key point is that Ethereum Localism’s spirit is spreading: funding local “regen” communities via global coordination. In one sense, these could be seen as embryonic network states – they are networks of people aligning around values (like regeneration) across borders. But crucially, their aim is not to form a breakaway state; it’s to empower local action and then recombine knowledge globally. They coordinate through “open social protocols” and map digital networks to physical communities in a collaborative way. This approach tries to capture the benefits of the network state vision (self-organizing communities with shared purpose) while avoiding the pitfalls (exclusion, separatism, founder dominance). As one Ethereum Localism thesis states, *“communities that will most resonate with Ethereum are those that already explore cosmo-local patterns… even as a global network, Ethereum’s operations are always local”*. In short, Ethereum Localism is coordination-first: it treats Ethereum as a coordination layer for a plurality of local, democratic commons, rather than the seed of new city-states. It exemplifies how plural networks of communities can be built with Web3, emphasizing regeneration, participatory design, and Ostrom-style commons governance that has been “playing out at the community level…for years” before blockchain.

Regenerative Coordination: Bioregional DAOs and Public Goods Funding

The ethos of “regen” – regenerative finance and governance – has become a rallying point for those applying coordination-first principles. In practice, this has given rise to bioregional DAOs, experimental funding rounds for local public goods, and networks like ReFi DAO and Regens Unite that explicitly focus on ecological and social regeneration through Web3. These efforts illustrate how coordination tools can bolster local institutions (like community projects or environmental initiatives) without forming separate sovereign entities. They also highlight issues of scale, inclusivity, and interoperability in a cooperative context.

Bioregional DAOs are DAOs organized around a specific geographic region or ecosystem (a bioregion), aiming to steward commons and support communities in that place. Think of a DAO for the Amazon watershed, or for a metropolitan area, pooling resources for local sustainable development. Austin Robey describes *“bioregional DAOs as commons composed of diverse skills bound through a shared territory”*. Unlike global online clubs, these DAOs are pegged to a bioregion – membership and purpose are tied to the land and its inhabitants. We can compare them to historical “communities” but augmented by DAO tech. A bioregional DAO might fund forest conservation, water quality monitoring, or local education, using smart contracts to gather funds and reward contributors. Importantly, their legitimacy comes from serving everyone in the region, not just token holders. In this sense, a bioregional DAO is closer to a public utility or local cooperative than a private club. The P2P Foundation notes it’s useful to contrast bioregional DAOs with “guild DAOs” (interest or craft-based groups): the former are place-based commons, the latter are affinity-based commons. Many DAOs today are guild-like (formed around a shared interest like a DeFi protocol or an NFT art style), whereas bioregional DAOs root membership in living somewhere and caring for that place. This reflects a key pluralist idea: people are connected not just by interests, but by shared environments and local cultures.

Rather than superseding local governments, bioregional DAOs often seek to complement and work with existing institutions. For example, a watershed DAO could partner with local authorities, indigenous groups, and scientific DAOs to form a holistic management system. *“We could imagine bioregional DAOs guarding the headwaters of a region partnering with earth observation DAOs, storytelling DAOs, and regenerative science DAOs to form a coherent vision of the state of a watershed”*. Each brings different knowledge – local context, remote sensing data, community narratives, scientific expertise – and together they coordinate action. This modular, federated approach is very different from a monolithic network state trying to control territory. It’s coordination among networks to serve the commons. The advantage, as Austin Wade Smith argues, is that impact can scale by many small groups working together, without requiring any single hierarchy to grow unwieldy. Smaller DAOs remain intuitive and community-based, yet through federation they tackle larger-scale issues. This is scaling out via networks, not scaling up via centralization. It inherently encourages plurality (each DAO is distinct yet collaborative) and avoids the brittle nature of one-size governance. Bioregional DAOs thus demonstrate how a coordination-first mindset can address local governance and infrastructure – from tracking pollution to funding local entrepreneurship – in a democratic way. They empower local stakeholders directly (everyone can participate in the DAO if mechanisms allow broad access, not just wealthy investors) and align incentives through token economics or rewards for positive actions (like regenerating land).

