--- title: 翻譯共筆:China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia image: https://i.imgur.com/U7ZUp7A.jpg --- 華爾街日報於2020年2月3日刊出此篇報導,內容從中國隱瞞武漢肺炎疫情說起,談到金融市場的危機。作者指出,中國政府主導的金融市場行為、房地產大泡沫、地方政府和地方金融機構的無限槓桿行為都讓中國的金融市場風險非常巨大,而且相關的監管人員也不見得有能力、有授權空間來處理,因為背後涉及到高官權貴的資產分配,利益複雜。文章後段談的是美國人怎麼看這一切。作者認為在全球化之下,中國內部變化會引起全球的連動,而這一切變化還沒有結束。作者用比較委婉的方式批評部份美國人天真的認為中國威脅會減少、美國可以撒手不管國際事務。 在刊出此篇文章之後,中國方面一下子驅逐了三位記者(兩位美國籍,一位澳洲籍),而且全球眾多中國人相當憤怒。 歡迎大家一起動手翻譯,成果以CC0授權釋出。 [原文網址](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-the-real-sick-man-of-asia-11580773677) ## 協作方式 請點選右上角筆狀符號即可進入編輯介面。 Danny Lin: 譯完的感想:作者其實是拿「東亞病夫」來暗喻在中共治理下的中國,有很多虛假的數字與過度膨脹的經濟。藉由此次冠狀病毒的影響,借題討論在中國的重要性日益重要的情況下,一旦中國在世界政治與經濟光譜佔有的重要性像今日這樣重要,像是病重卻吃了補藥的病人,一旦哪一天一夕間崩解了,將可能會造成高度毀滅性的後果。 這個標題可能比較聳動一點,但內文討論到的問題,其實沒有污辱中國的意向,而是提醒西方世界跟中國這樣一個大國相交,必須採取某些降低被可能崩解的情況下影響的風險。最後一張圖的標題是 A Communist Coronovirus 也很有趣,個人認為也是雙關,意味著在中共治理下的中國,中共本身其實就是冠狀病毒。 ![](https://i.imgur.com/LnQxxZv.png) ## 貢獻者 雨蒼 Danny Lin ## 全文翻譯 ### China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia 中國是亞洲真正的病夫 #### Its financial markets may be even more dangerous than its wildlife markets. 相比野生動物市場,中國的金融市場或許更危險 By Walter Russell Mead 華特·羅素·米德(Walter Russell Mead) Feb. 3, 2020 6:47 pm ET 東部時間2020年2月3日下午6:47 ![](https://i.imgur.com/U7ZUp7A.jpg) A Chinese woman wears a protective mask in Beijing, Feb. 3. 2月3日,一名中國婦女在北京戴著防護口罩。 PHOTO: KEVIN FRAYER/GETTY IMAGES 照片:凱文·富萊爾/蓋帝圖像 The mighty Chinese juggernaut has been humbled this week, apparently by a species-hopping bat virus. While Chinese authorities struggle to control the epidemic and restart their economy, a world that has grown accustomed to contemplating China’s inexorable rise was reminded that nothing, not even Beijing’s power, can be taken for granted. 向來強勢的中國政府本突然變謙虛了,很明顯是因為可在物種間傳染的蝙蝠病毒的緣故。正當中國苦於控制疫情並重啟經濟動能之時,即使身處在一個習慣性認定中國崛起,似乎無所不能的世界裡,也不能認為這一切都是理所當然的。 We do not know how dangerous the new coronavirus will be. There are signs that Chinese authorities are still trying to conceal the true scale of the problem, but at this point the virus appears to be more contagious but considerably less deadly than the pathogens behind diseases such as Ebola or SARS—though some experts say SARS and coronavirus are about equally contagious. 我們不曉得新的冠狀病毒會有多危險。不過,我們可以看到中國仍在努力掩飾問題的真相,目前看來,這個病毒似乎比伊波拉或SARS的傳染力更強,但致死率相對要低得多,儘管部分專家指出SARS和冠狀病毒具有同樣的傳染性。 China’s initial response to the crisis was less than impressive. The Wuhan government was secretive and self-serving; national authorities responded vigorously but, it currently appears, ineffectively. China’s cities and factories are shutting down; the virus continues to spread. We can hope that authorities succeed in containing the epidemic and treating its victims, but the performance to date has shaken confidence in the Chinese Communist Party at home and abroad. Complaints in Beijing about the U.S. refusing entry to noncitizens who recently spent time in China cannot hide the reality that the decisions that allowed the epidemic to spread as far and as fast as it did were all made in Wuhan and Beijing. 