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# System prepended metadata

title: 12/15/2022 Meeting Notes
tags: [Meetings]

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tags: Meetings
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# 12/15/2022 Meeting Notes

## Broker Kick Out Proposal V2 
- reputation needed? Overhead, but slashing could be enough to reduce attack vectors 
- weighting -> potentially exponentially increasing with number of flags

- randomness: on-chain randomness tricky, need to seperate on and off-chain processes
- if we could have randomness we could pick random brokers from that same bounty to inspect
- what if brokers were watchers but only on bounties where they dont broker
- random checks at regular intervals not enough to cover all activity
- performance measures missing makes the system more complicated
- bundling brokers with watchers would get benefit for free
- randomness outside of smart contract for example gas price of last block

- timing cycle - pick broker to inspect
 as much as possible offchain
 everyone picks other brokers off-chain (we dont even know the full set necessarily)
 if we could pick randomly then only that set is allowed to vote
 
 flag idea to increase audit chance promising 
 who wants to convince who?
 assign every broker to one other broker, if someone gets flagged you can have the assigned brokers check, random assignments
 problem: colluding brokers not able to vote out others at will
"  should I vote or should I not vote"
flag could be a little expensive, random number attached to it, verifiable random function, maybe chainlink or get from some contract for free, from that say whether an address should be included, problem is choosing the right modulo, how many do we want to be in that set, their addresses should be uniformly distributed, take number of validators and use that as modulo

list of all brokers in smart contract would be possible, and generate random subset of this 
array and random number (juuso can choose algo to choose random subset), modulo number of brokers -1 get next one
how do selected brokers know they are selected, if they know their own index that could be enough, however that could change, depends on the addresses, harder to make sure that you always get the same number
for purposes of modelling there's going to be that many watchers after a flag, 
all brokers are watchers, whenever there's a flag in any bounty, pick n brokers to validate
incentives need to be right to make sure that they're indifferent on what to vote

if brokers are not in the same bounty they are not in same topology they should not audit each other
-> no then incentives are  wrong 

sponsors are not live, so they should not be added for overhead
they could optionally participate if they want to exercise some power such as final word
if sponsor could give out trust tokens (web of trust bootstrap) 

randomly selected brokers validate these flags
two different selections
- brokers in bounty assigned to watch
- if there's a flag brokers from outside come to check
- initial stake into being broker and then also stake into bounty
    - 
what if flagging also requires a deposit
- have money available in positive case
- in negative case slashing pays
- should be equal amounts to make voting indifferent

reputation: age, amount of delegation
proposal way too complicated, need to find minimal compromise between complexity and vulnerability

flag -> brokers in bounty watching each other -> flag if they discover by doing tx into the bounty -> only brokers in bounty can raise this flag -> random subset of all is chosen 
not considering actively or strategic malicious brokers with this yet
no need to yet specify specific randomness approach
- putting random number in hands of SC is costly
- agreeing between well functioning agents on what the random number was is pretty free
- central place to report to with audits would be easier (where would the audits start) 
- brokers in bounty might want to start the audits
- flaggings could work since stake would be backing it
- could the sponsorship be used to have power to decide 
    - if bunch of brokers would like to collude -> sponsor bounty and attack other voting power , stake lots of brokers in, then start sponsoring (can get % of brokership back), flashloan mitigation by making slower 
- what could be the mechanism that forms basis of trust -> random query idea -> incentivizing that -> 

## Broker DD V2