A real-world example is the Celo Local Region DAO initiative. The Celo blockchain’s community has seeded regional DAOs (in Kenya, Latin America, India, etc.) to fund local blockchain projects and public goods. In Gitcoin Grants Round 18 and beyond, ReFi DAO (a collective for regenerative finance) ran Local Node grant rounds for these regional communities. They provided matching funds to dozens of local “nodes,” helping projects like community gardens in Kenya or solar installations in rural India get support from a global donor pool. This culminated in late 2023 with the Regen Coordi-NATION Round, which explicitly combined forces across GreenPill (Ethereum regen chapters), ReFi DAO (regional climate nodes), Celo regional DAOs, and the Regens Unite community. The Regen Coordi-NATION round was essentially a global coordination exercise for local impact: it pooled $60k from various partners and invited regenerative projects from around the world to seek funding via quadratic funding. Each participating local group had to be vetted by its community (ensuring local legitimacy), and the round used QF so that broad community support translated into matching funds. The very name “Coordi-NATION” is a playful jab at the network state concept – implying we can create a coordination nation (a nation of networks) rather than a sovereign network state. Indeed, the organizers described it as *“supporting a global movement of regenerative communities leveraging Web3 for real-world impact… showcasing how community coordination, Web3, and innovative finance can enable ecological and social regeneration on a global scale”*. Instead of one new state solving climate change, it’s many communities coordinated in a network, tackling issues in parallel and sharing what works.

The results of these regen rounds have been promising in participation if modest in funds. For instance, ReFi DAO’s August 2023 round had 31 local nodes with over 1,500 contributions, demonstrating significant grassroots engagement. Contributors often gave small donations (a few dollars), but quadratic matching amplified their impact nearly 100-fold in some cases. This model inherently values inclusivity – even a small donor has influence – and interoperability – multiple networks (Gitcoin on Ethereum, donors bridging from other chains like Celo) working together. There were challenges, like bridging tokens across chains and platform UX issues, highlighting the importance of good infrastructure to avoid “platform risk.” But overall, these experiments show that coordination can scale horizontally: many local efforts connected by shared protocols and funding mechanisms, without a central authority. They also surface the complementarity between global and local: global crypto funding can fill gaps left by national governments or aid organizations, reaching grassroots groups directly. In doing so, they strengthen local capacity (a village builds a solar well thanks to a DAO grant) which in turn contributes to global goals (climate resilience).

One could argue this loosely resembles a “network state” of regen communities, but with a crucial difference: there is no central commandment or founder. It is a pluralistic federation. Each local chapter has its own priorities (some focus on reforestation, some on education) and remains embedded in its country’s legal context (many are informal groups or registered NGOs). The role of the Web3 coordination layer is simply to amplify their efforts and weave connections (through events like Regens Unite gatherings, where members from different locales meet and share knowledge). This model heeds Vitalik Buterin’s call that *“we need to bring in more democracy and large-scale coordination… to make network communities truly successful”*. Instead of pursuing secession, the regen coordination approach tries to “exit to community” – building up community ownership and governance over resources – and “entrance” into networks of mutual support. In essence, it asks: Why start a new state when we can network our communities to help each other? The positive vision here is of a global network of local commons – many local DAOs and projects, interoperating through open protocols and shared funding pools, co-creating solutions. It seeks the same endgame as many network state advocates (empowered communities, more effective governance), but via cooperation and integration rather than exit and segregation.

Decentralized Science and Public Goods: Coordinating Knowledge Commons

Another arena where coordination-first approaches shine is decentralized science (DeSci) and innovation funding. Traditionally, science and research suffer from coordination failures: fragmented funding, closed access to knowledge, and misaligned incentives (publish or perish, siloed IP). Web3 communities have begun addressing this by creating platforms and DAOs to coordinate scientific research and funding in an open, collective way. This serves as a case study for how global collective action can be tackled without a “network state of scientists,” but instead through networks of collaborators and novel incentive mechanisms.