中國對危機的最初應對似乎不夠積極。武漢政府針對疫情十分隱秘與封閉;中央政府雖然強力介入處理,但目前看來效果不佳。很多城市及工廠紛紛封閉了,但病毒依舊持續傳播。我們非常希望中國當局能夠成功地控制住疫情並治癒患者,但國內外各界對於中共對疫情控管至今仍然憂心忡忡。中國抱怨美國政府限制曾到中國旅行過的外籍人士入境政策,並無法阻絕疫情在武漢及中國向外散佈。 The likeliest economic consequence of the coronavirus epidemic, forecasters expect, will be a short and sharp fall in Chinese economic growth rates during the first quarter, recovering as the disease fades. The most important longer-term outcome would appear to be a strengthening of a trend for global companies to “de-Sinicize” their supply chains. Add the continuing public health worries to the threat of new trade wars, and supply-chain diversification begins to look prudent. 市場預測,冠狀病毒流行最可能在經濟面的影響,將會造成中國經濟成長率在第一季快速下探,但隨著疫情好轉而恢復。長期而言,最重要的是跨國企業將加速其供應鏈「去中國化」。在目前貿易戰威脅下,加上對公共衛生問題的憂慮,各企業開始嚴肅思考其供應鏈多元化的策略。 Events like the coronavirus epidemic, and its predecessors—such as SARS, Ebola and MERS—test our systems and force us to think about the unthinkable. If there were a disease as deadly as Ebola and as fast-spreading as coronavirus, how should the U.S. respond? What national and international systems need to be in place to minimize the chance of catastrophe on this scale? 冠狀病毒疫情及先前的 SARS、伊波拉和中東呼吸症候群等事件正在測試我們現有的系統,去思考從未想過的問題-如果像伊波拉這樣致命且像冠狀病毒一樣快速傳播的疾病出現了,美國該如何應對?我們需要建立什麼樣的國家及國際體系來減少這種規模的大災難發生的影響? Epidemics also lead us to think about geopolitical and economic hypotheticals. We have seen financial markets shudder and commodity prices fall in the face of what hopefully will be a short-lived disturbance in China’s economic growth. What would happen if—perhaps in response to an epidemic, but more likely following a massive financial collapse—China’s economy were to suffer a long period of even slower growth? What would be the impact of such developments on China’s political stability, on its attitude toward the rest of the world, and to the global balance of power? 這個疫情也促使我們思考在地域政治及經濟上的各種可能。我們也看到了,金融市場及商品價格對疫情的快速,姑且希望這對中國經濟成長僅是短暫的衝擊。如果因為疫情,甚至更直接帶來金融體系的崩潰後,造成中國的經濟因此長期放慢成長,會變怎麼樣?疫情如果影響了中國政治穩定,中國對其他國家的態度以及全球勢力平衡的影響又會是如何? China’s financial markets are probably more dangerous in the long run than China’s wildlife markets. Given the accumulated costs of decades of state-driven lending, massive malfeasance by local officials in cahoots with local banks, a towering property bubble, and vast industrial overcapacity, China is as ripe as a country can be for a massive economic correction. Even a small initial shock could lead to a massive bonfire of the vanities as all the false values, inflated expectations and misallocated assets implode. If that comes, it is far from clear that China’s regulators and decision makers have the technical skills or the political authority to minimize the damage—especially since that would involve enormous losses to the wealth of the politically connected. 