A prime example is the effort to decentralize the academic publishing and peer review process. In a 2021 study, Tenorio-Fornés et al. introduce Decentralized Science (DecSci) as *“an interoperable platform based on decentralized technologies that aims to provide an alternative publication model to enhance transparency and accountability of peer review”*. They prototype using Ethereum smart contracts and IPFS (a decentralized storage network) to create a journal system where submissions, peer reviews, and revisions are all recorded on-chain transparently. Reviewers earn reputation and possibly tokens for timely, quality reviews, and editors can easily find reviewers via an open reputation database. The goal is to realign incentives so that researchers and reviewers are coordinating for the common goal of knowledge production rather than being exploited by closed publishers. This system doesn’t require a new “Academia State” to enforce rules; it uses a protocol to nudge behavior (e.g. smart contracts releasing tokens for completed reviews, or a transparent log deterring unfair rejections). Early surveys indicated that many academics believe such a reputation system could improve fairness and would be willing to participate. In essence, this is a coordination device: it creates a shared ledger of contributions and a reward mechanism to encourage cooperation (sharing reviews, improving papers) in the scientific commons. By decentralizing pieces of the workflow, it prevents any single actor or platform from capturing all value (a common issue where publishers reap profits while academics do the work). This speaks to the platform capture problem we’ll discuss later – a coordination approach tries to ensure the platform is a commons (possibly owned by a DAO of scientists) rather than a for-profit gatekeeper.

Beyond publishing, DeSci DAOs like VitaDAO, PsyDAO, and others are coordinating funding for research in areas such as longevity, mental health, and open biotech. For example, VitaDAO pools funds from members to invest in early-stage longevity research, with IP or data eventually turned into open assets owned by the DAO (or converted into NFTs that represent claims on patents, which the DAO can ensure are licensed openly). This flips the traditional model where pharmaceutical companies capture drug patents; instead, a collective of patients, researchers, and enthusiasts co-fund and co-own the outputs. It’s a form of crowd-driven public research funding. Again, the motif is coordination. Instead of leaving research prioritization to governments or corporations alone, these communities coordinate global participants (anyone with an internet connection and some funds or expertise) to support projects they find valuable. Notably, this has been done without declaring a new “network state of science.” It operates much like an open consortium. The membership is fluid, anyone can join VitaDAO by contributing funds or work, and decisions are made by token-holder voting and working groups. This is effectively transnational, but it doesn’t challenge any state’s sovereignty – it works alongside universities and labs by providing grants. In fact, many projects VitaDAO funds are academic labs or spinouts that also get government grants. The difference is the DAO coordinates additional resources and aligns the community around ensuring results enter the public domain. This is a practical example of how a global internet community can produce public goods (knowledge, medical research) through voluntary coordination, arguably achieving some goals a “Science Network State” might claim, but with far more inclusion and flexibility.

On the topic of public research funding innovations, Web3 has introduced mechanisms like quadratic funding (QF) and retroactive public goods funding (RPGF) that enhance coordination. Quadratic Funding, theorized by Glen Weyl and Vitalik Buterin, is a matching funding scheme where community donations signal what projects are valued, and a pool of matching funds is distributed according to the square of the sum of square roots of contributions (formula aside, the effect is that many small donations can outweigh a few large donations). Gitcoin has used QF in grant rounds to fund open source and scientific projects, effectively crowdsourcing priority-setting for funding. For instance, in some rounds, open science projects (like open climate data tools) received matching funds from Gitcoin’s QF pool based on broad community support. This method coordinates the wisdom of the crowd and incentivizes people to contribute to public goods knowing their impact will be magnified. It’s a stark contrast to the bureaucratic, top-down grant system in nation-states, and yet it can operate complementary to it. We might imagine governments in the future adopting QF for distributing portions of research budget, or at least looking at the signals from these Web3 rounds to inform policy. Retroactive public goods funding, championed by Optimism and others, is another concept where you reward projects after the fact for the public goods they created, using mechanisms like soulbound reputation or community votes. All these are coordination innovations: they don’t require a new government, they are protocols any community (or state) can plug into to improve allocation of resources to where community values lie.

By engaging critically with these experiments, we see both the potential and the challenges. On the positive side, decentralized coordination can unlock contributions from a wider range of participants – e.g., a scientist in Nigeria can get funding from a global DAO, or a student can review papers and build reputation on a decentralized journal, opportunities that might be blocked in traditional systems. It also increases transparency and accountability, since actions are on-chain (as Tenorio-Fornés et al. note, blockchain makes the whole peer review process auditable). Furthermore, it builds a sense of community and shared mission beyond borders, which is what network state proponents also seek. However, these efforts face growing pains: ensuring broad inclusivity (most participants are still crypto-savvy, which can skew towards certain demographics), handling governance as they scale (avoiding plutocratic control by token whales or ensuring expert input is weighted properly in decisions), and integrating with real-world legal systems (DAOs holding IP or funding university research must navigate contract law, etc.). There’s also a risk of fragmentation if too many separate DAO silos form in science without coordinating with each other or with traditional institutions – which again calls for interoperability (there are initiatives for DAO-to-DAO collaboration in DeSci to prevent this). Overall, DeSci exemplifies how a coordination-first approach can make inroads into entrenched domains like science by focusing on open collaboration tools rather than political secession. It is arguably more feasible in the short term than any network state, and it addresses global challenges (knowledge access, innovation) by leveraging the global network of minds, not by carving out a mini-state. This speaks to a general pattern: where network state rhetoric imagines solving problems by starting fresh polities, coordination praxis tends to solve problems by networking people in novel ways across existing boundaries.

Challenges and Critiques: Scale, Inclusivity, and Interoperability

Having seen the promise of coordination-first experiments, it’s important to acknowledge the challenges and critiques that arise – some of which mirror criticisms of network states and others unique to decentralized networks. Key issues include how to scale coordination without centralization, how to ensure inclusivity and avoid new forms of exclusion, how to keep networks interoperable versus fragmenting into fiefdoms, and generally how to prevent the emergence of “digital feudalism” in both models.

Scale and efficacy. Detractors of purely voluntary coordination argue that without formal state power, these networks might lack the ability to enforce large-scale change or provide security. A common critique of DAOs and decentralized communities is that they work well for niche tasks or small groups, but can they coordinate millions of people or tackle global crises effectively? Network state advocates might claim that ultimately a state (even a new one) has coercive power and heft that a loose network lacks. However, as Vitalik Buterin pointed out, network states themselves face scaling problems: if they remain small enclaves, their geopolitical influence is minimal, and if they somehow grew large (hundreds of thousands of citizens), the internal governance needs to scale beyond a founder’s diktat. Both models must confront the reality that size and complexity can strain any governance system. For coordination-first projects, scaling often means federating rather than growing a single hierarchy – which, while avoiding single points of failure, can complicate decision-making. We see this in something like the Regen CoordiNation initiative: coordinating multiple DAOs and local groups is messy (different platforms, communication gaps, etc.). But this approach may still be more resilient than a monolithic network state, because the failure of any one node doesn’t bring down the whole. The question “which scales better?” is still open. Traditional states have scale via hierarchy and force, but suffer from bureaucracy and detachment. Decentralized networks have flexibility and local fit, but suffer from coordination overhead as they grow. One possible synthesis is what Vitalik called “bringing in large-scale coordination ideas” to network communities – essentially combining democratic state capacities (large-scale public goods, infrastructure) with network agility. In practice, this might mean DAO networks interfacing with nation-states or forming umbrella cooperatives to undertake large projects (e.g. a coalition of city DAOs building a shared solar grid across regions). Inclusivity at scale is another challenge: ensuring that as numbers grow, the processes still allow meaningful participation by ordinary members and not just insiders or experts. Here, mechanisms like sortition (random citizen juries), quadratic voting, or reputation-weighted voting could help keep governance both participatory and effective, but these are still experimental. The advantage coordination approaches have is they are inherently experimenting with such governance innovations, whereas a network state with a strong founder might not prioritize that until too late.

Inclusivity and equity. Who benefits from these models? Critics of network states argue they would primarily serve the wealthy and mobile, possibly exacerbating inequality. Buterin notes that while rich professionals can “exit” countries with digital nomad visas or second passports, “what about regular people?…What about the Rohingya minority…?” – those who most need refuge or better governance may be least able to join a network state. If network states cherry-pick talent and capital, they risk becoming like elite gated communities, not vehicles for the marginalised. Srinivasan’s vision has been called a form of “cloud neo-feudalism” appealing to a narrow segment of tech-savvy libertarians. Coordination-first communities, especially those focused on public goods, strive to be more inclusive, but they have their own barriers (tech literacy, access to internet and financial tools, language). There is a risk that DAO governance, for instance, is dominated by those with the time and expertise to participate, who often skew Western or upper-middle-class. However, initiatives are underway to broaden access: localized DAO hubs that train community members, mobile interfaces for inclusion in areas with only smartphones, and partnerships with traditional organizations to onboard users. One notable point of inclusivity is diversity of viewpoints. Because coordination networks do not demand total ideological alignment, they can encompass more heterogeneity. For example, in a public goods funding round, contributors might range from anarchists to social democrats to apolitical developers – all can agree on funding, say, an open-source tool, even if they disagree on other philosophies. This pluralism is a strength for inclusivity. It means coordination networks can potentially include people who would never join the same network state due to differing beliefs. Plural networks are in theory open to all who share a broad purpose, without litmus tests on creed (aside from basic values like not being hateful, etc., which most communities enforce). Of course, ensuring effective inclusion – that marginalized voices aren’t drowned out – remains a work in progress. This is where designs like quadratic voting help (they prevent majority domination by giving weight to intensity of preference). In practice, one can point to examples like the Downtown Stimulus quadratic funding experiment, where small local businesses and community projects in downtown areas got funded by residents – the method gave voice to many small stakeholders who typically lack say in urban development. The broader point: coordination-first approaches aim for systems where everyone impacted can have a say, aligning with democratic ideals, whereas the network state approach inherently limits voice to those within a particular aligned community, which may leave many out.