疫情對於中國金融市場的影響,最終可能比中國的野生動植物市場更大。過去數十年來,由政府主導的放貸、地方官員勾結地方銀行貪瀆、過度炒作瀕臨泡沫化的房地產,以及巨大的工業產能過剩所堆積的成本,中國已經到了需要進行大規模經濟整頓的時候了。即使是很小的經濟衝擊,都可能點燃大火,使得過去這些虛假的經濟數字、過度膨脹的期望,以及財富不均的分配問題,一夕間爆發開來。如果真的發生了,我們不曉得在中國的立法及決策階層是否有足夠的能力或政治手段來降低這樣的傷害—尤其是這可能會造成相關的政治既得利益者在財富上巨大的損失。 We cannot know when or even if a catastrophe of this scale will take place, but students of geopolitics and international affairs—not to mention business leaders and investors—need to bear in mind that China’s power, impressive as it is, remains brittle. A deadlier virus or a financial-market contagion could transform China’s economic and political outlook at any time. 我們還不曉得何時或是否會發生此種大規模的災難,但地域政治與國際外交的學生們,更不用說是商業領袖及投資人們,都必須要記住,中國崛起的吸引力極大,但非常脆弱。一個致命的病毒,或金融市場問題的蔓延,可能隨時改變中國的經濟與政治面向。 Many now fear the coronavirus will become a global pandemic. The consequences of a Chinese economic meltdown would travel with the same sweeping inexorability. Commodity prices around the world would slump, supply chains would break down, and few financial institutions anywhere could escape the knock-on consequences. Recovery in China and elsewhere could be slow, and the social and political effects could be dramatic. 許多人擔心冠狀病毒將造成全球性的大流行。實際上,中國經濟崩潰後的後果,將可能伴隨著不可逆轉的全面性反應。全球各地的物價將會暴跌、供應鏈因此瓦解,幾乎沒有金融市場可以從這場連鎖反應中脫身。中國及其他國家的復原可能會很緩慢,但在社會及政治上的效應將會極大。 If Beijing’s geopolitical footprint shrank as a result, the global consequences might also be surprising. Some would expect a return of unipolarity if the only possible great-power rival to the U.S. were to withdraw from the game. Yet in the world of American politics, isolation rather than engagement might surge to the fore. If the China challenge fades, many Americans are likely to assume that the U.S. can safely reduce its global commitments. 如果中國的影響力從地域政治地圖上因此縮水了,對全球造成的影響也將十分驚人。部分人士擔心一旦中國退出這場大國競爭的比賽,世界將回到單極體系。然而,在美國主導的世界政治中,市場孤立將會取代多邊參與突如其來。一旦中國的挑戰式微了,許多美國人可能或認為美國可以因此確保減少其對全球社會的安全承諾。 So far, the 21st century has been an age of black swans. From 9/11 to President Trump’s election and Brexit, low-probability, high-impact events have reshaped the world order. That age isn’t over, and of the black swans still to arrive, the coronavirus epidemic is unlikely to be the last to materialize in China. 到目前為止,二十一世紀一直是個黑天鵝時代。從 911 到川普當選及至英國脫歐,可能性低但影像大的事件重塑了世界秩序。黑天鵝時代尚未結束,黑天鵝還沒有真的到來,冠狀病毒疫情不會是最後一個出現在中國的事件。 Wonder Land: The coronavirus is a metaphor for two political ideas that are incompatible with the realities of the modern world: China’s Communist Party and isolationism. Image: Noel Celis/AFP via Getty Images 幻想世界:文中冠狀病毒是用來隱喻兩個與現代世界現實不符的政治構想:中國共產黨和孤立主義。圖片:Noel Celis /法新社,蓋蒂圖片社