Interoperability vs. fragmentation. A major promise of Web3 is interoperability – open standards that let different communities and systems work together. If coordination-first networks adhere to this, they can avoid the fragmentation that plagues both nation-states (borders hindering cooperation) and potentially network states. Indeed, one critique of having many network states is you risk a Balkanization of the world into countless micro-polities that don’t share common protocols. If each network state has its own laws, currency, maybe even blockchain, how do they interoperate? There’s a scenario where network states replicate the problem of incompatible jurisdictions and standards, only worse. Coordination approaches, on the other hand, often build with interoperability in mind – for instance, using Ethereum as a base layer means any DAO or dApp can plug into another easily, share tokens, data, etc. The Regen CoordiNation round deliberately spanned multiple platforms (Ethereum, Celo) and sought to integrate various grant tools, showing an intent to be cross-network. That said, even in Web3 coordination, protocol divergence can happen – e.g., multiple quadratic funding protocols that don’t connect, or different identity systems that aren’t recognized across communities. To combat this, many advocates push for open standards and networking of networks. Vitalik’s suggestion that DAOs (or network states) include external representation in governance is essentially to keep them interoperable at a governance level too – to avoid siloed decision-making. For example, a city DAO might allocate a seat in its council to a representative from a neighboring city’s DAO, creating a fabric of interlocking governance. This is reminiscent of federalist or confederation models, but more voluntary. If coordination networks can achieve high interoperability, they could form something akin to a metanetwork or “network of societies” that share certain commons (like global climate commitments, or open knowledge repositories). The CIP’s vision of “embracing complexity and diversity… fostering inter-coordination and fluid recombination” implies networks that can recombine and coordinate with each other on the fly. Achieving this is difficult – it requires both technical standards (common APIs, identity, etc.) and social/political goodwill to collaborate. The risk if they fail is fragmentation: isolated communities that might each reinvent wheels and be vulnerable to larger powers due to lack of a united front.

Avoiding Digital Feudalism and Platform Capture

Perhaps the most pointed critique bridging both network state and coordination visions is the danger of digital feudalism – new forms of overlordship and serfdom emerging in digital platforms. In a worst-case scenario, network states could become little more than “digital fiefs” ruled by tech oligarchs, as the Collective Intelligence Project warned. A network state’s founder, if unchecked, might be akin to a feudal lord, and citizens are there by consent only until they aren’t – but exit costs or network effects could trap people. Primavera De Filippi highlighted this authoritarian potential in network states: “exit-based governance is authoritarian as the founder sets the rules, and one must agree or exit”, with forking as the only relief. Without voice, members are effectively vassals who can leave the fief but have no say within it. Moreover, if these network states own land, one can imagine scenarios of neofeudal landlordism – a wealthy network buys up land and dictates rules, potentially bypassing national labor or environmental laws, and residents either submit or depart. This is not far-fetched; some charter city or seasteading proposals flirt with this dynamic, and Balaji’s network state concept arguably extends it globally. Commentators have noted that “The Network State” vision combines digital feudalism with populism (rallying an in-group against the world). The fear is replacing democratic governance with a patchwork of private micro-kingdoms.

Coordination-first ecosystems are not immune to feudal dynamics either, but in different form. Here the worry is platform capture: large platform operators or early adopters amassing outsized power over the infrastructure that everyone uses. Michel Bauwens uses the term “netarchical capitalism” to describe how centralized platforms (like Facebook, Google) exploit user-generated networks for profit. In the context of Web3, netarchical tendencies could arise if, say, one blockchain or one DAO framework becomes dominant and its controllers extract rent from all communities on it. For instance, if Ethereum’s core development or validators were controlled by a small group, they could dictate terms for every DAO running on Ethereum – a potential chokepoint. Or consider if a handful of multi-sig key holders effectively govern a supposedly decentralized protocol; the users are then in a feudal relation, relying on the lords (key holders) who have ultimate say. The early DeFi world saw such concerns with admin keys, and governance token concentration. Furthermore, if knowledge commons and local projects rely on platforms that end up bought or corrupted by corporate interests, the communities can become economically dependent – a form of digital serfdom where they labor for the platform’s profit without shared ownership. Bauwens stresses that value should be circulated back to the communities that create it, otherwise the pattern of exploitation continues even in “decentralized” guise. For cosmo-localism to flourish, he argues, we need platform cooperatives and partner state models that ensure re-investment at the local level. This is analogous to preventing feudalism: instead of lords (platform owners) extracting value, the network of communities either owns the platform collectively or is supported by public frameworks that keep it free and open.

How can we avoid digital feudalism and capture? For network state advocates, one solution is to bake in democracy and “exit to community” as Vitalik urged. If a network state must exist, perhaps it can include a constitutional mechanism to remove the founder’s absolute power once it grows (as Prospera, a charter city, planned a referendum for residents to potentially kick out the managing company after reaching a certain size). Better yet, ensuring from the start that governance is broad-based (multi-sig committees, community assemblies, etc.) can prevent the founder-knows-best trap. Another strategy is legal interdependence: a network state could voluntarily abide by international human rights frameworks or allow external ombudspersons, preventing it from becoming a law unto itself. Essentially, injecting a bit of voice and oversight can counter pure exit-based autocracy. However, these fixes move the network state concept closer to the coordination paradigm – acknowledging interdependence and common standards (which is exactly CIP’s point that real network society needs pluralism).

On the coordination side, avoiding feudalism means maintaining decentralization of power in practice, not just name. This involves both technology and governance. Technologically, it means favoring open-source, community-run infrastructure over proprietary ones. For example, if a science DAO uses a decentralized storage like IPFS and open journals, rather than relying on Elsevier’s platform, they remain autonomous. Community-governed blockchains or truly decentralized layer-2 networks can reduce reliance on any single corporate chain. Governance-wise, it means continued experimentation with ways to limit plutocracy and concentration. As Buterin noted, one must be wary of “coin-driven governance” where whales rule. Using identity-based voting, quadratic mechanisms, reputation systems can distribute influence more evenly. It also means all stakeholders (not just token holders) need voice – for instance, users and contributors of a platform having say, not just investors. This is like reinventing cooperative models on-chain (some DAOs have non-transferrable governance tokens earned through work, to avoid pure capital control). Another check is fostering competition and choice at the platform level: if one DAO platform becomes extractive, communities should be able to migrate to another (akin to federated instances in Mastodon vs. being locked into Twitter). The ease of forking code or switching protocols in open-source provides a pressure against platform abuse, but only if communities are capable of migrating – which comes down to not having high exit barriers.

The partner state approach Bauwens mentions is also intriguing: existing public institutions could support open networks to prevent corporate capture. For example, a city government might officially adopt an open DAO platform for local budgeting, funding its maintenance as public infrastructure, thereby keeping it out of purely profit-driven hands. This creates a symbiosis between traditional authority and new networks, hopefully marrying the strengths and mitigating the weaknesses of each. It’s an example of how coordination networks need not exist in an anarchic vacuum; they can align with enlightened governments (national or municipal) that act as guarantors of the commons – a stark contrast to network states which see existing states mostly as entities to exit from.

In closing this critique section, it’s clear that vigilance is needed regardless of model. Both network state aspirants and coordination advocates must intentionally design against authoritarian drift. The network state folks must confront the “founder = king” problem and lack of external checks – without course correction, their experiments may fail or create dystopias. The coordination folks must ensure the commons stay commons – preventing new power concentrations among techies or capital providers that could undermine the very pluralism they seek. Encouragingly, much of the emerging literature is aware of these dangers. We see key thinkers explicitly warning of feudalism and capture (De Filippi in HBR, Bauwens on netarchical capital, Buterin on plutocracy) and proposing remedies like commons-based governance, exit-to-community, and trans-local alliances. By learning from these insights, the Web3 community can strive to build what CIP calls a *“brighter future…embracing the complexity and richness of shared lives rather than retreating into fragmented network states”*.

Conclusion: Coordination without Separation – A Pluralistic Path Forward

Exploring the tension between network state and coordination-centric visions reveals a fundamental question: do we advance humanity by creating new exclusive polities, or by improving how all of us coordinate across our many communities? The analysis here, supported by emerging experiments and thinkers, leans strongly toward the latter. Plural, coordination-first approaches appear not only more inclusive and democratic, but also more practical in addressing real-world challenges. Rather than bet on startup societies ruling patches of land, the innovators in Ethereum localism, regenerative finance, and decentralized science are betting on networks of communities co-creating solutions. They are building institutions that are distributed but connected – local DAOs tied into global protocols, researchers and activists self-organizing funding and governance without waiting for permission, and technologists focusing on empowering existing communities (cities, bioregions, affinity groups) instead of encouraging them to exit and form new mini-states.

This is not to entirely dismiss the network state idea – its provocation has spurred valuable debate on how to reimagine governance in the internet age. It asks us to consider how we might consciously form communities around shared values at a global scale. However, as critics have pointed out, the network state in its pure form feels like a **“backward-looking solution”**. It resurrects the logic of micro-kingdoms and utopian colonies (“exitocracy”) at the expense of pluralism and justice. The experiments we examined show that many of the underlying goals of network staters – community self-determination, better governance, aligned incentives, public goods provision – can be pursued through coordination-first networks without secession. Instead of one group exiting, we find ways for everyone to voice and cooperate. Indeed, in a world facing global problems like climate change, pandemics, and inequality, retreating into dozens of ideological enclaves could be counterproductive. As Noah Smith observed, at the level of nations “exit won’t work…eventually there is nowhere to run”. Climate disasters or authoritarian aggressors won’t spare you because you bought land elsewhere; collective defense and action are still needed. This underscores that interdependence is not a choice, but a reality of the 21st century. Thus, frameworks that embrace interdependence – like cosmo-local networks sharing knowledge, or DAOs forming pacts to not defect on each other – are more fit for purpose.

The “coordination vs. network state” debate also brings us back to classic political theory: the balance of voice and exit (Albert Hirschman’s terms). Too much exit (without voice) leads to fragmentation and neglect of the commons; too little exit can lead to stagnation and oppression. The sweet spot seems to be empowering voice through new channels while keeping exit as an ultimate safeguard. Coordination-centric models do allow exit in the sense that one can start a new DAO or fork a project – but the cultural emphasis is on collaboration and recombination rather than endless schism. This is reminiscent of liberal science or open-source culture: forking is possible but cooperation is often more rewarding. Network states, by elevating exit to the primary governance mechanism, may undervalue the power of loyal opposition and collective problem-solving within a diverse polity. Democratic participation – messy as it is – has proven vital for legitimacy and adaptability in societies. It’s encouraging that even voices within the network state camp (like Buterin and De Filippi) ultimately call for injecting more democracy and commons orientation into the concept. That is effectively a concession that coordination (voice, cooperation) must tame exit in any sustainable model.

Real-world applicability also favors coordination. The case studies of Ethereum Localism, regen rounds, and DeSci are happening now, with tangible (if early) results, within existing legal and social systems. They don’t require waiting for a new country to be recognized. Any city can start a DAO for participatory budgeting; researchers can join a DeSci platform today; communities can launch local token economies legally (with some creativity). Meanwhile, how many true network states have been established? Thus far, mostly just talk and some online groups with network state aspirations. Attaining land and sovereignty is a daunting hurdle – and as Primavera noted, owning property under a nation’s jurisdiction doesn’t let you just declare independence. Recognition by existing states is a high bar that likely keeps network states in the realm of theory for now. By contrast, coordination projects often aim to work with governments or at least within their laws (like the Colorado co-op laws enabling some DAO legal structures, or the EU funding sandbox for blockchain public services). The risk of “platform capture” is arguably lower when public agencies are involved as partners, and legitimacy is higher when locals see these innovations improving daily life (e.g. a community currency that revitalizes a town). In fact, these successes could influence existing governments to adopt similar models, gradually transforming institutions – a much different strategy than exiting and competing. One could imagine, in a decade, national governments implementing quadratic funding for local budgets, or recognizing DAO-based land trusts as governance partners for commons, effectively absorbing the best of coordination technology into public policy. This incremental, integrative approach may yield more systemic change than any isolated network state could.

In conclusion, the network state vs. coordination dichotomy teaches us that how we go about decentralizing matters deeply. A coordination-first, plurality-embracing path appears more aligned with regenerative and democratic values than a competition of cloud sovereigns. As the P2P Foundation’s vision and CIP’s critique both suggest, the future is likely in network societies – rich tapestries of networked communities, overlapping and cooperating – rather than in network states that draw hard borders around themselves. The experiments in Ethereum Localism, cosmo-local production, regen finance, and DeSci are early attempts at weaving that tapestry. They show that we can build pluralistic, local-first institutions with global support, essentially new “nations” of shared purpose that live atop old nations, without the need for formal secession. These coordination networks strive to be open, inclusive, and resilient, avoiding the traps of digital feudalism by keeping governance participatory and resources in the commons.

To truly succeed, coordination-based movements will need to remain vigilant and iterative: continuously refining governance to be more fair and scalable, ensuring technology remains a tool for empowerment and not control, and maintaining pluralism as a core principle. If they do, they stand to enable a more pluralistic, regenerative, and democratic future – one where communities large and small can self-organize to solve problems, supported by global knowledge and solidarities, rather than splintering into insular “states.” In the end, the measure of success will be whether these new forms improve people’s lives and address our shared crises. The early evidence – funding for local climate actions, democratizing scientific knowledge, reviving urban commons – gives reason for optimism. The network state might remain an intriguing thought experiment, but coordination in its many forms is already proving to be the real engine of innovation in decentralized governance. As one Ethereum localist manifesto proclaimed, “in this network that resists capture and the myopia of centralized power, there are many nodes, both analogue and digital”, and we all can participate permissionlessly. It is in nurturing those many nodes and their connections – not isolating them into new silos – that a more free, plural, and collaborative society could take shape.

References:

1. Srinivasan, B. (2022). The Network State. (Concept summarized in 【29†L63-L71})

2. Collective Intelligence Project (2025). “We need network societies, not network states.” (Critique of network states as “digital fiefs” and call for pluralistic network governance)

3. Buterin, V. (2022). “What do I think about network states?” Vitalik.ca blog. (Analyzes Balaji’s concept; highlights concerns about founder centrality, “exit” limits, and need for democratic roadmaps)

4. De Filippi, P. & BlockchainGov (2023). Overthrowing the Network State podcast series. (Proposes “CoordiNATIONS” – commons-based, interdependent networks – vs. exit-based network states)

5. Ethereum Localism: Quarta, G. (ed.) (2025). Ethereum Localism and the Commons Economy. (Essays on connecting Ethereum to local communities and cosmo-local principles)

6. Bauwens, M. (2023). “The Cosmo-Local Plan for Our Next Civilization.” In Ethereum Localism. (Articulates cosmo-localism: global knowledge commons + local production; critiques Web3 “exit” mindset)

7. P2P Foundation Wiki (2023). “Bioregional DAOs” and “Ethereum Localism” entries. (Definitions and examples of bioregional DAOs and Ethereum localist ideas)

8. Gitcoin Governance Forum (2023). “Regen Coordi-NATION Round Proposal and Results.” (Details the collaborative funding round uniting ReFi DAO, GreenPill, Celo regional DAOs, etc., with cosmo-local and coordination goals)

9. Tenorio-Fornés, A., et al. (2021). “Decentralizing Science.” Information Processing & Management, 58(6). (Prototype of decentralized peer review and publishing platform using Ethereum/IPFS)

10. Primavera De Filippi (2018). “Blockchain, Feudalism, and the Future of Law.” Harvard Business Review. (Discusses how blockchain could either democratize governance or lead to new feudal lords if not regulated – relevant to platform capture concerns)

11. Austin W. Smith (2022). “Commons Sense: The Social Life of Ecological-Digital Linkages.” (Mirror essay on regenerative DAOs; quoted in P2P wiki )

12. Buterin, V. (2022). “Soulbound [Tokens]” & posts on decentralized governance. (Referenced by Vitalik for moving beyond coin voting).